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and the personal moral reservations of some state leaders-play some role to varying
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history of individual cases as well as in cross-case comparison of the three states.
Understanding these constraints is helpful for evaluating the efficacy of policy
tools designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons as well as how to manage crises
and conflicts between regional nuclear-armed states.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Rational deterrence theory suggests that states, which are attempting to deter the
actions of another state, increase the likelihood of success by having the necessary
capabilities and intentions to retaliate and credibly communicating the same to the
challenging state. Yet, second-generation nuclear states, despite being regionally
situated in severe security environments marked by a series of wars over the last half-
century, have not openly utilized their nuclear capability in a way consistent with
deterrence theory. Instead, undeclared nuclear states have pursued policies of opacity in
which they largely deny the possession of nuclear weapons and refrain from publicly
issuing nuclear declarations or threats.
Why do second-generation nuclear states pursue policies of nuclear opacity,
which may result in making deterrence less effective than declaring capabilities and
intentions? The first five states to acquire nuclear weapons, the United States, Russia,
Britain, France and China, have all followed a development path whereby they have
openly declared their nuclear status through a variety ofmechanisms. In contrast, the
second wave of nuclearized states-including Israel, India, and Pakistan-have followed
policies of secrecy regarding their nuclear status. For example, Israel is characterized as
2having an "almost fanatical tradition of secrecy" I and its official stance on nuclear
proliferation is a vaguely worded statement that it will not be the first state to introduce
nuclear weapons into the Middle East. Similarly, India and Pakistan, despite their 1998
nuclear tests "effectively maintain a high level of secrecy" regarding the properties of
their nuclear weapons, command and control organization, operational plans, nuclear
strategies and general force structures.2
The result of this secrecy is an ambiguous nuclear status, which ultimately makes
it much more difficult for other states to accurately read the capabilities and intentions of
their adversaries and increases the possibility of deterrence failure based on
miscalculation and misperception.3 Given these consequences, why then do these states
insist on policies of nuclear ambiguity?4 The dangers of miscalculation, particularly in
violence prone regions such as the Middle East and South Asia, and in the shadow of
nuclear weapons, suggest the importance of understanding the reasons for state decisions.
I Michael Handel, Israel's Political-Military Doctrine, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs,
Occasional Papers, no. 30 (Cambridge: July 1973), 12,50. Quoted in Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 139.
2 Rodney W. Jones, "Minimum Nuclear Deterrence Postures in South Asia: An Overview," Report
prepared for Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, 1 October 2001,
6.
3 Avner Cohen and Benjamin Frankel, "Opaque Nuclear Proliferation," in Opaque Nuclear Proliferation:
Methodological and Policy Implications, Benjamin Frankel, ed. (Portland: Frank Cass & Co., 1991),32.
4 This project uses the terms ambiguous and opaque interchangeably. There is some debate regarding the
efficacy of 'opaque' or 'ambiguous' deterrence. If other states are aware of the nuclear capability, does it
provide for some level of deterrence? While scholars are divided on this point, there is a general consensus
that deterrence is enhanced with openness, leaving opaque deterrence, as a suboptimal outcome compared
to visible deterrence.
3In addition to the diminished effectiveness of deterrence, there are several other
implications stemming from policies of nuclear opacity.5 When states engage in opaque
nuclear proliferation, there are "organizational and technical reasons" that increase the
likelihood of accidents and unsafe policies.6 Additionally, since the nuclear development
programs are compartmentalized within the government and conducted in secret, there is
often little outside feedback and it is difficult to hold program administrators accountable
to external policymakers.7 Further, states with opaque nuclear arsenals, functioning
under a veil of secrecy, inhibit debate within state domestic populations, and in some
cases among the leadership. Not only does such secrecy threaten adequate civilian policy
evaluation,8 but it also seriously undermines democratic principles within these states.9
Finally, another implication of opacity is that international efforts to manage proliferation
through arms control and other mechanisms are hindered in discussion, negotiation, and
verification.
This project evaluates several explanations for varying degrees nuclear openness
or opacity, the dependent variable, by assessing the relative validity of international and
5 There may be other motives for acquiring nuclear weapons such as prestige. Still, there is no reason on its
surface why if a state is seeking prestige it should not make it known what its capabilities are if successful.
Moreover, prestige is not mutually exclusive with deterrence motivations and may also be present to some
extent. Thus, the puzzle remains. Why, if both motives suggest a more open nuclear status, is such a
policy is not implemented?
6 Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: W. W.
Norton & Company, 1995),81, and Scott D. Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory,
Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons," International Security 18, no. 4 (Spring 1994).
7 Cohen, "Opaque Nuclear Proliferation," 34.
8 Stephen Van Evera, "Why States Believe Foolish Ideas: Non-Self-Evaluation by Government and
Society," Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (1988).
9 Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 81. Cohen, "Opaque Nuclear
Proliferation," 33.
4domestic level hypotheses. The first international level explanation focuses on the
regional security environment as a cause of nuclear proliferation, which also creates
incentives to adopt a policy of ambiguity. From this perspective, regional states acquire a
nuclear capability in order to deter their adversaries. At the same time, second-
generation nuclear states face a number of challenges in their development and can ill-
afford to engage in competitive arms races and other policies that increase the probability
of conflict. Thus, nuclear ambiguity can be explained as way for regional adversaries to
dampen competitive policies and reduce the transition risks associated with developing
nuclear arsenals.
The second international level explanation that is evaluated in this study focuses
on the role of patron states in shaping their client states' foreign policies. From this
perspective, stronger states are motivated to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, or at
least to prefer that it remains hidden. Using economic and military inducements, as well
as the threat of sanctions, patron states are credited with pressuring their client states into
maintaining an ambiguous nuclear posture.
The third explanation stemming from the intemationallevel is based on the norms
and institutional framework of the non-proliferation regime. The propositions sourced in
this perspective suggest that the international non-proliferation regime imposes material
and normative costs on nuclear proliferators. As such, second-generation nuclear states
seek to avoid these costs by not openly acknowledging their nuclear capabilities.
There are two variants of the domestic level explanation, domestic politics and
moral and/or cultural constraints. In terms of the domestic politics, the decision to pursue
5a nuclear weapons option is usually a controversial decision. There are often deep
divisions between state leaders as to whether nuclear weapons will effectively provide for
state security, given the financial costs and other risks associated with the program. As
such, in governments where such decisions require a consensus, there may be
compromises reached as to the state's nuclear posture to avoid some of the feared costs.
Alternatively, in states with centralized decision-making, leaders that would suffer costs
by instituting an open nuclear posture would reject this option.
The other domestic level explanation focuses on the particular moral or cultural
attributes of state leaders. In particular, given the destructive nature of nuclear weapons,
many leaders have expressed moral reservations about relying on weapons ofmass
destruction for state security. This reluctance, it is hypothesized, translates into an
unwillingness to fully embrace an overt nuclear posture.
This study finds that when the hypotheses are tested against the cases of Israel,
India, and Pakistan, the evidence most strongly points to the presence of international
factors as causing these states to choose nuclear opacity. In particular, a state's regional
security environment and U.S. promotion of its non-proliferation policies have powerful
influences on a second-generation nuclear state's posture. In all three of these cases,
insecurity has compelled each state to pursue nuclear weapons to provide for deterrence.
At the same time, disparities in nuclear development created incentives for each
state to avoid taking an open posture that would be provocative to its regional adversaries
and their allies. In the case of Israel, this meant preserving its nuclear monopoly and
favorable conventional balance that would be threatened by regional states either
6developing a counterbalancing nuclear option or seeking external assistance from their
allies. For India, while it was much stronger than its historic adversary Pakistan, New
Delhi was cautious about competing in nuclear terms with a much stronger China, at least
until it could achieve relative parity in nuclear terms. Additionally, China's
predisposition to assist Pakistan's nuclear and conventional programs was a further
incentive to not provoke Islamabad. And Pakistan lagged substantially behind India,
giving it few reasons to publicly compete in a race that it was sure to lose. However,
Pakistan's hand was forced by India deciding to test in 1998, and it quickly followed suit
lest the Indians believed that Pakistan did not actually have a nuclear weapons capability.
In terms ofpatron state pressures, the United States was the main great power that
both had the incentive to stop nuclear non-proliferation, and was willing to use its
leverage with client states to influence their foreign policies. While Washington
recognized that it would likely not be able to stop these three states from acquiring
nuclear weapons, it did seek to at least slow down the programs and keep them out of the
public eye so that other proliferators were not encouraged to follow suit.
U.S. pressure was particularly effective with Israel and Pakistan to the extent that
there were economic and military ties between the states. However, there are limitations
to the United States' ability to influence other state's foreign policies, as demonstrated by
Pakistan's decision to test in 1998 in response to India. The Indians were also responsive
to U.S. pressures, mainly during the 1980s and 1990s as India sought to open up trade
and technology linkages with the Americans. Having established these ties, the Indians
7correctly calculated that the U.S. would be unwilling to punish them for long after the
1998 tests.
While there is also some evidence supporting the international non-proliferation
regime and domestic level explanations, closer analysis suggests that the regional security
environment and U.S. threats and inducements also informed these factors. As such,
their own independent effect is diminished. As to the non-proliferation regime, all three
states avoided obligations that would limit their ability to produce nuclear weapons. The
regime mattered to some material extent in slowing down India and Pakistan's programs,
but there is little evidence to suggest that any ofthe three states embraced the principles
and norms promulgated by the regime in general.
Similarly, there is some evidence in support of the proposition that domestic
politics mattered. The strongest evidence is from the Indian case, where domestic
politics was a source of pressure on Indira Gandhi's government to test in 1974.
Additionally, the nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party ("BJP") came to power in 1998,
which helps to explain the timing of that test. However, when evaluating India's overall
history, the domestic political factors was neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for
India testing. Rather, each leader had to evaluate the existing constraints as to whether
testing was opportune. And given these rather case specific features, there is no
generalizable statement that encompasses the varied domestic political factors in each
case.
Moreover, there is even less evidence suggesting that normative or cultural
constraints are primarily responsible for states choosing nuclear opacity. While
8individual leaders may have had strong moral reservations about relying on weapons of
mass destruction, there is little evidence suggesting that they did not fully evaluate their
options and they continued to pursue a nuclear option nonetheless.
This dissertation proceeds according to the following format. Chapter Two
details existing deterrence literature, derives hypotheses, and discusses the
methodological approach of process tracing and the congruence procedure. Chapter
Three is a case study analyzing the origins of Israel's nuclear opacity. Chapter Four and
Five are cases studies on South Asia, specifically the Indian and Pakistani nuclear
programs and associated ambiguous postures from 1974 until 1998 when both states
tested and openly declared themselves nuclear weapons states. Chapter Six compares
and analyzes the results from the three empirical chapters. Chapter Seven concludes with
the findings and implications of this study.
9CHAPTER II
THEORY AND METHODOLOGY
The following chapter outlines the theoretical foundations and methodological
approach informing this project. The first section reviews nuclear deterrence literature
and discusses how the second wave ofnuclear proliferation challenges the assumptions of
deterrence theory. This is followed by a review of existing research on opacity, which
primarily addresses the historical nuclear development within a particular country of
study. While focusing on individual countries is helpful in identifying potential
explanatory variables in particular cases, it does not permit us to draw inferences across
cases and assess relative explanatory power. Through comparison of the explanatory
variables, this project seeks to develop a more general theoretical framework that can
explain why nuclear states would choose opacity over a visible deterrence posture.
To this end, the second section outlines hypotheses and derives predictions of
observable data according to each theoretical perspective. This discussion focuses on
international variables-the regional security environment, patron state pressures, and the
international non-proliferation regime-and domestic level factors-party and interest
groups politics, and moral and cultural constraints.
The final section discusses the case selection of Israel, India, and Pakistan. I also
outline the congruence procedure and process tracing methodologies used in this study.
10
I. Literature on Nuclear Deterrence and Opacity
A. Nuclear Deterrence
Early in the Cold War, the intense rivalry between the United States and the
Soviet Union led to a nuclear arms race. It was not immediately clear how the addition of
these new weapons, with substantially increased capacity for destruction, would affect
the likelihood of conflict between the two competing states. Over time scholars and
policymakers theorized that stable, mutual deterrence was established between the
superpowers based on mutually assured destruction. l The key to this stability is
maintaining effective deterrence.
Deterrence is generally understood as the threat of punishment or retaliation by
one state to prevent another state from undertaking undesirable actions.2 It is primarily a
peacetime objective and fails by definition when conflict, or other unwanted action, is
1 For some scholars, this was the result of the "nuclear revolution," meaning that the security dilemma
could be mitigated and great powers could peacefully coexist under conditions of defense dominance where
each side was assured a second-strike capability. See, e.g., Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear
Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); Charles L.
Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Stephen Van
Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).
"Offensive" or structural realists accept the peace inducing effects of nuclear weapons among great powers,
but still find that states engage in competitive security policies at the conventional leveL See, e.g., John 1.
Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2001), 130-133;
Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," in The Origin and Prevention of Major
Wars, Robert Rotberg and Theodore Rabb, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988),48-52.
However, consensus about the effects of nuclear weapons is not universal and John Mueller argues that the
"long peace" between the U.S. and the Soviets was based on the obsolescence of major war, rather than
deterrence. John Mueller, "The Essential Irrelevance ofNuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World,"
International Security 13, no. 2 (Fall 1988), 55-79.
2 Robert J. Art, "The Four Functions of Force," in The Use of Force, Robert 1. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz,
eds. (Lanham: University Press of America, 1993) 4; Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence and Reassurance," in
Behavior Society and Nuclear War, Tetlock, et aI., eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991),9.
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initiated by an aggressor.3 Deterrence therefore involves "the use of threats to induce the
opponent to behave in desirable ways.,,4
During the Cold War and after, substantial scholarly work was devoted to
understanding the conditions under which deterrence is most likely to succeed or fail.
This academic and policy discussion has, in large part, revolved around the basic
assumptions ofrational deterrence theory and empirical criticisms of the model.s
Rational deterrence theory is predicated on the assumptions that states behave as
rational, unitary actors. 6 Whether a state is willing to initiate a war with another state is
based on a rational calculation of the costs and benefits of going to war. In its simplest
form, a state will refrain from attacking another state when the costs are perceived to
exceed the benefits. That is, "[i]f a country knows that it is likely to lose a long, nasty
war in the process, it will probably not seek to press its claims against a rival.,,7 For
deterrence to be effective, then, it is important to convince the would-be challenger that
the costs of attacking are too high. 8 The defending state is more likely to successfully
3 Glenn H. Snyder, "Deterrence and Defense," in The Use of Force, Robert 1. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz,
eds. (Lanham: University Press of America, 1993),351.
4 Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidal, "Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies,"
World Politics 41, no. 2 (January 1989), 151.
5 Rational deterrence theory is also referred to as "classical" deterrence theory. See Paul C. Stem, et al.,
"Deterrence in the Nuclear Age," in Perspectives on Deterrence, Paul C. Stem, et al., eds. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1989),5. A significant part of this debate also revolves around methodological
differences. See, for example, Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, "Deterrence and Foreign Policy,"
World Politics 41, no. 2 (January 1989).
6 Rational deterrence theory, as developed in the abstract during the 1950s and 1960s posited these
assumptions. For a review, see Paul C. Stem, "Deterrence in the Nuclear Age," 5.
7 Achen and Snidal, "Rational Deterrence Theory," 150.
8 Achen and Snida1, "Rational Deterrence Theory," 151.
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deter a would-be attacker if the defender: (1) possesses the necessarily military
capabilities to respond; (2) has the political will to use them; and (3) can credibly
communicate its capability and resolve to the challenging state.9
Conversely, rational deterrence theory predicts that deterrence will be more likely
to fail if one of the above three elements is missing. Therefore, states should demonstrate
or otherwise communicate their military capabilities and attempt to issue credible threats
to bolster deterrence. Furthermore, the destructive potential of nuclear weapons "makes
either unilateral or mutual nuclear deterrence appear far more likely to be successful than
did the preceding conceptions. If leaders were to take steps to minimize miscalculation--
making their military capabilities obvious, making their threats clear, controlling for
accidents, and so on-there is no obvious reason why deterrence could not successfully
continue for some time."lO However, as discussed below, second-generation nuclear
states do not follow these prescriptions: they do not make their nuclear military
capabilities obvious and/or take steps to credibly communicate their resolve.
1. The Role of Capabilities for Deterrence
For effective deterrence, "a state must have, or at least appear to have, the ability
to actually impose sufficiently high costs on an adversary. This is the role of a state's
9 Robert J. Art, "The Four Functions of Force," 4. While not always explicit, it is further assumed that the
challenging state has some ability to accurately assess the defending state's capabilities, intentions, and
communications. See Paul C. Stem, "Deterrence in the Nuclear Age," 6.
10 Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1983), 61.
13
punitive capabilities."ll In the modem nuclear age, a sufficient nuclear capability that
threatens unacceptable harm on the challenging state is achievable.
First, a credible nuclear retaliatory capability is attainable by a determined
proliferator. The basic requirements for a sufficient retaliatory force are to construct at
least a rudimentary nuclear device and protect it so it is deliverable. 12 Most states that
choose to have nuclear weapons are able, with varying degrees of challenges, to acquire
at least a basic capability if they are determined enough to invest the resources.
Moreover, once a state has developed a nuclear weapons capability, given the ease with
which nuclear weapons can be hidden and delivered, protecting and maintaining its
retaliatory ability is manageable.13 For these reasons, even a nascent nuclear capability is
generally deemed sufficient to raise the costs to the challenger of an attack to
unacceptable levels, even ifthe target's precise capability is unknown to the challenger. 14
Second, the costs of nuclear retaliation are relatively easy to calculate. The
enormously destructive capacity of nuclear weapons simplifies the calculations for
would-be aggressors. Because any nuclear attack is likely to be too costly, calculating
the damage from nuclear weapons is relatively straightforward. Indeed, "the key effect
of nuclear weapons is to allow both analysts and policy makers to greatly simplify the
11 Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990), 8.
12 Kenneth N. Waltz, "More May Be Better," in The Spread ofNuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed,
Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, eds. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2003), 20-23.
13 Waltz, "More May Be Better," 20-23. Because even relatively few weapons can inflict unacceptable
damage, states can employ various measures to hide and protected at least a small stock of deliverable
weapons. Further, "[m]eans of delivery are neither difficult to devise nor hard to procure," Ibid., 21.
14 Waltz, "More May Be Better," 20-23.
14
essence of computing how much of a threat is needed to deter what kind of attack.,,15
Therefore, states likely will not miscalculate the destructive capability of a nuclear-armed
adversary.
Because it is relatively easy to have a sufficient and protectable capability, which
a rational challenger can assess accurately enough, it is presumed that a nuclear~armed
state seeking to deter a challenger will sufficiently demonstrate through testing and public
declarations its ability to inflict unacceptable harm. As such, both rational deterrence
theory and its critics largely assume that a nuclear-armed state seeking to deter another
will communicate its capability to a potential challenger. This is the pattern set by the
first generation of nuclear states. The U.S., Soviet Union, u.K., France, and China all
publicly tested and declared their nuclear weapons, making it relatively easy for other
states to assess their capabilities.
For these reasons, most research on nuclear deterrence has presumed that a state's
nuclear status is clear, particularly since the defender has a strong incentive to
demonstrate its capability for the purposes of deterrence. Accordingly, most research has
focused not on the possession of nuclear capability per se, but on the problem of how to
make credible a promise to use this capability to retaliate.
2. Credible Threats
According to rational deterrence theory, "sufficiently strong, clear, credible
threats will deter" would-be challengers. 16 Conversely, there is the expectation that
15 Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis, 61.
15
deterrence will fail when "the retaliatory threat is absent, incredible, or less valuable than
the prize.,,17
Successful nuclear deterrence depends on the credibility of the defender's promise
to retaliate. 18 The enormously destructive power of nuclear weapons means that making
deterrent threats credible to a nuclear-armed adversary is problematic. Credible threats
are often unbelievable under conditions of mutually assured destruction because there are
few interests that are perceived to be worth attacking over when the risk of retaliation
means annihilation. The ability to issue credible threats is especially problematic in cases
of extended deterrence or conflicts that do not threaten the territorial integrity of the
nuclear state. 19 For this reason, it is important for states to bolster the credibility of their
threats.
Costly signals are one way for a defending state to increase the credibility of its
resolve under conditions of uncertainty. Because the challenging state may be unsure of
whether the threats issued by the defending state are credible or simply a bluff, the
defending state can communicate its resolve by undertaking a costly enough action to
signal to the other side its resolve.2o The defending state thus "signal[s] its intentions by
16 Achen and Snidal, "Rational Deterrence Theory," 149. They also "point to historical examples in which
the threat of retaliation was clear and credible, yet deterrence failed." Ibid.
17 Achen and Snidal, "Rational Deterrence Theory," 152.
18 Achen and Snidal, "Rational Deterrence Theory," 152.
19 Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1988).
20 James D. Morrow, "The Strategic Setting of Choices: Signaling, Commitment, and Negotiation in
International Politics," in Strategic Choice and International Relations, David Lake and Robert Powell, eds.
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). See also James D. Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of
16
taking actions that inflict costs it is willing to bear but other types [of states] are not.,,21
This allows the challenging state to detennine that it is facing a resolute defender and
back down.22 However, if the costly action is one that the potential aggressor cannot
distinguish from a similar action by a bluffing state, the credibility problem remains.
Credibility may also be enhanced by the "threat that leaves something to chance."
The logic here is that a crisis between two adversaries risks getting out of control ifthe
defending state takes lower level, responsive steps that increase the likelihood of
escalation. This escalation may then lead to a massive nuclear retaliation.23 A threat is
thus enhanced as "a response that carries some risk of war can be plausible, even
reasonable at the time when a final, ultimate decision to have a general war would be
implausible or unreasonable.,,24
A further option is to exercise limited but severe retaliatory options to enhance
credibility.25 The basis of this approach is to achieve deterrence by threatening
unacceptable costs, even though limited in comparison to massive retaliation. Credibility
is achieved by threatening or exercising a limited option, which demonstrates that the
Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38,
no. 2 (June 1994).
21 Morrow, "The Strategic Setting," 88.
22 Morrow, "The Strategic Setting," 90.
23 Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).
24 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 89.
25 Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory. See in particular Chapter Two "The Nuclear Revolution and the
Problem of Credibility," 6-32.
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defending state is willing to take further action. 26 The key here, however, is that the
limited option be enough to demonstrate resolve, but still leave the adversary with
enough that it will not retaliate in order to preserve what is left,27 This option is posited
as effective under conditions of uncertainty, where a challenging state may not know the
intent or level of resolve in its adversary.28
3. Criticisms of Rational Deterrence Theory
While rational deterrence theory delineates the logic of nuclear deterrence, the
assumptions underpinning the perspective are subject to various criticisms on empirical
grounds. Broadly, critical approaches focus on the real world application of rational
deterrence theory, and the validity of the assumption that states behave as rational,
unitary actors.
The initial criticism of rational deterrence theory sought to make the model's
abstract concepts more historically grounded, such that the theory could actually inform
policy making. This important contribution suggested that rational deterrence theory fit
the best at the strategic level of conflict,29 However, at lower levels of conflict, such as
limited war and crisis and preventive diplomacy, complexity and context limit the
26 Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory, 17.
27 Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory, 17.
28 Uncertainty for Powell is incomplete information as to the type of state; that is whether they are resolute
or irresolute, in the deterrence relationship. Uncertainty does not refer to a lack of knowledge about
whether another state has actually achieved a nuclear capability.
29 Alexander L. George and Richard M. Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and
Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).
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applicability of rational deterrence assumptions.3o Under these conditions, deterrence
operates with more actors, variables, and changing environments. This complexity and
context-dependence is not encompassed in modeling the strategic interaction of two
players, with clear objectives that remain static.3! With the proliferation of factors at
lower levels of conflict, deterrence is "dependent not upon comparatively few technical
variables, known with high confidence on both sides, but upon a multitude of
variables ...that fluctuate over time and are highly dependent on the context of the
situation.,,32 For this reason, rational deterrence theory, and its primary focus on strategic
interaction, is of limited utility when applied to conflicts that are at the sub-strategic
level.
Other research suggests that states do not actually behave as either assumed or
predicted by rational deterrence models. These works challenge rational deterrence
theory's assumptions that there is a "rational decision maker, perfect information, and a
politically neutral environment.,,33 One line of criticism focuses on the assumption that
states behave as rational actors. This research generally tends to focus on cognitive
impediments to rational calculations at the group or individual level. Various authors
argue that case studies of deterrence failures suggest that the presumed rational
calculations did not take place for a variety of reasons, including imperfect information,
30 George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, 49-55.
31 George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, 54.
32 George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, 54.
33 Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter,"
World Politics 41, no. 2 (January 1989),224.
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misperception, and psychological biases. 34 Even the incorporation of incomplete
information into rational deterrence models is insufficient because "[s]tudies of
deterrence and intelligence failures find that error rarely results from inadequate
information but is almost always due to theory and stress driven interpretations of
evidence.,,35 Thus, from this perspective, it is not the lack of information, but
miscalculation or misperception of available information that leads to deterrence failures.
Another source of criticism accepts that states are rational actors, but contends
that they still behave differently than predicted by rational deterrence theory. State
decision-making is influenced by other factors such as domestic political considerations
and norms. For example, Lebow and Stein have found that in some circumstances,
leaders are pressured by domestic politics to engage in a war that they risk 10sing.36 This
then causes leaders to initiate a conflict that they rationally calculate they will lose,
because they perceive the domestic consequences of not responding as more costly than
losing a war. 37 Similarly, T.V. Paul contends that deterrence theory must also take into
account, "along with psychological and domestic variables, normative factors [that] have
a place in outcomes of deterrence as well as war initiations.,,38 From Paul's perspective,
34 See, e.g., Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," World Politics 31, no. 2 (January 1979); Irving
Janis and L. Mann, Decision-Making: A Psychological Analysis (New York: Free Press, 1977).
35 Lebow and Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory," 217. They specifically address Robert Powell's work
on incorporating uncertainty into rational deterrence theory.
36 Lebow and Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory," 211.
37 Lebow and Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory," 211.
38 T.V. Paul, "Nuclear Taboo and War Initiation in Regional Conflicts," Journal of Conflict Resolution 39,
no. 4 (December 1995), 711.
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the nuclear taboo restrains states' political will, which in turn diminishes the defending
state's ability to deter a non-nuclear challenger because the threats are not credible.
In short, according to these perspectives, rational deterrence theory fails to
accurately predict deterrence outcomes because it does not adequately account for other
variables that matter. Explaining deterrence failures or success therefore must not only
account for the strategic interactions affecting rational calculations, but also the domestic
political calculations and norms that influence state leaders.
There are substantial differences between the supporters of rational deterrence
theory and its critics in assessing the theory's ability to explain and predict state behavior.
Nonetheless, both sets of research agendas share a common, fundamental assumption that
states seeking to deter challengers will openly acknowledge and demonstrate their
nuclear capabilities and issue threats. For example, rational deterrence theory expects
that states seeking to deter others will communicate its capabilities and intentions as
"deterrence works only if the deterrent capability is known and feared by one's
adversaries.,,39 Therefore, "[i]n the end, A must communicate to B both its capabilities
and its intentions.,,4o
Similarly, critics of rational deterrence theory also assume the same conditions of
openness when assessing deterrence outcomes. This means circumstances under which
"the deterrer carefully defined the unacceptable behavior, threatened retaliation, had the
capability to implement the threat, demonstrated resolve, but the challenger still
39 Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998),238.
40 Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis, 87.
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proceeded to use force.,,41 Indeed, for Lebow and Stein, this "highly restrictive definition
of failure" was deliberately chosen for methodological purposes in order to test for the
failures of rational deterrence theory by "exclud[ing] cases where challengers resorted to
force but defenders did not attempt to deter or did so ineptly.,,42 In short, both rational
deterrence theory and its critics incorporate the assumption that states seeking to deter
challengers communicate their capabilities and intentions.43 As discussed below, this
shared expectation is problematic when applied to second-generation nuclear states.
4. Second-Generation Nuclear States and Deterrence
As more states began developing nuclear arsenals, researchers began studying the
proliferation patterns of second-generation nuclear states. This work has found that
second-generation nuclear states do not follow the same path of force and threat visibility
as the first five nuclear states. Instead of adopting a highly visible nuclear status-
militarily, politically, and technologically-more recent proliferators have chosen a more
"complex model" that entails denying or shielding their nuclear capabilities and
. . 44
mtentIOns.
41 Lebow and Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory," 220.
42 Lebow and Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory," 220.
43 While critics adopt these assumptions for methodological reasons in order to directly address the
foundations of rational deterrence theory, the outcome is essentially the same where the research is focused
on states seeking to communicate their capabilities and intentions.
44 Avner Cohen and Benjamin Frankel, "Opaque Nuclear Proliferation," in Opaque Nuclear Proliferation:
Methodological and Policy Implications, Benjamin Frankel, ed. (Portland: Frank Cass & Co, 1991),14.
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This empirical difference between the proliferation patterns of first- and second-
generation nuclear states casts doubt on the applicability of the rational deterrence model.
Rational deterrence theory's assumptions reflect the open or visible behavior of first
generation nuclear states.45 Lessons learned from the Cold War were primarily based on
the experiences of the U.S. and USSR, where both great powers had visible nuclear
postures.46 For this reason, deterrence has largely been "predicated on nuclear weapons
being readily observable. Visibility was deemed essential for the purpose of effective
deterrence. The adversary had to be able to 'see' one's nuclear devices and assess their
capability and survivability in order to take them into account in his {sic} deterrence
calculations.,,47
However, the assumption that nuclear-armed states will communicate in some
fashion their nuclear weapons capability and conditions under which the state would
retaliate does not apply to second-generation nuclear states. States employing opaque
postures generally do not follow this model of deterrence in two important ways.
First, second-generation nuclear states often do not publicly confirm the
possession of nuclear weapons. How does a state deter without acknowledging that it has
the retaliatory ability to do so? As to deterrence theory, "[t]here is little in the literature to
tell us how a country should plan to use its nuclear weapons to deter its adversaries while
45 Benjamin Frankel, "An Anxious Decade: Nuclear Proliferation in the 1990s," in Opaque Nuclear
Proliferation: Methodological and Policy Implications, Benjamin Frankel, ed. (Portland: Frank Cass & Co,
1991),8.
46 Cohen and Frankel, "Opaque Nuclear Proliferation," 14.
47 Cohen and Frankel, "Opaque Nuclear Proliferation," 17.
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denying the possession of these weapons. Even if one party has an inkling that the other
party is in possession of nuclear weapons, the act of denial or their possession creates a
situation different from the deterrence conditions prevailing between the superpowers.,,48
Moreover, "[d]eterrence theory has been predicated on the rational calculation of risks
and benefits by both sides in a crisis. Opaque proliferation makes it very difficult-if not
impossible-to know what one is faced with as far as the other side's nuclear capabilities
are concerned. Rational decisions, difficult to make under any circumstances, are even
more so under opacity.,,49
Second, for deterrence to work, it is important to communicate to the challenging
state the clearly defined unacceptable action and how the defending state will respond.5o
As opaque nuclear states do not acknowledge their capability, they have also refrained
from issuing explicit threats or promulgating nuclear doctrines that indicate the
circumstances in which they will respond with nuclear retaliation. Some believe that
deterrence is more likely to fail bctween second-generation nuclear states because their
capability and intentions are not clearly communicated, leaving an adversary to guess at
the conditions under which retaliation may occur.51 Moreover, since the deterrent is not
48 Cohen and Frankel, "Opaque Nuclear Proliferation," 32. They also suggest that there are a variety of
factors that could make deterrence more unstable than between the super powers.
49 Cohen and Frankel, "Opaque Nuclear Proliferation," 33.
50 Stein, "Deterrence and Reassurance," 10.
51 See, e.g., Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1982).
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acknowledged, some scholars argue that nuclear ambiguity creates a severe credibility
problem regarding whether the opaque state is both able and willing to retaliate. 52
Even work that addresses the factors affecting credible threats and incorporates
uncertainty into the rational deterrence model is of limited utility when applied to second-
generation nuclear states. As an initial matter, nuclear deterrence theory largely
presumes that states will act to communicate their nuclear capabilities. As such, the
focus is almost entirely on how to issue credible threats. The empirical differences
between the two different patterns of nuclear development also have significant
implications for understanding the role of credible threats. Because second-generation
nuclear states largely refrain from directly issuing nuclear threats, of the deterrence
literature is largely irrelevant to understanding the behavior of these states.
B. Conceptualizing The Dependent Variable, Nuclear Opacity
What then, distinguishes opaque from open or visible nuclear postures? Second-
generation nuclear states that employ an opaque nuclear stance are labeled by a variety of
terms such as: opaque, undeclared, de facto, ambiguous, covert, latent, classified, and
threshold states. In contrast, the first five nuclear states are referred to as declared, overt,
visible, and open. Regardless ofthe terminology, there are several features of opacity
that make it qualitatively different from that of the open or visible posture of the five
declared nuclear states.
52 Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953-1970 (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1988), 31.
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At the most extreme, an opaque state does not test its nuclear capability, denies
possession ofnuclear weapons, does not organize the deployment of weapons, issues no
direct nuclear threats, promulgates no military doctrine and insulate its nuclear program
from public purview and other branches of the government.53 Moreover, there is little or
no debate within the government or society at large regarding these elements of the
nuclear programs.54 In short, "opaque proliferants follow a policy of calculated nuclear
ambiguity, mixing a public posture of restraint with the covert development ofnuclear
weapons.,,55
In contrast to this characterization of opacity, declared nuclear states are more
transparent with their nuclear capabilities and intentions. All five declared nuclear states
have exploded nuclear devices, incorporated nuclear forces into their military structures,
publicly held discussions and debates regarding appropriate nuclear strategies, and have
issued nuclear threats in support of their political objectives.56
While this characterization of opaque and visible ends of the spectrum represent
'ideal type' nuclear states, it is useful to think of states as falling somewhere on a
continuum of relative openness on one end to primarily an opaque stance on the other.
Israel most closely falls on the opaque end of the spectrum, where it has developed a
sophisticated nuclear force but has not acknowledged testing and has not declared itself a
53 Cohen and Frankel, "Opaque Nuclear Proliferation," 21-22.
54 Cohen and Frankel, "Opaque Nuclear Proliferation," 21-22.
55 Devin T. Hagerty, "The Power of Suggestion: Opaque Proliferation, Existential Deterrence, and the
South Asian Nuclear Arms Competition," in The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread and
What Results, Zackary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel, eds. (Portland: Frank Cass & Co., 1993), 257.
56 Frankel, "An Anxious Decade," 8.
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nuclear weapons state. In contrast, the United States is the most visible with a history of
testing, publicly declaring its nuclear posture, and generally open democratic decision-
making. Pakistan falls more towards the middle of the spectrum. Pakistan exploded a
nuclear device in 1998, making its capability more visible than Israel's. Yet, Pakistan is
more opaque compared to the first-generation nuclear states because it has not declared
its nuclear intentions and the extent of its known weapons capability remains uncertain.
India is the most visible of the second-generation nuclear states, having conducted
nuclear test in 1974, and follow-up tests in 1998. Further, India has begun to draft a
nuclear doctrine, although there has been relatively little public government discussion
regarding its capabilities and intentions.57 Still, from 1974 to 1998, India practiced a
policy of ambiguity regarding its intentions and capabilities and has done little to clarify
its posture since the 1998 tests.
That said, opacity is not directly equivalent to a lack of knowledge. Even in the
quintessential case of opacity, Israel, other actors have access to some information. Such
information is often in the form of obliquely worded statements by leaders, leaks within
the program, intelligence by other states, and speculation by experts. Given the
economic, scientific and technical knowledge required to acquire a nuclear capability, it
is very difficult to hide the acquisition of nuclear weapons from the international
community. Opacity, then, suggests the refusal to acknowledge openly or define the
parameters of a suspected nuclear program. Additionally, obliquely worded statements
57 Embassy of India, "Draft Report ofNational Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine";
available from http:://www.indianembassy.org/policy/CTBT/nuclear_doctrine_aug_17_1999.htrnl;
Internet; accessed March 2004.
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may suggest a nuclear weapons capability, without actually admitting it. In this context,
the ambiguous stance intentionally creates some measure of uncertainty. Thus, opacity is
not a complete lack of knowledge, but general uncertainty regarding the extent, nature
and intentions behind a nuclear weapons program. Of course, on the visible side of the
spectrum, there is no such thing as complete transparency either. For example, the
United States still maintains secrecy regarding operational and technical details that
would, ifknown, put its second-strike capability at risk.
C. Existing Approaches to Explaining Opacity
In addition to the scholarship that seeks to clarify the conceptual differences
between visible and opaque nuclear postures, there are historical and regional case
studies of nuclear development in Israel, India and Pakistan that suggest reasons for
opacity. For example, in explaining Israel's nuclear opacity, Avner Cohen argues that
Israel's posture is largely the result of a strategic culture of secrecy that formed early to
protect the program, as well as a general ambivalence about relying on nuclear deterrence
for Israeli security.58 Cohen, who has done extensive archival research and interviews
with Israeli officials, acknowledges that other factors such as international constraints and
domestic politics also matter. He does not, however, assess the relative explanatory
power of these factors, a task that requires a comparative framework.
58 Avner Cohen, "Nuclear Arms in Crisis Under Secrecy: Israel and the Lessons of the 1967 and 1973
Wars," in Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
Weapons, Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
2000).
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Others have argued that Israel's nuclear policy is the result of domestic-level
factors, primarily the parochial interests of leaders who benefit from opacity. 59 From this
perspective, Israeli leaders disagreed at the outset over the wisdom of pursuing a nuclear
weapons program that could jeopardize Israel's relationship with the United States, which
would in tum affect Israel's economy. Opacity thus was a compromise between those
who supported a nuclear program and those who did not.60 This analysis is compelling to
the extent that it details the contending domestic interests and the process of forging
compromise between them, which arguably resulted in a policy of opacity. Still, this
argument does not adequately account for the role of external pressures in shaping
domestic preferences for opacity once the decision was made to acquire a nuclear
capability. That is, in the absence ofD.S. pressure, it is unlikely that Israel would have
initially adopted an opaque posture. Additionally, the precise argument that developing a
nuclear program might jeopardize relations with the U.S. and thus affect the economic
interests of various domestic actors was not advanced in the cases of India and Pakistan.61
Thus, a cross-case comparison of the explanatory validity of this perspective is useful for
determining the range of its applicability.
59 Etel Solingen, "The Domestic Sources of Regional Regimes: The Evolution of Nuclear Ambiguity in the
Middle East," International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 2 (June 1994),318.
60 Solingen, "The Domestic Sources of Regional Regimes," 320.
61 Solingen does incorporate analysis ofIndia and Pakistan into her argument that ruling coalitions that
pursue economic liberalization policies are more likely to practice "nuclear restraint" in the form of joining
regimes or denuclearizing. See Etel Solingen, "The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint," International
Security 19, no. 2 (Fa111994). In her book length project explaining when states nuclearize or not,
Solingen analyzes additional cases in East Asia and the Middle East. However, this analysis does not
include India or Pakistan. See Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the
Middle East (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).
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There is also voluminous literature reviewing the history ofIndia and Pakistan's
nuclear programs. Much of this work focuses on the motivations behind the acquisition
of their nuclear weapons, while largely ignoring the issue of opacity. The research
seeking to explain the 1998 nuclear tests generally comes the closest to addressing the
questions of opacity. To explain the 1998 nuclear tests, scholars have focused on
domestic politics, a changing security environment, and general development of a nuclear
capability to explain the timing of these tests.62 While the decisions to proceed with the
tests are certainly central to understanding opacity because it is a break from the previous
policy, it is by no means the only relevant event. Rather, the history of the programs and
the times at which India and Pakistan seriously considered reducing opacity, but did not,
are also important for understanding the factors at play in constraining their decisions to
publicly demonstrate their nuclear capabilities and bolster deterrence.
II. Possible Explanations
Extant explanations of nuclear opacity fall into two general categories:
international constraints and domestic level factors. I first discuss international
constraints, followed by a discussion of domestic sources of opacity.
A. International Constraints
International constraints suggest that other states and the international community
playa significant role in determining whether or not a state will declare its nuclear
capability and intentions. There are several sources of external pressure on the
62 For a good overview of these arguments, see D. R. SarDesai and Raju G. C. Thomas, eds., Nuclear India
in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Palgrave, 2002).
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proliferating state that may lead it to choose opacity: existing rivalries with regional
states; pressure from the undeclared state's patron supporter; and pressure from the
international non-proliferation community as a whole. These external factors are
discussed below.
1. Regional Security Environment
The nature of the adversarial relationship between the undeclared nuclear state
and its rival(s) influences whether or not the undeclared state moves from an opaque
posture to an overt one. Mainly, where regional states seek to contain mutual hostility
from spiraling into an armed conflict-while at the same time maintaining a deterrent-it
is often in the interests of both the rival and undeclared state to maintain opacity.
Conversely, it is expected that under conditions of extreme insecurity, a state will
demonstrate its nuclear capability.
a) The Deterrence and Spiral Model
As outlined by Robert Jervis, states engaged in competitive dynamics have two
idealized ways to respond to their adversary to avoid conflict: use "sticks" to deter, or
"carrots" to reassure and avoid an unintended spiral. These are different prescriptions
offered by the deterrence and spiral model about how to provide for state security based
on a reading of an adversary's intentions. A state's military choices may have the
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unintended consequence of either signaling a lack of resolve that invites aggression, or an
overly threatening posture may lead to an unintended spiral of conflict. 63
The deterrence model posits that "power must be met by power.,,64 When faced
with an aggressive adversary, it is advisable that the defending state signal its capability
and willingness to respond with threats and force. 65 This is because "moderation and
conciliation are apt to be taken for weakness" and will invite aggression.66 As related to
nuclear opacity, the deterrence model implies that states should openly declare their
nuclear capability as soon as it is developed, in order to cast aside any doubts about the
defending state's ability to retaliate.
In contrast, the spiral model "argues that it is often not in the state's advantage to
seek a wide margin of superiority over its adversary" and that "coercion is not likely to
produce the desired results.,,67 Rather, "threats and negative sanctions, far from leading
to the beneficial results predicted by deterrence theory, are often self-defeating as a costly
and unstable cycle is set in motion.,,68 From this perspective, conflict may arise where
both states are status quo security seekers, but misinterpret or rationally must respond to
63 63 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1976),84.
64 Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 78.
6S Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 101.
66 Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 59.
67 Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 80.
68 Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 81.
32
their adversary's military activities.69 While sharing a common interest in avoiding
conflict, states also must provide for their own security within an anarchical international
structure.70 As such, states tend to assume the worst from their adversaries, and respond
to buildups and military force preparations. This response may lead to "the classic spiral
of arms and hostility [being] set in motion.,,7! Arms races are one obvious manifestation
of this spiral.72
In short, security seeking states may face a security dilemma where "the means by
which a state tries to increase its security decrease[s] the security of others.,,73 The
intensity of the security dilemma can vary over time, based on two variables: whether
defensive weapons and policies can be distinguished from offensive ones, and whether
the defense or offense has the advantage.74 The security dilemma is most severe when
offense is dominant and cannot be distinguished from defense.75 When defense is
dominant and distinguishable, the security dilemma can largely be ameliorated.76 For
69 Security dilemma dynamics leading to a spiral may also be based on rational decisions, not simply a
misperception of another state's status quo, security-seeking intentions that are perceived as aggressive.
See Charles L. Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," World Politics 50, no. 1 (October 1997), 171-
201.
70 Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 66.
71 Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 92.
72 Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 66.
73 Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics 30, no. 2 (January 1978), 169.
74 Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," 186-187.
75 Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," 211.
76 Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," 211.
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subscribers of the security dilemma, nuclear armed states with a secure second-strike
capability fit in the latter category and can enjoy a relatively higher level of security.
Yet the transition to MAD can itselfbe dangerous and may reduce state security.
Policies that cause spiraling risk state security ifit reduces a state's ability to perform
military missions and waste money.77 Both of these considerations are highly relevant
for second-generation nuclear states.
The transition to a distinguishable, defense dominance position can be unstable
and create insecurity among adversaries as power fluctuates. Until both states in a rivalry
have achieved a secure, second-strike capability, the other side's forces are a potential
offensive threat, especially where there are concerns about the survivability of one's own
forces. This "action-reaction process shifts the offense-defense balance, the result is a
change-a decrease or an increase-in military capabilities.,,78 This means the transition
to MAD may be accompanied by shifts in power that can lead to first-move advantages
and windows of opportunity and vulnerability because of the impact of nuclear weapons
on the offense-defense balance.79 This may lead to a spiral ofconflict where each side is
competing in an arms race to gain an advantage or at least ensure it does not lag behind
the developments of its adversary. Further, prior to reaching MAD, or MAD based on
77 Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," 175.
78 Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," 176.
79 See Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict, for an analysis of how power
shift and first move advantages are more likely to lead to conflict; Charles L. Glaser, "When are Arms
Races Dangerous? Rational versus Suboptimal Arming," International Security 28, no. 4 (Spring 2004), 75.
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unstable mutual deterrence,80 competition can be cost intensive, and may require
diverting from conventional programs. However, if states can survive this transition,
then once they reach MAD, "the nuclear arms race should peter out once the [states]
deploy[] robust assured destruction capabilities, which could provide additional
security.,,81
Moreover, in addition to reducing its ability to perform military missions, the
spiral may change "the adversary's beliefs about the state's motives, convincing the
adversary that the state is inherently more dangerous than it had previously believed.,,82
This fuels unnecessary competitive dynamics that waste state resources, "leaving it no
more secure but less prosperous.,,83 This concern is particularly relevant for the
developing states at issue here with finite resources.
On the other hand, "a state can sometimes use restraint in building military forces
to reduce the adversary's concerns about its" aggressive intentions.84 That is, restraint is
used to reduce insecurity by signaling that the building state does not have aggressive
intentions. A state can communicate benign intention by exercising unilateral restraint
and maintaining its "military capability below what it would choose for adequate
80 It is hypothesized that deterrence between regional adversaries may be less stable than that between the
u.s. and the Soviet Union because of ongoing hostilities, territorial claims, shorter retaliation times, and
lack of civilian oversight and developed systems to prevent accidents.
81 Glaser, "When are Arms Races Dangerous?" 75.
82 Glaser, "The Security Dilemma ReVisited," 178.
83 Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," 183.
84 Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," 181.
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deterrence and defense were it not considering the effects of signaling.,,85 Of relevance
here, opacity provides states with the ability to signal restraint by not publicly exploiting
every nuclear advance a state makes, or by not directly linking nuclear weapons to
official state policy as related to an adversary's military conduct. Nonetheless, signaling
restraint does run the risk that the adversary will interpret this conduct as demonstrating a
lack of resolve, which may in tum encourage an adversary to press for its claims.86
b) Opacity for Deterrence and Reassurance
In reality, while the deterrence and spiral model suggest different prescriptions
depending on the motivations of an adversary, there is often uncertainty as to an
adversary's motives. This means that "except in extreme cases of near certainty, the
theory calls for a mix of spiral and deterrence model policies."87 This requires a status
quo state to balance its competitive options for military capabilities and to signal
deterrence, while at the same time seeking to signal benign motives. 88
For these reasons, in regions where local states seek to contain mutual hostility
from spiraling into an armed conflict, it is often in the interests of both the rival and
undeclared state to maintain opacity. Opacity is a policy that mixes the prescriptions of
the deterrence and spiral model by simultaneously developing a nuclear capability as a
hedge but at the same time, refraining from demonstrating this capability that would
85 Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," 181.
86 Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," 181.
87 Glaser, "When are Arms Races Dangerous?" 57.
88 Glaser, "When are Arms Races Dangerous?" 55.
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provoke the other side from responding in the same manner. In short, opacity is a chosen
strategy that seeks to combine reassurance and deterrence to simultaneously prevent
aggression while preventing a spiral into hostilities.
If a state clarifies its nuclear capabilities and intentions, it pressures the rival state
to respond to the nuclear developments of its adversary. Otherwise, in the transition to
MAD, a state may find itself subject to the offensive capabilities of its adversary without
comparable retaliation in tum. Further, if a state declares its nuclear capabilities, it
creates incentives for its adversary to seek to bolster its own deterrence credibility by
demonstrating resolve. These actions may in tum lead to an open arms race,
characterized by the rapid development and accumulation of weapons, which requires a
substantial investment of time and financial resources to compete. A competitive arms
race is often not in the interest of a developing state that is required to adopt foreign
policies that balance security goals and economic development. 89 Since undertaking a
nuclear weapons program is an expensive and difficult processes, the rival state may
prefer to not have to expend resources on an open competition.
Instead, states may engage in tacit bargaining, where they seek to establish
common gain and have an affordable and manageable nuclear weapons program.90 By
remaining opaque, the undeclared nuclear state is able to signal some level of restraint
89 Michael D. McGilU1is, "A Rational Model of Regional Rivalry," International Studies Quarterly 34
(1990),112.
90 This also allows them some flexibility in posturing independent from the domestic political pressure.
See the related discussion on nuclear nationalism in the domestic politics section.
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and seek to ameliorate a spiral of conflict with its adversaries.91 This serves the function
ofminimizing public challenges and perhaps allows some level ofbackroom diplomacy
to maintain lower levels of antagonism.92 Even if the undeclared state assumes that the
rival state will eventually develop a response, the undeclared states potentially can slow
down this process by not highlighting differences in development and refraining from
goading its adversary into responding to each development.
In addition to the undeclared state seeking to minimize the threat of its nuclear
developments, its adversary often also has an interest in maintaining this fiction. In this
sense, there is tacit cooperation between the undeclared and rival state, in which both
have incentives to not publicly address the nuclear status. For the adversary, it also faces
resource constraints and has an incentive to avoid a costly arms race, one that it may also
lose. This tacit cooperation between adversaries may be threatened by domestic political
pressures to respond to other's gains, ifpublicly acknowledged. Opacity mitigates some
level ofpolitical pressure on rival states to match nuclear capabilities and put leaders in
untenable conflict situations.93
In short, given the security risks associated with a competitive arms race, and the
benefits of restraint, there are a number of incentives for both the undeclared state and its
91Jervis, Perception and Misperception.
92 Neil Joeck, "Maintaining Nuclear Stability in South Asia," Adelphi Paper 312 (New York: Oxford
University Press for IISS, 1997) and Neil Joeck, "Tacit Bargaining and Stable Proliferation," in Opaque
Nuclear Proliferation: Methodological and Policy Implications, Benjamin Frankel, ed. (Portland: Frank
Cass & Co., 1991).
93 Solingen, "The Domestic Sources of Regional Regimes," 324. How long this will remain the case is
open to question as some Middle Eastern states are now openly acknowledging Israel's nuclear status.
Additionally, Israel's nuclear capability has been referenced in justification for the development of
chemical and biological arsenals.
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rival to refrain from openly addressing the undeclared state's nuclear status. Opacity is
thus a mechanism to decrease the potential for conflict and expense that an open arms
race creates. This theoretical basis suggests the following hypothesis:
HI: Nuclear opacity is a strategy employed by a nuclear state seeking to
deter its adversary, while simultaneously refraining from provoking an
openly competitive arms race or armed conflict.
If this hypothesis explains second-generation nuclear postures, then there should
be evidence of the opaque state seeking to use its nuclear program to obtain some benefit
of deterrence. This would likely entail signaling to an adversary that the opaque state has
the ability to quickly change its nuclear policy ifthe circumstances warrant it. However,
because deterrence actions have the potential to escalate conflict between adversaries,
efforts to bolster deterrence by an opaque state are likely subtle and heavily reliant on
uncertainty. This would be consistent with the countervailing goal ofpreventing a
competitive arms race.
Thus, leaders should also demonstrate conservative behavior that is sensitive to
the costs of the nuclear program and potential risks of reallocating resources from
conventional weapons systems and economic development. There should be an absence
of "crash" programs that significantly change the developmental pace between the
adversaries. Likely there would also be a lack of highly publicized development
breakthroughs and leaders refraining from issuing nuclear threats during times of
heightened crisis. At the same time, states that are seeking to avoid competition would
be unlikely to refer to more advanced nuclear developments of its adversary, lest it would
have to acknowledge its own deficiencies. Moreover, there should be evidence of
. _. __ . -------------------
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some-although not necessarily extensive given the adversarial relationship-types of
cooperation that reduces competition incentives. Examples of such measures include
regional confidence-building or agreements to refrain from attacking each other's nuclear
facilities.
On the other hand, an arms competition may become more attractive for a state
that enjoys a substantial power advantage, as it would be able to outstrip its adversary in
an arms race. Conversely, in a severe security environment a state may be compelled to
rely on its nuclear capabilities if it cannot rely solely on its conventional capability. In
either of these instances, at each end of the security continuum, it is more likely that a
state will forego a policy of opacity and choose to clarify its nuclear capabilities and
intentions.
Hypothesis 1 would be disconfirmed if there is little evidence of restraint among
the state. The lack of restraint would suggest other factors are stronger incentives for
maintaining opacity, as there would be no logical reason to be engaged in competitive
nuclear policies without garnering the deterrence benefits of an overtly recognized
capability. Further, if the undeclared state believed that it was inevitable that the rival
state would acquire nuclear weapons, or an overt nuclear posture, then there is little
incentive for it to remain opaque. Opacity in this instance would more likely be
explained by other factors than the prospect of the rival state also refraining from a
.visible stance.
40
2. Patron State Incentives
Patron states that seek to promote non-proliferation, or opacity as an alternative,
are also a source of constraint on the undeclared state. Within this framework, regional
powers have an incentive to acquire arms and military and economic aid from global
powers in order to increase their own security.94 More powerful, global states may have
an interest in providing economic and military assistance to these weaker states to
promote their own interests. Weaker states may also be motivated to cooperate with a
more powerful state-even ifit is not yet formally receiving aid-where there is the
future prospect of cooperation.95
Nonetheless, even though states may find a common interest in cooperating,
competitive interests exist as well. As such, the supplier state will seek to influence the
decisions of the recipient state by providing military and economic aid. In return for this
assistance, the recipient state is obligated to "abstain from a political course which might
put in jeopardy the continuation of military aid.,,96 Thus, while "[r]egional powers use
military expenditures, arms imports, and alignment concessions to improve their security,
[doing so] results in economic, dependence, and alignment costs. ,,97 Here, the costs are
refraining from relying on an overt nuclear posture.
94 McGilU1is, "A Rational Model of Regional Rivalry," 112.
95 See Solingen, Nuclear Logics.
96 Hans Morgenthau, "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid," The American Political Science Review 56, no.
2 (June 1962),303.
97 McGilU1is, "A Rational Model of Regional Rivalry," 125.
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The provision of military and economic assistance by a patron state to a client
state is expected to give the supplier state leverage over the recipient state. 98 The extent
ofthe patron state leverage is determined by several factors, including: (1) the value of
the aid; (2) how readily available it is from other sources; (3) how dependent the client
state is on the patron state; and (4) a relatively low degree of motivation regarding
concessions from the client state.99 Because substantial influence requires the existence
of all of these factors, it is predicted that foreign aid often plays little role in the client
state's foreign policy stance. Client states that are able to easily gain economic and
military assistance from other patrons, which reduces their dependencyloo on the existing
patron state, and have strong reasons to not concede on an issue, are the least likely to
predicate their behavior on the receipt of aid. The exception to this is when "the
recipients are so vulnerable and dependent that they are forced to follow the patron's
wishes even when those wishes conflict with their own."IOI
Further, regional states are not without influence on their more powerful patrons.
Rather, the relationship is often characterized by mutual influence. 102 Bargaining power
between the supplier state and its recipient is determined by the relative value of the
98 Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987),41. Walt uses
alignment and alliance interchangeably to discuss both formal and informal cooperation. Ibid., 12.
99 Walt, Origins of Alliances, 43-44.
100 Dependency is a function of the degree of threat facing the state combined with degree of assistance the
supplier state can provide and the availability of alternative means to meet the threat. Glenn Snyder,
Alliance Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 31.
10\ Walt, Origins of Alliances, 45.
102 McGinnis, "A Rational Model of Regional Rivalry," 114.
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relationship and the comparative availability and attractiveness of other altematives. 103
Additionally, the patron state may not be able to cut off aid to a client state if the patron
state's domestic political processes make the threat incredible. 104 Patron states may also
be unwilling to cut off or reduce assistance if it would endanger the client state. 105 These
constraints have the effect of further reducing the supplier state's leverage over the
recipient state.
Regarding nuclear opacity, the great powers have sought to prevent the spread of
nuclear proliferation among regional states. During the Cold War, the superpowers
agreed that the spread of nuclear weapons was not in their interests and have employed a
variety of mechanisms to slow horizontal proliferation. One tool is the bilateral
relationship between the superpowers and its client states.
However, the extent to which non-proliferation policies have been pursued,
particularly between the patron and client state, has varied over time and such policies
have generally been ineffective in stopping the proliferation of second-generation nuclear
states. Given the difficulties in stopping determined pro1iferators short of military attack,
the United States in particular has sought to minimize the impact ofproliferation by
providing incentives for continued opacity. Yet, in essence, "the only thing that the
United States had been able to do was to delay and de1egitimize proliferators' nuclear
103 Snyder, Alliance Politics, 75.
104 Walt, Origins of Alliances, 44.
105 Robert O. Keohane, "The Big Influence of Small Allies," Foreign Policy no. 2 (Spring 1971).
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efforts, and prevent both open nuclear threats and 'red lines' as publicly defined
deterrents, fearing situations that might be uncontrollable."lo6
Further, while the US may be able to ignore dealing with proliferation
developments given the general secrecy surrounding the programs, it would not be able to
look the other way in the face of an open nuclear disclosure. The United States, or other
patron states, would be forced to make difficult decisions whether to cut off assistance to
second-generation nuclear states or risk publicly undermining the credibility of its non-
proliferation efforts. The undeclared state, since it risks losing bilateral financial and
conventional military aid from its patron if it openly defies nonproliferation efforts has
incentives to remain opaque unless it is forced by security considerations to reveal its
nuclear capabilities.
Nonetheless, there are limits to the extent to which external pressures can prevent
states from openly disclosing in severe security environments. In the absence, however,
of exacerbating security factors, patron states can provide incentives in the form of
threats and inducements to keep nuclear proliferation opaque. In this way, both the
undeclared state and patron state share an interest in an opaque nuclear posture and both
are complicit in maintaining this position.
This suggests the following hypothesis:
H2 : Nuclear opacity is the result ofpatron state threats and inducements.
If this hypothesis is true, we should observe the patron state either explicitly or
implicitly link the provision of assistance to the nuclear posture chosen by the recipient
106 Shlomo Aronson, The Politics and Strategy ofNuclear Weapons in the Middle East: Opacity, Theory
and Reality, 1960-1991 (Albany: State University ofNew York Press, 1992),262.
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state. Further, the more the client state is dependent on the aid, as well as the higher
priority that the supplier state puts on opacity, the more likely it is that a state will choose
an ambiguous posture. At the same time, the recipient state should have some leverage
with its patron ifit is valuable to the relationship, and even more so if the supplier state
will continue to support its client regardless of its nuclear stance. It is also important to
note that if opacity is both in the patron and the client's state interest, notwithstanding the
dynamics of the supplier relationship, the logic here does not apply.
Of course, the reverse of this logic would disconfirm this hypothesis. First, if
there is no link made between economic and military aid to the client state in return for
nuclear restraint, then it suggests that the patron state would supply the same regardless
of the undeclared state's actions. Second, if the amount of aid is minimal, nonexistent, or
if it does not really affect the client state's calculations for other reasons, this suggests
that aid and other forms of threats and inducements are not linked to the client states'
behavior. Third, if the patron state publicly refers to the client state's nuclear capability,
then it is not perpetuating or supporting the undeclared states opaque stance. Finally, if
the patron states make only symbolic or minimal responses to more visible postures, then
there is little credibility in threatening to withhold aid.
3. International Non-Proliferation Regime
The final source of international constraints is that of the international non-
proliferation regime. International opinion serves as a source of external pressure on an
undeclared state by making the acquisition of nuclear weapons unacceptable according to
international standards of conduct. While second-generation proliferators have remained
.- - -- ._-------
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detennined to acquire a nuclear capability despite the costs of doing so based on the non-
proliferation regime, they have sought to do so in such a way as to not provoke an
international response.
Therefore, some scholars contend that nuclear opacity is in response to an
international presumption of nuclear non-proliferation. 107 From this perspective, states
that seek to develop a nuclear weapons capability do so against the prevailing sentiment
that prohibits proliferation. Essentially, from this perspective, "opaque nuclear
proliferation has become the strategy of choice for acquiring nuclear weapons at a time
when the desire to possess such weapons is viewed as illegitimate."I08 As such, second-
generation nuclear states seek to avoid the costs of going against the nonn of nuclear
non-proliferation.
Generally, many states in the international system have a shared interest in
preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. These states have joined together and
cooperated in fonning fonnal institutions and organizations designed to prevent both
horizontal and vertical proliferation. These institutional frameworks include the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty ("NPT"), the International Atomic Energy Agency ("IAEA"),
and the smaller Nuclear Suppliers Group. Additionally, there are a host of regional
organizations and confidence-building procedures designed to obviate the need for
nuclear weapons. Together, these international and regional efforts have created a
presumption against the spread of nuclear weapons, such that states wishing to swim
107 See, e.g., Frankel, "An Anxious Decade."
108 Cohen and Frankel, "Opaque Nuclear Proliferation," 23.
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against the tide of international opinion must do so against a strong current. Political
obstacles, which did not exist for the first five nuclear states, are now in the path of states
wishing to openly acquire nuclear weapons. In short, some scholars argue that,
It is the effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime's efforts to
delegitimate the open acquisition of nuclear weapons that has stimulated
many of the fundamental changes between patterns of the first and second
generation of proliferation. It is the establishment of the pattern of non-
proliferation as an international norm that has prompted opaque
proliferation. The non-proliferation regime has thus sired an invisible,
d d l 'fi . 109un ergroun pro 1 eratlOn.
The United States has taken the lead in creating and enforcing this international
cooperation against horizontal proliferation. As such, it plays an important role in
sustaining the norms, regimes, and institutions related to non-proliferation. 110 At the
same time, the international community further perpetuates opacity by not
acknowledging the de facto nuclear capabilities of undeclared states. For example, the
existing members of the NPT refuse to allow Israel, India and Pakistan to join as nuclear
states. Instead, the P-5 continues to call for these states to join the NPT as non-nuclear
states and to abide by its provisions as such. Moreover, when states act outside ofthe
accepted frameworks, they are condemned by other states for their actions. Overall, this
institutional framework makes it more difficult and costly for states to develop nuclear
arsenals, even without the cooperation of non-member states.
Significantly, Israel, India, and Pakistan are not members ofthese institutional
frameworks. Yet, regime restraints come from more than membership in these
109 Cohen and Frankel, "Opaque Nuclear Proliferation," 17.
110 Randy J. Rydell, "Opaque Proliferation and the Public Agenda," in Opaque Nuclear Proliferation:
Methodological and Policy Implications, Benjamin Frankel, ed. (Portland: Frank Cass & Co, 1991), 127.
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organizations. Regime theory suggests that other aspects of these regimes constrain the
nuclear activities of these proliferators. The nuclear non-proliferation regime is not
confined to just the formal institutions designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
Rather, the international non-proliferation regime consists of "principles, norms, rules
and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given
issue-area."]]] These principles and norms combine to create a "system of injunctions
about international behavior.,,]]2 The result, from this perspective, is the creation of an
international norm that horizontal proliferation is an illegitimate activity such that states
cannot publicly declare their interest in acquiring nuclear weapons.]]3 Additionally, this
regime attaches significant importance to "open detonations" based on the behavior of
first-generation nuclear states. As such, this type of openness has served as a baseline
against which forbidden nuclear behavior is evaluated. In short, from this perspective,
the development of the non-proliferation norm thus explains the difference in the pattern
between first and second-generation nuclear proliferators. The fundamental change in the
pattern between these states was caused by the development of the institutional
frameworks and the regime.
Thus, for the opaque nuclear state, the costs and benefits of openly declaring its
nuclear capabilities and intentions are outweighed by the incentives to remain ambiguous
111 Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,"
in Stephen D. Krasner, ed. International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 1. In this
regime, the United States has been the unquestioned leader in establishing the institutional and
organizational mechanisms to prevent the spread of horizontal proliferation.
ll2 Cohen and Frankel, "Opaque Nuclear Proliferation," 16.
113 Cohen and Frankel, "Opaque Nuclear Proliferation," 16.
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in the face of external constraints. The implication is that opaque nuclear states will
remain so as long as there is international pressure to do so and the benefits of open
deterrence do not exceed the international costs. If the opaque state faces an increasingly
hostile security environment with its rival, then the benefits of open deterrence at some
point will outweigh the costs of declaring its nuclear status. The veil of opacity may also
be pierced if the costs of external pressure decrease or if other states begin to openly
acknowledge the nuclear status of the opaque state.
This theoretical approach suggests the following hypothesis:
H3: Nuclear opacity is the result of undeclared states fearing the costs of
the international community's response to open nuclear policies given
international norms against proliferation.
Based on this perspective, second-generation states should reflect, at a minimum,
concern that they will be internationally isolated ifthey undertake open proliferation.
Proliferators should calculate the response ofthe United States and others supporting the
non-proliferation regime. Under a robust regime, proliferators would expect costs
imposed from other states if they openly demonstrated their nuclear capabilities in
violation of the international norm.114
Even stronger support of the role of the international regime is if there is evidence
that second-generation states have internalized the norms against non-proliferation such
that they genuinely embrace its concepts by seeking to slow or stop the spread of nuclear
weapons, or at least condemn those that would publicly demonstrate their capabilities.
114 Roger K. Smith, "Opaque Proliferation and the Fate of the Non-Proliferation Regime," in Opaque
Nuclear Proliferation: Methodological and Policy Implications, Benjamin Frankel, ed. (Portland: Frank
Cass & Co, 1991), 96.
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Strong evidence of having internalized the nonns would consist of states not even
considering testing even though they have developed the capability.
Conversely, this hypothesis would be disconfinned ifthere was little or no
international response to previous moves to disclose nuclear proliferation efforts. It
would be further disconfinned if there was little evidence that that undeclared state
considered international responses in its calculation of its nuclear policy.
B. Domestic Sources of Opacity
There are two domestic sources of opacity. The first explanation suggests that
leaders of particular political parties or interest groups have conflicting preferences as to
whether the state should develop nuclear weapons, and if it does so, whether the
capability should be open or not. Opacity, from this perspective, is the result of a
compromise solution between divergent interests as to the state's nuclear status. The
second domestic source of opacity focuses on the domestic nonnative and cultural
prohibitions against relying on an overt nuclear posture for security. These explanations
are discussed below.
1. Opacity Based on Domestic Interests
Some domestic political actors have interests that would be adversely affected by
a visible nuclear weapons capability and resist efforts towards openness. There are also a
variety of interests that support an open posture. Opposition to, as well as support of, an
open nuclear capability is generally fonned along a spectrum of interests.
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Initially, it is useful to distinguish between actors who oppose the development of
nuclear weapons in general, and those that oppose making such information public once
the decision is made to pursue the program. On the one hand, some actors prefer not to
develop nuclear weapons, and further oppose an open posture for reasons that it is too
costly or believe that such openness will not contribute to state security. Others may
oppose developing a nuclear weapons capability, but once the decision has been made to
invest the resources, believe that a more open posture is the best course of action.
Finally, there are those that both support developing a nuclear option and prefer that the
state's nuclear capability be openly acknowledged for the purposes of enhancing state
security. In short, just because an actor did or did not oppose the decision to develop a
nuclear capability does not necessarily mandate that they promote opacity as well. A
summary of these positions on a continuum is as follows:
Oppose nuc. option
Oppose openness
Oppose nuc. option
Support openness
Support nuc. option Support nuc. option
Oppose openness Support openness
Domestic constituencies may oppose an overt nuclear posture for a variety of
reasons. Some resist openness on the basis of cost and reallocation of resources from
other programs, such as scientists who are opposed to nuclear weapons programs that
take funding from their research, and industrial and commercial actors that are sensitive
to the threat ofbilateral and multilateral sanctions imposed by outside sources in the
event of disclosure. l 15 Another significant source of opposition may include beneficiaries
of conventional military resources, who fear a loss of resources. Still others express
115 Solingen, "The Domestic Sources of Regional Regimes," 318-325.
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doubts about the usefulness of nuclear weapons for providing security and are often
skeptical about the wisdom of the decision to develop nuclear weapons in general. Other
support for opacity may come from groups seeking to develop and protect the nuclear
program in the face of domestic resistance from other salient actors, but generally support
the nuclear program.
On the other hand, pressure for openness exists from those that believe state
security is best achieved through an open nuclear capability, and those that seek
legitimacy and perhaps primacy of the nuclear program, such as some scientists and the
military branches in charge of the nuclear arsenal. Further, public opinion can be an
important source of pressure towards openness, particularly in states that foster "nuclear
nationalism." In cases of nuclear nationalism, leaders have to consider maintaining the
support of its domestic populations, which are generally supportive of a nuclear option.
While widespread public support does not automatically force a policy of openness, it
gives leaders that support an open option further support for their position. In short, there
are domestic level winners and losers related to resource allocation, prestige, and
vulnerability to external pressures on interests.
For these reasons, according to domestic political explanations, political party or
interest group politics are an important cause of opacity based on the different parochial
interests of actors and institutions.116 This suggests the following hypothesis:
H4 : Nuclear opacity is based on the convergence of interests of domestic
actors that benefit from an undeclared status and who would suffer costs if
the state's nuclear capabilities and intentions were declared.
116 Solingen, "The Domestic Sources of Regional Regimes," 319.
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This perspective suggests a particular causal chain leading to opacity when
the dominant decision-makers prefer transparency. In particular, there should be
evidence of some discussion, debate, or other indicators of the opposition views
being taken into account by the deciding leadership that prefers an open nuclear
stance. That is, the particular interests opposed to openness must effectively have
enough power to influence the ultimate decision. The strongest support for this
position would be evidence confirming that the controlling leadership supported
an open posture, but acquiesced to the concerns of those who opposed this policy.
Conversely, leadership that opposes an open stance and the development
of nuclear weapons, but moves toward openness or continues development
suggests some compromise with other interests. Again, there would have to be
evidence of both the controlling leadership preferences and minority preferences
that were taken into account to show a relationship. And, obviously, this
hypothesis would also be disconfirmed if there was a general domestic consensus
among leaders preferring openness based on their own interests, but the policy
remained one of opacity.
2. Opacity as a Result of Normative and Cultural Prohibitions
While the norms of the non-proliferation regime imposes some level of cost on a
proliferating state, domestic level strategic culture arguments focus on the deep-rooted
norms within a state to explain the level of nuclear transparency. Even though
acknowledging some practical considerations regarding the security environments and
mixed motives for acquiring nuclear weapons, the argument is that cultural and
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nonnative constraints have helped shape how states respond to the process of acquiring a
nuclear capability and fonnulate their strategy to deal with the same. Similar elements of
cultural explanations further stress a general state ambivalence about the development of
a nuclear capability.
This perspective suggests the following hypothesis:
Hs: Nuclear opacity is based on nonnative and cultural constraints
amongst the leaders of the undeclared states, which reflect deeply held
reservations about the role of nuclear weapons in providing for state
security.
If this perspective is accurate, then at a minimum, leadership should generally
resist basing state security on nuclear weapons, absent the threat of total destruction. In
particular, there should be a general absence of reliance on nuclear weapons for security,
including an overall resistance to planning and implementing a nuclear deterrent strategy.
A more extreme version suggests that leadership overall would not even consider nuclear
deterrence an option, even in circumstances of obvious military utility. A further part of
this theoretical basis suggests that "unthinkable" aspect of nuclear weapons, or at least
their non-use outside of threatened state annihilation, is thoroughly ingrained in state
leadership. This suggests that there would be little questioning of existing policy and
very slow change, if at all, over time.
Thus, state hesitation to be open about its nuclear program are hypothesized to be
a product of both international and domestic level factors. Figure 1 summarizes these
potential explanations and associated predictions.
Figure 1 - Hypotheses Related to Nuclear Opacity
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Explanation Predictions Examples
HI: Regional Security
Environment
Policy statements, advertising
Signal that the opaque state has the technology developments,
ability to quickly change its nuclear characterizations of nuclear
policy if the circumstances warrant it. program - should increase
during times of crisis if trying
to deter.
Absence of "crash" nuclear
program, sensitivity to costs,
concerns about reallocating
resources from conv. or
I P,oed nucle", development by the domestic programs, refrain
opaque state. from highly publicized
breakthroughs, not issue direct
public nuclear threats during a
crisis, no reference to more
advanced capabilities.
Some limited cooperation with Regional confidence-building
adversary to reduce risks during measures, agreements to
transition. refrain from attacking nuclearfacilities.
Hz: Patron State Pressures
Non-proliferation measures
Existence of issue linkages based on that require cut off of
threats or inducements from the assistance or sanctions, policy
patron state. statements or other
communications linking
restraint to cooperation.
Highly dependent states will exhibit
more conforming behavior than less
dependent states.
Non-proliferation pressures will be
more effective when a high priority
for the patron state.
-
Figure 1 - Hypotheses related to nuclear opacity (continued)
55
Explanation Predictions Examples
H3: Int'l Non-proliferation
Regime
Opaque state is concerned about the Statements or other indicia that
opaque state is evaluating the
costs that would be imposed by potential costs that would be
members of the non-proliferation imposed by going against the
regime.
regime.
Recognition that there is an int'l norm Evidence that opaque state
against testing and non-proliferation, fears being cast as an
and to break it would isolate the irresponsible state. Uses the
opaque state. norms to promote own non-proliferation interests.
Opaque state has internalized ideas Opaque state seeks to promote,
about the validity of the int'l regime or at least not directly
and the dangers of nuclear undermine the non-
proliferation. proliferation regime.
R 4: Party/Interest Group
Politics
Decision-making is based on Should see evidence of bargaining
compromise between interest process, parsing of interests, and
groups. compromise solution of opacity.
Alternatively, the decision
maker controls nuclear policy, Control over decision-making, havedoes not have to take other
preferences into account, and particular interests that would be
prefers an opaque stance based affected by an open posture, and
make decisions based on these
on own domestic interests that interests.
would be adversely affected by
an open posture.
Rs: Moral/Cultural Constraints
Expressions of doubt or lack of
reliance on nuclear weapons for
security.
Leaders do not consider the use of
nuclear weapons as an option even
when militarily useful.
Little questioning or reevaluation of
existing policy.
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III. Methodology
This research project is centered on evaluating the proposed explanations of
nuclear opacity through case studies. As outlined above, there are multiple plausible
explanations for state decisions to declare their nuclear status. This project assesses the
relative validity of these explanations through case studies of the nuclear postures of
Israel, India, and Pakistan.
A. Case Selection
This dissertation includes three case studies of undeclared nuclear states, Israel,
India and Pakistan. The universe of countries with nuclear weapons is extremely limited.
For this reason, I have chosen to study the available cases of opaque nuclear states-that
is states that have acquired a deliverable nuclear capability for the purposes of deterrence
but still maintain opacity.
The Israeli case provides the basis for the 'quintessential' opaque nuclear case as
it remains the most secretive, having never publicly tested or declared itself a nuclear
weapons state. There is more variation on the dependent variable, nuclear opacity, in the
cases ofIndia and Pakistan as they tested in 1998. Prior to testing, both states maintained
an ambiguous posture for decades, and despite the 1998 tests remain relatively opaque
compared to the declared states.
There are three undeclared nuclear cases that are being excluded from the
analysis, including Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa. The primary reason that
Argentina and Brazil are excluded is that it is unclear that they ever developed enough of
a capability that it would have been rational for them to go public.
57
South Africa did develop an arsenal of six nuclear bombs, which its leader gave
up in the early 1990's. It is not readily apparent that South Africa sought to develop a
nuclear arsenal for immediate deterrence purposes. The problem for the purposes of this
study is that without having a deterrence dynamic-which presumes a visible posture-
there is no compelling puzzle as to why South Africa did not publicly acknowledge the
capability. Because this study is limited to cases of states seeking to deter their
adversaries, there is no apparent reason to include South Africa. This is not to say that
the case is not worth further exploration, but for the narrower purposes of understanding
deterrence dynamics, if offers less than the selected cases.
Finally, this project is not dealing with currently proliferating states such as North
Korea and Iran. These states are essentially third-generation nuclear states, with their
primary nuclear development occurring decades later in a different global security
environment. This distinguishes them in fundamental ways from the cases analyzed here.
Furthermore, the specifics of each case also suggest that there are different factors
informing North Korea and Iran's programs. For example, North Korea's nuclear
weapons program does not appear to be security driven, such that it is seeking to deter a
regional adversary. Rather, its behavior appears to fit more closely to seeking attention,
as it varies between extremes in rhetoric from nuclear posturing to indicating that it will
cooperate with international non-proliferation agreements.
B. The Congruence Procedure and Process Tracing
I employ two within-case methodologies-the congruence procedure and process
tracing-as a way to test whether the evidence supports the various hypotheses. The
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congruence procedure operates by comparing whether the theoretically predicted value of
the dependent variable matches observed value of the dependent variable, given the
independent variables observed in the study. If the dependent variable's outcome is
consistent with the predicted result, based on the observed independent variables, then the
possibility of a causal relationship is strengthened. I I?
The congruence procedure can be substantially strengthened by also using process
tracing. The method of process tracing attempts to identify the causal path explaining
how the independent variable leads to the resulting dependent variable. 118 In essence,
process tracing is linking the independent variable to the dependent variable by
identifying the causal connection, process, and mechanisms between them. This method
is conducted by testing whether the observed processes match those predicted by a
theory.119 This involves "identifying steps in a causal process leading to the outcome of a
given dependent variable of a particular case in a particular historical context.,,120 I then
compare the results across the cases.
In terms of data collection, Alexander George's method of structured, focused
comparison is designed to elicit similar data across cases. By asking general questions of
each case, comparable date is obtained from each, which can then be compared with
Il7 Alexander 1. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social
Sciences (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2005), 179.
118 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, 183.
119 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, 217.
120 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, 176.
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other cases. 121 Consistent with this approach, the evidence collected is designed to
h £: 11' . 122answer t e 10 owmg questIOns:
1. What are the undeclared state's incentives for acquiring nuclear weapons?
2. What threats or inducements were proffered by the patron states to promote
opacity?
3. Did the undeclared state have fears of international responses to nuclear
development, testing and other forms of openness?
4. Are there contending domestic political factions that support opacity within the
undeclared state?
5. What role did common beliefs and values as related to nuclear weapons influence
state leadership?
6. What were the reasons that made the undeclared state consider declaring?
7. Has the variation within opaque and nuclear states cohered with the expectations
of the hypotheses?
8. Are there factors outside of the hypotheses that have influenced undeclared state
behavior?
The main source of evidence for the country specific case studies is secondary
literature, which provides historical accounts for each state. This body of secondary
works mainly consists of historical scholarship, published security analyses, and media
sources. I sought to verify the accuracy of this literature with as many other sources as
possible, including primary material such as government documents and leadership
memoirs when available. Additionally, I used available primary sources such as the
minutes of meetings, memos, cables, congressional resolutions and other data that
i21 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, 86.
122 Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused
Comparison," in Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy, Paul Gordon Lauren, ed.
(New York: Macmillan Press and Co., 1979).
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documents u.s. perceptions of the programs and its efforts to affect the declaratory status
ofthe other states, either bilaterally or through the non-proliferation regime.
C. Methodological Challenges
There are several difficulties associated with this methodology. Given that the
nuclear programs are secret, obtaining accurate information is difficult. Nonetheless,
there are extensive historical accounts of all the nuclear development of all three cases.
And as more and better data has become available over the last few years,123 it has not
only confirmed much of the previous scholarship, but has also underscored that there is a
fairly accurate understanding of the programs in general even if the details have been in
question. Moreover, evaluating whether the theoretical explanations accurately account
for what is observable, in terms of processes and mechanisms, can be helpful for
determining if some explanations are less credible. Further, this research agenda remains
salient for understanding current state behavior and deserves study in whatever form
available.
A second possible criticism of the proposed methodology is that there is very little
variation on the dependent variable within the cases of nuclear opacity. That is, Israel
has taken no steps to openly declare its capability, while India has conducted nuclear tests
at different times and Pakistan once. Even with the nuclear tests, there remain many
123 For example, Israel in the mid-1990's declassified some of its documents relating to the origins of its
nuclear weapons program in the 1960's. See Avner Cohen, "Stumbling Into Opacity: The United States,
Israel, and the Atom, 1960-1963," Security Studies 4, no. 2 (Winter 1994-1995). Cohen was also able to
gain access to a number of interviews and other primary source materials for Israel and the Bomb. Hersh
was also able to access key figures involved in the Israeli government and interview them for his project,
Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (New
York: Random House, 1991).
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areas of opacity within South Asian cases. 124 There are several ways that I sought to
handle this issue given the universe of available cases. All three of the cases contain
'critical junctures' in the historical accounts where leaders grappled with their country's
nuclear status. These potential turning points are analyzed for the factors that explain the
decisions not to openly declare. Additionally, the Indian case provides within-case
variation, as India tested in 1974 and then remained ambiguous until the 1998 test. This
variation on the dependent variable, combined with several historical junctures where
Indian leaders chose not to test, allowed me to make multiple within-case observations. 125
The third potential criticism of the methodology is that the universe of cases is
rather limited and at the same time encompasses very different regions. That is, the
ability to draw contingent generalizations may be limited based on the relative lack of
declared and non-declared nuclear states in general. There simply may not be enough
cases for a general theory of state behavior. Furthermore, the cases of opacity may not be
comparable, also making it difficult to develop a generalized theory. Still, this subset of
declared and undeclared nuclear states represents an important research agenda given the
relevance of nuclear weapons.
124 Rodney W. Jones, "Minimum Nuclear Deterrence Postures in South Asia: An Overview," Report
Prepared for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (Reston, Virginia: Policy Architects International,
2001). .
125 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods For Students of Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1997), uses the term cases, and Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social
Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), refers
to observations. Both are referring to the same concept.
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CHAPTER III
ISRAEL
Israel has a sophisticated nuclear arsenal and delivery capability. It is estimated
that Israel has developed between one and two hundred nuclear weapons. This includes a
thermonuclear capability and tactical nuclear weapons. Israel has also developed
delivery mechanisms via land, air, and sea, giving it a second-strike capability.
Notwithstanding these capabilities, and a now widespread understanding that Israel is a
nuclear weapons state, Israeli leaders still neither publicly admit nor deny its nuclear
arsenal and instead reaffirm the longstanding commitment to not be the first state to
introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East.
Israel's ambiguous nuclear policy is largely the result ofIsraeli leaders balancing
countervailing external pressures from its patron state, the United States, and its regional
security requirements. The official Israeli nuclear policy was developed in the 1960s as a
result of U.S. non-proliferation pressures. Washington was concerned that an overt
Israeli nuclear program would further fuel conflict in the Middle East between the
regional states, and had the potential of becoming an internationalized problem ifit
spurred the Soviets to greater involvement in the area. As such, the U.S. formulated a
policy designed to fulfill its own foreign policy goals of dampening the Arab-Israeli
conflict through continued engagement in the region and promoting international non-
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proliferation. Washington first pressured Israel to give up its nuclear ambitions, and
failing that, to keep them hidden. To this end, the U.S. sought to inspect the Dimona
reactor, and publicly tie Israel to its statements that its nuclear program was for entirely
peaceful purposes.
It was under continued diplomatic pressure from the U.S. that Israeli leaders first
formulated the current policy, which was further refined to include promises that Israel
would not test nor declare itself a nuclear weapons state. The newly adopted posture in
the 1960s was further entrenched as the U.S. became a major supporter ofIsrael's
conventional systems through economic aid and military assistance. Because Israel's
security needs vis-a.-vis its regional adversaries were largely met through conventional
superiority, it could live with deterrence through uncertainty with an ambiguous posture.
In this way, opacity served as a useful compromise to both the Americans and Israelis
because it provided for the foreign policy goals of each.
While U.S. pressures directly resulted in the initial formulation ofIsrael's nuclear
policy, Israel's regional security environment also played a primary role in both creating
incentives for acquiring nuclear weapons and maintaining ambiguity. From its
independence, Israel has operated within a severe security environment with its early
years marked by wars with its surrounding neighbors. Israeli leaders chose to develop a
nuclear weapons capability with the intent that it would serve as a deterrent against
hostile Arab states in the Middle East, particularly in the face of an overwhelming
conventional coalition or the potential use of chemical or biological weapons.
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At the same time, as the policy of deliberate ambiguity developed, the Israelis
found it more advantageous to their strategic position to rely on U.S. economic and
military assistance, which assured conventional superiority and required less dependence
on nuclear deterrence. Israel's ambiguous nuclear posture also reduced incentives for
other Middle Eastern states to acquire nuclear weapons or call on the Soviets to intervene
on their behalf against a nuclear Israel. This in tum assisted Israel in maintaining the
conventional balance of power in its favor and its nuclear monopoly. Israel's opaque
nuclear posture has thus been maintained over time in response to both its relationship
with the United States and regional dynamics.
Further, the effects of international non-proliferation regime were not significant
in causing Israel to initially choosing its nuclear stance. The regime was in its infancy
during the time that Israel developed and achieved a nuclear option. Israel also avoided
NPT treaty commitments so that it would not be obligated to limit its nuclear
development. To the extent that the international non-proliferation regime mattered, it
was primarily based on direct U.S. pressures against proliferation in the form of
encouraging Israel to subject the Dimona reactor to inspections and safeguards, and
accede to the newly formed international non-proliferation agreements.
Additionally, there is not particularly strong evidence supporting the proposition
that Israel's nuclear posture is primarily the result of domestic political compromises.
While there was disagreement as to the security value of developing a nuclear option,
Israel's Prime Ministers behaved in a remarkably consistent fashion in furthering the
program at each stage as Israeli leaders grappled with overwhelming security concerns.
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Additionally, there is direct evidence that the current fonnulation came into existence
from diplomatic dialogue with the U.S., prior to Israel having actually achieved a nuclear
weapons capability.
Similarly, the evidence suggests that Israeli security planners marched forward in
developing a sophisticated nuclear arsenal, and considered a variety of scenarios in which
it would use nuclear weapons. This militates against the explanation that Israel's nuclear
ambiguity was the result of a strategic culture that ossified existing policy without further
reVIew.
The following details the above dynamics. The first section describes Israel's
ambiguous nuclear posture. This is followed by a discussion of U.S. patron state
pressures, regional incentives for nuclear weapons and ambiguity, the limited role of the
international non-proliferation regime, the contentious domestic politics at the time, and
the theory that continued ambiguity is at least in part based on Israel's strategic culture.
I. Description of Israeli Ambiguity
Notwithstanding Israel's estimated sophisticated nuclear arsenal, its official
stance has remained remarkably consistent for over forty years-that Israel will not be
the first state in the Middle East to introduce nuclear weapons. This is currently Israel's
nuclear policy, as settled on during diplomatic meetings between U.S. and Israeli
representatives during the 1960s, and often repeated by both sides throughout the ensuing
years.
Prior to this formulation, Israeli officials used various explanations for the
construction of the Dimona reactor. For example, U.S. requests for information about the
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facility were met with different explanations ranging from textile factories to
metallurgical research facilities. l Indeed, the inquiries reportedly led to the U.S.
receiving seven different explanations about the nature ofthe building.2
As Israel was under increasing pressure to justify constructing a new, more
powerful nuclear reactor, then Prime Minister Ben-Gurion publicly characterized the
Dimona facility as being designed "exclusively for peaceful purposes," like the American
provided Soreq 5 MW research reactor? By 1963, Prime Minister Eshkol's government
settled on the existing policy that Israel would not be the first state to introduce nuclear
weapons into the Middle East. Prime Ministers Golda Meir and Yitzhak Rabin provided
the exact same reassurance to the U.S. government.
Subsequently, no Israeli government has official strayed from this policy, through
either a declaration that Israel is a nuclear weapons state, or through publicly testing and
claiming responsibility for the latter. This distinction between official and unofficial
sources is important, to the extent that some former Israeli government leaders and
academics have argued for a more robust nuclear posture, based on the assumption that
Israel does indeed possess nuclear weapons.
I Zaki Shalom, Israel's Nuclear Option: Behind the Scenes Diplomacy Between Dimona and Washington
(Portland: Sussex Academic Press and Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 2005), 11.
2 Alan Dowty, "Israeli Perspectives on Nuclear Proliferation," in Security, Order, and the Bomb: Nuclear
Weapons in the Politics and Defence Planning of Non-Nuclear Weapon States, Johan Jorgen Host, ed.
(Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1972), 142.
3 Odgen R. Reid to State Department, "Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion's Responses to Questions
Asked in the Knesset Concerning a New Israeli Nuclear Reactor," 21 December 1960, Nuclear Non-
Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Proquest, 2008), no. NP00722, 1.
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For example, former Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan told the New York Times in
1981 that while Israel would not be the first state to introduce nuclear weapons into the
Middle East despite having the capability, it also "shouldn't be too late.,,4 Similarly,
writing in the early 1980s, scholar Shai Feldman has recommended that Israel have an
open nuclear posture for deterrence purposes.5 And by 1986, a former nuclear technician
who worked at Dimona, Mordechai Vanunu, provided photographs and information
about Israel's nuclear program. It has further been speculated that Israel participated in
an unclaimed, joint nuclear test with South Africa-the Vela incident-located in the
southern Indian Ocean in 1979.
The steadfast official Israeli response to these public airings ofIsrael's nuclear
program has been to stick to its official policy that Israel will not be the first state to
introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East. In short, Israel has never officially
acknowledged that it possesses nuclear weapons, and effectively does not deny it either.
Its stance, that it would not be the first to "introduce" nuclear weapons, left enough
ambiguity to serve the purpose of deterrence but also enabled it to avoid the costs of
openness, as discussed below.
II. Patron State Pressures: U.S.-Israeli Partnership in Opacity
Beginning in the early 1960s, the U.S. sought to use its influence with Israeli
leaders to persuade them to forego nuclear weapons. During this time, there was some
limited direct provision of conventional military assistance, which would increase
4 "Dayan Says Israelis Have The Capacity to Produce A-Bombs," New York Times (25 June 1981), AI.
5 See, e.g., Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1982).
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exponentially after the 1967 Six Day War, and again after the 1973 Yom Kippur War.
For its part, Israel first sought security guarantees from the U.S., which were unavailing.
Israeli security planners also sought to engage the U.S. to gain more access to economic
and military assistance, which would result in stronger relations over time.
But early on, from the late 1950s through the early 1960s, Israel was insecure and
this created a deep vulnerability to U.S. pressures even without the existing, relatively
weaker linkages. 6 Thus, U.S. pressure in the form of diplomacy, economic assistance,
and nascent military cooperation with the potential for increased assistance was
sufficiently strong to keep Israel's nuclear ambitions guarded, although it was not enough
to stop the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Stronger ties would be forged simultaneously
with the Israeli's developing nuclear capability from the mid-1960s through the early
1970s, further reinforcing Israel's nuclear posture and enabling Israel to rely mainly on
conventional forces.
The following discusses how the construction of the Dimona reactor sparked U.S.
concerns about nuclearizing the Middle East and increased Soviet intervention in the
region. In response, the U.S. undertook a number ofmeasures to minimize the effects of
the Israeli nuclear program on the region. This included pressuring Israel to open up
Dimona to inspections, and diplomatic measures linking the provision of U.S. aid to
Israeli nuclear restraint. In the end, Israel was willing to give up an overt posture and the
U.S. was willing to provide the Israelis with enough conventional support to minimize
6 The U.S. publicly refused to directly provide Israel with weapons until it sold some anti-aircraft missiles
as "defensive" weapons in 1962. However, during this time period the u.s. provided other states with
conventional assistance that was then funneled to Israel, as was planned.
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the circumstances in which they would publicly acknowledge a nuclear weapons
capability.
A. Israel's Nuclear Program Spurs U.S. Interest
From the beginning of the Israeli nuclear weapons program, secrecy was
paramount to shield the construction of the Dimona nuclear reactor. Later, as evidence
became increasingly available that the Dimona reactor would be capable of producing
weapons grade plutonium, U.S. concerns were heightened about Israeli nuclear
intentions. This led to U.S. actions to prevent Israel from developing nuclear weapons,
and failing that, to keep Israel's nuclear capability secret.
The construction of the Dimona reactor was necessary for the Israeli weapons
program and became the main source of contention between Israel and the U.S. Prior to
this, under the Atoms for Peace program in the late 1950s, the United States provided
Israel with the small 5 MW Soreq research reactor. U.S. supply and funding for this
facility was contingent on Israeli agreement to not produce plutonium for weapons and
was ultimately subject to IAEA safeguards. Interestingly, against some nuclear
scientists' wishes, Ben-Gurion "forbade using the American reactor to produce
plutonium, and ordered that the agreement be adhered to meticulously."? This suggests
that while Ben-Gurion was determined to pursue a nuclear option against foreseeable
American objection, he would not do so at all costs. As such, the Israelis needed to find
7 Michael Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement: How Israel Went Nuclear and What That Means for the
World (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2006), 55.
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an alternate source to support their nuclear weapons program with plutonium. They
turned to France for assistance. 8
Israel and France signed a secret agreement to build the Dimona reactor in the
Negev desert. Both states sought to keep the contract private, in part, to keep the
activities hidden from the Americans until the reactor was far enough along that it would
be a fait accompli. This was because the U.S. could exert political pressure on both states
to forego the contract if it became public. The initial secrecy regarding the construction
of the reactor thus helped to shield it from interference. To this end, France and Israel
were successful in keeping the project hidden from public purview for several years from
1957-1960. However, the surrounding secrecy would be an issue once the project was
visible, requiring both an Israeli explanation as to the purpose of the reactor as well as
justification of why it was kept hidden from the rest of the world.
By 1960, the first documented hint of suspicion regarding Israeli nuclear
intentions came from the U.S. embassy in Israel. The U.S. embassy personnel reported
that the Israelis "may be pursuing the exploitation of its uranium resources more actively
that it is publically {sic} willing to admit.,,9 Moreover, the ongoing construction on the
Dimona reactor could not be kept hidden forever. It soon became apparent that Israel
was building a nuclear reactor in the desert and the United States was immediately
8 France was also a major conventional weapons supplier to Israel early on. And because France during
this early period had few proliferation reservations, it was not a significant source of patron state pressure
on Israel to remain ambiguous.
9 James M. Ealum to U.S. Department of State, "Israel's Uranium Potential," Israel, 26 August 1960,
Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Proquest, 2008), no.
NP0067l,2.
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suspicious as to the nuclear weapons potential of the reactor. For example, U.S.
intelligence received a report in December 1960, at the end of the Eisenhower
administration, suggesting that, "'Israel, with French assistance is building a powerful
nuclear reactor in the Negev, with the intention of producing weapons-grade
plutonium. ",10
U.S. suspicions were further aroused, not only by the physical contours of the
developing reactor, but also by the Israeli and French silence as to the nature and purpose
of the project. This silence portended in the American mind the potential for a source for
nuclear weapons, not withstanding subsequent Israeli denials. As reported to the Foreign
Affairs Committee of the U.S. Congress, the Dimona reactor has:
"been a disturbing element in the whole Middle East picture, largely
because of the fact that this reactor apparently has been under construction
for some time without anything public having been said about it.
Certainly we had never been told about it, even though we have
cooperated with Israel on the building of a small nuclear experimental
reactor.. .it is considerably larger than any need for an experimental
reactor in Israel, but the present statements of the Israeli Government are
that this is still experimental, leading to a power reactor."JJ
With President Eisenhower on his way out, it would be left to the incoming
Kennedy administration to formulate a strategy to address the implications stemming
from the Dimona reactor. And because President Kennedy was concerned about limiting
the nuclear arms race, he would pay significant attention to Israel's nuclear aspirations as
10 Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, 146. There is some suggestion that this was a way to leak the
information to the U.S. without angering the French. Ibid. 147.
II Christain A. Herter, Jr., "Regarding Israel's Nuclear Capability," statement to U.S. Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, 6 January 1961, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security
Archive and Proquest, 2008), no. NP00739, 4.
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part of his foreign policy agenda. 12 Stemming from these U.S. concerns, the two
countries would engage in an intensive dialogue that would set the basis for Israel's
calculated policy ofnuclear ambiguity.
At the beginning of this conversation, the U.S. privately demanded explanations
for the new Israeli facility. These requests for information were met with various
explanations that reportedly ranged from textile factories to metallurgical research
facilities. 13 Indeed, the inquiries reportedly led to the U.S. receiving seven different
explanations about the nature of the building. 14
The United States was not the only curious observer of the Dimona progress.
Shortly after the U.S. began detecting the Dimona construction, the inevitable media
reports began to filter out that the Israelis were building the reactor. Israel responded by
denying that the reactor was for anything but "peaceful purposes." For example, in
responding to a London Daily Express article, the Israeli press quoted Chairman of the
Israeli AEC, Ernest Bergmann, denying that Israel was approaching the stage of
producing atomic bomb as "flattering but false" and "grossly exaggerated.,,15 Other
denials suggested that the article was "absurd.,,16 The Israeli Embassy in London further
issued a flat denial that Israel had neither the means nor the intent to make a bomb. l7
12 Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, 180.
13 Shalom, Israel's Nuclear Option, 11.
14 Dowty, "Israeli Perspectives on Nuclear Proliferation," 142.
15 Ogden R. Reid to State Department, "Israeli Press Reports on Alleged Nuclear Power Plant
Construction," 18 December 1960, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security
Archive and Proquest, 2008), no. NP007l8, 1.
16 Reid, "Israeli Press Reports on Alleged Nuclear Power Plant Construction," no. NP007l8, 1.
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Similarly, shortly after media reports about the reactor, Prime Minister Ben-
Gurion publicly answered Knesset questions. There he framed the Dimona reactor as
being "like the American reactor, is designed exclusively for peaceful purposes, and was
constructed under the direction oflsraeli experts.,,18 Ben-Gurion further stated that "[t]he
Government of Israel, as is well-known, proposed general and total disarmament in Israel
and neighboring Arab states, on condition that there would be a mutual right of
inspection.,,19 At the same time, while emphasizing the peaceful purposes of the reactor,
Israeli officials stressed that it was a small country in terms of means and population and
did not have the capability of realizing a nuclear weapons capability.20 Israeli denials
that it lacked the capability to produce nuclear weapons would be dropped over time and
replaced with suggestions that it lacked the intention.
As Israel began to publicly acknowledge that Dimona was a nuclear reactor, but
deny its nuclear weapons aspirations, this development was significant enough that it
required a response from the United States. In anticipation of Ben-Gurion's
announcement before the Knesset about Israel's peaceful nuclear program, the U.S.
government prepared the standard public statement that would be carefully adhered to in
subsequent years. Mainly, the United States would seek to reaffirm its non-proliferation
17 Reid, "Israeli Press Reports on Alleged Nuclear Power Plant Construction," no. NP00718, 1.
18 Reid, "Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion's Responses to Questions Asked in the Knesset
Concerning a New Israeli Nuclear Reactor," no. NP00722, 1. Here, France escapes suspicion.
19 Reid, "Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion's Responses to Questions Asked in the Knesset
Concerning a New Israeli Nuclear Reactor," no. NP00722, 2.
20 Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, 100.
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interests while distancing itself from the Israeli program to avoid any suggestion that
Washington was colluding with Israel.
For example, prepared comments noted that "[i]t is firmly established and well-
known United States policy that we oppose the proliferation of nuclear weapons
throughout the world, and out law does not permit us to assist other countries to develop
nuclear weapons capabilities.,,21 Rather, the extent of U.S. assistance was limited to the
small Soreq research reactor under the Atoms for Peace program, which the U.S.
participated in with many countries throughout the world. In this way, Washington could
avoid "being drawn into implications of...U.S. association with an alleged Israeli
weapons program.,,22 Additionally, the U.S. publicly welcomed the Israeli statements
that the program was entirely for peaceful purposes. In subsequent negotiations, U.S.
diplomacy would seek to hold Israel to its public and private comments that it did not
intend to produce nuclear weapons. This approach would enable the U.S. to continue to
publicly push for non-proliferation measures and Middle East peace.
Indeed, this public fayade adopted by the United States would be maintained even
as U.S. knowledge and suspicion ofIsrael's nuclear intentions became more certain over
time. For example, by 1964 the Johnson administration had information that "Israel now
has the technical capability to develop a bomb... [it] could detonate its first nuclear device
21 U.S. Department of State, "Suggested Press Guidance for Chairman McCone if Asked About Reported
Israeli Atomic Weapons Development," secret, 17 December 1960, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington
D.C.: The National Security Archive and Proquest, 2008), no. NP00717, 1.
22 U.S. Department of State, "Suggested Press Guidance for Chairman McCone if Asked About Reported
Israeli Atomic Weapons Development," no. NP00717, 2.
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two to three years after a decision to develop a weapons capability.,,23 Even more
evidence had accumulated by 1968 with continued Dimona secrecy, the inability to fully
inspect the reactor, suspected pilfering of nuclear materials by Israel, continued nuclear
cooperation with France, and Israel's own acknowledgement that it had the ability to
produce fission explosives.24
Nonetheless, the United States did not seek to publicly confront Israel about its
nuclear ambitions. Instead it chose to pressure Israel in private, combining threats and
inducements to first seek to prevent Israel from going nuclear, and failing that, to keep its
capability hidden from public purview. These private efforts to dissuade Israel from
going nuclear created tensions between the two states until it was resolved. As Rabin
noted in his memoirs, "[t]he nuclear issue for many years lay like a disturbing shadow
over the relations between Israel and the United States.,,25
Ultimately, these efforts at a behind the scenes resolution resulted in the initial
policy of Israeli opacity that continues today. The following details why leadership in
Washington was opposed to a public Israeli nuclear capability and the measures the U.S.
took to influence Israeli leaders to prevent public disclosure of the nuclear weapons
program.
23 U.S. Department of State, "Background Paper on Factors Which Could Influence National Decisions
Concerning Acquisition ofNuclear Weapons," 12 December 1964, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington
D.C.: The National Security Archive and Proquest, 2008), no. NPOI079, 17-18.
24 Peter Pry, Israel's Nuclear Arsenal (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984),40.
25 Quoted in Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, 301.
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B. U.S. Opposition to Israeli Nuclear Proliferation
The evidence suggests that the United State was deeply concerned with the
prospect of an Israeli nuclear weapons program, fearing that it would have both regional
and international ramifications. In particular, Washington believed that Israeli nuclear
weapons would further fuel conflict in the Middle East by increasing Arab state
incentives to acquire nuclear weapons, and may have triggered an attack on the Israeli
facilities that could spill into a broader conflict. Moreover, the United States, with its
stance clearly lodged in non-proliferation, would lose whatever influence it was seeking
to cultivate in the Middle East, to possibly be replaced by the Soviet Union that might
have been willing to provide nuclear guarantees or assistance. While these fears were not
realized, they were a source of anxiety for U.S. officials and the reasons for pressuring
the Israelis in an effort to convince them to forego a nuclear program.
1. Regional Middle East Concerns
Generally, Washington was concerned that the continued horizontal spread of
nuclear weapons would undermine U.S. efforts to curb proliferation. Additionally, the
United States feared that the introduction of nuclear weapons into the Middle East by
Israel would have profound regional implications by increasing the propensity for
conflict. As the Johnson administration noted, the "[p]roduction of nuclear weapons and
delivery capabilities may complicate or endanger the political stability within a region,
yielding undesirable playback effects on the country that goes the national nuclear
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route.,,26 Because the U.S. sought at this time to remain neutral between the states in the
Middle East, as well as prevent the Soviets from gaining influence in the region,
Washington feared that nuclear weapons would substantially complicate this balance.
First, the United States was interested in preventing the spread of nuclear
weapons generally, and more specifically in the Middle East. An open Israeli nuclear
program ran counter to this policy because it increased the incentives for regional Arab
states to acquire their own nuclear capability as a counter. Further, while the other states
in the region were not immediately capable of creating a comparable indigenous
program, they could seek assistance from other states to supplement their technical
deficiencies. Another option for the Arab states was to seek a nuclear guarantee from the
Soviet Union. From the U.S. perspective, this possible continued widening of the Cold
War to the Middle East with a nuclear dimension could have significant international
implications, which it sought to avoid.
Second, there were substantial concerns that an Israeli introduction of weapons
into the regional landscape would increase the propensity for direct conflict through
preventive war. One scenario is that Egypt would attack the Dimona facility to neutralize
the nuclear program and thereby spark a wider war. For its part, Egyptian responses to
Dimona further heightened this concern on behalf of the United States. For example,
Egypt's Nasser indicated that if Israel was producing nuclear weapons, he would
necessarily have to launch a '''protective war. ",27 In 1965, the Israeli nuclear program
26 Walt W. Rostow, "A Way of Thinking About Nuclear Proliferation," 19 November 1964, Nuclear Non-
Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Proquest, 2008), no. NPOI046, 3.
27 Shalom, Israel's Nuclear Option, 57.
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was declared by Egypt as a casus belli, with "[p]reventive war is the only way to preempt
the acquisition of nuclear might by Israel.,,28 The United States government appeared to
take these statements seriously, noting that "for its own survival, the UAR probably sees
advantages in preventing the use of nuclear weapons, and therefore also their introduction
into the area.,,29
For these reasons, the United States has sought to prevent an Arab-Israeli war
caused by Israel's nuclear program?O One of the first approaches the U.S. would take
was to reassure Nasser of Israel's peaceful nuclear intentions. At the same time, the
United States would pressure Israel to open up its facilities for inspection for the purpose
of demonstrating that Israel was not building nuclear weapons?! This strategy, the U.S.
argued, was in both its own and Israel's interest in order to protect the Dimona facility
from attack and prevent the Soviets from assisting Egypt. 32
While the United States was concerned about Arab state responses to Israel's
nuclear program, U.S. leaders also felt that Israel was disregarding these potential
problems in its pursuit of a nuclear option. As such, Washington would seek to highlight
its regional concerns in an effort to dissuade a public Israeli nuclear capability. At the
28 Shlomo Aronson, Israel's Nuclear Programme, the Six Day War and its Ramifications (London: King's
College, 1999),28, citing Jumhuria (Cairo), translated by Hazav, Israeli Intelligence Translation Service,
(March 12, 1966).
29 Aronson, Israel's Nuclear Programme, 30.
30 Aronson, Israel's Nuclear Programme, 4.
31 U.S. fears in this regard are helpful in keeping the U.S. engaged and also putting pressure on Israel. That
is, Nasser had every incentive to fuel these fears.
32 Shalom, Israel's Nuclear Option, 77.
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same time, this strategy was designed to refrain from putting so much pressure on Israel
as to damage the relationship between Washington and Tel Aviv. As Rostow suggested
under the Johnson administration,
"[w]ith respect to Israel, the familiar question is whether there is a
combination of stick and carrot, ofpressure and reassurance, we can
mount without wrecking either our relation to Israel or our tenuous links to
the Arabs. A heightening of Israeli anxiety about an Arab nuclear
capability is an asset we can and should use.,,33
Similarly, the U.S. also sought to bring to the Israel's attention American concerns over
the potential for Soviet nuclear involvement in the Middle East.
2. Risk of Soviet Nuclear Assistance or Intervention on Behalf of
Arab States
The United States was also very concerned that the Israeli nuclear program would
cause the Arab states to seek atomic cooperation with Soviet Union. As noted at the time
to the U.S. Foreign Affairs Committee, the Israeli nuclear program "[r]ight or wrong, it
throws all the Arab States {sic} over to the Russian side of the fence," which has
"introduced a new element into the whole Middle East, which is a disquieting element.,,34
Similarly, Dean Rusk advised then President Kennedy that "Israel's acquisition of
nuclear weapons would have grave repercussions in the Middle East, not the least of
33 Rostow, "A Way of Thinking About Nuclear Proliferation," no. NP01046, 17.
34 Herter, "Regarding Israel's Nuclear Capability," no. NP00739, 5.
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which might be the probable stationing of Soviet nuclear weapons on the soil ofIsrael's
embittered Arab neighbors.,,35
From the U.S. policymaker perspective, "we just can't imagine anything more
disastrous from our point of view than ifIsrael were to explode a nuclear device. I can't
think of anything that would drive the Arab world more tumultuously into the arms of the
Soviet.,,36 While Rusk acknowledged that Israel's Prime Minister Ben-Gurion had made
both public and private reassurances to the U.S. that the Israelis "committed themselves
categorically,,37 to not making nuclear weapons. However, there was still concern about
the effects of the Dimona reactor on regional states because Israel had not sooner
revealed its progress on the facility, nor opened it up for inspections.
Of the Arab states, Egypt was one of the most likely at the time to have a strong
incentive to acquire a nuclear capability in response to Israel. However, Egypt did not
have the indigenous ability to create a weapons option; this would necessitate turning to
an external benefactor. The United States feared that the most likely Egyptian patron
would be the Soviet Union. For example, in 1963 the United State predicted that the
UAR "alone or in combination with other Arab States, does not have the capability of
producing a nuclear weapon in the foreseeable future ... If Nasser could not devise a
35 Dean Rusk to President John F. Kennedy, "Israel's Atomic Energy Activities," secret memorandum, 30
January 1961, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Proquest,
2008), no. NP00745, 1.
36 Herter, "Regarding Israel's Nuclear Capability," no. NP00739, 8.
37 Herter, "Regarding Israel's Nuclear Capability," no. NP00739, 8.
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counter to an Israeli nuclear threat on his own, he probably would tum to the USSR to try
to ensure his protection." 38
Moreover, the United States feared that it would be seen as being in collusion
with the Israelis if Washington did not take some steps to stop the nuclear program. Not
only would this further tilt the Arab states towards the Soviets, but could exacerbate
tensions in the Middle East. For example, the 1963 National Security Estimate suggested
that "the Arabs would blame the West, including the US, for the increased Israeli threat ..
.. In an atmosphere of this kind, there would always be the possibility that one or the
other side would initiate hostile action to safeguard its ultimate security.,,39 Moreover,
with both U.S. and Soviet involvement, there was the additional problem that a regional
conflict had the potential of becoming international.
These concerns further prompted each presidential administration to quietly sit on
any subsequently acquired information about the Israeli nuclear program. For example,
in 1968 CIA director Richard Helms reportedly informed President Johnson that Israel
had atomic bombs.4o President Johnson's response was to order "Helms not to tell
anyone else, not even the secretaries of state and defense," given the concern of how the
Arab states and Soviets would respond to such news.41
38 Central Intelligence Agency, "The Advanced Weapons Programs of the UAR and Israel," heavily
excised secret National Intelligence Estimate, 8 May 1963, Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington
D.C.: The National Security Archive and Proquest, 2008), no. WM00059, 6.
39 Central Intelligence Agency, "The Advanced Weapons Programs of the UAR and Israel," no. WM00059,
6.
40 Pry, Israel's Nuclear Arsenal, 40.
41 Pry, Israel's Nuclear Arsenal, 40.
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Not only would Washington refuse to publicly divulge information it had about
the Israeli nuclear program, but it also pressured Israeli leaders into keeping the program
hidden. While the United States understood the security rationale behind the Israeli
development of a nuclear option, Washington feared that this
"narrow but intense anxiety brings the Israelis close to the point of
ignoring the negative arguments of a general pacific kind; and the possible
playback effects of what it does on the decision of Cairo. It does not
contemplate a confrontation with one of the superpowers; and, therefore,
the relationship with the U.S. and possible damage to that relationship are
the only major restraints on proceeding to achieve a national nuclear
capability.,,42
That is, since the Israelis did not fully appreciate the dangers of its nuclear program on
regional and international dynamics to Washington's satisfaction, the United States
would use its relationship as leverage with Israelis in order to dampen the effects of the
program.
c. U.S. Policy Towards Israel's Nuclear Program
Given U.S. concerns outlined above, Washington formulated a policy designed to
pressure the Israelis to give up their nuclear ambitions, or at least to minimize the
repercussions by keeping it out of public purview. Publicly, the U.S. would accept
Israel's stance that the Dimona reactor was only for peaceful purposes. The U.S. also
sought to reassure regional Arab states initially that the reactor was as Israel represented
it to be. Privately, the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon presidential administrations would
seek to use a combination of inspections and conventional and economic assistance
linkages to discourage Israeli proliferation.
42 Rostow, "A Way ofThinking About Nuclear Proliferation," no. NP01046, 12.
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Nonetheless, while Washington hoped that these measures would be enough for
Israeli leaders to forego nuclear development, the U.S. was also not willing to impose
substantial enough pressure to rupture its relationship with Israel. For its part, Israel was
at the time vulnerable to U.S. pressures given its need for both conventional military
weapons and economic support, but still determined to acquire the ultimate insurance.
The result was a compromise between Tel Aviv and Washington that settled on the policy
of nuclear opacity.
The following details U.S. efforts to provide assurances to other states as to
Israel's nuclear intentions, while at the same time seeking influence Israeli nuclear
policy. The U.S. did this by seeking inspection rights to the Dimona reactor, increasing
the provision of conventional arms to Israel under the justification that if the latter felt
secure it would not need nuclear weapons, and highlighting to Israeli leaders the expense
of a nuclear weapons program.
1. Downplay Rumors & Provide Reassurances
Given Washington's concerns that nuclear weapons would proliferate in the
Middle East and further destabilize the region, U.S. officials sought to publicly downplay
to the rest of the world the significance of the Dimona reactor. Additionally, Washington
sought to reassure the Arab states in the Middle East that the U.S. took nuclear
proliferation seriously. Vital to these early efforts was keeping the issue out of the public
eye and to quell media reports.
The Kennedy administration first formulated this strategy in response to Ben-
Gurion's public acknowledgement ofthe Dimona reactor to the Knesset. After Ben-
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Gurion's Knesset appearance, the State Department issued a statement in response that
the United States welcomed the Government ofIsrael's statements concerning the
peaceful character of Israeli atomic energy activities and that Israel had no intention of
producing nuclear weapons.43 The State Department further indicated in a careful
statement that it believed that the "Israel atomic energy program as made public does not
represent cause for special concern.,,44 In doing so, the U.S. publicly accepted the official
Israel position on the reactor.
Nonetheless, from the U.S. perspective, the sooner the public's interest in Dimona
waned, the better. Kennedy reportedly met with Ben-Gurion and indicated that it was in
both states' common interests that other countries did not believe that Israel was
proliferating.45 As articulated at home, the Kennedy administration did not believe that,
"the extended public speculation regarding the Israeli atomic energy
program will advance the interests of the United States, and we have taken
and will continue to take any feasible measure to damp down speculation
on this matter and in particular to avoid giving occasion for renewed
suspicions and possible undesirable reactions in the Arab world. We
believe that persistent but quiet diplomatic approaches are most likely to
be productive.,,46
Consistent with this approach, the U.S. government instructed its diplomatic corps
to reassure host governments that there was little cause for excitement over the press
43 Christian A. Herter, "Press Guidance for Discussion oflsraeli Nuclear Energy Activities," 22 December
1960, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Proquest, 2008),
no. NP00726, 2-3.
44 Herter, "Press Guidance for Discussion oflsraeli Nuclear Energy Activities," no. NP00726, 3.
45 Shalom, Israel's Nuclear Option, 29.
46 William B. Macomber to James T. Ramey, "Additional Recent Information on the Israeli Atomic Energy
Program," 19 January 1961, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive
and Proquest, 2008), no. NP00744, 1-2.
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reports of the Israeli reactor. For example, one set of instructions read: "FYI. Dept
considerably disturbed by large amount of info re USG interest in Israel's atomic
program which has leaked into American and world press. Effect has been to create more
excitement than facts as revealed by Israelis warrant. Dept will do what it can in
Washington and hopes addressee posts can assist in stilling atmosphere.',47
At the same time, the United States wanted to distance itself from Dimona and
underscore its commitment to non-proliferation. Specifically the United States sought to
impress on other countries that it was not involved with the Dimona reactor and that
Israel was not a special case that would be ignored. Rather, "the United States
Government at all levels, including the highest, takes serious view of the Israeli nuclear
activity and is determined to oppose the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities as
firmly in Israel as elsewhere.,,48 Washington also stated that its nuclear assistance was
limited to the Soreq research reactor, the kind that the U.S. government had assisted 30
other countries with.49 To further assuage fears and put the reactor in context, the United
States government also suggested that Dimona was smaller than many others currently
being built, including facilities being constructed by India.5o Reportedly, the initial
announcement by Ben-Gurion that the reactor was for peaceful purposes and subsequent
47 Herter, "Press Guidance for Discussion ofIsraeli Nuclear Energy Activities," no. NP00726, 3.
48 Dean Rusk, "U.S. Government Is Committed at Every Level to Stopping Nuclear Proliferation In Israel
and Elsewhere," 3 March 1961, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security
Archive and Proquest, 2008), no. NP00755, 1.
49 Herter, "Press Guidance for Discussion ofIsraeli Nuclear Energy Activities," no. NP00726, 1.
50 Rusk, "U.S. Government Is Committed at Every Level to Stopping Nuclear Proliferation In Israel and
Elsewhere," no. NP00755, 2.
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U.S. efforts to downplay the significance ofDimona had the desired effect of taking the
"pressures off the Arabs to achieve a balancing atomic capability."sl
Still, the secrecy surrounding Dimona would continue to foster suspicion. This
prompted the U.S. to continue to pressure Israel to open up the facility to inspections.
Moreover, by keeping the issue simmering below public purview, the United States and
Israel were able to engage in the quiet diplomacy that protected U.S. non-proliferation
interests while allowing the Israelis to come to terms with the regional and international
implications oftheir program. For the United States, the first item on the diplomatic
agenda was to directly pressure Israel into allowing inspection of the Dimona reactor.
2. Direct Pressure on Israel
Following Ben-Gurion' s characterization of the Dimona reactor in the Knesset
as for peaceful purposes, the United States sought to tie Israel to this claim by inspecting
the reactor and verifying these intentions. While the U.S. had some success doing so
initially, overtime and as the Israelis further developed a weapons capacity, it not longer
became a feasible option for both governments.
As the United States ultimately gave up pushing for further inspections and
accepted that the facility would not be subject to IAEA safeguards, U.S. policymakers
considered a variety ofmeasures that might induce Israel to forego a nuclear weapons
option. For example, they considered the efficacy of a formal security guarantee,
coordinating a U.S.-Israeli contingency plan against possible Arab attack, limiting UAR
51 Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, 189.
87
missile development and applying IAEA safeguards at UAR nuclear facilities, as well as
economic and political sanctions.52
Still, despite strong U.S. interests in non-proliferation, some of the above tools
were not practical or feasible in the long run. The United States wanted to maintain a
good relationship with Israel while at the same time fostering better ties with the Arab
states. The purpose of maintaining this balance was to reduce the propensity for conflict
in the Middle East while at the same time preventing the Soviets from gaining increased
influence in the region. As such, the United States could neither provide absolutely for
Israel's security nor could it exert all leverage available to it to convince the Israeli
leaders to not develop a nuclear option. As U.S. policymakers recognized early on, "[t]he
need for the US to maintain a position of balance between the Arabs and Israel in order to
be able to exert a moderating influence on Near East tensions, reduces our ability to
provide these inducements or apply these sanctions.,,53 The result was that the U.S.
applied "rather fine-grained attempts" to apply pressure on Israel on an "ad hoc" basis54
rather than employing the entire arsenal of tools available.
As such, U.S. conventional weapons and economic assistance remained the
primary sources of leverage for convincing the Israelis to maintain an opaque nuclear
posture. As summarized from the U.S. government perspective,
52 U.S. Department of State, "Background Paper on Factors Which Could Influence National Decisions
Concerning Acquisition ofNuclear Weapons," no. NPOI079, 20.
53 U.S. Department of State, "Background Paper on Factors Which Could Influence National Decisions
Concerning Acquisition ofNuclear Weapons," no. NPOl079, 20.
54 Rostow, "A Way of Thinking About Nuclear Proliferation," no. NP01046, 1. Rostow characterized U.S.
efforts as not apply extensive pressure. This is different than later statements but suggests that the U.S.
utilized some the tools it had, but did not use all of them for maximum effect. There is also the difference
from candid characterization and that relayed to the Israelis.
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"the intensity of USG opposition to nuclear proliferation has been
forcefully brought home to Israel frequently and recently, together with
the realization that the development of an Israel nuclear weapon would
lead to sharp displeasure accompanied by severe curtailment of the
American support in other fields which Israel needs so badly.,,55
As it turned out, while such pressure was not enough to stop the Israel nuclear weapons
program, it was sufficient to keep it opaque.
The following discusses the formative years of the Israeli program and U.S.
efforts to persuade the Israelis not to publicly declare itself a nuclear weapons state when
it had the capacity. The evidence suggests that both the U.S. and Israel struggled with a
formula that would meet both countries countervailing interests. The result over the
course of several years was an understanding between the two countries that Israel would
not give up its nuclear option, but would refrain from being the first country in the
Middle East to introduce nuclear weapons.
a) Dimona Reactor Inspections
After the revelation that Israel was building a reactor in the Negev desert with
French assistance, the U.S. under President Kennedy began an earnest dialogue to
convince Israeli to forgo a nuclear weapons option. In contrast to the American assisted
Soreq facility, which was subjected to U.S. oversight and governed by a bi-lateral
agreement that prohibited military use,56 the Dimona reactor had no such restrictions
55 William N. Dale to State Department, "Current Status of the Dimona Reactor," 9 April 1965, Nuclear
Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Proquest, 2008), no. NPOll14, 1.
56 U.S. Department of Defense, "Public Affairs Guidance l4C - Israel Nuclear Reactors," 6 January 1961,
Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Proquest, 2008), no.
NP00738,2.
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from any state, including France. The concern of course, was that Dimona facility would
be capable when it became operational ofproducing weapons grade plutonium, which
could be used in an explosion of a nuclear device.57 As such, the Kennedy administration
wanted access to Dimona to verify that it was indeed what the Israelis represented-that
it was designed for peaceful nuclear energy and not to build weapons.
The primary tactic the administration used was to urge the Israelis to grant
visitation and inspection rights to the new facility. Initially, the U.S. plan was to pressure
Israel to place Dimona under international safeguards when it became operationa1.58 As
reasoned by the Kennedy administration:
It would seem to us that if in fact Ben Gurion is telling truth in his
statement to Knesset and Israeli Ambassador's reply to Secretary, most
effective manner by which Israel could allay hysterical Arab suspicions
would be for Israel to invite International Atomic Energy Organization to
send inspectors to check out the Beersheba reactor and report that it is
solely used for peaceful purposes. Here there might also be opportunity
for exercise of principle of continuous, effective inspection which is key
element in our proposals for control of armaments. 59
The Israelis quickly rejected the prospect of general international inspection. Tel Aviv
reasoned in its general response that "[w]hile Israel accepts the general principle of
international safeguards to assure the peaceful use of atomic energy, it believes also in
57 Herter, "Regarding Israel's Nuclear Capability," no. NP00739, 8.
58 Herter, "Regarding Israel's Nuclear Capability," no. NP00739, 9.
59 Robert M. McClintock to State Department, "Israeli Invitation to the IAEA to Visit Nuclear Power Sites
Would Allay Arab Fears," 27 December 1960, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National
Security Archive and Proquest, 2008), no. NP00731, 1.
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equality; thus it does not propose to open the Dimona reactor to international inspection
until such inspection applies to comparable reactors everywhere.,,6o
As Israel was unwilling to subject the facility to international safeguards, this
mainly left the option of informal visits by American scientists. It was difficult for Israel
to deny access to U.S. scientists given their public representations about the nature of the
facility. Further, from the Kennedy administration's perspective, if the reactor was
indeed for peaceful purposes, the inspections would serve the important function of
allowing the U.S. to reassure the Arab states. The administration further hoped that such
inspections would allow for continuing oversight in accordance with U.S. non-
proliferation goals.
Starting with the Kennedy administration, Washington was able to negotiate a
series of informal visits to Dimona by American scientists from 1961 through 1969.
Once some limited visits were conducted, the United States used the reported information
to then reassure other regional states ofIsrael's benign nuclear intention. For example,
after a visit in the spring of 1961, the U.S. concluded that that "Dimona project appeared
of type and magnitude described publicly by Israe1. .. our experts found no evidence
Israelis preparing produce weapons. We noted, accordingly, that observations US
scientists tended to support public and private assurances re peaceful intent Dimona
project. We further noted that highest levels this government opposed to proliferation
nuclear weapons production capabilities and had so informed Israe1.,,61 Similarly, after a
60 Macomber, "Additional Recent Information on the Israeli Atomic Energy Program," no. NP00744, 4.
61 Dean Rusk to U.S. Embassies, "Israel's Dimona Reactor," 31 October 1962, Nuclear Non-Proliferation
(Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Proquest, 2008), no. NP00922, 1.
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visit the following year, Washington reported that "[r]ecently there has been a further
visit by American scientists to Dimona reactor. This enables us to renew statements of
June 1961 that latest observations again confirm Israeli statements that reactor intended
for peaceful purposes only. There NO repeat NO evidence of preparation for nuclear
weapons production. ,,62
Nonetheless, the inspections were contentious and short-lived. By June 1965, the
u.s. visits were being publicly picked up by the press,63 which would further hasten the
demise of the inspections. The Israelis resented the now public intrusion on their
sovereignty and suggestions were rife that American scientists were not actually privy to
Dimona's real purpose as the visits were carefully structured. Eventually, by the Nixon
administration, Washington stopped requesting the visits. This change in American
policy was viewed by some as tacit acceptance that Israel was continuing with its nuclear
plans and the U.S. could not longer pretend otherwise. From the U.S. perspective, there
were concerns that if Israel were engaged in nuclear weapons activities that were not
detected by U.S. inspections, then the U.S. would be implicated if the nuclear activities
then became public.64
62 Rusk, "Israel's Dimona Reactor," no. NP00922, 1.
63 George W. Ball to U.S. Embassies, "U.S. Inspections Verify That The Israeli Reactors Are For Peaceful
Purposes Only," 28 June 1965, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security
Archive and Proquest, 2008), no. NPO1171, 1.
64 Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today, (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1984),375.
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b) Conventional Weapons Linkages
With prospects for the inspection regime dimming, U.S. presidential
administrations also sought to link U.S. supplied conventional weapons to Israel's
nuclear posture. It was rationalized that Israel would be less willing to develop a nuclear
weapons option if they were more secure in conventional terms. Moreover, the implicit
threat that the U.S. could stop cooperating in the face of a public nuclear weapons
program was clearly understood by Israeli leaders.
Since its independence, Israel has faced a severe security environment in the
Middle East. With neighbors that threatened its existence, and the threat of a potentially
overwhelming conventional coalition from its adversaries, Israeli leaders pursued the
nuclear option as a weapon of last resort. While the United States did not embrace Israeli
nuclear deterrence as a preferred strategy, the leaders in Washington appeared to
understand the security reasons motivating Israel to develop a nuclear capability. For
example, U.S. officials understood that,
"[i]n the case of Israel the argument for the development of a national
nuclear capability is almost uniquely military; that is, as a reserve
deterrent power in a moment of desperate confrontation with Cairo. In
particular, the Israeli, with their extraordinarily heightened sense of
vulnerability, are worried about an Arab attack conducted so swiftly as to
make U.S. or Western support too late to be effective.,,65
It made sense, then, from an American perspective, that any efforts to convince
the Israelis to forego the nuclear option would have to necessarily address its military
insecurity. As the CIA reported, "there would be a better than even chance that Israel
65 Rostow, "A Way of Thinking About Nuclear Proliferation," no. NP01046, 12.
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would develop such weapons ifit felt that it was unable to maintain its military
superiority over the Arabs.,,66
As previously discussed, a formal guarantee from the U.S. was not an option from
the leaders in Washington who also hoped to cultivate cooperation with the Arab states.
Additionally, it became less and less likely over time that Israel would sacrifice its
nuclear ambitions for any guarantees, fearing that such promises would not come to
fruition in the height of a crisis, or would come too late. Succinctly stated, Tel Aviv did
not "consider present US assurances adequate to protect Israel against attack.,,67
As such, the primary channel through which the United States could exert
pressure, or provide reassurances, was through the provision of conventional military
assistance. By arranging to supply the Israelis with conventional weapons, Washington
hoped to open an avenue of influence that entailed both inducements and threats. The
logic was that if Israel felt that it had conventional superiority over its neighbors, then it
would not be forced to rely on a nuclear deterrent. Further, as the Americans correctly
understood, the Israelis sought "a close military association with the United States to
supplement its independent military deterrent. ,,68 In short, the hope was that "providing
for Israel's conventional military needs would result in two major benefits to the United
States: it would endow Israel with a sufficient deterrent capability that would reduce the
66 Central Intelligence Agency, "Nuclear Weapons Programs Around the World," 3 December 1964,
Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Proquest, 2008), no.
WM00093, 11.
67 State Department, "Background Paper on Factors Which Could Influence National Decisions Concerning
Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons," no. NP01079, 19.
68 U.S. Department of State, "Background Paper on Factors Which Could Influence National Decisions
Concerning Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons," no. NP01079, 19.
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danger of an Arab-initiated attack, and this in turn would lower Israel's motivation for
developing a nuclear option.,,69
Consistent with this approach, both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations
simultaneously provided increased conventional weapons assistance while also seeking to
minimize Israeli efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. For example, under the Kennedy
administration, the United States sold HAWK-SAM missiles to Israel as an inducement
to steer them away from nuclear weapons development.?O Assistance would grow under
the Johnson administration as he hoped to allay Israeli "fears of the Arabs and oftheir
precarious military situation so that they would tum away from the bomb."?! As such,
Washington also directly sold Israel offensive weapons with forty-eight Skyhawk planes
and two hundred Patton tanks.n
In exchange for U.S. military assistance, the Israelis were required to pledge that
they would not use the weapons for their nuclear weapons program and to reaffirm the
promise to not be the first state to introduce nuclear weapons into the region. This meant
that despite some presidential advisors' recommendations, the sale of the Skyhawk planes
was not conditional on requiring the Israelis to completely give up their nuclear
program.73
69 Shalom, Israel's Nuclear Option, 74.
70 Pry, Israel's Nuclear Arsenal, 12.
71 Pry, Israel's Nuclear Arsenal, 11.
72 Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, 257.
73 Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, 300. Rusk, Clifford and Warnke sought to convince Johnson to not
sell the planes without this condition. President Johnson did not require it. In other words, he had accepted
that Dimona was not going away.
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While the Americans used the promise of increased access to U.S. conventional
military systems to extract promises ofnuclear restraint from the Israelis, it is also
important to note that Israel was not without leverage. Indeed, given U.S. interests in the
region, and its clear stance on non-proliferation, the Israelis had an implicit threat that
they could choose an open nuclear posture in the event of a conventional shortfall. Prime
Minister Eshkol recognized this and saw the nuclear program, in addition to providing
Israel with a last resort nuclear capability, as a bargaining chip vis-a.-vis the u.S.74 And,
as previously discussed, U.S. officials recognized this in their justification for increasing
American aid to Israel as a way to ensure that the Israelis were not tempted to go nuclear
because they could feel secure with their conventional superiority.
Shortly thereafter, Israel purchased fifty Phantom fighters from the U.S. As
public speculation at the time suggested, the "US would not have sold Phantoms without
an assurance from Israel that it would not go nuclear and would possibly even adhere to
the NPT...this line of reasoning is founded on the assumption that the US is actively
exploiting the leverage conferred by Phantoms to 'Buy off the Israeli nuclear weapons
program.,,75 While Israel was willing to make promises that it would not use the planes
to carry nuclear weapons, it also "made it entirely clear that it opposed any linkage
between the sale of fighter planes and Washington's demands of Israel on the Dimona
74 Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998),240.
75 David K.E. Bruce to State Department, "Israel's Nuclear Policy," 16 January 1969, Weapons ofMass
Destruction (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Proquest, 2008), no. WM00134, 2.
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issue.,,76 For his part, Kissinger considered withholding the delivery of the Phantoms as
an option to exert additional leverage on Tel Aviv if needed to achieve Israeli
reassurances.
77
Still, there were obvious limits to the amount ofpressure the U.S. was willing to
impose. Washington did not want to take measures that would be counterproductive by
making Israel more insecure conventionally. Additionally, the Israelis imposed their own
conditions by refusing American efforts to link conventional assistance with activity at
Dimona. And ultimately both sides recognized that they shared an interest in continued
cooperation. Further, as time went on, such cooperation would be threatened as a matter
of American law ifIsrael publicly acknowledged its growing nuclear capability. In this
event, under the Glenn and Symington Amendments, military and economic assistance to
any country acquiring nuclear weapons would, by requirement, be cut ofC8 Thus,
neither side had a strong interest in revealing the Israeli program.
Despite these limitations, the importance of U.S. conventional support on Israel is
rated ofvery high importance in affecting Israeli opacity according to some former
officials. Reportedly:
"Late ambassador Paul C. Warnke confirmed that the United States had
conditioned the supply of offensive weapons to Israel on its refraining
from conducting nuclear tests. IfIsrael carried out a test, the United States
had the legal instruments not only to cease the supply of attack weapons,
76 Shalom, Israel's Nuclear Option, 134.
77 State Department, "Review Group Consideration of Response to NSSM-40," 30 June 1969, Kissinger
Transcripts (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Proquest, 2008), no. KT00030, 2-5.
78 Honore M. Catudal, Jr., Israel's Nuclear Weapomy: A New Arms Race in the Middle East (London:
Grey Seal Books, 1991), 11.
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but also to demand that Israel return some of the armaments already
supplied. Warnke added that Israel had adopted the nuclear ambiguity
policy at America's insistence. He put it like this: 'I think we preferred
the fact that Israel was not declaring that it had targeted some potential
enemy with nuclear weapons. ",79
Thus, in the end, the Americans were partially successful. The Israelis were
strongly motivated to cooperate with the U.S. in order to gain access to more
sophisticated conventional weapons than they would have otherwise had. However, Tel
Aviv was only willing to trade so far, limiting the quid pro quo to an opaque nuclear
stance rather than giving up the entire program.
c) U.S. Economic Leverage
Over time, the economic assistance the United States provided to Israel was
substantial for the small country and continued to grow with each successive presidential
administration. For example, U.S. aid to Israel was $40 million dollars during the last
year of the Kennedy administration.so By 1965, the Johnson administration raised it
some 80 percent to reach $71 million, and the following year another increase of 80
percent, and aid totaled $130 million.s1 There were further increases under the Nixon
administration, with aid increasing to the $500-$600 million range, compared to the
79 Quoted in Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, 343.
80 Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, note 9, 377.
81 Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, note 9, 377.
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previous $100 million per year. 82 Similarly, after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, aid jumped
to $2.6 billion for fiscal 1974 and a similar level in fiscal 1976.83
This assistance also provided the Americans with another source of leverage over
the Israeli nuclear program. For example, Washington confronted Israel about its $80
million dollar nuclear project, which was significant given the amount ofD.S. aid Israel
received. 84 Similarly, the Israelis were informed that their missile program (required over
the long nm to deliver nuclear weapons) was "hellishly expensive," which was intended
to convey to Tel Aviv that "it would not be allowed to fritter away such sums on defense
projects whose effectiveness the administration doubted.,,85
Given the American grip on the purse strings, it was further implied that with U.S.
financial support and opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons, the continuation of the
nuclear program could have "gravest consequences" for the U.S.-Israeli cooperation.86 In
1965, the Johnson administration also hinted that it considered imposing economic
sanctions on Israel if it continued down the nuclear path. And "[w]ith the Israeli
economy entering a steep economic slump, the White House expressed surprise at
82 Charles Lipson, "American Support for Israel: History, Sources, Limits," in U.S.-Israeli Relations at the
Crossroads, Gabriel Sheffer, ed., (Portland: Frank Cass, 1997), 141.
83 Lipson, "American Support for Israel," 141.
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85 Shalom, Israel's Nuclear Option, 82.
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Israel's willingness to divert vast sums on exorbitant projects such as the Dimona reactor
and French surface-to-surface missiles."s7
While the United States never followed through with its threats, their existence
suggests that the Israelis were put on notice that the U.S. took the Dimona activities very
seriously. Moreover, because U.S. domestic law required a cut off in assistance to newly
nuclearized states, Israel could be certain that publicly declaring their capability or testing
would result in a loss of American support.
Additionally, the evidence suggests that Israeli leaders were acutely aware of the
costs of the nuclear program, making them sensitive to the difficulties in paying for
conventional weapons. For example, one Knesset member responded to Ben-Gurion's
Dimona statement that "the production of nuclear arms is a veritable suicide for small
countries all the more as such production does not prevent those countries from allocating
huge sums of money for conventional armament."ss This also made them more
vulnerable to U.S. forms of economic and conventional pressures. Concerns such as
these provided further incentives to keep Israel's nuclear progress hidden from public
view so as to not trigger a cut off in U.S. financial and conventional weapons assistance.
D. The Truce Between the U.S. & Israel
With the foregoing factors informing negotiations, Washington and Tel Aviv
engaged in on ongoing, intensive dialogue over the course of several years as to Israel's
nuclear ambitions. The result of these diplomatic exchanges and negotiations was the
87 Shalom, Israel's Nuclear Option, 127.
88 John F. Shaw to State Department, "Ben Gurion on Israel's Two Reactors," 17 August 1962, Nuclear
Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Proquest, 2008), no. NP00898, 2.
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agreed upon fonnula that Israel would not be the first state to introduce nuclear weapons
into the Middle East.
The basis of this understanding began under the Kennedy administration and was
prompted under pressure to open up Dimona to inspections. During one of the meetings
to discuss Israeli nuclear intentions, Shimon Peres met with President Kennedy as a
representative of Ben-Gurion. During this meeting, Kennedy reportedly directly asked
Peres if Israel was making an atomic bomb. Unprepared for this direct approach, Peres
improvised by stating, "I can say to you clearly that we shall not introduce atomic
weapons into the region. We will certainly not be the first to do so. We have no interest
in it, indeed the contrary is true. Our interest is in lessening of the tension of the anns
race, event to total disannament.,,89
Successive Israeli governments would similarly seek to deflect U.S. pressure by
characterizing the reactor as peaceful. For example, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol
followed the precedent set before him stating in 1963 that '''I desire to confinn Mr. Ben-
Gurion's clear assurance on the (peaceful] character and purpose of the Dimona
reactor.,,90 For its part, the U.S. continued to push for a clearer definition of what the
"introduction" of nuclear weapons in the region would mean according to the Israeli
government. The documents and reports from this time suggest a struggle to fonnulate a
stance that would accommodate U.S. interests in opacity while at the same time provide
for Israeli deterrence needs.
89 Quoted in Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, 251.
90 Dale, "Current Status of the Dimona Reactor," no. NPOll14, 1.
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This understanding was reached in a dialogue between Warnke representing the
United States and Rabin and Israeli Air Force commander Hod. In the conversation, the
discussion centered on whether testing and a public announcement would constitute an
"introduction." Initially, Rabin agreed that introduction meant a physical presence of
nuclear weapons. 91 However, Commander Hod suggested that testing was important to
whether or not nuclear weapons were introduced.92 From here, the Israeli perspective
developed that simply having nuclear weapons was not enough. Rather, according to
Rabin, "a state possessed nuclear weapons only if they had been tested and proven
functional.,,93 Rabin also noted that an additional component to introducing weapons to
the region included "notoriety.,,94 When specifically asked whether an advertised, but
untested nuclear weapon would be considered an introduction, Rabin replied "Yes. That
would be introduction.,,95 In short, from the Israeli perspective, either a public
announcement or testing constituted introducing nuclear weapons into the Middle East.
Rabin in particular was concerned with the requirements of deterrence as well.
From his perspective, '''introduction' ofnuclear weapons were intended to deter the other
side, not destroy it. Therefore, each side had to be aware of the other's nuclear
arsenal.,,96 Similarly, he is reported as saying, "[t]here must be public acknowledgement.
91 Shalom, Israel's Nuclear Option, 163
92 Shalom, Israel's Nuclear Option, 163.
93 Shalom, Israel's Nuclear Option, 164.
94 Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, 311.
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The purpose of nuclear weapons is not to use the weapon itself, but to use its deterrent
power. I don't believe any power that has nuclear weapons plans to use them, although
you cannot ever be sure. Ninety-nine percent of their value is deterrence.,,97
From this dialogue, an understanding solidified as to Israel's policy of opacity.
The United States was not fully satisfied with the Israeli perspective that either testing or
openly declaring were the only way to introduce nuclear weapons, and considered Israeli
possession of nuclear weapons as introduction.98 The concern from Washington was that
the Israeli formulation left it with considerable room to maneuver. It left open the option
for Israel to develop nuclear weapons but to not "introduce" them through testing or
public declaration.99
Phrased another way, "[s]uch a pledge can be interpreted as a 'no first use or test'
policy, ruling out public announcement ('introduction') of a bomb but not its actual
development, full or partial."lOO This leeway was, of course, what made the formula
work for the Israelis, given their determination to develop a nuclear deterrent. Not only
could Israel develop nuclear weapons without violating its agreement with the United
States, but also it allowed Israel some measure of deterrence through uncertainty because
97 Quoted in Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, 311.
98 Shalom, Israel's Nuclear Option, 165-166.
99 Shalom, Israel's Nuclear Option, 166.
100 Dowty, "Israeli Perspectives on Nuclear Proliferation," 143.
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Israel still had the ability to develop weapons. In short, by this statement, Israel does not
deny that it has nuclear weapons. 101
While the U.S. clearly would have preferred a different formula, there was both
an understanding in Washington for the reasons behind the Israeli need for a deterrent, as
well as resignation that the U.S. was not willing to sacrifice its relationship with them to
prevent it. As such, the American goal shifted to persuading Israel to keep its promise
not to be the first state to introduce nuclear weapons into the region. As Warnke noted,
the U.S. was concerned about the risks stemming from Israel being a nuclear power, but
this risk would be even greater if they acknowledged they were a nuclear power. 102 In
short, Warnke summarized the U.S. position as "'[w]e hoped that we would persuade
Israel not to develop nuclear weapons. So my own sense was, if it became a declared
nuclear power then there was a greater risk of proliferation. If you got one keep it
undercover, don't publicly advertise the fact that you are a nuclear power.",J03
Since that formulation, the U.S. has sought to hold the Israelis to the public
posture ofdenial even as it became apparent that Israel had a nuclear option and would
not roll it back. At the same time, Washington remained equally committed to not
publicly recognizing or revealing Israel's nuclear progress; it chose to remain complicit
even in the face of clear evidence. For example, by 1968, some of the top leadership in
the Washington considered it a foregone conclusion that the Israelis had the bomb.
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However, they were so obsessive about the secrecy of the program, the information was
strictly limited. As Carl Duckett later revealed, the "CIA had drafted a National
Intelligence Estimate on Israel's nuclear capability in 1968. In it was the conclusion that
the Israelis had nuclear weapons. He showed it to Mr. Helms. Helms told him not to
publish it and he would take it up with President Johnson. Mr. Helms later related that he
had spoken to the President, that the President was concerned, and that he had said 'Don't
tell anyone else, even Dean Rusk and Robert McNamara.",104
The crucial understanding reached between Israel and the United States under the
Kennedy and Johnson administrations-mainly that Israel would not be the first state to
introduce nuclear weapons into the region-was further entrenched under the Nixon
administration. The Nixon administration eventually reached a meeting of the minds
between Nixon, Kissinger and Golda Meir, that Israeli nuclear weapons were inevitable
and simply had to determine the best way to manage the relationship. To be sure,
relations were not always entirely smooth, but during the Nixon administration, Israeli
leaders felt safe "coming clean" with its program to the U.S.
As Golda Meir has previously advocated to Ben-Gurion, Israel now had the
opportunity to be directly honest with the United States regarding its nuclear capabilities
and intention. As Prime Minister, she met with Nixon and held "a serious and sincere
104 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Inquiry into the Testimony of the Executive Direct for Operations,"
February 1978, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Proquest,
2008), no. NP01567, 5.
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discussion on Israel's strategic weapons and to tell the truth," as she had wanted to do
since the beginning. 105
The revelations were no surprise to the White House, particularly Kissinger who
believed that nuclear weapons were inevitable given the security enviro!1IDent. Indeed,
Kissinger reportedly believed that rather than fighting India and Israel in their pursuit of
nuclear weapons, the administration should assist, or at least not hinder them, in order to
strengthen the West. 106 Nonetheless, he still sought to formulate a policy that would be
advantageous to u.s. interests in the region.
From Kissinger's perspective, Washington could live with a secret nuclear
program; however, the real issue was that Israel's missile program would reveal Tel
Aviv's true nuclear intentions. As detailed in a meeting to assess options for addressing
Israel's program, policy analysts determined that,
"if Israel signs the NPT and gives appropriate assurances on not deploying
nuclear weapons, we could live with a secret research and development
program. Missiles, however, are a special problem. Once deployed, the
world would be convinced that Israel had nuclear warheads. It just didn't
make sense to have a highly expensive missile that would land somewhere
within a half-mile of the target to carry only 'five hundred pounds' (sic) of
high explosive."107
It seems as if even that the missile program wasn't necessarily opposed by Kissinger, in
principle. Rather, the publicity was of greater concern. Indeed, there was the idea that if
105 Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, 315.
106 Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, 316.
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Israel agreed to not deploy missiles but kept them hidden, this would not be "completely
inconsistent with U.S. interests."I08
At the same meeting, U.S. officials discussed options that focused on Israel
keeping its nuclear capabilities secret. Ideas floated at the meeting included: 1) seeking
Israeli adherence to the NPT; 2) seeking private, bilateral assurances that Israel would not
deploy or test nuclear explosive devices; 3) creating circumstances in which Israel would
not "announce" a nuclear capability and would maintain secrecy on its research and
development activity; and 4) gaining Israel's agreement not to carry forward any further
developments in the weapons field. lo9
As with prior administrations, the Nixon presidency wanted to avoid any possible
accusations of collusion with the Israelis. Consistent with previous U.S. policy, the best
way to do this was with the opaque nuclear posture. As explicitly determined,
"[t]here was some discussion of whether in light ofbelief that Israel had
developed nuclear weapons, we could now seek to get agreement from
Israel that it would not develop a nuclear explosive device. The consensus
was that we should, that this would serve to force Israel to 'hide' its
program, and that this would limit any aspect of collusion."llo
And as before, Washington remained concerned that an Israeli test would provoke the
Arab states. III Given the context of this relationship, and while recognizing that the
Nixon/Meir documents are not declassified, there is a general belief that Nixon promised
108 State Department, "Review Group Consideration of Response to NSSM-40," no. KT00030, 3.
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that Israel will have ready access to u.s. conventional weapons in exchange for the
Israeli bomb staying "in the basement," absent circumstances of extreme emergency. I 12
This outcome was the result of "intensive, ongoing dialogue that began with the
Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon administrations. Essentially, the policy of nuclear opacity
is tied to a secret, multi-layered set of understandings between the two countries, so that
Israel cannot abandon this policy without American approva1.,,113
On the basis of the now candid relationship between the two states that continued
to grow closer, the negotiated policy has appeared to work extraordinarily well for both
sides. For Israel, it perceives that it has garnered some measure of deterrence through
uncertainty with the very existence of Dimona. Indeed, as time marched on, suspicions,
hints, and unofficial revelations such as through former Dimona technician Mordechai
Vanunu, there is little doubt that Israel has developed a sophisticated nuclear capability.
And clearly Israel maintains a formidable conventional arsenal, assisted in no small
measure by the United States. From the perspective of the United States, it has kept itself
publicly distanced from the Israeli nuclear program while maintaining them as an ally.
Additionally, Washington was free to push its non-proliferation agenda, while
simultaneously seeking regional Middle East peace and minimizing Soviet intervention in
the area during the Cold War. An overt Israeli nuclear arsenal would have jeopardized
the American ability to pursue these foreign policy goals. 114
112 Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, 318.
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III. Regional Security Environment
Regional pressures ultimately influenced Israel's decision to retain an opaque
nuclear posture. However, Israeli leaders initially grappled with the countervailing
pressures of seeking to achieve and maintain a nuclear monopoly while deterring its Arab
enemies. Deterrence required, at a minimum, some uncertainty as to Israel's nuclear
status prior to it having a deliverable capability. As such, Israel resisted early efforts to
reassure other regional states as to its capabilities and intentions. Yet, at the same time, if
Israel appeared to achieve a nuclear capability, this would place substantial pressure on
its regional neighbors to respond in order to counter the Israeli threat while catering to
their domestic populations. Over time, once it became apparent that the region would not
be quickly nuclearized, and indeed the majority of the Arab states preferred a non-nuclear
path, Israel's chosen posture of opacity was reinforced. This enabled Israel to preserve
its nuclear monopoly and rely mainly on conventional superiority. Israel's nuclear
posture further reduced the risk that the Soviet Union would either provide nuclear
assistance or intervene on behalf of Arab states and shift the conventional balance of
power away from Israel's favor.
On the other side of the equation, the financial, technological, and lack of external
support from other states militated against a nuclear solution for most Arab states in the
Middle East. Additionally, because Israel was largely seen as acquiring a nuclear
capability for its own survival, rather than to dominate the region, security did not require
mutual deterrence as long as Israel refrained from issuing nuclear threats. However,
choosing to not acquire nuclear weapons was not a foregone conclusion, given the status
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of the conflict in the Middle East and rhetoric used to unite the domestic populations
against Israel. This meant that if Arab leaders acknowledged Israeli nuclear capability,
they would have to justify to their domestic constituents their overall lack of a response.
Israeli opacity allowed them to forego a nuclear response, while issuing threats that they
would respond ifIsrael crossed the nuclear threshold.
Finally, the United States played a role in the regional dynamics. Washington's
interest was to prevent the spread ofnuclear weapons, minimize Middle East conflicts,
and limit Soviet intervention in the region. It did so by seeking to pressure Israel to
reassure its neighbors regarding the nuclear issues, and other attempts to reduce
incentives that would lead to further horizontal proliferation. The cumulative effects of
these factors are discussed below.
A. Israeli Nuclear Deterrence and Maintaining the Monopoly
Israel's deterrence posture was conducive to maintaining a policy of nuclear
ambiguity for several reasons. Early in its development, Israel sought to garner some
measure of deterrence through uncertainty, at least until it developed a deliverable
capability. By that time, the benefits of an opaque stance were becoming more apparent.
Additionally, because Israel sought to maintain a nuclear monopoly in the region, and its
nuclear capability was reserved as 'weapons of last resort' , it neither needed to
demonstrate its capability, nor had the incentive to do so in the absence of threats to state
survival.
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1. Deterrence Through Uncertainty
Israel developed a nuclear weapons capability in order to deter its regional
enemies, which had combined superior resources and a population that could threaten
Israel's existence. This meant that Israel considered the deterrent effects of its nuclear
program both during the initial development phase when it did not yet have a capability,
and thereafter when it had the capability but the already established policy of nuclear
opacity. It is during the former time period that Israel necessarily relied on "deterrence
through uncertainty" by seeking to keep its enemies guessing as to its capabilities until it
actually achieved nuclear option. Uncertainty meant both disguising Israel's actual
intentions to achieve a bomb capability while at the same time keeping other states
questioning the accuracy of this stance. This is, ofcourse, a fine line between deterrence
through uncertainty and provoking one's adversaries to counteract a nuclear threat, while
also seeking to reassure friendly states.
For example, the London Daily Express reported that U.S. officials considered
Israeli denials related to Dimona to be a "cover-up to avert the strong reaction the Israelis
expect from Abdul Nasser and other anti-Israel leaders in the Middle East.,,1l5 Yet, this
is in contrast with some Israeli leaders seeking to prevent the U.S. with "reassuring"
Nasser. 116 Indeed, Israel was resistant to U.S. efforts to inspect the Dimona facility and
then pass on the "peaceful" nature of the program to Egyptian leaders. Instead, Israeli
leaders argued that ""[i]n certain circumstances a virtuous woman may not want to
115 Reid, "Israeli Press Reports on Alleged Nuclear Power Plant Construction," no. NP00718, 1.
116 Likely early on this was also, in part, to prevent inspections by the U.S., which wanted to see Dimona
and then pass on information to Egypt that the reactor was for peaceful purposes.
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appear virtuous.' (Chaim Yahil in May 1963, referring to a US request to reassure
President Nasser about the peaceful nature of activities at Dimona.),,117
Along these lines, Shimon Peres argued to U.S. leaders that it was in "Israel's
highest interest to leave Nasser in a state ofuncertainty regarding the level of
development and objectives of the Dimona Project.,,118 Otherwise, "ifthe reactor were
monitored by an international team ... nothing suspicious would be discovered, and the
information would be relayed to Egypt. Egypt could breathe more easily, but this would
detract from Israel's deterrence power.,,119 Similarly, as incoming Prime Minister Eshkol
rejected American requests to reassure Nasser, as it was good for Nasser to worry about
Israel's capabilities since Nasser often threatened war on Israel. 120 Eshkol further
communicated to President Johnson that Nasser was building an Egyptian nuclear
capability, which he would do even ifhe was reassured that Dimona was for peaceful
purposes only.121 Therefore, although Israel "was not engaged in nuclear weapons
production,"122 it would not be in its interests to communicate the same to its enemies.
This stance was premised as least in part on the belief that Middle East proliferation was
inevitable.
117 Dale, "Current Status of the Dimona Reactor," no. NP01114, 1.
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Early Israeli efforts to establish deterrence through uncertainty was not lost on
u.s. leadership. For example, an airgram sent to the State Department during the
Johnson administration with "Deterrence by uncertainty" written in the margins next to
"[t]he shroud of secrecy on Dimona was and is part of an overall security blanket to keep
the Arabs from being sure about any facet ofIsrae1's strength.,,123 Further, as reported
from an American perspective, Washington did not believe that Dimona was simply a
bluff to create a question of an Israeli nuclear deterrence and rather accurately estimated
that the facility was designed to develop a weapons capability:
"High officials ofthe GOI have frequently admitted, however, that they
are quite glad to "keep Nasser worried" on this subject. This element of
psychological warfare is stated by Israeli officials to be the reason for the
extraordinary security precautions which have surrounded Dimona from
its inception. The extent to which this bluff is actually useful to Israel is
debatable; it may even be counterproductive through creating a distrust
stimulating the Arabs to greater efforts (nuclear and otherwise) against
Israel. In any case, it seems unlikely that any large fraction of the $60
million already spent at Dimona can be justified in terms of the bluff value
of the installation.,,124
Indeed, U.S. officials noted that when viewed as a security safeguard by being capable of
making nuclear weapons in a very short period of time "if the international situation
should appear to require it" then "it is quite remarkable how much progress Israel has
made along the path to a nuclear weapon.,,125
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2. Maintaining the Nuclear Monopoly
Israel was the first state in the Middle East to develop a nuclear option, giving it a
regional nuclear monopoly. At the same time that Israel sought to deter its adversaries, it
also formulated a policy ofdenying other states in the region the same nuclear capability
if possible. Israel's goal of achieving and maintaining a nuclear monopoly in the Middle
East required twin efforts: to acquire its own nuclear option while simultaneously
preventing another Arab state from doing the same.
As previously discussed, opacity assisted the Israelis in their own efforts because
it shielded the program external interference during its infancy. That is, Israel had to
ensure that it could protect its own nascent capability being developed at Dimona long
enough to successfully have a credible deterrent. Furthermore, to maintain its monopoly,
Israel sought to reduce Arab state incentives and capability to acquire their own nuclear
option. Opacity eventually became important for minimizing some Arab states'
incentives, notably Egypt during the 1960s and 1970s, to acquire their own nuclear
capability.
Israel had strong incentives to prevent other regional states from acquiring a
similar capability that would dilute its own threat. The nuclear monopoly means that
Israel retains the ultimate trump card for its security, one that could be used if necessary
against a non-nuclear state in dire circumstances. For this reason, Israel developed the
longstanding policy that it will not tolerate nuclear weapons in the region.
This policy has, at times, required extraordinary efforts by the Israelis. There are
numerous instances of suspected Israeli sabotage of nuclear equipment destined for Arab
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states in the Middle East. 126 Additionally, during the construction of Iraq's Osirak
reactor, the Israelis are suspected of having sabotaged the facility three times prior to
destroying the facility. 127 And ofcourse, the most prominent example ofIsrael's
determination to retain a nuclear monopoly was demonstrated by the 1981 Israeli attack
on the Osirak reactor. This event was understood by Arab states as Israel's attempt to
make its nuclear monopoly in the Middle East permanent. 128
What is further particularly notable about the attack on Osirak was the muted U.S.
response. Washington condemned the attack as destabilizing and promised to investigate
allegations that the Israelis used U.S. jets to conduct the strike. If so, then the U.S.
government would have been mandated under the Arms Export Control Act to cut off
military assistance, as required when a country substantially violates the terms of the
transfer agreement. Privately, the U.S. government evaluated whether the Israeli use of
U.S. arms may have violated the agreement in "legitimate self-defense.,,129 Finally, the
U.S. conducted a review and suspended the delivery of four F-15 planes that were
scheduled to be shipped. 13o This was of little consequence to Israel's nuclear policy at
\26 Pry, Israel's Nuclear Arsenal, 34.
127 Catudal, Israel's Nuclear Weaponry, 101.
128 Shai Feldman, "Israeli Deterrence and the Gulf War," in Deterrence in the Middle East: Where Theory
and Practice Converge, Aharon Klieman and Ariel Levite, eds. JCSS Study no. 22 (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1993), 126.
129 Robert M. Kimrnitt to Richard V. Allen, "Israeli Strike-Legal Aspects," NSC Memorandum, 11 June
1981, Terrorism and U.S. Policy (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Proquest, 2008),
no. TE00672, 1.
130 Walter J. Stoessel, Jr. to U.S. Embassy, Saudi Arabia, "Saud's Remark on Issues and Answers," 15 June
1981, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Proquest, 2008),
no. NP01899, 3.
115
this time as the CIA had already estimated that Israel possessed between ten and twenty.
nuclear weapons that could be delivered as either bombs or with the indigenously
produced Jericho missiles. 131 In short, Israel was determined to maintain its monopoly
status and it did not face substantial resistance by the U.S. or other states in doing so,
given the threat of spreading nuclear proliferation.
Eventually, and for the reasons set forth more fully below, Israel's intent to keep
other states from developing a nuclear capability in the Middle East became a further
incentive for keeping its capability discreet. Mainly, as other states in the region did not
have readily available options to counter the Israeli nuclear progress, maintaining a
nuclear monopoly continued to be a viable strategy. This subtle but important
recognition occurred under Prime Minister Eshkol's tenure, when he became concerned
that Israeli activities would increase Egypt's motivation to acquire nuclear weapons. As
such, maintaining opacity was seen as a potential way to "deter the Egyptians while at the
same time communicating reports designed to calm them.,,132 In short, there became no
reason to provoke its adversaries with a visible nuclear posture if a primary goal was to
reduce their motivation for acquiring a counter capability. At the same time, as discussed
below, Arab states have largely not acknowledged Israel's nuclear capability, instead
relying on threats to respond ifIsrael openly acknowledged its nuclear capability.
131 Judith Miller, "3 Nations Widening Nuclear Contacts," New York Times Article, 28 June 1981, Nuclear
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B. Regional Benefits from Ambiguity
Initially, regional constraints did not factor heavily into Israeli calculations.
Rather, Israel seemed resigned that the Middle East would become nuclearized and
sought to gain as much as possible from its own potential deterrence by minimizing
reassurances to Arab states. It was the United States that was primarily concerned with
Arab and Soviet responses, and in seeking to minimize these fears, pressured Israel to
keep its nuclear ambitions muted. Over time, as the Middle East did not swiftly
transform into a nuclear arena, either from indigenous development or Soviet
involvement, the benefits of opacity became apparent. Regional considerations then
played a more significant role in providing benefits that further weighed in favor of
maintaining opacity. That is, the regional constraints were more indirect in that they
were channeled through the U.S., which in tum was the primary source of pressure.
1. Early U.S. Reassurances & Muted Arab Response
Israeli ambiguity, coupled with U.S. efforts to reassure Arab states ofIsrael's
benign nuclear intentions, served initially to buy Israel time to complete the Dimona
reactor. When construction of the Dimona reactor became public in the early 1960s, it
heightened anxiety among Israel's Arab neighbors as to Israeli intentions. While the U.S.
sought to reassure the region and downplay the significance of the reactor, several Arab
states issued statements expressing their concern and threatening that they would respond
by acquiring a nuclear capability themselves.
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For example, Nasser's response to Ben-Gurion's announcement in the Knesset in
1960 was that Egypt would, if Israel developed nuclear weapons, launch a preemptive
war. 133 The Dimona reactor would also lead to an increased determination to build a
larger reactor, where previously they had done nothing more than talk about it. 134 In
response to U.S. efforts to assure the Government of Jordan, its representatives stressed
that if "Israel has intention making atom bomb later on Arabs will not delay getting their
own.,,135 Similarly, the U.S. embassy in Lebanon noted there were still calls for an Arab
bomb in response to Dimona, although efforts there to reduce the anxiety were working
to the extent that the government toned down its rhetoric and there were less newspaper
reports. 136
For its part, the U.S. was actively trying to reassure the Arab states as to Israel's
peaceful intentions. It sought to communicate that the U.S. was in no way involved in
Dimona and that it had received Israeli reassurances that it had no nuclear intentions. 137
Washington also signaled that it was committed to maintaining its stance towards non-
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proliferation and would continue to follow the Israeli development close1y.l38
Apparently, these efforts were at least partly successful through 1965. It was reported
that the Dimona matter was mentioned occasionally between the Americans and
Egyptians from 1961 through 1965, and that United States "seemed to take the Israeli
reactor far more seriously than Egypt did."l39
2. Increase in Public Threats
Still, by the late 1960s and early 1970s, there was considerable concern again
among the Arabs states that Israel was pursuing a weapons option. 140 Without a public
Israeli nuclear weapons program, there was less incentive for other states in the region to
acquire that same. 141 With Israeli nuclear weapons, Egypt was the most vulnerable to
attack and "for its own survival, the UAR probably sees advantages in preventing the use
of nuclear weapons, and therefore also their introduction into the area.,,142 Furthermore,
Egypt also stood to lose the most politically. With Egypt ostensibly the politica11eader in
the region, U.S. estimates concluded that "Nasser's image as the dynamic leader of Arab
nationalism is strengthened by his ability to display advanced military technology. It is
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140 Pry, Israel's Nuclear Arsenal, 30. Nonetheless, this did not stop the 1973 war, either because it was a
war oflimited objectives, or the Soviets might intervene and thus keep the Israelis from using nuclear
force, or Egypt and Syria did not really believe that Israel had in fact developed a nuclear capability yet.
See, e.g., Ibid., 31. However, later reports suggest that Israeli leaders did in fact prepare nuclear bombs but
then the battle turned to Israel's favor. Ibid., 31-32.
141 U.S. Department of State, "Background Paper on Factors Which Could Influence National Decisions
Concerning Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons," no. NP01079, 23.
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clear that the DAR's political position would be weakened ifIsrael were to acquire a
nuclear status and the DAR did not.,,143
In response renewed suspicions of Israeli intentions, several of the Arab states
increased their own rhetoric with threats that they considered the Dimona reactor a casus
belli, given the potential threat it posed to other states. As public rhetoric increased there
were further specific threats to conduct a preemptive attack the Dimona facility. For
example, by 1966 Nasser was publicly and privately threatening to possibly launch a
preemptive strike on Israel before Dimona went fully nuclear. 144 According to U.S.
analysts, the Israeli threat that would motivate this attack would be if it became apparent
that the Israelis either had, or would shortly have, nuclear weapons. If this were the case,
then "the Egyptian objective would be to destroy the Israel facilities as quickly and as
effectively as possible and then retire behind the frontier counting on international public
opinion and pressure to prevent Israel from retaliating.,,145 The Egyptians would label
such actions, if taken, as defensive. 146
Additionally, public statements were issued that the Israeli program justified
regional proliferation. Indeed, the "most frequent Arab response to the development of
Israel's nuclear weapons has been to threaten to procure them themselves.,,147 For
143 U.S. Department of State, "Background Paper on Factors Which Could Influence National Decisions
Concerning Acquisition ofNuclear Weapons," no. NPOI079, 22.
144 Aronson, Israel's Nuclear Programme, 54.
145 Aronson, Israel's Nuclear Programme, 28-29.
146 Aronson, Israel's Nuclear Programme, 28-29.
147 Catudal, Israel's Nuclear Weapomy, 96.
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example, by 1974, President Sadat promised that "if Israel intends to introduce nuclear
weapons into this area [the Middle East], we too will find a way of acquiring such
weapons.,,148 The Syrians similarly threatened that an Israeli nuclear option left the
Arabs with the choice of either preventing Israel from gaining them or countering them
with their own acquisition. Of these two alternatives, President Assad suggested that the
alternative of acquiring weapons was more promising as a response. 149 Along the same
lines, by the mid-1970s, Iraqi leaders were justifying the Osirak reactor as a necessary
response to Israel's nuclear weapons program.
C. Factors Militating Against Arab Nuclear Weapons
Despite these public and private threats, the regional states did not have the
indigenous capability to counter Israel in the nuclear field in the 1960s. Egypt was the
most likely candidate, based both on motivation and resources. However, Washington
was convinced that Egypt did not have the facilities. ISO Egypt's program also faced a
severe shortage of personnel, materials, and money. lSI Indeed, the economic factor alone
148 Catudal, Israel's Nuclear Weaponry, 96.
149 Catudal, Israel's Nuclear Weaponry, 96, quoting interview on Cairo Radio, December 17, 1976.
150 Herter, "Regarding Israel's Nuclear Capability," no. NP00739, 8.
151 U.S. Department of State, "Background Paper on Factors Which Could Influence National Decisions
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was "almost overwhelmingly against [Egypt] developing a nuclear weapon.,,152 In short,
based on technological and economic deficiencies, it was estimated that Egypt did not
have the capability to undertake a national nuclear weapons program in the foreseeable
future. 153
The U.S. was still concerned that Egypt might try nonetheless to acquire a nuclear
capability from external sources. Washington thus sought to work out a qualitative arms
limitation solution in the Middle East to prevent a nuclear arms race. 154 There was some
success on this front as Nasser eventually gave reassurances to the U.S. that Egypt would
not develop nuclear weapons. 155
However, the concern remained that if Egypt had to respond to a publicly nuclear
Israel, Soviet provisions of nuclear weapons could potentially be a reality. In particular,
Washington believed that the potential existed for Egypt, lacking its own indigenous
capability, to tum to the Soviets for nuclear and conventional support in order to balance
against the growing Israeli capability. According to U.S. estimates:
"IfIsrael were to develop a nuclear weapon, the pressure on the UAR
military would be so great that it would seek every means to obtain a
matching deterrent. Since it is unlikely the UAR could develop its own
nuclear weapon, the UAR would press the Soviet Union...to supply the
means or the weapons. The Soviet Union would almost certainly not
152 U.S. Department of State, "Background Paper on Factors Which Could Influence National Decisions
Concerning Acquisition ofNuclear Weapons," no. NP01079, 23.
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supply weapons, but it might use the opportunity to acquire a nuclear
missile base in the DAR and concomitant leverage over DAR foreign
policy.,,156
Consistent with these concerns, there were some reports that the Egyptians did approach
the Soviets for nuclear assistance. The evidence suggests that the Soviets refused to
provide either nuclear weapons or the technology to develop them. I 57 Yet, there is also
information that the "Soviets extended a vague nuclear guarantee to Egypt late in 1965.
According to a carefully worded press report from Cairo on February 4, 1966, Soviet
Deputy Minister ofDefense Marshal Grechko 'reportedly refused to provide Egypt with
nuclear weapons but pledged protection ifIsrael developed or obtained such arms.",158
While the Soviets appeared less than enthusiastic about supplying Arab states
with nuclear weapons, technology, or even security guarantees, it was uncertain at the
time whether or not the Soviets would inject themselves into the conflict and was reason
to practice nuclear restraint. This has led some analysts to conclude that Moscow
therefore also seemed to prefer that Israel keep its nuclear activities secret. 159
Israel would have an additional conventional problem by provoking Moscow's
client states. Soviet officials told the West that ifIsrael attacked Syria, even in a
156 U.S. Department of State, "Background Paper on Factors Which Could Influence National Decisions
Concerning Acquisition ofNuclear Weapons," no. NP01079, 22.
157 U.S. Department of State, "Background Paper on Factors Which Could Influence National Decisions
Concerning Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons," no. NP01079, 24.
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nos. 1-2 (1984), 112.
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Company, 1988), 104-106.
123
conventional capacity, the USSR would assist its ally with military force, and even
possibly tactical nuclear weapons if necessary. 160 This necessarily meant that Israeli
security planners had to calculate the potential and accompanied risks of Soviet
intervention on behalf of its client states.
In short, openly declaring would increase the incentives for outside powers to
transfer nuclear weapons or technology to an Arab state and "would thus endanger the
advantages ofIsrael's conventional superiority which, so long as it lasts, is still preferable
to any other conceivable military situation.,,161 Of even more concern, the evidence
suggests that the "Soviet views ofIsrael's nuclear option played at least an important role
in Israeli deliberations regarding Egypt's challenge in May 1967.,,162 After the 1967 war,
there was reportedly some concern by the Israeli leaders that the Soviet Union would
preemptively strike the Dimona facility and thereby kill the nascent nuclear weapons
program. 163 For these reasons, from Israel's perspective, it had little incentive to
exacerbate relations or a regional arms race by demonstrating its nuclear capabilities.
With few prospects for either acquiring their own nuclear capability, or garnering
Soviet assistance-at least while Israel remained opaque-Egypt also sought to
downplay the significance ofIsrael's nuclear capability. Part of this reason was
160 Catudal, Israel's Nuclear Weaponry, 93, citing Leonard C. Spector, New Nuclear Nations (New York:
Vintage Books, 1985), 134.
161 Dowty, "Israeli Perspectives on Nuclear Proliferation," 146.
162 Aronson, Israel's Nuclear Programme.
163 Pry, Israel's Nuclear Arsenal, 19.
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practical. 164 By not directly acknowledging the Israeli capability, it reduced incentives
for the Arab states to develop a nuclear response. Opacity enabled the Egyptian
government to avoid explaining its relative lack of response to the Israeli program. 165
Otherwise, the "formal recognition that Israel had nuclear weapons would have forced
ruling coalitions to counter that capability, in response to popular dissatisfaction with the
idea of an Israeli nuclear monopoly.,,166
Nuclear restraint by the Arab states would have been much more difficult to
accomplish if Israel had thrown down the gauntlet by overtly acknowledging its nuclear
capabilities and intentions. However, as matters stood, the Egyptians and other Arab
states could live with the Israeli program to the extent that it was not an open issue
between the states. In particular, Egyptian security motivations to acquire nuclear
weapons were minimal. 167 Thus, as summarized by Warnke:
"'Ambiguity gives the Arab states a good excuse for not doing more to
eliminate Israel ... I think there is a feeling in part of the Arab states that
they cannot do anything about it and I think that they are happy that way.
They are happy not being in a position in which somebody is going to say,
'Why don't you attack Israel, why don't you bomb Jerusalem?' So I think
that everybody is more comfortable with the situation that exists than they
would be with any other situation.",168
164 For a psychological explanation for this approach, see Gabriel Ben-Dor, "Arab Rationality and
Deterrence," in Deterrence in the Middle East: Where Theory and Practice Converge, Aharon Klieman and
Ariel Levite, eds. JCSS Study no. 22 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993),91.
165 Shalom, Israel's Nuclear Option, 16.
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(June 1994), 324.
167 Certainly, if the region moves towards nuclear weapons beyond Israel, such as acquisition by Iran or
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Further, by not proliferating, regional states sought to have the international non-
proliferation focus on Israel. Indeed, another strategy employed by Egypt and the other
Arab states was to bolster the non-proliferation regime and keep other powers engaged to
put pressure on Israel. In particular, regional states have urged Israel to join the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty and accept inspections by the International Atomic Energy
Agency.
For example, in 1981, President Saddam Hussein indicated that Israel should
announce that it would destroy its nuclear weapons, agree to international inspections, at
which time the Arab states would provide a written commitment to not produce nuclear
weapons. 169 Egypt also sought to underline its non-proliferation credentials with the
u.s., promising that the DAR did not intend introduce nuclear weapons into the region
and "Nasser has on several occasions condemned nuclear testing and described nuclear
war as one of the greatest dangers facing mankind.,,17o While these efforts failed to lead
to any real results, they provided other states with another avenue to justify their non-
proliferation in the name of peace.
In sum, the broad stroke approach of Arab states in response to the developing
Israeli nuclear potential was to issue threats that they would respond in kind. However, it
is notable that these threats were issued in the event Israel went nuclear, and did not
actually accord Israel status as a nuclear weapons state. This has allowed the Arab states
169 Catudal, Israel's Nuclear Weaponry, citing interview with Al-Anba (Kuwait), 19 January 1981.
170 u.s. Department of State, "Background Paper on Factors Which Could Influence National Decisions
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to threaten a costly response without actually undertaking one. 171 It has also relieved
them of the costs of going nuclear, without having to justify to their domestic populations
their reasons for not responding to Israel's nuclear option. For these reasons, these states
have chosen to also support and maintain Israel's policy of nuclear opacity.
Even in the face of increasing evidence ofIsrael's nuclear capability, both the
Israeli policy of opacity and the Arab stance towards it has remained remarkably
consistent. For example, even after Mordechai Vanunu's publicly disclosed that Israel
had nuclear weapons, the Israeli government continued to not acknowledge that Israel
had nuclear weapons and repeated that it would not be the first state to introduce them
into the Middle East. Additionally, Arab reactions to the press reports stemming from the
Vanunu incident were muted. Rather, the "only notable Arab response has been request
by several Arab delegations to the United Nations for a debate on Israel's nuclear
weapons program in the current General Assembly session."I72
More recently, the Arab League publicly declared that its member states would
withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty ifIsrael officially announced
possession of nuclear weapons. 173 The League also insisted that if Israel went public,
they would seek to have the U.N. Security Council pressure Israel to destroy the weapons
171 Iraq was a notable exception to this general position. However, Israel was not the only state factoring
into Saddam Hussein's calculations, and there is considerable speculation that Iran's posture was a
substantial driver in the program, notwithstanding the public justifications by the Iraqi regime.
172 Patricia Murphy, State Department, "U.S.-U.K. Bilaterals: Israeli Nuclear Issues," 18 November 1986,
Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Proquest, 2008), no.
NP02380, 3-4.
173 The Associated Press, "Arab League will call for leaving nuclear treaty ifIsrael admits to atomic
weapons," International Herald Tribune (5 March 2008).
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and bring its other atomic installation under international inspection.174 This statement is
remarkable in that it is seeking to publicly tie Israel to its policy of opacity. It also
suggests that the Arab states continue to rely on and refer to the international non-
proliferation regime in the hope that it will put pressure on Israel to maintain its stance.
IV. International Non-Proliferation Regime
The Israeli nuclear program escaped some of the more overt pressures from the
international non-proliferation regime because the Dimona reactor, the basis for the
Israeli nuclear option, was built and operational before the U.S. cooperated with other
nuclear states to deny technology to non-recognized nuclear weapon states. Nonetheless,
the U.S. did seek Israel's cooperation in establishing the institutions and framework of
the inspections regime. Interestingly, Israel did cede early on to U.S. pressures and
signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty. However, Israel has largely remained outside of
nuclear non-proliferation regime, firmly rejecting international efforts to inspect and
safeguard Dimona,175 as well as refusing to sign the landmark Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty in 1968. Consistent with its stance on the LTBT, Israel has signed the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, although the Knesset has not ratified it.
The dynamics ofthe U.S. led non-proliferation regime and effects on the Israeli
nuclear posture are discussed below. The primary lesson derived from this interaction is
that to the extent the non-proliferation regime mattered for Israel, it was because the U.S.
174 The Associated Press, "Arab League will call for leaving nuclear treaty ifIsrael admits to atomic
weapons," International Herald Tribune (5 March 2008).
175 As previously discussed, Israel allowe.d early U.S. inspections of Dimona, carefully limited and without
a formal framework providing for them to continue.
128
was the driver behind the regime during this period. As such, the normative constraints
that are now accepted and attributed to the international regime were not yet established
and played little role in determining Israeli opacity initially. Instead, it was U.S. pressure
on Tel Aviv, as well as other states to stop nuclear cooperation with Israel, that mattered
to any relevant degree within this international framework. Clearly, these efforts were
less effective than U.S. direct pressures, given the increasingly close relationship with
Israel over time.
A. U.S. Non-proliferation Interests
Washington was interested in engaging Israel in the nascent non-proliferation
regime it was promoting to prevent the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons. As
previously discussed, the U.S. was further concerned that Israeli nuclear weapons would
lead to other Arab states proliferating the Middle East.
To encourage acceptance and compliance with the institutions and regimes the
U.S. was establishing, Washington was willing to remind Israel, as well as other states in
the Middle East, that it was contributing significant financial assistance to their domestic
programs. This part of the strategy was to make
"periodic high-level US public statements emphasizing our opposition to
the introduction of nuclear weapons into the Near East. The sanctions
would not have to be spelled out. But since Israel and the UAR are
heavily dependent on our aid (especially the former), we should leave no
doubt of the decisive action we would take in this field should steps be
taken toward the introduction of nuclear weapons into the area.,,176
176 U.S. Department of State, "Background Paper on Factors Which Could Influence National Decisions
Concerning Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons," no. NPOI079, 26.
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Further increasingly this threat over time was the fact that Congressional
legislation ensured that the Presidency was not supporting a state that was seeking a
nuclear capability. This culminated in the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act that
mandated U.S. imposed sanctions on any state that used U.S. assistance for nuclear
weapons explosions or other purposes.
Nonetheless, Washington, while being willing to press privately for Israeli
cooperation, did not want to make public threats that it would impose sanctions. Instead,
for example, the message was transmitted "indirectly such as through congressional
speeches and articles, or in publications by journalists and scholars. In this way, the U.S.
Government would be free to apply explicit pressures where they are likely to do more
good than harm."l77 For example, a congressional resolution was recommended to
highlight the urgency of non-proliferation and that the "development of nuclear weapons
rather than the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, is a factor to be
taken into account in determining the future economic relations of the U.S. with such
country.,,178
177 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "Proposed Program Under NSAM No. 335," 31 July 1965,
Presidential Directives (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Proquest, 2008), no.
PD01128,6.
178 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "Proposed Program Under NSAM No. 335," no. PD01128, 7.
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As this suggests, Washington was only willing to go so far in pressuring other
states compliance and it sought to balance the message. Of particular concern was that if
the U.S. threatened to cut off support, this strategy could backfire and cause allies to
acquire nuclear insurance out of fear that it could not rely on the u.S. 179 Additionally,
the U.S. did not want to cut off relations in the event that the nuclear option was still
chosen. In short, U.S. policy was to "try to avoid getting into a position where it would
be difficult to maintain good relationships with a country if it does decide to acquire
nuclear weapons.,,180
Israeli opacity was particularly important as the U.S. wanted to remove itself
from suspicion that it was acting with collusion with Israel. Not only would this matter
for brokering peace, but also for promoting its international non-proliferation agenda. It
avoided the appearance of U.S. cooperating with Israel that would delegitimize its other
non-proliferation efforts, in particular towards Pakistan in coming years, which would
overall weaken U.S. non-proliferation policies. Therefore, the U.S. had to publicly
maintain its non-proliferation policy towards all states, otherwise, "[i]fwe aquiesce {sic}
to Israeli possession ofthe bomb, it makes it difficult for us to tell any other country it
should not acquire one.,,181
This also meant that the U.S. had a further incentive to keep ongoing Israeli
nuclear progress below the below the public eye. This stance was maintained even in the
179 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "Proposed Program Under NSAM No. 335," no. PDOI 128,6.
180 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "Proposed Program Under NSAM No. 335," no. PDOI 128,6.
181 "Experts Accept Claim about Israel's Nuclear Capability," 8 January 1987, Nuclear Non-Proliferation
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131
face of clear evidence otherwise. For example, by 1986 Mordechai Vanunu, a technician
at Dimona, publicly revealed the facility's secrets. While U.S. and British experts
believed the veracity of his statements, "[f]or political reasons, neither U.S. nor Israeli
officials publicly acknowledge that Israel is a nuclear power. Admission that Israel has
the bomb would pose severe problems for the U.S. government, which has an official
policy of discouraging nuclear proliferation and denying aid to nations that are
developing atomic weapons.,,182
For these reasons, opacity remained an important "second-best" option for the
U.S. and Israel. Israel's opaque nuclear posture allowed the U.S. to maintain its non-
proliferation stance worldwide while at the same time continuing cooperation with Israel.
Nonetheless, early on Washington had some early success in persuading Israel to sign the
Limited Test Ban Treaty. However, it failed to garner Israeli acceptance of the Nuclear
Non-proliferation Treaty, which Israel would have had to sign as a non-nuclear power. In
short, the most the U.S. was able to accomplish was Israeli opacity, but not for Tel Aviv
to give up a nuclear option.
B. Partial and Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaties
By mid-1962, the United States was prepared to push for more international
standards and cooperation that would limit the diffusion of nuclear weapons. At the same
time, U.S. estimates clearly showed it was anticipating an Israeli nuclear weapons option.
182 "Experts Accept Claim about Israel's Nuclear Capability," no. NP02407, 3. Israeli officials did not deny
Vanunu's claims.
132
In a secret memorandum, the U.S. government estimated which states were likely
to acquire nuclear weapons with and without the Test Ban Treaty. The overall
conclusion was that the Test Ban Agreement would increase the costs ofproducing
nuclear weapons and, in tum, slow the diffusion. In part, the agreement would
delegitimize testing during a period of time when that more countries were considering
"going nuclear.,,183 The agreement signaled that that signing states did not welcome new
proliferators and made it more likely that they would take measures to further discourage
proliferation. From the U.S. perspective:
"Although the ending of testing would have an important effect on
diffusion (especially a comprehensive ban) a more important factor will be
the pressures the U.S., the USSR and other are willing to employ in
restraining others from testing.. .In some cases, we and others, would
probably have to employ stronger incentives and sanctions than has
seriously been considered so far. However, a comprehensive test ban
would make it more likely that stronger steps could be taken and would be
effective." I84
In terms ofIsrael, the U.S. estimated that despite the high costs of nuclear
weapons, Israel faced significant pressures to continue to develop an option. 185 That is,
the U.S. also accurately predicted that in the next ten years (1972) Israel was likely to
produce nuclear weapons. 186 The report further noted that that Israel would likely be able
183 Robert S. McNamara to John F. Kennedy, "The Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons With and Without A
Test Ban Agreement," 27 July 1962, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security
Archive and Proquest, 2008), no. NP00892, 4.
184 McNamara, "The Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons With and Without A Test Ban Agreement," no.
NP00892,5.
185 McNamara, "The Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons With and Without A Test Ban Agreement," no.
NP00892,2.
186 McNamara, "The Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons With and Without A Test Ban Agreement," no.
NP00892,2.
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to test around 1966_67. 187 Thus, in order to convince Israel to sign the Test Ban Treaty,
analysts believed that "Israel, would require a mixture of positive incentives (e.g., sharing
ofweapons) or penalties (economic or military) before signing. In some cases it might
take the joint action of the U.S., and USSR to coerce states into signing and observing the
agreements.,,188
Israel ultimately decided to join the treaty, and signed shortly after the United
States and Soviet Union. Given Israel's determined effort to develop a nuclear
capability, why did it forgo the option to test early on by signing the Partial Test Ban
Treaty? Related, why would it later reject signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty?
And why would Israel follow the rejection of the NPT with later signing, although not
ratifying, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty? While there are not clear evidentiary
sources that suggest a definitive reason why Israel would give up the right to nuclear
testing, there are a few considerations that likely informed Israeli decision-making.
First, there was the physical reality limiting the ability for Israel to conduct a
nuclear test on its own territory. Because Israel had relatively little open space away
from population centers on which to test, it was faced with geographic constraints. This
meant, as one analyst argued, that "Israel welcomed the treaty, and a few days later
became the twenty-third country to sign it. It had nothing to lose. Israel never planned to
187 McNamara, "The Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons With and Without A Test Ban Agreement," no.
NP00892,6.
188 McNamara, "The Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons With and Without A Test Ban Agreement," no.
NP00892,2.
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conduct nuclear tests in the atmosphere or in space, or even underground for that
matler.,,189
Additionally, there were significant political constraints imposed by the United
States, and Israel was still seeking to develop its nuclear capability at Dimona. Because
Israel could live at the time with non-visible posture, signing the Limited Test Ban Treaty
was palatable. Later, when the NPT came up, Kissinger and Nixon had already decided
that they would press less heavily, particularly since they viewed Israeli nuclear weapons
as inevitable. And giving up its nuclear option was something that Israel did not
seriously consider.
In terms of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Israel's previously made decision
not test would similarly explain why Israel was willing to sign this treaty some thirty
years later. Because Israel had likely already decided against testing, and possibly has
acquired enough prior data to now rely on computer simulations, it could sign the CTBT
in 1996 without concern that it would limit Israel's already existent and sophisticated
nuclear program. 190 Nonetheless, the Knesset has yet to ratify the agreement, which has
further hindered the agreement from being entered into force. Tel Aviv is likely in no
hurry to ratify the agreement to the extent that the treaty also stalled in the U.S. and has
not been ratified by Congress. This means that the U.S. is not a particularly strong source
of pressure on Israel to ratify the agreement. Additionally, because neither Egypt nor
189 Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, 234.
190 There was considerable speculation that Israel acquired testing data early on from the French, had
possibly tested in conjunction with South Africa in 1979, and had acquired U.S. supercomputers by 1994,
enabling complex calculations that obviated the need for physical testing of sophisticated systems.
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Iran have ratified the agreement, it is unlikely that Israel will do so until either of these
states accedes to the treaty.
c. Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty
Israel was just on the cusp ofhaving a nuclear explosive capability when the U.S.
began to push for the nuclear non-proliferation treaty in the mid-1960s. This timing, as
well as the implications of the treaty likely made it undesirable from Israel's perspective
to join. In particular, ifIsraeljoined the treaty as a non-nuclear state, which was the
framework that was established and the only option available to it, then it would likely
have degraded its deterrence, based on uncertainty, posture. To this day, Israel remains a
non-signatory, despite the varied sources ofpressure it endured in resisting the treaty.
Signing the NPT would have had more significant implications for Israel that the
Limited Test Ban Treaty. If Israel signed the NPT, then it would effectively be signaling
that it accepted a non-nuclear status. Israel recognized that signing the treaty would
effective negate any existing security it had achieved by preserving its nuclear option for
future use. 191 At the same time, Israel recognized that the U.S. movement towards the
treaty would have profound implications for the Israeli nuclear program. Reportedly,
Ben-Gurion was in a hurry to complete Dimona "before a NPT made the bomb
internationally illegal and thus would impair the Israeli effort to get it more than ever.,,192
For its part, because the Israelis had signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the
United States was hopeful that it could similarly induce Tel Aviv to sign and ratify the
191 Catudal, Israel's Nuclear Weaponry, 44.
192 Aronson, Israel's Nuclear Programme, 20.
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Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. As estimated at the time, Washington believed that it
had the economic clout to persuade the Israelis to join the treaty:
"Israel may well be seeking a nuclear weapon capability, and has the
technical resources to succeed. Nevertheless, Israel was apparently
persuaded, both by domestic and foreign opinion, to sign the limited test
ban treaty. If these inducements prove insufficient for a non-proliferation
treaty, there is little doubt that the United States (with or without the help
of the lJK and France) could exert upon Israel sufficient economic
pressure to obtain Israeli adherence to the treaty at the same time as the
Arab states sign it.,,193
In addition to economic leverage, Washington hoped that a critical mass would be
reached in the Middle East with Arab states signing the treaty, which would then put
pressure on Israel to also comply with its terms. However, accounting for Israeli security
was also seen as essential to gaining Israeli cooperation. At a minimum, it was viewed
that Israel would also be likely to sign if the agreement contained an escape clause
similar to that in the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Moreover, Israel was more likely to sign
ifTel Aviv "received some assurances of aid from the Western governments in the event
of an overwhelming Arab attack," although the U.S. calculated that this last condition
might be "watered down or waived in view of the substantial economic leverage which
the US can wield in any negotiations with Israel.,,194
In seeking to convince Israel, U.S. officials stressed also its well-worn arguments,
highlighting the "ineffectiveness ofIsrael's opacity policy as a deterrent factor," and
193 "Value and Feasibility of a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," 10 December 1964, Nuclear Non-
Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Proquest, 2008) no. NP01070, 13-14.
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argued that the "policy of international opacity contained the grave risk of precipitating
undesirable responses in the Arab world.,,195 Initially, some within the U.S. government
favored pressuring the Israelis by linking the sale of the American Phantom jets to the
NPT; Israel rejected this strategy.196
Further, Washington contemplated the ability for the French to pressure Israel into
signing, given their previously close military cooperation. At the same time, the U.S.
was concerned that the French would hinder progress towards the treaty. As
contemplated at the time,
"Paris does have some leverage with Tel Aviv because of French military
and technological assistance to Israel. .. .IfFrance saw some advantage in
establishing a close link with Israel. . .Israel might see fit to withstand U.S.
pressure to sign a test ban and a non-proliferation agreement. This
unpleasant scenario is not likely to take place, but its possibility does high-
light the potential for mischief held by those governments that might
actively oppose a test ban treaty or a non-proliferation agreement.,,197
Ironically, more reliable from the U.S. perspective was the similar Soviet interest
in also stopping the spread of horizontal nuclear weapons. Along these lines, it was
reported from the Israeli Mossad that the Soviets sent Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko
to Washington in order combine superpower pressure to stop the construction of
Dimona. 198
195 Shalom, Israel's Nuclear Option, 149.
\96 Shalom, Israel's Nuclear Option, 155.
197 U.S. Department of State, "Background Paper on National Attitudes towards Adherence to a
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and to a Non-Proliferation Agreement," no. NP01078, 6.
\98 Aronson, Israel's Nuclear Programme, 20.
138
Ultimately, however, it was recognized in Washington that Israel was always
going to avoid any commitments in either public or private that would limit its ability to
produce nuclear weapons. 199 Instead, Israel continued to move steadily forward to having
the capability to assemble its developing weapons option. This reality combined with the
pragmatic approach ofKissinger and Nixon resulted in whatever pressure existed as
being short lived in respect to joining the NPT. Rather, Kissinger decided that Israel
should not be pressured to adopt the NPT treaty, or to reveal its nuclear intentions or
existing capability. zoo For their part, the Israelis justified their rejection of the treaty in
terms of the regional conflict. They argued that the Arab states could still arm
themselves with nuclear weapons even ifthey signed the treaty and that "although Israel
was not a nuclear state, its technological capability was a factor of immense power in the
regional and international arena."ZOl
In short, Israel was at the forefront of the non-proliferation regime. This was of
benefit because Israel was able to complete Dimona and reject joining the NPT as a non-
nuclear weapon state. Doing so helped it to preserve its nuclear option and also signal
that it would not give up this ability. At the same time, ambiguity was helpful in that
Israel was able to avoid a public clash with the United States, which clearly favored the
newly minted agreement. In this way, the two states could continue to cooperate, but
199 U.S. Department of State, "Background Paper on National Attitudes towards Adherence to a
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and to a Non-Proliferation Agreement," no. NP01078, 5-6.
200 Karpin, The Bomb in the Basement, 318.
201 Shalom, Israel's Nuclear Option, 152.
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without either side having to give up what they considered vital to their own foreign
policies.
As this analysis suggests, these decisions were made before the institutional and
normative aspects of the international non-proliferation regime were firmly established.
As such, these approaches have limited explanatory power in explaining Israeli decisions
at the time as well as the choice of opacity. Over time, as the regime continued, it
became an additional factor in the Israeli calculation. However, there is little evidence to
suggest that the regime helped to create the initial policy of opacity, as much as U.S. and
Israeli interests coincided enough with the ability to manage very divergent policy
interests.
V. Domestic Politics Factors
There are two domestic political arguments related to Israel's formal policy of
nuclear opacity. The first is based on a political economy explanation for states' nuclear
policies. As applied to the Israeli case, the argument is that ambiguity was the result of
compromise between leaders who were deeply divided as to whether Israel should
acquire nuclear weapons, and where leaders stood in this debate depended on their
economic model preferences. While this explanation is an accurate description ofthe
nuclear debate that went on during the 1950s and early 1960s, it is not particularly
compelling to the extent that there is little evidence that Israeli leaders were concerned
mainly with economic policy. Rather, security factors trumped, and with that the
concomitant capability to pay for both a conventional and nuclear force.
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The second explanation suggests that Israeli strategic culture has been an
important factor in maintaining nuclear ambiguity. In particular, Israeli leaders have not
fully addressed the implications of acquiring a nuclear capability and this is a reason for
the ongoing policy. However, the historical record suggests that Israeli nuclear policy is
often subject to review, and continued advancements have incorporated the nuclear
capability into Israel's defense planning. This suggests a more dynamic policy than
institutionalized norms and processes that have ossified into existing policy. These
arguments are discussed below.
A. The Domestic Political Compromise Explanation
The central argument that Israel's nuclear policy is a function of domestic politics
is from Etel Solingen's work. In her general theory, Solingen sets out a political
economy explanation for states' nuclear policies. More specifically, she argues that
actors preferring an internationalist economic strategy-which includes access to
markets, capital, investments, and technology-are less likely to pursue nuclear weapons
programs.202 In contrast, "inward-oriented coalitions" are more likely develop nuclear
weapons as these actors have a higher tolerance for bearing the external costs imposed by
this policy choice.203 Based on these models, she argues:
"[L]eaders and ruling coalitions interpret security issues through the prism
of their own efforts to accumulate and retain power at home.
Internationalizing leaders define economic growth and global access as
crucial for advancing state security, rejecting nuclear weapons if the latter
202 Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2007), 40-41. See also Etel Solingen, "The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint."
203 Solingen, Nuclear Logics, 43, 51.
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endanger those core objectives. Conversely, inward-oriented leaders
thrive by defining security as 'self-help' while protecting and promoting
constituencies that variously favor economic, political, strategic, religious
or cultural autonomy."Z04
In terms of explaining Israel's longstanding policy of nuclear opacity, Solingen
applies a "hybrid" model of domestic political survival. From this she contends that
Israeli leaders settled on nuclear ambiguity, in part, as a response to deep divisions within
Ben-Gurion's government as to whether nuclear weapons would provide for Israeli
security. The main divisions at the time were between those that preferred nuclear
weapons for deterrence purposes, and others who were concerned with the costs of the
program and the likely effects ofnuclearizing the Middle East. However, the evidence
that she cites more strongly supports the proposition that Israel's nuclear policy was not
primarily the result ofpolitical economic preferences. Rather, Israel's leaders had to
contend with countervailing factors such as U.S. pressures and regional concerns that
created both incentives for developing a nuclear option while also creating security
risks-these were the central concerns.
The divisions among the Israeli leaders at the time were centered on how to best
provide for state security, and Israel's economic model was tertiary to this discussion.
The discussions reflected the Israeli leaders' preoccupation with the security implications
flowing from a nuclear program, and created divisions within parties as well as within
Ben-Gurion's cabinet over the issue. Nuclear proponents such as Ben-Gurion, Moshe
Dayan, and Shimon Peres believed that an Israeli nuclear option would provide an
204 Solingen, Nuclear Logics, 52-53. This explanation is also subject to the criticism that more secure states
can afford the luxury of trading away nuclear programs and having economic goals as a higher priority.
This suggests that security is a condition precedent for an internationalized economy, not the other way
around.
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effective deterrence against a much stronger Arab coalition of conventional forces, as
well as chemical and biological weapons.
Others were less sanguine about the ability for nuclear weapons to ultimately
provide for Israeli security. For example, Yisrael Galili and Yigal Allon opposed basing
Israeli security on nuclear weapons because they believed that it would contribute to an
arms race in the region, would weaken Israel's conventional capabilities through resource
reallocation to the nuclear program, and, given Israel's small size, it would not be able to
establish stable deterrence through a secure second-strike capability,z°5 Levi Eshkol and
Pinhas Sapir shared these concerns, and also were particularly opposed to spending
money on Dimona in the face ofthe Egyptian build up of conventional forces in the early
1960s,z°6
Yet, despite these divisions, Israeli policy remained remarkably consistent across
different leaders in this early time period for the nuclear program. This is, in part, from
the relatively constant external pressures creating similar incentives that Israeli leaders
had to respond to, including deflecting U.S. pressures and maintaining a primacy of
conventional forces. For example, Ben-Gurion himself recognized the need for
conventional weapons. In 1962 he came to the conclusion that Israel should primarily
205 Yair Evron, Israel's Nuclear Dilemma, 6-7. For proponents of nuclear weapons, they initially believed
that they would be cheaper in the long run as fewer conventional forces would have to be purchased. See
Solingen, Nuclear Logics, 192.
206 Seymour M. Hirsh, The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy (New
York: Random House, 1991),65. For example, by 1961, Egypt's military expenditures had reached almost
$340 million and were about twice as much as what Israel was spending. Ibid.
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rely on a conventional capability, with nuclear weapons as instruments last resort.207 At
the same time, Eshkol himself protected the nascent Israeli nuclear capability when
becoming Prime Minister in 1963. Notably, he rejected the NPT and continued the
nuclear weapons program even in the face of withering U.S. pressure.
Economic considerations certainly played a role in this overall debate, given the
vast sums ofmoney Israel was spending on military equipment, combined with external
dependence, and a relatively stagnate and small economy. However, Israeli motivation
for cooperating with the U.S. was not primarily based on a desire for a liberal
internationalized economy; the Israelis wanted economic and military support, regardless
of the economic model embraced by the patron state.
Because ofthese motivating security factors, Israel's nuclear policy has been
remarkably consistent, notwithstanding variations in the economic policy preferences of
its leaders. Moreover, the contours of the debate at the time that the policy was
formulated, combined with the direct evidence of U.S. pressures resulting in the framing
ofIsrael's official nuclear stance, suggest that the main issues facing Israel's leaders were
how to accommodate countervailing security pressures.
Solingen's explanation is consistent with this analysis to the extent that it
recognizes the importance of external actors in affecting the preferences, or at least
calculations, of domestic political leaders. However, by placing a premium on domestic
political leaders' different preferences, her argument effectively eliminates regional
considerations, and does not adequately capture the importance of U.S. direct pressures in
207 Yair Evron, Israel's Nuclear Dilemma, 6-7.
144
the Israeli case. In short, Solingen's explanation does not accurately capture the
complexity of the external dynamics facing Israel's leaders. 208
Rather, there was a primacy of factors fundamentally affecting Israel's security,
such as access to conventional arms, economic assistance, maintaining allies, and
considering regional implications from Israeli actions. This had less to do with Israeli
leaders' domestic political economic preferences as much as figuring out how to balance
these countervailing security considerations.
Finally, while there is evidence of disagreement among Israeli leaders as to
whether Israel should develop a nuclear weapons program, this debate was held largely
outside of the context of whether the nuclear option should be open. Ben-Gurion began
the nuclear weapons program by constructing Dimona from funding sources mainly
external to the Israeli government. 209 There was little compromise here and the question
ofIsrael should adopt an open posture was not yet ripe. When Eshkol became Prime
Minister in 1963, Dimona was just coming online. He could have sought to kill the
nuclear weapons program but did not. At the same time, Israel was just beginning to
develop a bomb capability when Tel Aviv agreed with Washington to keep Israel's
nuclear stance ambiguous. In short, Israel's posture of nuclear opacity was adopted prior
to it having a capability to test or otherwise declare. This effectively foreclosed debate
208 Solingen herself recognizes the limits of her explanation to some extent by concluding that Israel is not a
strong ground for testing her theory given the severe security environment in which the Israelis operated
within when choosing a nuclear option. See Soligen, Nuclear Logics, 209.
209 Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 70.
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about Israel's particular nuclear posture because it had already been determined with the
u.s. by the time Israel achieved a nuclear capability.
B. Ambiguity as a Function of Strategic Culture Explanation
A second domestic level explanation for Israel's nuclear posture focuses on the
culture of secrecy that has developed around the program. Avner Cohen posits that
Israeli leaders' responses to the nuclear issue are in large part a function of their existing
security environment in the Middle East, within the larger context of the Holocaust
experience. On the one hand, this meant that Israel pursued a nuclear option in the early
days of statehood as a form of 'worst-case' insurance against annihilation. At the same
time, Cohen argues that given the international norms ofnon-use2lo combined with the
horrors of indiscriminate violence, Israeli leaders and populations at large are uneasy
with the idea of a nuclear threat. 211 The result, Cohen contends, is that Israel's nuclear
policy is a result ofIsrael's political culture and reflects deep ambivalence about nuclear
weapons.212
In support of this position, he maintains that Israeli leaders refrained from issuing
nuclear threats during the 1967 and 1973 wars, even though it had the nuclear capability
to do so. He argues that policymakers were restrained from thinking through the
deterrence uses of nuclear weapons given,
210 Nina Tannenwald, "The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Nonnative Basis ofNuclear Non-
Use," International Security 53, no. 3 (Summer 1999).
211 Avner Cohen and Benjamin Frankel, "Opaque Nuclear Proliferation," in Opaque Nuclear Proliferation:
Methodological and Policy Implications, Benjamin Frankel, ed. (Portland: Frank Cass & Co, 1991),28.
212 Cohen and Frankel, "Opaque Nuclear Proliferation," 27-28.
146
the very apocalyptic nature of planning the unthinkable, particularly under
conditions of opacity, generated cognitive and cultural obstacles to
articulating nuclear doctrines and command and control procedures.
Israeli leaders remain reluctant to think, let alone to plan, the unthinkable.
Indeed, over time, a strategic culture has developed in Israel that nuclear
weapons are near taboo and should not be used, short of situations that
threaten the country's existence. 213
He further acknowledges that early events shaped Israel's nuclear policy in the 1950s and
1960s, but contends that since then opacity has been maintained by Israel's national
. I 214secunty cu ture.
While it is true that nuclear weapons are not normally directly discussed in public
forums, it would be a mistake to give this evidence too much weight. As Cohen himself
acknowledges, the Israeli nuclear program and subsequent policy of opacity was the
result of security concerns combined with U.S. pressures. As to maintaining the posture,
the evidence suggests that Israeli leaders are not as reluctant to plan for the "unthinkable"
behind closed doors.
Even leaders such as Eshkol, who had concerns about the undertaking a nuclear
weapons program, himself furthered it on becoming Prime Minister. Reports suggest that
it was under Eshkol's leadership, one to two rudimentary bombs were constructed by the
1967 Six Day War, which was Israel's first nuclear alert. 21S Similarly, during the 1973
213 Avner Cohen, "Nuclear Arms in Crisis Under Secrecy: Israel and the Lessons of the 1967 and 1973
Wars," in Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
Weapons, Peter R Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000),
105.
214 Cohen, "Nuclear Arms in Crisis Under Secrecy: Israel and the Lessons of the 1967 and 1973 Wars,"
343.
215 See, e.g., Warner D. Farr, "The Third Temple's Holy Of Holies: Israel's Nuclear Weapons,"
Counterproliferation Paper No.2, U.S. Air Force Counterproliferation Center (September 1999), 10.
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Yom Kippur War, thirteen bombs were reportedly assembled during Israel's second
nuclear alert. 216 Subsequent leaders have also authorized continued development,
including a thermonuclear capability, tactical nuclear weapons, and by 2003 it was
estimated that Israel had achieved a secure second-strike capability with land, air, and
sea-based delivery systems.217 Additionally, nuclear weapons are seen as an appropriate
response to chemical and biological attacks by other states, and Israel itself has developed
the same capabilities. This evidence suggests the primacy of security factors, combined
with prudence in maintaining regional and international relations, have largely dominated
Israeli thinking.
VI. Conclusions
The evidence in the Israeli case supports the finding that Israel's ambiguous
nuclear posture primarily resulted from American pressure, and was further reinforced by
regional dynamics. There is less support for the propositions that Israel's nuclear policy
is mainly the result ofthe international non-proliferation regime, domestic political
compromise, or strategic culture factors.
Beginning in the early 1960s, the United States became concerned about Israel's
nuclear intentions with the construction of the Dimona reactor. From an American
perspective, Israeli nuclear weapons would cut against U.S. interests in generally
preventing horizontal proliferation, would encourage regional tensions in the Middle
East, and would possibly cause Soviet intervention on behalf of the latter's Arab client
216 FaIT, "The Third Temple's Holy Of Holies," 12.
217 Joseph Cirincione, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Threats (Washington D.C.:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005).
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states. Based on these concerns, U.S. Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon sought to
first pressure the Israelis to forego a nuclear option, and failing that, to keep its nuclear
capability hidden. To this end, U.S. officials employed diplomatic pressures, and
inducements and implicit threats based on economic and military assistance to convince
the Israelis to adopt a restrained nuclear posture.
Based on these pressures, Israeli leaders, mainly under the Ben-Gurion, Eshkol,
and Meir administrations, allowed periodic U.S. inspections of the Dimona reactor and
sought to reassure leaders in Washington that their nuclear program was for peaceful
purposes only. The Israelis were under no illusion, however, that they would give up a
nuclear option in light of their regional security problems. During the course of resolving
these conflicting interests, a compromise was struck between Washington and Tel Aviv.
As first articulated by Shimon Peres, under direct questioning from President Kennedy,
Israel would not be the first state to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East. As
further dialogue established, "introduce" included either a public declaration or a nuclear
test.
As this suggests, the U.S. explicitly linked its economic and military assistance to
Israel's posture of nuclear restraint. At the time, the Israelis were vulnerable to this
pressure, and in any event, wanted to primarily rely on a conventional capability, which
could be helped significantly by cooperating with the U.S. But because nuclear weapons
were also seen as important insurance for Israeli survival, its leaders will unwilling to
entirely trade away or limit the nuclear weapons program. Thus, in the end, both sides
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compromised, resulting existing Israeli nuclear policy that both states still actively
maintain.
Over time the policy proved beneficial to both sides' goals and has been
continued. As a result of this policy, Israel was able to ensure conventional superiority
while still being able to retain its nuclear weapons capability-both of which have
contributed to a more secure Israel from its neighbors. Further, the policy allowed the
U.S. to continue to provide Israel with economic and military assistance while at the
same time maintaining a distance from the nuclear program and potential charges of
collusion. This permitted Washington the freedom to push its non-proliferation foreign
policy agenda with more legitimacy than it would otherwise have.
At the same time, Israel's regional security environment also played an important
role in creating incentives for Israeli leaders to both choose to develop nuclear weapons
and to refrain from publicly demonstrating its nuclear capabilities. In particular, Israeli
security planners feared an overwhelming Arab coalition, or later on the use of chemical
and biological weapons. Nuclear weapons were seen as a way for Israel to deter these
threats, and provide it with worst-case insurance in the event that its survival was
threatened. Based on Israel's relative insecurity during the late 1950s and mid-1960s,
Israeli leaders sought to benefit from uncertainty related its nuclear capability to bolster
deterrence. At this time, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion and later Eshkol resisted U.S.
requests to reassure the Egyptians that Israel's program was entirely for peaceful
purposes, arguing that it was in Israel's best interests that there was uncertainty as to its
capabilities. Additionally, the formulation that Israel would not be the first to introduce
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nuclear weapons neither limited Israel's ability to acquire the capability, nor provided
reassurances that it would not do so.
As time went on, additional benefits to an ambiguous nuclear posture became
apparent. In particular, during the 1960s, the Arab states generally lacked the economic
and technological ability to build nuclear weapons. This enabled Israel to establish a
nuclear monopoly, which it sought to maintain. By keeping its nuclear capabilities
ambiguous, the Israelis reduced incentives for its regional adversaries to pursue a counter
balancing response through acquiring nuclear technology or guarantees from other states.
In particular, Israeli leaders did not want Egypt or other Arab states provoked into
developing their own nuclear arsenals or seeking nuclear assurances or technology from
the Soviets. While the Soviets were less willing to provide nuclear assistance, they were
much more likely to intervene conventionally on behalf of the Arab states. This also
factored heavily into Israel's calculations. And for states such as Iraq that nonetheless
marched forward with a nuclear program, Israel maintained its monopoly by force.
Taken together, there is evidence that the regional security environment created
countervailing pressures on Israel's nuclear policy. On the one hand, its relative
insecurity counseled for a more open nuclear posture, except that this would hinder
Israel's conventional program because ofD.S. limitations. And the Israeli leadership
identified early on that maintaining conventional superiority was a higher priority over
relying on a nuclear deterrent, and the budgeting reflected these concerns. A policy of
nuclear ambiguity also assisted Israel in dampening a nuclear arms competition in the
Middle East, or at least more than otherwise would have occurred with an open posture.
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Yet, at the same time, there were few avenues for explicit agreements to limit nuclear
weapons.
To the extent that the nascent non-proliferation regime mattered, it was because of
u.s. direct pressures on Israel to accede to the newly formed international treaties. Israel
signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty at the behest of the U.S., and likely because it did not
anticipate conducting atmospheric tests. And by the time the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty came up for signature in 1996, Israel had already developed a nuclear arsenal,
although it still is making no moves toward ratification. Israel also avoided the
commitments of the NPT, mainly because it would relegate Israel to a non-nuclear
weapons status and limit its ability to have nuclear weapons. In short, there is little
evidence that the regime itself has significantly materially impacted Israel's nuclear
program, or that Israel is particularly concerned with international opinion as related to its
security decisions. And there is little evidence that Israel has internalized non-
proliferation norms to the extent that it seeks to support them.
Further, the evidence supports a stronger finding that Israeli ambiguity was
function of the bargain struck between Washington and Tel Aviv, rather than among the
domestic political interests of Israeli leaders. The discussion at the time revealed an
overwhelming concern with the best ways to provide for Israeli security.
Notwithstanding some differences in the best way to accomplish this, there was a
general consensus that Israel must retain conventional superiority. Additionally, Israeli
leaders remained remarkably consistent in their nuclear policies, regardless of differences
they may have had with their predecessors. This also suggests the relative importance of
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the external factors in affecting Israeli calculations. And other discussions related to
Israel's economic policy remained tertiary in the nuclear weapons context.
Similarly, the evidence suggests that Israeli leaders have made the decision to
further advance their nuclear capability, as well as considered circumstances in which
they would use nuclear weapons. This suggests that, contrary to the position that Israeli
leaders have maintained opacity because of its existing strategic culture, nuclear weapons
have fully been incorporated into Israel's security planning, and that Israel's policy of
nuclear ambiguity is subject to review in the face of threats to its security. Figure 2
summarizes the hypotheses in the context of the Israeli case.
Figure 2 - Summary of the Presence of Explanatory Factors in the Israel Case.
Hypothesis Predictions Evidence Measures
Reg. Sec. Env. Deterrence Signals High
Conservative Nuclear Strategy High
Limited Cooperation Low/medium
Patron State Issue Linkages High
Conforming Dependent States Medium/high
Nuclear Priority for Patron Medium/high
Int'l Non-Prolif. Regime Material Costs Low
Norm Recognition Low
Internalized Norms Low
Domestic Politics Bargaining and Compromise Low
Posture is in interest of Low
centralized decision-makers
Moral/Cultural Constraints Expressions of Nuclear Doubt Low
Nuclear Weapons Not an Low
Option
Lack of questioning existing Low
policy
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CHAPTER IV
INDIA
India's regional security environment, informed by the series of wars with China
and Pakistan, has motivated it to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. Still, throughout
most of India's nuclear weapons development, it has maintained an ambiguous public
posture where its quantitative and qualitative capabilities have remained "uncertain to the
Indian public and the outside world."!
Only twice has India publicly demonstrated its progress by conducting a series of
underground nuclear tests at its Pokhran test site in the Rajasthan Desert. The first time
India tested an atomic device was in 1974 during Indira Gandhi's tenure as Prime
Minister. Gandhi referred to the test as a 'peaceful nuclear explosion' and chose to revert
to an ambiguous nuclear posture in which India clarified neither is nuclear capabilities or
intentions. The second time India conducted nuclear tests was in May 1998, almost
twenty-four years to the day after the first time India tested, when Atal Behari Vajpayee
and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) came to power. Vajpayee officially chose to
1 GeorgePerkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1999), 2.
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'induct' India's nuclear weapons capability by carrying out a total five tests on May 11 th
and 13 th and formally declaring to the world that India was a nuclear weapons state.2
This watershed event in 1998 represents a significant turning point in Indian
nuclear development compared to the decades-long trend of not testing. Given this
variation over time in India's nuclear posture, as well as differences with the first five
declared nuclear states, this chapter seeks to answer two questions related to India's
nuclear posture. First, why did India develop its nuclear capability in secrecy from its
1974 test until 1998?3 Second, why did India choose to briefly lift this veil of secrecy in
1998?
Analysts seeking to explain India's particular nuclear stance largely point to
external and internal constraints that have forced India to hide its nuclear capabilities and
intentions. Some researchers have focused on external constraints and suggest that the
United States and other material restrictions imposed by the non-proliferation regime at
the bequest of the United States, have caused India's nuclear development to be
conducted 'underground' in order to minimize interference with its nuclear
2 For Vajpayee's official statements to the press and the Lok Sabha, India's parliament, see Embassy of
India, "Prime Minister's Statements and Interview," available from
http://www.indianembassy.org/pic/nuclear/pm(interview).htm; accessed March 2004. One of the devices
was reportedly thermonuclear. Even after the tests in 1998 Indian officials did not define India's future
nuclear posture and Indian officials gave contradictory statements regarding the state of readiness and plans
for future weaponizatiOll. See Devin T. Hagerty, "South Asia's Big Bangs: Causes, Consequences, and
Prospects," Australian Journal oflnternational Affairs 53, no. 1 (1999),23. India has moved towards no
first use policy. See the draft at Embassy oflndia, "Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on
Indian Nuclear Doctrine Embassy oflndia," available at
http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/CTBT/nuclear_doctrine_aug_17_1999.htrn1; accessed March 2004.
3 It is widely believed that India made the decision to weaponize in 1987 and had achieved the ability to use
aircraft as a delivery method by 1990. See Eric Arnett, "Nuclear Tests by India and Pakistan," in SIPRI
Yearbook 1999: Armaments. Disarmament and International Security. Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute, compo (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 371. India's missile delivery option
came to fruition in 1994 with the deployment of the Prithvi class.
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deve10pment.4 In order to explain India's change in posture in 1998, others argue that
India's security environment became even more precarious at the end of the Cold War
with its loss of the Soviet Union as a political and military ally. In this changing strategic
context, India tested its nuclear weapons in an effort to fend off renewed U.S. non-
proliferation pressures in the 1990s while bolstering its security position against China
and growing Pakistani nuclear and missile capabilities.5
In contrast, regional specialists often contend that domestic compulsions within
India can explain the years of public restraint from 1974 until the 1998 nuclear tests.
There are two variants of the domestic politics argument. The first strand suggests that
the Congress Party, largely in power during most of India's nuclear weapons
development, did not prioritize the public demonstration ofIndian nuclear capabilities.
4 Frankel suggests this answer in Benjamin Frankel, ed., Opaque Nuclear Proliferation: Methodological and
Policy Implications (Portland: Frank Cass & Co, 1991), although does not detail precisely how the US was
able to influence Indian leaders into forgoing a nuclear option for most of its history. Bradley A. Thayer,
"The Causes ofNuclear Proliferation and the Utility of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime," Security
Studies 4, no. 3 (Spring 1995), also suggests the non-proliferation regime, mainly pointing to the United
States as the driving force. See also Nina Tannenwald, "The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the
Normative Basis ofNuclear Non-Use," International Organizations 53, no. 3 (Summer 1999), for
influences of the non-proliferation regime. Many Indian scholars do not acknowledge outside influences,
generally given Indian efforts to maintain an independent identity. An important exception to this is
journalist Raj Chengappa, Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story ofIndia's Quest to Be a Nuclear Power
(New Delhi: Harper Collins Publishers India, 2000), who details the pressures the U.S. brought to bear on
the Indian nuclear program.
5 Notably in this camp is Jaswant Singh, the Foreign Minister under Vajpayee in 1998. Similarly, other
scholars such as T. V. Paul, "India, the International System and Nuclear Weapons," in Nuclear India in the
Twenty-First Century, D. R. SarDesai and Raju G. C. Thomas, eds. (New York: Pa1grave, 2002) and
Power Versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons (Montreal: McGill University Press, 2000),
Sumit Ganguly, "India's Pathway to Pokhran II: The Prospects and Sources of New Delhi's Nuclear
Weapons Program," International Security 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999), Mohan Malik, "Nuclear Proliferation In
Asia: The China Factor," Australian Journal ofInternationa1 Affairs 53, no. 1 (1999), Ashok Kapur,
"Nuclear Development ofIndia and Pakistan," in Nuclear Rivalry and International Order, Jorn Gje1stad
and Olav Njo1stad, eds. (London: Sage Publications, 1996), and C. Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: The
Shaping ofIndia's New Foreign Policy (New York: Pa1grave Macmillan, 2004), all suggest one or more of
these factors combined to create conditions forcing India to publicly declare its nuclear capabilities.
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When the moderate Congress and United Front parties were swept aside in the 1998
elections, the 'chauvinistic' and 'jingoistic' nationalist BJP party inducted nuclear
weapons as part of the party platform they were elected on. 6
The second variant of the domestic politics argument focuses on the moral
leadership and reservation of Indian leaders, who have been influenced by ahisma, or the
belief in nonviolence embodied in Gandhian doctrine.? In particular, this explanation
suggests that the moral and ethical constraints ofIndian leaders have militated against
relying on open deterrence or making significant changes in India's posture.8 From this
perspective, Vajpayee represented a radical departure from previous Indian Prime
Ministers and took a decidedly different nationalist approach to state security with little
moral compunction or reservation.
This study finds that India's regional security environment has significantly
contributed to its nuclear posture. Chinese nuclear weapons advancements motivated the
Indians to respond with a nuclear test as soon as they achieved the technical capability to
do so in 1974. However, the test caused Pakistan to accelerate its own nuclear program
6 Most news analysis attributed the tests to this factor, as well as Neil Joeck, "Nuclear Developments in
India and Pakistan," Access Asia Review 2, no. 2 (July 1999).
7 Interestingly enough, early on U.S. government analysts also found this to be a factor in Indian
development through Nehru, who died in 1964 from a heart attack. However, they also recognized that
Desai, who was similarly morally opposed to nuclear weapons faced increasing pressures to further develop
India's nuclear capability. See, Warren H. Donnelly, "India and Nuclear Weapons," Issue Brief, 5 January
1988, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey,
1992), no. NP02577.
8 George Perkovich, "What Makes the Indian Bomb Tick?," in Nuclear India in the Twenty-First Century,
D. R. SarDesi and Raju G. C. Thomas, eds. (New York: Palgrave, 2002), and India's Nuclear Bomb,
suggests this is an important factor, as well Jacques E. C. Hymans, "Why Do States Acquire Nuclear
Weapons? Comparing the Cases ofIndia and France," in Nuclear India in the Twenty-First Century, D. R.
Sar Desai and Raju G. C. Thomas, eds. (New York: Palgrave, 2002). For a cultural explanation of why
many Indian citizens support a nuclear capability in general, see Itty Abraham, The Making of the Indian
Atomic Bomb (New York: Zed Books, 1998).
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with Chinese assistance. This fact, combined with Indian efforts to rely on international
non-proliferation pressures to constrain Pakistan and India's own lack oflong-range
delivery capability provided little incentive for India to take the initiative and test first.
However, once Pakistan's program was a reality with missiles that could reach most of
India, combined with Indian capability to reach Chinese targets, there was less reason for
India to maintain an ambiguous posture rather than to move forward and seek to establish
a credible nuclear deterrent vis-a.-vis its regional adversaries.
Moreover, important advancements in India's economic, scientific, and political
arenas during the 1990s created conditions which allowed India to temporarily withstand
external constraints on its nuclear posture and test in 1998. In particular, the evidence
suggests that most ofIndian nuclear development has been marked by U.S. material
constraints in the form of economic and technological denial and inducements. The
Indians, bargaining from a position ofweakness, sought not to disrupt this tenuous link
after its 1974 test at Pokhran and for much of the Cold War. During the 1990s, Indian
scientific and economic growth, as well as a general warming trend in the relationship
with the United States, enabled India to deflect U.S. non-proliferation pressures while
moving forward with its nuclear development.
This finding is particularly surprising given that U.S. and Indian relations have
been poor during most of India's post-independence history and one would expect that
the U.S. would have little patron state leverage to influence Indian nuclear policy. The
vagaries of the Cold War in which the U.S. supported Pakistan against Soviet influence
and perceived Indian 'tilt' towards the Soviets has dampened many aid and trade efforts
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that would be seen as significant leverage on India's nuclear policy. Indeed, the fact that
the U.S. was able to influence Indian policy at all is testament to both India's relative
position in the international system and its desire to be considered a great power in the
future. 9
This argument suggests that India was adjusting its nuclear posture as neither a
response to short-term security factors nor immediate domestic agendas. Rather, India's
security environment, while marked by uncertainty regarding the drawdown of the Soviet
Union, was on balance more secure that it had been in previous times vis-a-vis Pakistan,
China and the United States. Additionally, domestic influences have played a lesser role
than external politics in explaining India's nuclear posture, given the efforts by
governments other than the BJP to further India's nuclear developments for decades prior
to and leading up to the actual tests in 1998. This evidence also effectively contradicts
moral restraint as an explanation. Nonetheless, Vajpayee and the BJP were more willing
to invoke international and regional backlash, which does help explain the timing of the
test, even if neither a necessary nor sufficient condition.
Moreover, this research found little evidence supporting the proposition that India
seriously considered the non-proliferation regime a significant factor in its nuclear policy.
Indeed, several states such as France and Russia have been relatively supportive of Indian
nuclear development for most of its history and others such as the UK and China have
only been mildly critical ofIndia's nuclear ambitions. The following chapter analyzes
9 Indian designs on great power status are well postulated. See T. V. Paul and Baldev Raj Nayar, India in
the World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), Paul, Power Versus Prudence, and
Ganguly, "India's Pathway to Pokhran 11."
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the role ofIndia's regional security environment, patron state incentives, the international
non-proliferation regime, and domestic politics on the 1974 test, the following period of
ambiguity from 1974-1998, and the 1998 nuclear tests.
I. Explaining the 1974 Indian Nuclear Test
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of the Congress Party was the first Indian leader to
approve the testing of a nuclear explosive device. In May 1974, she gave final
authorization to conduct the test, significantly characterized as a "peaceful nuclear
explosion," at the Pokhran site in the Rajasthan Desert. Prior to the "smiling Buddha"
test, Indian Prime Ministers had explicitly vowed that India would not acquire nuclear
weapons. Nonetheless, New Delhi had reserved the option to conduct peaceful nuclear
explosions (PNEs) even as U.S. and other states concerned about proliferation claimed
that there was no difference between testing for weapons purposes and peaceful
experimentation.
The evidence suggests that India's decision to test was largely in response to
Chinese nuclear developments, where China had "gone nuclear" with its public tests in
1964 and continued to advance its weapons program. As to the timing of the tests, India
tested as soon as it had the technological capability to do so. For these reasons, India's
initial decision to test in 1974 poses less of a puzzle than its subsequent ambiguous
. posture for over twenty years until the 1998 tests.
Nonetheless, India's characterization of the 1974 test is interesting from a
deterrence perspective. The test was a break from India's prior stance, to the extent that
India demonstrated that it had the capability to conduct a nuclear explosion. At the same
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time, by publicly characterizing the event as a peaceful nuclear explosion, India's nuclear
policy remained consistent with its previous longstanding position that explicitly denied
that India would produce nuclear weapons. India's nuclear policy also changed in two
subtle but important ways prior to the test. First, Indian Prime Ministers began to
acknowledge that the no-weapons policy was subject to review. Second, a couple of
years before the test, Indian leaders began to justify the scientific utility for peaceful
nuclear explosions.
The decision to test and its characterization was based i,n part on the regional
security environment in which India operated vis-a.-vis China, where India lagged behind
Chinese capabilities and development. India's insecurity motivated its leaders to create a
nuclear option, but at the same time refrain from directly acknowledging this as India was
in no position to compete with the far advanced Chinese nuclear capabilities. India's
security as related to its other adversary, Pakistan, also mattered. Mainly, India had to
ensure that it had an adequate conventional capability to maintain superiority over
Pakistan, which limited India's ability to reallocated resources to an expensive nuclear
weapons program.
As for patron state pressures or international non-proliferation policy, these
factors played less of a role in Indian calculations leading up to the 1974 explosion. The
test was a watershed event, which prompted a more serious U.S. non-proliferation policy
and caused Pakistan to accelerate its nuclear development. The combination of these
factors after the test became important constraints on limiting a more open demonstration
of continued Indian nuclear development.
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Domestic politics played some role, although it was not in and of itself
determinative. After the Chinese nuclear test and its continued accelerated advancement,
Indian Prime Ministers faced increasing calls from domestic actors for the government to
adopt a more robust nuclear policy. However, India's nuclear capability lagged and it
wasn't until 1974 that its scientists had developed the necessary technological
requirements for a test. The timing of the test was thus primarily based on scientific
advancement. This finding disputes two commonly attributed explanations for the 1974
test: that Prime Minister Gandhi tested at that time as a diversionary tactic to boost
popularity, and that previous Prime Ministers had not tested because they held a moral
aversion to nuclear weapons. The following discusses each of these factors.
A. Regional Security Environment
Both China and Pakistan figured predominantly in India's security calculations
leading up to 1974. India had fought and lost a border war with China in 1962, China
began nuclear testing in 1964, and India fought and won two wars against Pakistan in
1965 and 1971. India was also acutely aware of the potential for Chinese and Pakistani
collusion. For these reasons, India's public nuclear posture exaggerated how quickly
India could develop a weapons capability, while New Delhi also deemphasized its
interest by arguing that India was choosing to forego this route.
The reality, however, was that India lagged behind China in the nuclear field and
simply did not have the capability to respond. India began working in the wake of the
Chinese nuclear tests to rectify this disparity, although it chose to not directly compete
with China by continuing a steady buildup (rather than a crash program) and maintained a
---------- --------
162
disinterested posture in nuclear weapons, which included labeling its 1974 nuclear test as
a peaceful nuclear explosion ("PNE"). Nonetheless, swift Chinese advancements with its
nuclear weapons program spurred ongoing debates within India as to how it would
handle this threat to its security. In response to increasing calls for India to adopt a more
robust nuclear policy in response to China, Prime Minister Shastri added a qualifier to
India's traditional posture-that India's nuclear policy was subject to change if
necessary. Again, India did not have the capability at this time to actually respond. But
its leaders began to lay the groundwork by leaving its policy subject to review, and as
India became closer to being able to test, a public justification for PNEs.
1. Chinese Nuclear Testing Affects India's Nuclear Posture
Prior to the first Chinese nuclear test, there were few public indications that India
would pursue a nuclear weapons capability. The Nehru government had pledged that the
nuclear program was entirely devoted to the development ofpeaceful uses ofnuclear
weapons, and other states found this position credible.] 0 Even as it became increasingly
clear that China was developing a weapons program, Prime Minister Nehru stated that
India did not intend to make nuclear bombs, and indeed, was not even thinking about
making bombs.]]
Yet, Prime Minister Nehru also built flexibility into India's nuclear posture, such
that it could change if circumstances necessitated it. For example, Nehru, who reportedly
10 Central Intelligence Agency, "Indian Nuclear Energy Program," Confidential Scientific Intelligence
Report, 25 March 1958, Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive
and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. WM00026, 2.
11 Cited in G.G. Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma (New Delhi: Popular Book Services, 1968),22.
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had a strong personal aversion to the development of nuclear weapons, strongly
supported from the beginni1!g India's nuclear energy development.12 Nehru also
appointed Dr. Romi Bhabha as head of the AEC. This was significant as Dr. Bhabha was
a well-known advocate of India developing a weapons option, and privately indicated
early on that "India might be interested in atomic weapons in the future.,,13
Prime Minister Nehru also suggested, prior to the Chinese test in 1964, that
India's atomic energy program was well advanced, even more so than the Chinese
program. 14 As early as 1958, Prime Minister Nehru signaled that India's nuclear
development gave it the capability to build nuclear weapons, but chose not to use it. For
example, in response to a question about what India would do if another state in Asia had
nuclear weapons, he stated that "[w]e have the technical know-how for manufacturing the
atom bomb. We can do it in three or four years if we divert sufficient resources in that
direction. But, we have given the world an assurance that we shall never do so. We shall
never use our knowledge of nuclear science for purposes ofwar.,,15
Even with these public pronouncements, U.S. estimates suggested that while India
was reluctant to pursue nuclear weapons, its policy was still dependent on the perceived
12 Central Intelligence Agency, "Indian Nuclear Energy Program," no. WM00026, 3.
13 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, "Development of an Indian Nuclear Reactor," Confidential
Memorandum of Conversation, 19 November 1960, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The
National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. NP00701, 3.
14 Cited in Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma, 22.
15 Cited in Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma, 231
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threat from China. I6 From the Indian perspective, this threat began to increase
substantially based on both an existing border dispute with China and the Chinese nuclear
weapons program. By 1959, the relationship between India and China began to
deteriorate, which had a "deep impact" on India's security concems. 17 The border
problems between India and China led to India's defeat in 1962 war.
China also began to make significant advancements in its nuclear program. As
the U.S. accurately predicted, if China acquired a nuclear weapons capability, this
eventuality might compel India to follow suit. I8 Such a decision would be made
reluctantly, as India was perceived as having strong "emotional and political opposition"
to nuclear weapons, as well as cost considerations and economic growth priorities.19
Nonetheless, testing by China would create security concerns within India that it would
be subject to Chinese pressure and force New Delhi to rely even more on external states
for support if it did not develop its own independent option.2°
16 Secretary of Defense, "The Diffusion ofNuclear Weapons with and without a Test Ban Agreement,"
Memorandum to the President, 12 February 1963, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The
National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. 00941.
17 White House, "Memorandum ofConference with the President," Secret Memorandum of Conversation,
13 November 1959, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and
Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. NP00602, 4.
18 Central Intelligence Agency, "Likelihood and Consequences of the Development of Nuclear Capabilities
by Additional Countries," Secret, National Intelligence Estimate, 20 September 1960, Weapons of Mass
Destruction (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no.
WM00043,2.
19 Central Intelligence Agency, "Likelihood and Consequences of the Development ofNuclear Capabilities
by Additional Countries," no. WM00043, 6.
20 Central Intelligence Agency, "Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Capabilities of Free World Countries
Other than the U.S. and U.K.," Secret National Intelligence Estimate, 21 September 1961, Weapons of
Mass Destruction (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no.
WM00052,9.
165
Because of Indian security concerns, three years prior to the Chinese test in 1964,
there were indications that India was "deliberately improving its overall capabilities in
the nuclear field, possibly in anticipation that a future decision to develop an operational
nuclear capability may be required.,,21 Nonetheless, consistent with its previous posture,
India retained a public stance that it would not develop nuclear weapons even though it
had the technical ability. This stance changed fundamentally, albeit subtly, with the
explosion ofthe Chinese nuclear test.
In October 1964, China tested its first nuclear device at Lop Nur. While it was
widely understood that China was pursuing a nuclear weapons program, the advanced
bomb design and uranium materials used came as a surprise.22 This meant that China
would "become a much bigger nuclear power sooner than has been expected.'.23
Initially, the primary effect ofthe Chinese detonation was political rather than
military for India. According to U.S. analysts, China had achieved the same
technological feat as the great powers, strengthened its position vis-a.-vis the Soviet
Union (with whom relations had substantially cooled), and undermined India's leadership
role with the unaligned states.24 The initial test was not militarily significant however as
2\ Central Intelligence Agency, "Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Capabilities," no. WM00052, 9.
22 Chester Bowles to U.S. Department of State, "Views of Overseas Indian Correspondents on the Chinese
Nuclear Detonation," Limited Official Use, Cable 1271,24 October 1964, Nuclear Non-Proliferation
(Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. NP01022, 1.
23 Bowles, "Views ofOverseas Indian Correspondents on the Chinese Nuclear Detonation," no. NP01022,
1.
24 Central Intelligence Agency, "Nuclear Weapons Programs around the World," Top Secret Memorandum,
4 December 1964, Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and
Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. WM00093, 6.
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Chinese delivery systems were marginal.25 There was some concern however that China
might become more aggressive in its posture towards India as a result of the Chinese
bomb.26
The sophistication of the device exploded meant that China would have a
relatively advanced system once it furthered its delivery capabilities.27 This strengthened
Indian fears that China would gain an overwhelming military superiority over India. This
would pose a substantial threat to Indian security, whose leaders feared that China would
use its nuclear capability either for blackmail or in an armed conflict against a non-
nuclear armed India. The Chinese nuclear test also added onto existing Indian feelings of
vulnerability generated from the 1962 border conflict with China, notwithstanding the
fact that both the U.S. and USSR provided India with conventional military aid at this
time. 28 Moreover, the Indians were concerned that world recognition that China was a
nuclear weapons power would give it greater weight in international negotiations, at the
expense ofIndia,z9 Based on these combined factors, the pressures to obtain nuclear
25 Central Intelligence Agency, "Nuclear Weapons Programs around the World," no. WM00093, 6.
26 Chester Bowles to U.S. Department of State, "News Articles on the Chinese Nuclear Detonation,"
Unclassified Cable 1203, 17 October 1964, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National
Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. NPOlO02, 2.
27 Central Intelligence Agency, "Nuclear Weapons Programs around the World," no. WM00093.
28 U.S. Department of Defense, "The Indian Nuclear Problem," Secret Report, 24 December 1964, Nuclear
Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no.
NPOl086, 1.
29 Central Intelligence Agency, "Nuclear Weapons Programs around the World," no. WM00093. U.S.
assessments also noted that India feared that it would lose standing among other less developed nations.
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weapons was becoming "irresistible" in the face of continued Chinese nuclear testing and
developments.3o
However, in 1964 India was ill-equipped to respond with a nuclear capability of
its own, notwithstanding Dr. Bhabha's report that India could produce a nuclear bomb
within 18 months.31 Instead, new Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri condemned the
Chinese test as a threat to world peace,32 and reaffirmed that India would not develop
nuclear weapons. 33 However, after reiterating the official policy of abstaining from a
nuclear weapons program, Indian leadership undertook a significant reevaluation of
whether India should pursue a testing and weapons program. This resulting debate led
Prime Minister Shastri to publicly suggest that India could change its posture if
necessary, while he privately increased India's nuclear capabilities, in particular the
ability to conduct a nuclear test.
The Chinese nuclear tests thus fundamentally altered India's nuclear posture.
After the tests, India's leaders began to hedge on whether it would indefinitely foreswear
nuclear weapons, and behind the scenes began readying its nuclear program for testing.
This posture differed from India's longstanding policy to explicitly forswear a nuclear
weapons option, and reflected a growing concern with India's regional security
environment. The following discusses the parameters ofthe debate leading to this
30 U.S. Department of Defense, "The Indian Nuclear Problem," no. NPOI086, l.
3\ George Perkovich, India's Nucler Bomb, 490; Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma, 25-26.
32 George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb, 490; Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma, 26.
33 Central Intelligence Agency, "Nuclear Weapons Programs around the World," no. WM00093.
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change, the regional security issues infonning Indira Gandhi's ultimate decision to test in
1974, and India's continued efforts to develop a nuclear weapons capability.
a) Factors Informing India's Nuclear Debate
The very public Chinese program led Indian leaders to serious reevaluate India's
security requirements. This discussion centered on how to best provide for Indian
security and whether nuclear weapons were an integral component. The primary factors
infonning India's nuclear debate was whether India would enter into an unnecessary anns
race with either of its regional adversaries, how to balance nuclear weapons development
with its conventional resource requirements, and the cost and type of force structure
necessary for stable deterrence. In short, India had to decide how to transition to a
nuclear weapons state with a credible deterrent if it chose the weapons route. This debate
was important as it set the parameters on Indian thinking th:;tt infonned its leadership in
the subsequent decades, as well as provided well-rehearsed arguments in later years for
domestic political interests.
(1) Potential to Increase Tensions with Regional
Adversaries
If India chose a nuclear weapons route, the decision would have significant
security implications for its neighbors, China and Pakistan. At a minimum, there would
be the risk of further disrupting already poor relations with both states. A potentially
more dangerous outcome would be if a competitive dynamic resulted in a costly anns
race.
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As to China, if India developed nuclear bombs, and at least a rudimentary
delivery capability, it would force Beijing to reevaluate its military policy towards India,
and would likely be viewed by Chinese leaders as adding to the country's strategic
defense problems.34 Because India lacked these capabilities at the time, if they were
intent on competing with China in the short run, it would have required undertaking a
crash program in an effort to catch up. This effort would have increased the possibility of
provoking an arms race, if indeed India was successful in making significant gains with
its program. This possibility caused Indian leaders to caution prudence in India's
response to Chinese testing, noting that "nothing would suit Mao Tse-Tung's book better
than our being hustled into a nuclear race.,,35 A recognition that India lagged
considerably behind China further counseled against seeking to directly compete with
China by quickly and significantly bolstering India's nuclear weapons program.
Prior to developing a delivery system capable oftargeting China's population
centers however, Indian testing of a nuclear device would not change the balance of
power, even by perception as China was already well ahead in testing. Even if India
tested in response to the Chinese tests, the lag in development meant that China would
"explode far more advanced bombs by time India matches China's recent
34 Theodore L. Eliot, U.S. Department of State, to Hemy A. Kissinger, "NSSM 156 on Indian Nuclear
Developments," Secret Cover Memorandum, 11 September 1972, Presidential Directives II (Washington
D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. PR01075, 13.
35 Chester Bowles to U.S. Department of State, "Debate among the Indians As to What Should Be Done in
the Wake of the Chinese Nuclear Detonation," Confidential Cable 1323,29 October 1964, Nuclear Non-
Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no.
NP01031,2.
170
achievement.,,36 Simple testing, however, without an accompanied delivery system or
provocative statements, was unlikely to create serious protest by China. China itself
continued to test and refused to sign or comply with the Partial Test Ban Treaty at the
time. This made China unlikely to even publicly castigate an Indian testing program.
The risk of an arms race and deteriorating relations, if India chose a weapons
option, was much more likely with Pakistan. Indeed, advances in India's nuclear
program "would severely jolt Islamabad.,,37 The Pakistani security calculations were
considerably different from China, as Pakistan was both conventionally weaker than
India and its nuclear program was far less developed. Moreover, India had acquired its
Canberra bombers in 1958, giving it the ability to deliver nuclear bombs into Pakistani
territory. Therefore, any Indian decisions that would move it closer to acquiring a
nuclear capability made Pakistan extremely insecure.
For these reasons, Indian analysts understood that if it acquired nuclear weapons,
it would make Pakistan more inclined to seek them as well.38 Not only would Pakistan
"try desperately to follow suit," but it likely try to seek nuclear assistance from China.39
If actual program assistance was not forthcoming, Pakistan would likely seek from China
36 Bowles, "Debate among the Indians," no. NP01031, 4.
37 Eliot, "NSSM 156 on Indian Nuclear Developments," no. PR01075, 13.
38 Central Intelligence Agency, "India's Nuclear Weapons Policy," Secret Special National Intelligence
Estimate, SNIE 31-1-65, 21 October 1965, Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington D.C.: The National
Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. WM00107, 4.
39 "Value and Feasibility of a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," Confidential Internal Paper, 10 December
1964, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey,
1992), no. NP01070, 13.
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and the U.S. assurances of protection against Indian "nuclear blackmail.,,4o India already
feared collusion between Pakistan and China, which was further heightened after the
1965 and 1971 Indo-Pak wars because of China's support ofPakistan. Finally, India's
nuclear program would interfere with the normalization of relations between India and
Pakistan after their conventional conflicts.
In short, India's choice of how to respond to China's nuclear testing and
advancing weapons program had significant implications for relations with its neighbors.
In particular, Indian leaders that opposed a complete reversal of Indian nuclear policy by
undertaking a testing and weapons program feared the risk of an arms race with China
and Pakistan. While India could likely dampen the competition with China, any move by
New Delhi to demonstrate an increased weapons development was likely to encourage a
direct Pakistani response, one that realistically could be aided by China.
(2) Conventional Threats & Resource Allocations
Some Indian leaders opposed any nuclear decision that would affect India's
conventional ability to respond to threats from China and Pakistan. China's initial
nuclear tests were not themselves military significant as they were not accompanied by a
delivery capability that could reach India. This fact was recognized by Indian Defense
Minister Y.B. Chavan, who publicly downplayed the China test.41 He instead
40 Eliot, "NSSM 156 on Indian Nuclear Developments," no. PR01075, 11-12.
41 Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma, 26.
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emphasized that the primary short-term threat to India was from Chinese conventional
forces. 42
Because the Chinese military threat was primarily convention, the best way for
India meet the threat was by modernizing Indian conventional forces and "an expensive
Indian nuclear weapons program would divert scarce resources from this end.,,43 If India
instead chose to not make reductions in its non-nuclear forces, then to increase its defense
budget for nuclear weapons would require diverting resources from its economic
development programs.44 As such, some Indian leaders understood that they could face
resource problems as the expense of a ramped up nuclear program.45
Additionally, as the 1965 Indo-Pak war demonstrated, India needed to have
sufficient conventional military forces to deal with a Pakistan supported by China. As
Indian leaders who disapproved a nuclear weapons program pointed out, "during the
recent crisis, India was able to deal with both Pakistan and Communist China
simultaneously with conventional arms, and that what is needed is added strength ofthis
sort.,,46 Prime Minister Shastri further reinforced this position, stating that from "the
purely practical point it is more important that we build up our own conventional
42 Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma, 26.
43 Eliot, "NSSM 156 on Indian Nuclear Developments," no. PR01075, 10.
44 U.S. Department of Defense, "The Indian Nuclear Problem," no. NP01086, 4.
45 U.S. Department of Defense, "The Indian Nuclear Problem," no. NP01086, 5.
46 Central Intelligence Agency, "India's Nuclear Weapons Policy," no. WMOO107, 4.
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weapons and strengthen ourselves.,,47 India's military similarly preferred using available
funds to build up India's conventional military strength, and did not readily push for
nuclear weapons in the wake of China's test. 48
Finally, and in response to the political dimension of prestige, opponents of a
more robust nuclear weapons program argued that "a reversal of Nehru's traditional
position after all India has said about the evils of nuclear weapons would damage its
international prestige.,,49 This meant that for some, a weapons program would serve
neither military nor political purposes.
In short, the initial Chinese nuclear tests did not readily threaten India from a
military perspective, although this would change sooner than later. Opponents of a full-
fledged nuclear weapons program argued against the merits of diverting scarce resources
away from conventional weapons systems that were needed to deal with existing
conventional threats from China and Pakistan. Nonetheless, these initial responses were
largely the outgrowth ofmilitary assessments in the mid-1960s and would be subject to
revision as China's nuclear arsenal and delivery capabilities improved. Additionally,
once it became apparent that Pakistan was also pursuing nuclear weapons, India would be
forced to deal with this more immediate threat, notwithstanding the heavy costs. But as
an initial matter, India was not required to institute a crash nuclear weapons program to
respond to a military threat from China.
47 Central Intelligence Agency, "Scientific Intelligence Digest: The Indian Nuclear Weapons Program and
Delivery Capabilities," Secret Periodical, December 1965, Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington
D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. WMOO109, 1.
48 Central Intelligence Agency, "India's Nuclear Weapons Policy," no. WMOOI07, 4.
49 Central Intelligence Agency, "India's Nuclear Weapons Policy," no. WMOO107, 4.
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(3) System Requirements for Stable Deterrence
The Chinese nuclear test in 1964 prompted Indian leaders to begin to more
seriously evaluate the type of nuclear weapons systems it would need to deter China in
the longer term. One dimension of this debate centered around the type of nuclear force
and delivery system that would be required to have a meaningful response when China
developed its capability enough to militarily threaten India. Moreover, whether such a
system would be worth the costs was an additional factor. This debate was significant as
it was the beginning of Indian leaders undertaking these assessments. Prior to this point,
the government had not really estimated what a significant weapons system would cost or
how it would be used. 50
Proponents of a nuclear weapons program tended to exaggerate how quickly and
cheaply India could develop at least a rudimentary device and delivery system. For
example, they often relied on Dr. Bhabha's optimistic estimation that India could conduct
a nuclear explosion in 18 months, at a relatively cheap cost. As it turns out, Dr. Bhabha
both underestimated the costs of a nuclear explosion and the amount oftime required to
develop the explosive devices.51 Bomb proponents also felt that the costs were justified,
no matter what they were.
Opponents tended to argue that even if India sought to credibly deter China with
its own nucle~weapons program, the costs to develop a sophisticated second-strike force
50 Bowles, "Discussion oflndian Nuclear Capabilities and Intentions," no. NPOII01, 2.
51 Chester Bowles, "Jerome Weisner's Report on Visit to India and Discussion oflndian Nuclear
Capabilities and Intentions," Secret Cable, 21 January 1965, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.:
The National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. NP01101, 2.
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with adequate delivery systems would be exorbitant. For India, as a developing country,
even building a "few crude weapons and an unsophisticated delivery system" would be
an economic burden costing several hundred million dollars in the 1960s.52 A more
sophisticated program relying on modem aircraft or missiles with nuclear warheads
would cost several billion dollars during the same timeframe.53 Based on the distance to
Chinese targets, India would have to develop the latter option with long-range bombers or
missiles. As then Prime Minister Shastri recognized, "[0]nce we produce a bomb we
have to build for it the necessary carriers, rockets, etc. It starts a process of escalation
which has no end in the swiftly developing military technology of our times.,,54 India
would also have to maintain sufficient conventional forces, given its territorial dispute
with China that led to the 1962 war.
Moreover, India would have to rely in significant part on indigenously developing
these systems, as the major nuclear powers with these delivery mechanisms at the time--
the U.S. and USSR-were not sharing this type of advanced technology. 55 Because India
would have to develop the more ambitious program to credibly deter to a Chinese threat,
this left some opponents with the opinion that "the cost of a meaningful weapons system
will be prohibitive.,,56 This meant that without long-range bombers or missiles, an Indian
52 Central Intelligence Agency, "Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Capabilities," no. WM00052, 5.
53 Central Intelligence Agency, "Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Capabilities," no. WM00052, 5.
54 Central Intelligence Agency, "Scientific Intelligence Digest," no. WMOO109, 1.
55 "Value and Feasibility ofa Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," no. NPOI070, 12-13.
56 Central Intelligence Agency, "India's Nuclear Weapons Policy," no. WMOOI07, 4.
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nuclear capability vis-a.-vis China would have a marginal impact.57 Further, because such
a program would be very expensive, it would likely entail diverting "scarce resources
from badly needed economic and social development programs.,,58 Even if India made
advanced delivery systems a priority, it sti11lacked a sufficient economic base from
which to compete with China, in particular because China was already much further
along with its development.59
An additional concern was that even with just a rudimentary force that lacked a
long-range delivery system it could lead to increased tensions with China, which may
then weaken India's national security in the short tenn.60 And of course, there was the
ongoing concern that any of these actions could lead to an increase in tensions,
potentially leading to an arms race. In short, New Delhi was aware that there would be
transitional vulnerability for a considerable period oftime as it moved towards a weapons
option, and then to a second-strike capability.6l
b) India's Short-Term Strategy as China Continues Nuclear
Development
Notwithstanding increased Indian debate over the proper course of action, India's
actual options were limited during the 1960s because it had not yet developed the
57 Eliot, "NSSM 156 on Indian Nuclear Developments," no. PR01075, 17.
58 Eliot, "NSSM 156 on Indian Nuclear Developments," no. PR01075, 10.
59 Eliot, "NSSM 156 on Indian Nuclear Developments," no. PROI075, 10.
60 Eliot, "NSSM 156 on Indian Nuclear Developments," no. PR01075, 10.
61 Walt W. Rostow, "A Way of Thinking about Nuclear Proliferation," Confidential Internal Paper, 19
November 1964, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and
Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. NPOI046, 10.
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capability to test or deliver a rudimentary nuclear device. India's Air Force had
purchased Canberra bombers from Britain in 1958, which had the range to carry bombs
to targets in Pakistan, but could not range the higher population areas in China.62 In
addition, India only had enough plutonium to build at most one or two bombs. Indian
capacity would increase in 1968 and 1971 as two additional atomic power stations,
Tarapur and Rajasthan stations respectively, came online; however, this meant in the
interim that India had a relative dearth of sufficient nuclear material to construct nuclear
bombs.
At the same time, China continued developing and testing nuclear weapons,
which further ratcheted up the pressure on the Indian government to respond. The
Chinese program was developing quickly and by 1967 China conducted its sixth nuclear
weapons test, which was thermonuclear. Additionally, China had moved some troops
into the disputed area with India.
The continued and very public advancements of the Chinese nuclear program are
credited as creating a significant incentive for India to test its own device, followed by
the long-term development of a substantial nuclear program with advanced delivery
systems. The level of threat the Indians felt from the Chinese nuclear program was
largely a function of the pace and scope of China's own nuclear development-and
whether China continued to support Pakistan in any conflict with India, as it had done
62 Shyam Bhatia, India's Nuclear Bomb (Sahibabad: Vikas Publishing House, 1979) 127.
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during the 1965 war.63 Both of these conditions continued and increased Indian threat
perceptions ofboth of its neighbors.
Based on these incentives, U.S. estimates predicted that while Prime Minister
Shastri did not want to start a program, it was sti1llike1y that India would in the future
test a nuclear device and begin to develop weapons.64 This shift in opinion was based on
the sentiment that an independent nuclear deterrent was needed to in the event of another
confrontation with India's regional adversaries, as no nuclear power would risk a
devastating attack on its own soil, particularly iffor the sake of another country.65 In
short, as China continued to test, the pressure on Indian leadership to respond with a
credible nuclear deterrent increased.
However, New Delhi lacked the technical ability to respond to Chinese
advancements with its own nuclear tests. This left India's leaders with a strategy that
sought to minimize the impact of the continued Chinese testing, while India further
developed its own nuclear capabilities. This included emphasizing existing Indian
capabilities, which were under continued development, while simultaneously noting
Indian restraint. In particular, the statements that India's nuclear policies were subject to
change, as well as underscoring that India had the right to conduct PNEs represented a
shift in India's nuclear stance. Indian leaders also sought support from the international
community to constrain China's program, and Prime Ministers Shastri and later Indira
63 Central Intelligence Agency, "India's Nuclear Weapons Policy," no. WMOOI07, 6.
64 Central Intelligence Agency, "India's Nuclear Weapons Policy," no. WMOOI07, 1.
65 Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, "Concerns Whether Some Information Presented in a Newsweek
Article Is Classified," Letter, 19 August 1965, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National
Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. NPOl131, 55.
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Gandhi privately took measures to prepare India to conduct its nuclear test in 1974. The
following discusses these dynamics.
(1) India's Public Nuclear Policy Subtly Shifts
In response to continued Chinese nuclear development, Indian Prime Ministers
shifted away from Nehru's previous stance that India would not develop nuclear
weapons. The new public posture combined India's traditional approach of highlighting
its restraint, while suggesting that it nonetheless had the capability to make nuclear
weapons, with statements that India's nuclear policy was subject to review, and that it
had the right to conduct peaceful nuclear explosions. These latter two themes were
introduced in the wake of continued Chinese testing and, as a break from India's previous
policy, set the framework forthe Indian test as soon as it had the technical capability to
do so.
For example, India's ambassador the U.S., B.K. Nehru, requested that the U.S.
Secretary of State publicly announce that "India, like Communist China, has potential to
produce nuclear weapons but as good citizen ofworld India has no intention ofproducing
nuclear weapons" and to commend India for its policy.66 India further affirmed that it
"could make and explode a bomb tomorrow but we have not the desire nor the intention.
We are pledge to peace and we will only uss {sic} atomic science for peaceful
purposes.,,67 Prime Minister Shastri further stated that India would "try to eliminate the
threat and terror of nuclear weapons rather than enter into competition with other
66 Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb, 489.
67 Bowles, "Debate among the Indians," no. NPOI031, 2.
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countries to make or produce atom bombs.,,68 This position was underscored by the
declaration that "India had made a firm commitment to restrict its nuclear program to the
peaceful use of nuclear energy... [and] India's views on this subject are very strong.,,69
At the same time, India further downplayed the military importance of the Chinese
nuclear explosion, saying that it has "'made little difference' to India's defense
preparations as India was not producing the atom bomb.,,7o
Overall, this initial stance was largely consistent with how former Prime Minister
Nehru had characterized the Indian nuclear program by generally suggesting that India
had the capability to produce nuclear weapons, but chose restraint instead. To some
extent, this position both before and after the Chinese tests was an exaggeration of India's
nuclear development at the time. By the mid-1960s, India had perhaps enough plutonium
for a couple ofweapons, and had not yet begun to work on an explosives design. This
suggests that Indian leaders were seeking to bolster the state of their nuclear program,
while also seeking to gamer political leverage by emphasizing that India was behaving
responsibly in the international community by not pursuing atomic weapons.
However, there were also two changes to India's historic formulation described
above, following China's nuclear testing. First, as part of India's theme of restraint, its
leaders also began to more openly discuss the concept ofpeaceful nuclear explosions. By
68 Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilennna, 29.
69 1. Douglas Heck to U.S. Department of State, "India's Nuclear Policy in the Wake of ChiCom [Chinese
Connnunist] Nuclear Detonation," Confidential Airgram no. A-411, 23 October 1964, Nuclear Non-
Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no.
NPOIOI6.
70 Bowles, "Debate among the Indians," no. NPO1031, 2.
181
1971 Indian leaders were openly justifying that India retained the option to conduct
peaceful nuclear explosions. While retaining the option to conduct peaceful explosions
was consistent with previous Indian policy from the beginning of its nuclear
development, publicly addressing this possibility represented a shift in India's nuclear
stance. The Gandhi administration thus began to lay the ideational groundwork so that
when India did test, it could characterize it as peaceful, rather than as a signal that India
intended to build nuclear weapons.
Second, Indian leaders began to acknowledge that its no-bomb position was
subject to change. Prior to the Chinese tests, Nehru had declared without reservation that
India would not build nuclear weapons. However, subsequent leaders who had to address
the advancing Chinese nuclear capabilities began to hedge and sought to leave the option
publicly open in light its security environment.
For example, then Prime Minister Shastri, who was very reluctant to pursue an
advanced system because of the required costs, nonetheless still noted that if "if China
developed her nuclear power and perfected the delivery system, 'then we will certainly
have to consider as to what we have to dO.",71 New Delhi also informed Washington that
while India was committed to maintaining its nuclear program limited to peaceful
purposes, it left open the option that it may have to alter its present policy.72 Similarly,
subsequent Prime Minister Gandhi sought to reassure parliament by noting that the
71 Central Intelligence Agency, "Scientific Intelligence Digest," no. WMOOI09, 1.
72 L. Douglas Heck to U.S. Department of State, "India's Nuclear Policy in the Wake of ChiCom [Chinese
Communist] Nuclear Detonation," no. NPOI016.
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government was "building up its atomic power," albeit for peaceful purposes.73 She
further stated that peaceful nuclear development increased "know-how and other
competence," and that its existing policy of peaceful uses of nuclear energy was under
"constant review.,,74 Indian leaders had now begun to acknowledge that Indian nuclear
policy was subject to review, and further opened the door to a nuclear option.
In short, in the wake of the Chinese tests, India's public stance was one of
restraint but that this policy was subject to change, depending on the nature and scope of
the Chinese program. While India would also retain its characterization of its program as
peaceful, by now publicly justifying reasons for peaceful nuclear explosions further laid
the foundation that Prime Minister Gandhi would rely on when testing in 1974.
(2) Soliciting International Support
India also sought to use its position of restraint to urge other states to seek to
constrain the Chinese program while providing India with increased support in the face of
its nuclear adversary. For example, with rumors of an imminent Chinese test in
September 1964, Prime Minister Shastri urged other states to "persuade China to desist
from developing nuclear weapons," while noting that India's nuclear establishment was
firmly ordered to only develop peaceful uses of atomic energy.75
At the same time, India linked its response to the Chinese test on whether or not
the great powers provided India with protection from China. As communicated to
73 Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma, 45-46.
74 Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma, 45-46.
75 Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma, 25.
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Washington, New Delhi's decision about whether it would develop nuclear weapons was
contingent on the great powers' response to the Chinese nuclear developments, and the
implications for Indian security.76 Thus, if the great powers "succeeded in persuading
China through political and diplomatic means not to take advantage of its new military
strength then India could feel secure. Otherwise [India] would feel threatened by a
militarily superior China and would have to take steps to safeguard her national
security."n Similarly, Prime Minister Shastri indicated that India would retain the bomb
option unless it received guarantees from both the Soviet Union and the West that India
would be protected against attack from its enemies.78
However, any hope that the US. or international community at large would either
assist India or restrain China was short lived, if it was ever a realistic option. While some
Indian leaders may have initially been comforted by President Johnson's assurances that
the US. would "come to the aid of any nation menaced by China,,,79 by 1965 Indo-US.
relations significantly worsened when the US. cutoff arms supplies to both India and
Pakistan during the war. Other nuclear powers were also not inclined to extend the
security guarantees that India sought. Further, the Chinese nuclear program continued to
76 Harold W. Jacobson to U.S. Department of State, "[Excised] Views on India and the Bomb,"
Confidential Airgram, A-499, 27 November 1964, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The
National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. NP01050, 1.
77 Jacobson, "[Excised] Views on India and the Bomb," no. NP01050, 1.
78 Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, "Concerns Whether Some Information Presented in a Newsweek
Article Is Classified," no. NPO 1131, 57.
79 Central Intelligence Agency, "Indian Government Policy on Development ofNuc1ear Weapon[s],"
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(Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. WM00088, 1.
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develop apace. Thus, the pressure remained on India to resolve its insecurity vis-a-vis its
nuclear neighbor.
(3) Continued Indian Nuclear Development
While India's public posture shifted in slight, but important ways, its Prime
Ministers undertook measures to further the nuclear explosives program, which would
further lay the foundation for the nuclear weapons program. These decisions were made
behind the scenes, with few parliamentary or cabinet members being consulted. As such,
they were largely hidden from public purview.
Prime Minister Shastri had the initial task of determining how to respond to the
Chinese nuclear program. Under his direction, the government began to more seriously
evaluate and develop an Indian nuclear option. Immediately following the first Chinese
nuclear test, Shastri directed the Indian military services to prepare a study with
recommendations on the military implications of the Chinese test for India. 8o Part of this
included an estimate of what would be involved in conducting an underground explosion,
and whether India should develop its own bomb capability as a "hedge" against China.8!
U.S. reports also indicated that the Indians were increasing their military research
and development efforts.82 As part of this research, in 1965 Shastri permitted nuclear
80 Defense Intelligence Agency, "Press Coverage ofIndia's Developing Nuclear Capability," Secret Cable,
7 December 1964, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and
Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. NPOI060, 2.
81 Bowles, "Debate among the Indians," no. NP01031, 3.
82 Central Intelligence Agency, "The Indian Nuclear Weapons Capability," Classification Unknown,
Memorandum, 18 October 1965, Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington D.C.: The National Security
Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. WMOOI06, 1.
185
explosive technology to go forward, although labeled as for peaceful purposes only.
There was also some evidence that the Indians were "interested in establishing a high
explosives test site involving advanced instrumentation for research which could be
related to nuclear weapons deve1opment.,,83 The practical effect is that these measures
brought "India much closer to the point where it could develop its own nuclear weapons
if necessary to repel a nuclear threat from China or any other hostile nuclear power.,,84
By 1971, under the leadership of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, there were reports that
India's space and atomic energy programs were well under way, with a "new tempo
evident in rocketry research.,,85 By 1973 India had achieved the necessary technical
advancements to test, which it did under Indira Gandhi's leadership shortly thereafter.
Publicly, however, there were few indications of these decisions, beyond making
the case being able to conduct peaceful nuclear explosions. Rather, Indian leaders made
a public case for wanting to avoid a costly nuclear arms race. For example, Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi stated that "nuclear weapons are no substitute for military
preparedness, involving conventional weapons. The choice before us involves not only
the question of making a few atom bombs, but of engaging in an arms race with
sophisticated nuclear warheads and an effective missile delivery system. ,,86
83 Central Intelligence Agency, "Scientific Intelligence Digest," no. WMOOI09, II.
84 Bhatia, India's Nuclear Bomb, 132.
85 Kenneth B. Keating to U.S. Department of State, "Indian Space and Atomic Energy Programs,"
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Gandhi further argued that nuclear weapons would not enhance Indian national
security and would instead jeopardize its internal security due the economic burden the
program would impose. 87 She similarly noted that Indian leaders "have discussed this
question deeply and rejected the idea ofmaking a bomb. Once we launch into making it,
we would have to incur heavy expenses to keep abreast of nuclear weaponry and at the
same time maintain conventional equipment.,,88 Indian Chairman of the ABC, Vikram
Sarabhai, also declared his support for the government's non-nuclear stance because
India did not have "the money to devote to the long-range missiles, radar, electronics, or
industrial base that would be required to support a nuclear deterrent.,,89 Nonetheless,
Indian leadership kept the option of changing India policy open, and noted that Indian
scientists continued to study underground nuclear explosive research, albeit for peaceful
purposes only.9o
2. Pakistan
While China's nuclear advancements posed the primary consideration informing
India's nuclear concerns, Pakistan was not irrelevant to Indian security calculations prior
to the 1974 test. Pakistan factored into India calculations in two ways: first, whether
87 Jain, Nuclear India, 201-202.
88 Cited in Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb, 159.
89 Virkram Sarabhai, press conference, 1 June 1966, in Jain, Nuclear India, 179. Notwithstanding these
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3 May 1972, www.1exis-nexis.com.
187
India needed nuclear weapons to deal with its adversary and second, how an Indian
nuclear weapons option would affect Pakistan's nuclear ambitions. India was
conventionally superior to Pakistan, and preferred that Islamabad did not acquire nuclear
weapons; these preferences militated against India openly pursuing a weapons option.
As previously discussed, India during the 1960s and early 1970s had concerns
related to the costs of a nuclear weapons program. To some extent, the cost would be
less within this dyad because New Delhi already had at least a rudimentary delivery
system against targets in Pakistan. However, a nuclear option could only be affordable if
it did not take resources away from India's existing conventional superiority. This was
no small concern to India, given that it fought two wars with Pakistan during this time
period, and was also extremely concerned with Chinese assistance to Pakistan.
It was the addition of China to the Pakistani equation that prompted some Indian
leaders to demand that India develop nuclear weapons "in the face of the collusion
between China and Pakistan.'.9l However, Prime Minister Shastri explicitly rejected this
argument, noting that "despite the continued threat of aggression from China, which has
developed nuclear weapons, government has continued to adhere to the decision not to go
in for nuclear weapons but to work for their elimination. It is hardly necessary to alter
this decision in the light of the conflict with Pakistan."n
Military assessments generally agreed with this stance. For example, Major
General Son Dutt argued that India would not gain much security from nuclear
91 Letter quoted in Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma, 39.
92 Quoted in Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma, 40-41.
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weapons.93 While recognizing the increased threat from Pakistani and Chinese
cooperation, Dutt contended that developing a rudimentary nuclear capability would not
provide effective deterrence while undermining India's moral stance and irritating other
nuclear powers. 94 He further recommended that a better course of action for India would
be to attempt to stabilize relations with Pakistan rather than going the nuclear weapons
route.95 Similarly, Indian Defence Minister Ram defended government policies that were
modernizing the army, which would provide the best defense of India's borders through
. I 96conventlOna means.
Washington also understood that Indian decision-making was contingent, in part,
on maintaining conventional superiority over Pakistan. This necessarily implicated the
U.S. role in South Asia, and the quality and quantity of weapons Washington was willing
to provide Pakistan. In particular, the resumption of arms sales to Pakistan would
increase the incentive for India to acquire nuclear weapons if the conventional imbalance
did not remain in the region.97
Moreover, Indian leaders were concerned that nuclear weapons would likely
strain relations with Pakistan, and likely motivate the latter to develop their own nuclear
weapons capability. There was also considerable concern that Pakistan would approach
93 Major General D. Som Dutt, "India and the Bomb," Adelphi Paper Series, no. 30 (London: International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1966).
94 Som Dutt, "India and the Bomb."
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China for assistance in this regard. For example, there were rumors in 1968 that Pakistan
was planning to test an atom bomb, or that there might be Sino-Pakistani collusion on this
front. In response, Prime Minister Gandhi contended that Pakistan did not have the
capability to build a bomb, although it could conceivably get one from "somewhere or
the other.,,98 Given Pakistan's increased cooperation with China, the latter was the likely
reference. She further that "'[i]fwe make one Pakistan will definitely get a bomb....We
are anxious not to do anything which will precipitate a crisis. ",99
In short, because India retained conventional superiority over Pakistan, it had
little incentive to pursue a nuclear weapons program. However, this calculation could
change if India lost its conventional edge, or Pakistan began developing nuclear weapons.
While the former did not occur, there were vocal calls within some of the Pakistani
leadership during the 1960s for Pakistan to acquire nuclear weapons to make up for its
conventional deficiencies. These calls increased after Pakistan lost the 1971 war, and the
same year, its weapons program was initiated. At that point, India had few incentives to
not acquire a nuclear weapons capability, but still many reasons to hide this decision
during development. Still, in 1974 when India finally gained the ability to test, it was not
facing an immediate security threat from either China or Pakistan. Rather, New Delhi
was preparing for a longer-term threat from China and Pakistan, when the latter achieved
a nuclear weapons capability.
98 Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma, 43.
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B. Patron State Incentives
With its colonial history, Indian leaders carefully crafted a foreign policy that
sought to minimize dependence on other states. As leader of the non-aligned movement,
India further attempted, although often unsuccessfully, to maintain equidistance between
the U.S. and USSR during the Cold War. At the same time, India was a developing state
with incentives to build cooperative relations with patron states to gamer economic and
military assistance.
Based on this approach to foreign policy, as well as differing patron state views
on non-proliferation, India's nuclear energy program was vulnerable from Western state
suppliers. However, leading up to the 1974 test, India's relations with the U.S. in
particular were at a low point and there were not significant cooperation with economic
programs or conventional weapons. India relied primarily on the Soviet Union for its
conventional weapons, and Moscow was not willing to damage its relationship with New
Delhi over the nuclear issue. The following discusses the extent to which the U.S. had
some leverage over the Indian decision to test, as well as India's relationships with the
Soviet Union, and the Western nuclear suppliers, the lJK, France, and Canada.
1. Indo-U.S. Relations
By the early to mid-1960's, Washington was aware that India's nuclear program
could potentially produce nuclear weapons. IOO In July 1972, Prime Minister Gandhi
100 Secretary of State Dean Rusk to U.S. Embassies, "United States Government Is Committed at Every
Level to Stopping Nuclear Proliferation in Israel and Elsewhere," airgram, circular CG-769, 3 March 1961,
Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington, D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey,
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reiterated that India's nuclear policy was to investigate the possibility ofpeaceful nuclear
explosions, but not to develop nuclear weapons. lOl Nonetheless, the U.S. estimated that
the chances were "about even" that India would detonate a nuclear device within the next
few years from this 1972 assessment. 102 The United States wanted to avoid this outcome.
Before the Indian test in 1974, and increasing significantly after 1974, the United
States has sought to use its economic and technological leverage to induce Indian nuclear
restraint. However, the U.S. did not have significant avenues of cooperation with India in
the preceding years leading up to the test and had a limited ability to influence Indian
policy. In particular, by 1974 the United States did not have a significant amount of
leverage over Indian policy as relations were at a particularly low point in history. 103
There were enough issue linkages to give the Indians pause, but not enough to prevent the
1974 test in the face oflndia's other concerns.
2. The China Problem and U.S. Non-Proliferation Interests
The United States recognized that the Chinese nuclear weapons program created
strong incentives for India to develop its own nuclear weapons for deterrence. However,
Washington perceived an Indian nuclear option as contrary to U.S. interests. Broadly,
U.S. interests were to prevent the worldwide spread of nuclear weapons, have stability in
1992), no. NP00755. The United States appeared to have overestimated Indian nuclear weapons
capabilities, believing a number of times that the program was more advanced than it actually was.
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Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001).
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South Asia, and a "mutually satisfactory relationship with India.,,104 From the U.S.
perspective, if India developed nuclear weapons, it would reduce other states inhibitions
in following suit worldwide.
In terms of South Asia, Washington feared that an Indian decision to develop
weapons would be destabilizing by "adding fresh complications to Sino-Soviet relations
and risking new troubles with Pakistan."lOS Because an Indian nuclear program would in
tum threaten Pakistan, the U.S. concluded that, "our problem would be how to steady the
Pakistanis."lo6 There was the additional problem that Pakistan might also tum to China
for further assistance in the face of an Indian threat,107 Additionally, a nuclear weapons
program could threaten to undermine India's already fragile economy, which the U.S.
desired to see develop for future political stability.108
For these reasons, Washington sought to convince India to remain a non-nuclear
weapons state. Failing this, the hope was to convince India to refrain from testing or
otherwise demonstrating its nuclear development. Even iflndia ultimately decided to
test, the U.S. hoped to forestall this decision as long as possible even ifthis was not a
permanent solution. 109 From a U.S. perspective, "[e]ven if India eventually commences
testing, a further delay would assist our non-proliferation efforts by allowing more time
104 Eliot, "NSSM 156 on Indian Nuclear Developments," no. PR01075, 2.
105 Eliot, "NSSM 156 on Indian Nuclear Developments," no. PRO 1075, 21.
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for the NPT regime to become firmly established."]]O In terms of South Asian stability,
"[c]ontinued Indian restraint would provide further time for developing long-term
approaches, for permitting more favorable evolution in India-Pak relations and perhaps
within Communist China, and for taking steps which might ease the impact of an Indian
decision if our efforts to prevent it should not be proven successful."]]]
In short, because an Indian nuclear decision would conflict with U.S. interests,
Washington's objective was to "do what we can to avert or delay an Indian test, and if
these efforts fail, to limit the harmful repercussions.,,]]2 The strategy employed by
Washington then, was "designed to develop arguments and provide incentives that
reinforce existing Indian policy and make a PNE or weapons program look less
attractive.,,]]3 Below is a discussion of the efforts the U.S. to persuade India to forego or
delay nuclear testing.
3. U.S. Non-proliferation Pressures
Given U.S. interests in Indian non-proliferation, Washington pressed Indian
leaders to maintain the existing policy of nuclear restraint. To this end, the U.S. engaged
Indian leaders in dialogue as to the implications of a nuclear weapons program.
Washington suggested that pursuing a program would be expensive and provide marginal
110 Eliot, "NSSM 156 on Indian Nuclear Developments," no. PROI075, 22.
III Rostow, "The Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem," no. PD~ 1151, 8.
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security returns, while detracting from Indian economic growth, and potentially affecting
the bilateral aid relationship with the U.S. Washington was however unwilling to impose
any punitive measures because U.S. officials perceived that, combined with the
worsening bilateral relationship with India, sanctions would be counterproductive and
compel India to test.
First, the U.S. leaders sought to convince India to both forego a nuclear test, and a
much more ambitious program of developing a nuclear arsenal with a deliverable range
to China based on cost and marginal security benefits. In the course of this dialogue, the
U.S. signaled its position by engaging Indian leaders "into serious talks on dangers and
implications ofproliferation.,,114 To this end, Washington sought to emphasize the
economic costs and technical difficulties associated with the development of a nuclear
. 115
optiOn.
Further, while a nuclear test would be less costly than developing a nuclear force,
it would also do little to contribute to Indian security.116 To achieve security benefits vis-
a-vis China, India would have to incur much greater costs and technical difficulties to
achieve a deterrence force. A ''useful capability" for deterrence purposes would require
114 U.S. Department of State, "Discussion with Indian Officials about U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation,"
Secret Cable 1393, 12 January 1965, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security
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warheads, and relatively long-range delivery mechanisms, which would be much more
costly to acquire and keep up to date. I I?
Moreover, Washington suggested that the focus should be on improving India's
economic performance and limiting defense expenditures. 118 Otherwise, spending scarce
resources on building a nuclear capability, rather than allocating and investing money in
other domestic projects, would damage India's economic development. I 19
There was also an implicit threat that if India chose to pursue a weapons route, the
u.s. may cut off economic assistance. This was communicated to the Indians by
suggesting that the U.S. Congress would likely balk at providing any type of aid that
could be used to subsidize a nuclear weapons program. 120 After all, ifIndia could afford
the luxury of atomic bombs, it probably does not need outside development assistance. 121
And even though the U.S. was unwilling to directly link its assistance to non-
proliferation, it achieved this result by seeking to limit India's defense expenditures
overall. U.S. leaders had "made it clear that our willingness to follow through is
117 Rostow, "The Indian Nuclear Weapons Problem," no. PDOl151, 10.
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contingent" in part on India limiting its defense expenditures. I22 The result is that "[t]his
adds to pressures on India to forego-or at least delay-a nuclear weapons effort.,,123
At the same time, the White House was hesitant to use direct threats, such as
cutting back or eliminating economic aid, because it was concerned that doing so would
be counterproductive to U.S. Cold War interests. U.S. officials calculated that too tough
a stance on New Delhi might tum the Indians to greater reliance on the Soviet Union. 124
Washington understood that there were limits to the pressure it could impose on the
Indians at the time as related to economic leverage, and still accomplish its varied
objectives.
A second avenue to influence Indian nuclear policy was through existing U.S.
bilateral agreements for atomic energy. The agreements provided that the U.S. supply
enriched uranium for the Tarapur reactor and heavy water for the CIRUS reactor, and
heavy water that originated in the U.S. was used in RAPP I, the Canadian built reactor. 125
For its part, the U.S. interpreted these agreements as prohibiting any type ofnuclear
device, regardless of whether it was a PNE or not. The Indians disagreed. The basis of
the dispute is important to the extent that it would determine U.S. actions in the event that
India chose to test.
Anticipating that India would label its test a PNE, the U.S. sought to foreclose this
,option by characterizing PNEs as indistinguishable from a test for weapons purposes.
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Washington's position was that "peaceful and military nuclear explosive technologies
cannot be distinguished."I26 Further, according to Washington's interpretation, U.S.
supplied materials were prohibited from being used in any explosive device, even those
labeled a PNE. For the U.S., the "any nuclear explosive device, though it be intended for
benign economic purposes, could also be used for destructive purposes. The
development of [PNEs], therefore, is tantamount to the development of nuclear weapons.
Consequently, the United States would consider it incompatible with existing United
States-Indian agreements for American nuclear assistance to be employed in the
development of peaceful nuclear explosive devices."I27 U.S. representatives reiterated
this position to the Indians in March 1972, in response to rumors that India may conduct
aPNE. I28
The U.S. interpretation meant that, "Indian nuclear testing would require a review
ofUS cooperation in the atomic energy and space fields."I29 In this way, New Delhi was
on notice that atomic energy supplies from the U.S. could be in jeopardy, as well as other
cooperation in the space field, in the event it conducted any nuclear test. Still, as with
efforts to use economic avenues to influence Indian policy making, the U.S. refrained
from issuing direct threat to India, fearing they would be counterproductive. Instead,
Washington sought to inform the Indian leadership of the impact of the relationship if
126 Eliot, "NSSM 156 on Indian Nuclear Developments," no. PR01075.
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India tested, which was framed in terms ofUS. non-proliferation policy interests and
legal problems. 130
There is some indication that these nascent non-proliferation efforts were
significant enough to worry Indira Gandhi's advisors when she contemplated the 1974
tests. Mainly, her advisors were concerned that with a public demonstration ofIndia's
nuclear capabilities and no practical difference between a 'peaceful' explosive and a
nuclear bomb, despite the rhetoric, that the result would be a slow down in US. provision
of dual use technology and aid for Indian development. l3l So, while Washington's veiled
threats did not fall on deaf ears, they did little to resolve India's fundamental security
concerns vis-a.-vis China, and the continued deterioration of the relationship between the
two states further diluted the force of the US. non-proliferation message.
4. Limits to U.S. Non-proliferation Pressures
Washington's chosen strategy reflected its relative difficulty in ultimately
influencing Indian decision-making, primarily because it did not have substantial sources
of leverage or issue linkages. In particular, India's security issues were still outstanding
and there was a worsening of relations between the two democracies leading up to the
1974 Indian nuclear test.
The United States and India had relatively limited avenues of cooperation.
Throughout the 1950's and the 1960s, the United States and India cooperated on a
number of fronts. During this early time period, the US. provided India with agricultural
130 Eliot, "NSSM 156 on Indian Nuclear Developments," no. PR01075, 24.
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and food aid on a concessiona1 basis. Early on, India's nuclear program faced limitations
based on financial and technologica11imitations, forcing New Delhi to rely on outside
assistance in these areas. 132 The United States also included India in its Atoms for Peace
Program, which assisted India in building its first nuclear reactors and ultimately
provided India with the ability to pursue dual-use nuclear development. 133 Indian nuclear
scientists also trained in the U.S. 134
Still, one ofthe sticking points early in the relationship was U.S. insistence on
safeguards and control provisions that accompanied U.S. bilateral agreements related to
nuclear development. For its part, India was careful from the beginning of its nuclear
program to limit is reliance on the U.S. to the extent that New Delhi would be required to
accept safeguards that would ultimately affect its ability to develop a nuclear option. For
example, Dr. Bhabha, who headed India's atomic energy program, strongly objected to
U.S. efforts to impose safeguards. He characterized such measures as "onerous" and
"more or less an insult to India's peaceful intentions."I35 India also declined U.S. offers
for financial assistance to purchase a research reactor, based on its objections. 136 Because
132 Central Intelligence Agency, "Indian Nuclear Energy Program," no. WM00026, 1.
133 Canada was also a significant supplier oflndian reactors prior to the 1974 test. Part of early U.S.
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Commission, "Commission Decision on Sale of Heavy Water to India," Memorandum, 10 October 1956,
Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington, D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey,
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New Delhi after India tested in 1974, and the U.S. passed the 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act.
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India sought to maintain the independence of its program and limit external interference
with its nuclear development, the US. had few direct avenues of nuclear cooperation to
affect Indian non-proliferation policy.
In addition to the nuclear issues, the main source of tension between the US. and
India was a result of the Indo-Pakistan wars. The United States cut off arms to both India
and Pakistan during the 1965 war, and had not resumed supplying them by the 1971 war.
The suspension of US. military aid during the 1965 war, and that the U.S. failed to
prevent Pakistan from using U.S. weapons against India, was cited a proof by some
Indians that India could not depend on external power for protection. 137 Moreover, India
turned to the Soviets to buy conventional weapons after the US. refused to supply them
in 1965.138 The relationship between New Delhi and Moscow would continue to develop
and resulted in a steady source of weapons for India.
By the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, the United States had not resumed supplying
military assistance and was perceived as tilting toward supporting Pakistan. Further
adding insult to injury, from the Indian perspective, occurred when the U.S. sailed the
USS Enterprise aircraft carrier into the Bay ofBengal during the war. This move was
viewed by some India leadership as nuclear coercion and has been held up since as a
reason why Indian needs a nuclear capability to withstand the diplomatic pressures of
great powers. Additionally, India had little confidence that it could rely on external
137 Central Intelligence Agency, "India's Nuclear Weapons Policy," no. WMOOl07, 4.
138 U.S. Information Agency, "P.M. Gandhi's U.S. Visit," Unclassified Cable 15117, 19 June 1985, Nuclear
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support in the face of a nuclear threat by China. None of the great powers extended
security agreements, and, as discussed above, the U.S. relationship was worsening to the
extent that it had stopped providing conventional assistance. Further, in the midst of
contentious Cold War politics, the United States eyed India's cooperation with the Soviet
Union with increasing distrust, despite India's proclamations of 'nonalignment' between
either of the divisive Cold War blocks.
India, for its part, was determined to not be dependent on the United States as it
struggled to consolidate post-colonial independence and throw off any appurtenances of
colonialism or external U.S. influences over its internal politics. As such, India under the
new leadership of Indira Gandhi in 1966 took a more nationalist stance towards external
interference. For example, after 1971, Gandhi requested the U.S. stop its economic aid
missions and declared that India would no longer buy food from the U.S. on a
concessional basis as a symbol ofIndia independence. 139 Moreover, there are reports that
Nixon and Gandhi clearly did not get along at all,140 which lead to even more resistance
on Gandhi's part to accommodate U.S. non-proliferation efforts that ran contrary to
India's perceived interests.
The ultimate outcome of this dismal relationship is that the United States had little
direct leverage with which to persuade India not to test in 1974. As recognized in
Washington, "U.S. influence has drastically diminished over the past years and our
139 Paul and Nayar, India in the World Order.
140 Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb.
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current unilateral ability to affect an Indian nuclear decision is marginal." 141 Indeed,
relations were so poor it was predicted that a major and overly visible U.S. initiative
"would probably produce an effect opposite to that intended and hasten, rather than
delay, an Indian nuclear test.,,142 Washington further understood that if the U.S. resumed
anns sales to Pakistan, this would also shift the Indian balance towards testing.
In short, the U.S. was realistic that it would have difficulty in successfully
influencing Indian policy. Washington realized that its rather poor relations with India
did not put it in a real position to influence Indian nuclear decision-making. This made it
that much more important for other states exercise their influence in prevent India from
going nuclear. Yet, as discussed below, while the U.S. sought to encourage other states
to pressure India to not test, this was also of limited effectiveness.
5. Other Patron States
Prior to the 1974 nuclear test, U.S. ability to influence Indian policy was
relatively weak because it lacked significant cooperation with India. Other states,
including the Soviet Union, Canada, the UK, and France had stronger ties with India in
areas related to conventional weapons assistance and atomic energy development. In
particular, India as a less developed state was dependent on outside assistance for its
atomic energy program, making it vulnerable to pressure from these supplier states.
Because the United States itself did not have a great degree of effective leverage with the
Indians, it sought to encourage these states to use their influence to shape Indian nuclear
141 Eliot, "NSSM 156 on Indian Nuclear Developments," no. PR01075, 23.
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policy. Thus, the U.S. sought to indirectly affect Indian nuclear policy by convincing
other states to cooperate with the goals of the non-proliferation regime. Ultimately, the
Soviet Union and France were less willing to pressure India on its nuclear program, while
Canada and the UK were more willing to link their cooperation with India's non-nuclear
stance.
a) Soviet Influence
The United States recognized early on that the Soviet Union was a potential
source of leverage over India's nuclear program, and saw some value in enlisting Soviet
support to persuade India from developments that might lead to a nuclear option. 143
India's ties with the Soviets increased as New Delhi relied on Moscow for economic and
conventional weapons assistance, including MiG21 aircraft a few months before the 1962
Sino-Indian war. 144 In 1971, India and the Soviet Union further cemented their
cooperative relationship by signing the Treaty ofFriendship and Cooperation. The
Soviet relationship with India, which was closer than that ofthe U.S. because
Washington stopped the provision ofconventional assistance during the Indo-Pak wars,
meant that Moscow was in a better position to influence Indian policy in the years
direct!y leading up to the 1974 test.145
143 Eliot, "NSSM 156 on Indian Nuclear Developments," no. PROI075, 3.
144 Bhatia, India's Nuclear Bomb, 21-22.
145 Eliot, "NSSM 156 on Indian Nuclear Developments," no. PROI075, 23.
204
The Soviet Union was also similarly interested as the United States in preventing
the spread of nuclear weapons. 146 This meant that early on Moscow was reluctant to
actively assist Indian with creating a nuclear option. For example, when Indian scientist
Dr. Bhabha inquired about the possibility of a Soviet provided reactor that would enable
India to make weapons grade plutonium, his request was deferred. 147 Yet, while the
Soviets were unwilling to directly assist the Indian nuclear weapons program, Moscow
was also not inclined to strain its friendly relationship with India over the issue. 148 As
such, the Soviet Union was unlikely to cut off aid in an effort to influence India's nuclear
weapons policy, even ifIndia conducted a peaceful nuclear explosion or pursued a
nuclear weapons program. 149
Thus, as recognized by Washington, the Soviet Union was in a position to
influence India because of ties between the two states. However, even though Soviets
generally preferred nuclear non-proliferation, it was unwilling to exert any significant
leverage on India because it placed a higher priority on good relations with New Delhi.
This was the consistent position the Soviets took for most of India's nuclear
development, notwithstanding U.S. encouragement to exercise greater leverage over New
Delhi's nuclear policy. As a result, Soviet patron state pressures for non-proliferation
were relatively non-existent and therefore had little affect on India's nuclear posture.
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b) Nuclear Cooperation with the West
Early on India relied on Canada, the UK, and France to some extent, for financial
and technology assistance related to its nuclear energy program. Because India preferred
to obtain its nuclear technology from Western countries, this gave them some leverage
over Indian nuclear decision-making, although France declined to exert its influence for
non-proliferation purposes. Given the nature of the supplier relationship at the time, this
effectively put India on notice that Canada, the UK and the U.S. opposed testing,
regardless of whether it was labeled a PNE, but there was little precedent for India to rely
on to predict how this would ultimately affect is nuclear program. As such, the Indians
were surprised by the strength of Western supplier state reactions after the 1974 tests, and
the extent to which it affected India's civilian and military nuclear programs.
India developed cooperative relationships with the United Kingdom and Canada,
having formal agreements with both countries for reactors, parts, and materials for the
development of atomic energy.150 As noted by the U.S. government, "[a] common
language, favored financial arrangements with the sterling bloc area, and membership in
the commonwealth direct India's bilatateral or intentional activities into English or
Canadian channels.,,151 This included Tarapur reactor built in 1968 and the Rajasthan
power station build with Canadian assistance that came online in 1971.152 India also had
150 Central Intelligence Agency, "Indian Nuclear Energy Program," no. WM00026, 7.
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a cooperative arrangement with the French government, beginning with joint research
projects. 153
In terms ofmultilateral actions, the U.S. periodically talked with the UK, Canada,
Japan, and France about India's nuclear designs, and believed that "[w]e can continue
these discussions, trying to stimulate other countries to use their influence with the
Indians to prevent or delay a nuclear decision.,,154 In particular, the U.S. felt that
discussions with the Canadians and British were "particularly pertinent since an Indian
nuclear weapons program might involve material provided under an Indo-Canadian
agreement. ..and since the British currently have increased influence in New Delhi as a
result of their policy in 1971.,,155 One avenue for doing this was to put India on notice
that its primary nuclear suppliers considered peaceful nuclear explosions as a violation of
the agreements, although there was substantial ambiguity as the legality of this
interpretation. For this reason, India knew that testing in 1974 could affect its relations
with its nuclear supplier states. However, given the differing interpretations of its
contractual obligations, India could legitimately argue that it was within the terms of the
agreements by labeling the test a PNE.
As for France, it increasingly became a major provider of technical assistance for
India's nuclear energy and space fields. 156 This gave France increased ability to
153 Central Intelligence Agency, "Indian Nuclear Energy Program," no. WM00026, 7.
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influence Indian nuclear policy, but overall the French were less inclined to promote non-
proliferation polices. For example, while the French indicated that they would act as if
they had signed the NPT, they nonetheless "continued to be less restrictive than the US in
providing India with nuclear equipment.,,157 As such, it was recommended that the U.S.
hold further discussions with the French, and seek their cooperation in inhibiting India
developing a nuclear device and delivery systems. 158
Despite U.S. encouragement to India's suppliers to assist with delaying or
preventing India from developing a weapons option, the Washington was not particularly
sanguine that these countries would impose severe sanctions or that they would be
effective. Rather, ifIndia chose to test, U.S. analysts expected that other states' response
would be relatively mild, with the exception of the imposition of some penalties in the
scientific field. The general lack of response from other states was even more likely if
India labeled its explosion a PNE and disclaimed that it was part of a weapons
program. 159 Washington further expected that to the extent that states would take action,
it would be limited to scientific and technical areas.160 U.S. analysts further stated that
"[w]e are doubtful how far the French and the Soviets would be willing to go. Probably
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they would make some noises of displeasure, but then not join in any multilateral effort to
penalized the Indians.,,161
There is some evidence that Indian leaders were concerned about international
reactions related to the 1974 test. For example, even K. Subrahmanyam, one ofIndia's
traditionally outspoken proponents of India acquiring an overt nuclear deterrence posture,
"urged that India wait until the 1980s to go nuclear, when greater resources would be in
hand and India would be more able to withstand international backlash.,,162 Nonetheless,
it appears the Gandhi government may have underestimated potential backlash to the test,
even though it was labeled a PNE. Nuclear scientist Home Sethna indicated that the
Indians thought the U.S. would stick to its fuel agreements for Tarapur.163 The Indian
scientists were further surprised by Canada's sharp reaction. 164
India was also able to reduce its exposure by labeling the event a PNE, and further
claiming that it did not intend to develop a nuclear weapons capability. This
characterization kept it firmly out of realm of declaring that it was developing a weapons
option, which would have caused an even larger breach with other states. This stance
was essentially consistent with its previous posture that it had reserved the right to
conduct PNEs, as distinct from a weapons test. It allowed external states, while perhaps
condemning the tests, the ability to maintain relations and hope to continue to forestall a
weapons program. The Soviet Union in particular, while interested in preventing
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proliferation, had little interest in cutting off and maintaining separation from India over
the long term.
Some Western supplier states, especially Canada, were unwilling to carryon
nuclear cooperation with India following the 1974 test and it created additional
difficulties in the already limited U.S.-Indian nuclear relationship. As a result, India's
nuclear development was considerably slowed after the test and became much more
costly as it sought to gain self-sufficiency. Given these effects, India likely
underestimated the extent to which its program was vulnerable to external assistance, a
lesson it learned in subsequent years following the test.
C. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime
The Nuclear non-proliferation regime was in its infancy during the 1960s and
1970s, and began to develop simultaneously with India's nuclear program. Relevant
measures during this time period included the establishment of the IAEA for tightening
export controls, the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), and the 1968 Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty (NPT). While India was a supporter of the IAEA and the PTBT, it
refrained from signing the NPT. This meant that India was obligated to keep some
nuclear facilities under safeguard restrictions and a promise not to conduct nuclear
explosions above the earth's surface. However, India was not constrained by the NPT to
not become a nuclear weapons state. The regime, as comprised of nascent norms and
institutions, was therefore not a particularly strong constraining factor prior to the 1974
test. This is despite the fact that Indian rhetoric often supported nuclear disarmament
during this time.
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India was initially receptive to international agreements to ban nuclear weapons.
This evidence suggests that India hoped that an international regime would develop and
obviate its needs for a nuclear arsenal. Early on, Prime Minister Nehru pledged that India
would not use atomic energy for other than peaceful purposes.165 He further pushed
President Eisenhower at the U.N. General Assembly in 1960 for progress on a nuclear
test ban. 166 Prime Minister Nehru also urged the UK, U.S. and USSR to cease nuclear
weapons testing. 167
India's interest in a test ban treaty coincided with Washington's desire to limit the
horizontal spread of nuclear weapons and in the early 1960's, Washington began pushing
for a test ban treaty.· From the United States perspective, without the Treaty, eight
countries would have the ability to achieve a basic nuclear weapons capability by the
early 1970s.168 When the Partial Test Ban Treaty opened for signature in 1963, Prime
Minister Nehru was one of the first world leaders to sign the Treaty, proclaiming that the
agreement will "take us towards disarmament and peace.,,169 The Treaty also was signed
a year before China began conducting its first nuclear tests and India likely hoped that the
agreement would have some effect on constraining its neighbor. However, China did not
sign the agreement and continued atmospheric testing through 1980. And of course, the
165 Central Intelligence Agency, "Indian Nuclear Energy Program," no. WM00026, 7.
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tenns of the treaty do not prohibit underground explosions. With testing still an option,
India probably signed the PTBT because it did not conflict with New Delhi's ability to
maintain a nuclear option, unlike the NPT.
India was also a staunch supporter of the IAEA, and took an active part in the UN
discussions that led to the fonnation of the agency.170 When the IAEA was created, India
became a member and subjected some of its facilities to safeguards. New Delhi refused
however, as it continues to do so to this day, to accept full scope safeguards on all of its
nuclear facilities.
India also sought to rely on the principles of the non-proliferation regime in
responding to the threat of China's nuclear program. For example, in response to a
Chinese nuclear test, Prime Minister Shastri commented that India has "always held the
view that the use ofnuclear weapons should be banned by agreement and all nations in
the world should unite to save the humanity from destruction."I7I New Delhi also sought
Washington's support in putting forward a non-proliferation resolution to the lJN as a
response to Chinese testing. In Indeed, officials in the U.S. government characterized
India at the time as being "publicly committed against Indian acquisition of nuclear
weapons, and has vigorously pressed for a non-proliferation treaty in the UN." 173
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This meant that one factor that might persuade India to maintain its policy of not
developing nuclear weapons was if there was "meaningful international progress in the
field of disarmament.,,174 Washington further understood that a failure to address India's
concerns vis-a.-vis China's nuclear testing, and realistic efforts towards disarmament
would create further incentives for India's leaders to choose a nuclear weapons
program,175 and "an embittered and disillusioned India will almost certainly go all out to
become a nuclear power.,,176 In light ofIndia's concerns, Washington predicted that the
longer it took to create international agreements limiting testing and non-proliferation, the
less likely India would be to join them as China proceeded with its nuclear
developments. ln At the same time, as Washington recognized that New Delhi would not
accede to a non-proliferation treaty that failed to restrict China's nuclear weapons
program, and there was no chance that Beijing would accept such restrictions. 178
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was thus a sticking point for India. Under
the terms of the NPT, India would not be recognized as a nuclear weapons state and as a
signatory, would have been required giving up this option. This point was nonnegotiable
for India, in light of China's status as a nuclear weapons state under the NPT. In
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particular, India was concerned that the agreement would threaten India's security as a
non-nuclear weapons state versus its nuclear-armed adversary, China. 179 There was the
additional concern for some Indian that its lack of a nuclear weapons capability would
exclude it from top-level negotiations, such as on the UN Security Council, and that
China would be included because of its nuclear weapons status. 180
New Delhi it resisted the pressure to join the NPT on the grounds that it was
discriminatory and favored the 'have' nuclear weapons states at the expense of the 'have
nots', a justification that has continued through the present time. 18I This meant that even
if China signed the NPT, India would remain opposed because it codified the existing
nuclear order. At the same time, while India was not willing to sign the treaty in its
present form, India also sought to assure the U.S. that its "recalcitrance would not be seen
as hiding a secret desire to build a bomb.,,182
Even after its refusal to sign the NPT, Washington still hoped that India could be
persuaded to forego its own nuclear testing, or at least to delay a decision for some time.
However, efforts to convince the Indians to defer detonating a nuclear device "would be
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more likely to be successful is we were able to hold out hope of progress on a
Comprehensive Test Ban or some other major disarmament step.,,183 Yet, significant
progress on nuclear disarmament was elusive, and China continued to remain outside the
international non-proliferation framework.
In short, India was initially an active supporter of nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament. However, the realities of its regional security environment predominated
and New Delhi stopped short of agreeing to terms that would limit its future ability to
acquire a nuclear option and permanently relegate it to a non-nuclear state in contrast to
China. Additionally, prior to the 1974 test, there were far fewer supplier state
restrictions. This meant that after the test, India was affected by the regime to the extent
that it lost access to nuclear technology and materials. However, this was a minor issue
prior to the 1974 test, outside of the patron state sources ofleverage discussed above.
Further, while India was unwilling to participate in the formal non-proliferation
framework to the extent that it would limit its weapons ability, New Delhi also did not
seek to entirely ignore or undermine the process. And as Pakistan began to further its
nuclear development in the 1970s, India would invoke the principles of the non-
proliferation regime in response. In this way, India sought to use the existing framework,
combined with Indian nuclear restraint, as a way of directing international non-
proliferation constraints on its adversary.
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D. Domestic Politics
While the above explanations largely focus on India's economic and political
position vis-a-vis external constraints, other scholars contend that variation in India's
nuclear posture is primary the result of domestic considerations. The domestic level
explanations can be divided into two categories. The first explanation suggests that
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi decided to capitalize on popular support for the tests in
order to reap the political benefits for struggling and weak government. The second
explanation emphasizes India's general restraint in publicly acknowledging its
capabilities throughout the course of its nuclear development and suggests that India's
leaders have traditionally held moral and ethical reservations against relying on nuclear
weapons for state security. Prime Minister Gandhi's decision to test then in 1974 was an
aberration in India's nuclear history.
The first explanation largely focuses on explaining the break with India's
traditional posture to test in 1974, while the second is used to explain India's posture of
denying nuclear weapons intentions both before and after the tests. Taken together, the
two explanations suggest that generally India's posture was determined by its
reservations regarding the nuclear weapons but that enterprising politicians, presumably
not hindered by moral doubts, broke this stance to capitalize on popular sentiment. 184
This study finds that while domestic calculations did playa role in informing the
1974 nuclear test, it was primarily in response to the general consensus among Indian
leaders that India was required to respond to China's nuclear testing. There is however
184 It is interesting to note the potential contradiction between the explanations that the Indian leaders'
moral stance against nuclear weapons is not shared by the general population.
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little evidentiary support that the 1974 test were mainly conducted to divert attention
from India's domestic woes. Additionally, while some ofIndia's leaders expressed moral
doubts about relying on a nuclear weapons capability, all ofthem furthered the nuclear
weapons program in significant ways. This suggests that notwithstanding their personal
beliefs, India's leaders approached their decision-making with an eye to India's security
requirements. Moreover, the real differences between most Indian leaders centered on
how to divide scarce resources in a developing country with very real security problems.
The following discusses how the political consensus for a more robust nuclear
policy created permissive conditions allowing Prime Minister Gandhi to test as soon as
India was technologically capable. This is followed by a critique of the diversionary and
moral theories of India's nuclear posture.
1. Domestic Political Pressures
China's nuclear program led to a debate among Indian leaders as to how to best
respond to this threat. Over time and coinciding with continued, public advancements of
China's nuclear weapons program, a clear majority ofIndians supported a nuclear option.
By the time India achieved the technical capability to test, a more robust nuclear policy
was long overdue according to public sentiment. A peaceful nuclear explosion allowed
the Gandhi government to publicly respond to cross-party calls for an Indian response to
Chinese testing. At the same time, by labeling the explosion peaceful, India could seek to
mitigate international and regional reactions to the test.
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a) Domestic Political Support for a More Robust Nuclear
Policy
The perceived Chinese threat substantially increased Indian domestic support for
testing and developing a nuclear option. This shift in opinion occurred both among the
elites-scientists, po1icymakers, members of parliament, and the press-as well as the
general population. Several of the major political parties reflected the shift, with
opposition parties calling for a change in policy, as well as some members of the ruling
Congress party supporting a more robust nuclear policy.
The consensus that India should not develop nuclear weapons but nuclear energy
for peaceful purposes began to break down with India's loss in the 1962 Himalayan war
with China. 185 The next year rumors began that China was developing nuclear weapons,
followed by testing in 1964. Moreover, the 1965 war with Pakistan, and China's
threatened intervention in the conflict, gave further impetus to those that favored
developing nuclear weapons,186 and added more supporters to their cause. China's
explosion of a thermonuclear device in 1967 also underscored that Indian nuclear
advancement lagged significantly.
These events led to calls to develop nuclear weapons by supporting members
from both the opposition parties and ruling Congress Party in India. 187 The opposition
parties, in particular the Jana Sangh (which was a precursor to the BJP), criticized the
185 Bhatia, India's Nuclear Bomb, 106.
186 Central Intelligence Agency, "India's Nuclear Weapons Policy," no. WM00107, 3.
187 Warren H. Donnelly, "India and Nuclear Weapons," Unclassified Report, 10 July 1987, Nuclear Non-
Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no.
NP02483,5.
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government's existing nuclear policy. For example, the Jana Sangh argued that it was
"criminal folly" that India did not develop its nuclear capability before China.188
Members of the ruling Congress Party were themselves split over how to respond
to the Chinese tests. Reportedly, there were three different groups within the Congress
Party: (l) one group that wanted the Indian nuclear question "kept under constant re-
examination"; (2) a second group that included Prime Minister Shastri and opposed bomb
construction; and (3) a small group that favored immediate construction of a bomb. 189
Of those that favored a building a bomb or rethinking the question, they
reportedly took this position-not because they wished to embarrass the government on
this issue-but because they had national security concerns. 190 There was a further
concern that Indian prestige would suffer vis-a.-vis China, which would diminish Indian
influence. Additionally, those that supported bomb construction, both within and outside
the Congress Party, did so regardless of cost or the Indian government's previously
pledges to restrict itself to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 191
Not everyone agreed that India should pursue nuclear weapons, as there were
splits within the Congress and Swatantra parties, and the Communist Party opposed
strongly opposed the development ofnuclear weapons. 192 As previously discussed, there
188 T.T. Poulose, "India's Nuclear Policy" in Perspectives ofIndia's Nuclear Policy, T.T. Poulose, ed. (New
Delhi: Young Asia, 1978), 105.
189 Jacobson, "[Excised] Views on India and the Bomb," no. NPOl050, 2.
190 Jacobson, "[Excised] Views on India and the Bomb," no. NPOl050, 2.
191 Bowles, "Debate among the Indians," no. NPOl031.
192 Bhatia, India's Nuclear Bomb, 111.
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were a number of economic and regional factors counseling against the acquisition of
nuclear weapons. Some opponents felt that India should first become economically
strong before spending "gigantic outlays" into an atomic program,193 and believed that
India would not be able to compete against China. Other opponents were more
contingent with their opinions and preferred that India first pursued great power
protection, and failing that, develop a nuclear capability in response to China. 194 In short,
where Indian leaders stood on the issue of a more robust nuclear policy was largely in
response to the severity of perceived security threats and how to best manage them.
Prime Minister Shastri was himself reluctance to pursue a different nuclear
course. 195 However, this position was subject to increasing scrutiny from members of
parliament, his own government, and the Indian press as China continued to make
substantial progress with its nuclear program. 196 The domestic debate resulted in Shastri
making decisions that would enable India to test. At the same time, the reality was that
India had not yet developed a nuclear explosive capability, so there was a limited range
of options available to Shastri to respond to Chinese developments. Because ofthis
technology limitation, he did not have to ultimately decide whether India should acquire
193 Chester Bowles to U.S. Department of State, "Editorial Comments in the Indian Press Concerning the
Chinese Nuclear Detonation," Unclassified Cable 1263,23 October 1964, Nuclear Non-Proliferation
(Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. NPOI019, 1.
194 Bhatia, India's Nuclear Bomb, 113 and 121.
195 Chester Bowles to U.S. Department of State, "Effect of Chinese Nuclear Tests on India's Desires to
Speed Up Its Nuclear Program," Unclassified Cable 02253, 10 February 1965, Nuclear Non-Proliferation
(Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. NPOII06, 1.
196 Bowles, "Effect of Chinese Nuclear Tests on India's Desires to Speed Up Its Nuclear Program," no.
NPOll06,1.
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nuclear weapons or not since India was ready to either test or produce nuclear weapons.
Instead, he set in motion the nuclear explosives program that would bring India closer to
having a weapons option in the future.
To this end, Prime Minister Shastri sought an estimate of how what would be
involved for India to conduct an underground 'explosion.,197 He also made decisions in
1965 to develop nuclear explosives technology. Shastri further shifted from existing
official policy by announcing that India would only develop nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes, while at the same time he left open the possibility that India could change its
policy in the future. 198 This change is attributed, in part, to the fact that Shastri had
difficulty in getting formal Congress Party support for the maintaining the existing
policy, and had to acknowledge that the policy was subject to change. 199 Further, by
keeping nuclear policy under continuing study and reassessment, Shastri attempted to
appease his critics by qualifying the original statement that Indian policy had not
changed.2°0 Indira Gandhi inherited these domestic political pressures-which continued
to build in conjunction with continued Chinese nuclear development-when she came to
office as India's Prime Minister in 1966. As Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi further
advanced the nuclear explosives program that would enable India to test in 1974.
197 Robert S. Rochlin, "Comments on Non-Proliferation Background Papers of December 12, 1964," Secret
Memorandum, 31 December 1964, Japan and the U.S. (Washington, D.C.: The National Security Archive),
no. JU00402, 2; Bowles, "Debate among the Indians," no. NPO1031, 4.
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By the late 1960s, a substantial majority of the general population favored India
having an independent nuclear capability, and this sentiment was particularly strong
among the educated, urban elite.201 By 1970 and after "China's latest success in space, a
group of eminent Indian scientists, academicians, and politicians decided by an
overwhelming majority over the weekend that the Government should revise its present
policy and produce the atomic bomb immediately.,,202 The previously expressed
rationales still existed, that India's prestige had suffered with Chinese testing and that if
China used nuclear weapons in Asia, India would be targeted.203 And while there was
still dissent as to whether India should acquire atomic weapons, it was likely that a clear
majority supported having peaceful nuclear explosive technology as one step short of
actually making weapons. 204
Prime Minister Gandhi reportedly described the pressure on her government to
conduct the test as:
We don't want a bomb; we just want an explosion. In the diplomatic field,
the lack of a demonstration of our nuclear capacity has been a drawback-
and one that this government thinks it will not be able to withstand much
longer. Every time there is a bang from China, the pressure goes up. This
government, with troubles at home and a general election next year, is in
no position to withstand pressures.205
201 Donnelly, "India and Nuclear Weapons," no. NP02483, 5-6.
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This statement contains the amalgam of increasing domestic pressures based on Chinese
testing, prestige concerns, and domestic problems. However, as to the comment that
India did not want a bomb, the Prime Minister's private actions would belie this
disclaimer, as she advanced India's bomb program and delivery systems during her
tenure.
While there was considerable domestic political pressure to test, special interests
appeared to playa limited or nonexistent role in the decision to test. Some Indian press
reports had suggested that scientific interests played a role in the 1974 explosion. The
identified special interest was that the nuclear scientific community wanted to test to
regain credibility for progress that was often behind schedule with cost overruns.206 This
would take the pressure off ofIndia's perceived failing nuclear power program.207 The
scientists also wanted to test the validity of their designs. However, there is little
evidence that the scientists had any power to make the decision, and were limited to
lobbying the Prime Minister, who had the authority to authorize the tests. Moreover,
these concerns and scientific lobbying continued following the test and were directly
rejected on a number of occasions. This meant that while the scientists had an avenue of
influence with the Prime Minister, the latter was firmly in control of the decision-making.
The military was also kept largely out of nuclear policymaking. To the extent that
its leaders weighed in on the early debate, they did so with statements and analysis
206 J. Bruce Amstutz to U.S. Department of State, "Journalist Alleges India Has One Atomic Bomb Ready
in Reserve," Limited Official Use, Cable 03285, 4 September 1981, Nuclear Non-Proliferation
(Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. NP01915, 1.
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generally suggesting that India's primary threat remained conventional in nature,
notwithstanding the continued Chinese nuclear testing. As a result, the military was wary
of any program that would divert resources from conventional preparations. Yet, there
was some support for continued work on a nuclear program, viewed through a long-term
lens of requiring appropriate delivery systems for deterrence against China, and as long
such a program did not affect the resource allocations for conventional systems.208
In short, the 1962 military defeat coupled with the Chinese nuclear tests in 1964
set off a wave of political debate as to how India should best respond to its changed
security environment. As China continued to test, political opinion-particularly among
the elites, and reflected in the political parties-demanded that the government undertake
a more robust nuclear policy in response. This set in motion the decisions to develop
nuclear explosive capability, which came to fruition in 1973, with the test following
shortly thereafter. Thus, China caused the fundamental shift in Indian nuclear thinking,
with political pressures compelling a timely response.209
b) Timing of the Decision to Test
Notwithstanding the domestic debate, India did not have the technological
capability initially to respond to Chinese advancements. For this reason, the timing of the
test was based in large part on when the capability was actually developed. That is not to
discount the fact that Prime Minister Gandhi was under domestic pressure to respond-
208 See Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma, 54-56, for a survey ofIndia's military views related to the
utility of nuclear weapons to address the threat posed by China.
209 It is not clear when Indian leaders became aware of Pakistan's 1972 decision to pursue nuclear weapons.
There is evidence that India knew of the Pakistani program following the 1974 test.
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she was. However, it does suggest that arguments that are based on a public diversionary
tactic as dictating the timing are much less compelling.
Indira Gandhi came to power in 1966 as Prime Minister of a country that had seen
two wars within three years, and would have to face a third war with Pakistan in 1971.
The very closed economy was devastated from war, and there was recurring widespread
famine, internal sectarian violence, and sluggish economic growth for several years.210
And of course, the Chinese continued to make very public gains with their declared
nuclear weapons program.
Against this backdrop, it is speculated that test may have been conducted to boost
Prime Minister Gandhi's popularity in advance of upcoming elections. Some observers
explained the test as a way to salvage Prime Minister Gandhi's image.211 It was
suggested that she decided to test "in order to give sagging Indian morale a psychological
boost in the face of increasing domestic disillusionment and discontent, rampant
inflation, and serious food problems.,,212 The timing of the test served to divert public
opinion from the government's "mounting domestic problems," while also boosting
India's international prestige.213 It was also suggested that a further benefit from the test
210 For example, Indian economic growth averaged 1.65% from 1971-1974, data compiled from the World
Bank, "World Development Indicators," 1997.
211 Amstutz, "Journalist Alleges India Has One Atomic Bomb Ready in Reserve," no. NP01915, 1.
212 Sidney Sober, "Indian Nuclear Development - NSSM 156," Secret Cover Memorandum, 31 May 1974,
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1992), no. PROI076, 4.
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prior to upcoming elections would be to strengthen Indian nationalism, a political basis
that Prime Minister Gandhi was cultivating.214 In short, the explanation for the timing of
the test in 1974 is that Prime Minister Gandhi tested as a way to boost her popularity
shortly before the scheduled upcoming elections the following year.
While conducting a nuclear test could potentially further these interests,2lS the
diversionary explanation for the timing suffers from two analytic deficiencies.216 First,
the groundwork for the tests, which included both the technical capability and political
justifications, began years earlier and at a time that Prime Minister Gandhi was extremely
popular. Second, testing a year later would have put the test in closer proximity to the
scheduled elections, when she would have wanted a surge in popularity.
After coming to power in 1966 and conducting a review ofIndia's nuclear
program, Prime Minister Gandhi continued the nuclear explosives program. The design
for the nuclear explosive device that would be used for India's first tests was initiated in
1968.217 At this point, there were sufficient stocks of plutonium to begin test
preparations.218 Testing also required a fast breeder reactor to conduct theoretical
214 Eliot, "NSSM 156 on Indian Nuclear Developments," no. PR01075, 9.
215 While perhaps the test was politically motivated, in part, to provide a boost in popularity for the
upcoming elections, it actually did little in the long run for Gandhi's political survival as the chronic
internal problems remained. Gandhi declared a state of emergency and suspended the upcoming elections
the year following the test.
216 There is no written record of her decision to test, and she did not consult or inform all ofher cabinet
colleagues of her decision, and others were informed shortly before the test. Bhatia, India's Nuclear Bomb,
145. As Prime Minister it was within her authority to order the tests without consultation.
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calculations. Prime Minister Gandhi approved the Purnima reactor, which was
completed in 1972.219 In 1972 she gave the final authorization to take the final steps and
assemble the device, and the same year explorations for possible test sites began,z2o In
the meantime, Indian public rhetoric increased justifying the legitimacy of conducting
PNEs. The technical issues related to testing were resolved by 1973.221
The fact that she authorized the test a couple of years in advance of the actual test
suggest that immediate political concerns were not the proximate cause ofher decision.
Furthermore, when Prime Minister Gandhi made the decisions to continue work on
nuclear explosives, she enjoyed widespread public support. For example, U.S. estimates
noted that "[p]ublic opinion, in its present nationalist mood, would probably favor tests,
although, in the wake of India's victory over Pakistan, the political pressures for going
nuclear are less than a year ago [1971] :.222 Her political position in 1972, the year that
she approved assembling a nuclear explosive device, was further described as
"unassailable" given India's victory over Pakistan in the 1971 war, and the "liberation" of
Bangladesh.223 And finally, Indira Gandhi herself indicated that the PNE was conducted
when the scientists were ready.224
219 Bhatia, India's Nuclear Bomb, 141.
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The second analytic reason for questioning the diversionary explanation is that
she would have garnered greater political impact by testing in 1975, the year before
elections were scheduled to be held. Shortly after the tests, enthusiasm quickly waned
and the previous issues related to food shortages, high prices, and labor and political
umest dominated.225 It is possible that Prime Minister Gandhi she did not accurately
predict the life cycle of popularity from the tests, but it seems unlikely that as a political
veteran that she expected the nuclear developments to long overshadow the immediate
concerns much of the population was facing.
For these reasons, it is likely that the timing of the test was less because of the
general elections coming up and more based on the continuing pressures from the
Chinese program combined with having achieved the technological capability to test.
This means that Prime Minister Gandhi likely would have test earlier if she would have
had the option.
2. Moral Constraints
Some analysts point to moral opposition to nuclear weapons as a reason that India
adopted nuclear restraint. Both prior to the 1974 test and afterwards, Indian leaders
rejected acquiring a nuclear weapons capability on the basis ofthe enormously
destructive power of the weapons. This sense of moralism appears to come largely from
the ruling elite, given the general widespread support for an Indian nuclear program
among the public. Thus, whether India test are not, would be contingent, at least in part,
225 U.S. Department of State, "India: Uncertainty over Nuclear Policy," Confidential Intelligence Note, 13
June 1974, Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and
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on the moral preferences of the Prime Minister as the ultimate decision maker. However,
this perspective is undercut by evidence that Indian Prime Ministers, even those morally
opposed to nuclear weapons, furthered India's military program. This explanation also
fails to explain why Indira Gandhi, who apparently had no moral compunction with
nuclear weapons, did not continue testing after 1974. I first outline the basic argument
for a morally informed nuclear posture, followed by evidence that suggests Indian
regional security problems trumped a doctrine of nonviolence.
a) The Argument in Support of Moral Constraints
Some scholars have suggested that the Indian conceptions of morality and
nonviolence are at odds with nuclear weapons development and have attributed this
stance as having a significant effect on India's restrained nuclear policy.226 For example,
Perkovich argues that "for decades Indian leaders and citizens genuinely expressed moral
and existential doubts about possessing nuclear weapons, even as the capability to do so
was in hand. This distinguished India from the six earlier nuclear-weapons states, all of
whom developed and deployed nuclear weapons as soon as they physically could with no
moral pause.'.227 These moral and ethical doubts conceivably translated into a policy of
nuclear ambiguity, which put off deciding India's nuclear fate for decades.
From this perspective, since Indian independence in 1947 and throughout its
nuclear development, India has sought to incorporate moral and ethical constraints on its
own domestic nuclear program and in the international environment at large. This
226 Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb, 6.
227perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb, 57.
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modem moral vision largely rests on the Gandhian tradition of nonviolence. Gandhi was
abhorred by the United States bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World
War II and "believed that the bomb would bring moral devastation on those who
developed and used it.'>22S Since Gandhi was assassinated shortly after Indian
independence, it was his handpicked successor Jawaharlal Nehru who would have to
struggle with the policy implications of combining morality and nuclear weapons.
Statements during Nehru's administration suggest that Indian leaders strongly
opposed nuclear weapons. For example, Indian Defense Minister Katju declared: "There
has been a great deal of talk about nuclear weapons, atomic energy and all that. We do
not want them. Our whole foreign policy is based on it. We hate bombs, atom bombs and
hydrogen bombs and it would be ridiculous, I suggest, for India with its declared policies
and its very limited resources to think on these lines at all."zz9
In line with his personal moral beliefs, Nehru consistently proposed international
measures to limit the development and spread of nuclear weapons during his tenure in
office. Under his leadership, India during the 1950's presented eight different unilateral
and multilateral disarmament initiatives to the UN and argued against the moral and
ethical implications of a world filled with nuclear weapons.z30 Early on, India also
helped found the IAEA in 1957 and signed the PTBT in 1963. India's moral stance has
228 Cortright and Mattoo, India and the Bomb: Public Opinion and Nuclear Options, 6.
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consistently sought to promote peaceful nuclear energy, prohibition and disarmament of
nuclear weapons and "equity, fairness, and justice in the negotiation of international
agreements on nuclear nonproliferation."Z3) Integral to this international critique, India
also sought to highlight the apparent hypocrisy of the non-proliferation regime, as
embodied in the NPT, which sought to limit the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons
while the first five nuclear states continued to refine and expand their nuclear arsenals.
In terms of India's own domestic nuclear development, since Nehru was morally
opposed to building nuclear weapons, he consistently indicated that India would not take
this path while it sought to develop peaceful nuclear energy to support India's economic
and technological growth. This moral perspective was similarly reflected in Nehru's
successors and most Indian Prime Ministers, including Shastri, Desai, Rajiv Gandhi and
Rao, who were all personally opposed to relying on the weaponization of India's nuclear
capabilities for state security. With the exception of Indira Gandhi of the Congress Party
and Vajpayee of the BJP, most of India's leaders articulated in domestic and international
forums the importance of a moral and ethical foreign policy that prevented the
development and use of nuclear weapons.
b) Weighing Moral and Ethical Constraints
There are limits to how much a moral, culturally based explanation can account
for Indian nuclear policy, primarily because the actions of Indian leaders have differed
substantially from their rhetoric. There is no question that many of India's Prime
23\ David Cortright and Amitabh Mattoo, eds., India and the Bomb: Public Opinion and Nuclear Options
(Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1996),8.
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Ministers were personally influenced by the beliefs of Gandhi and ahisma, or
nonviolence. Still, the evidence suggests that the dictates of providing for state security,
both militarily and diplomatically, have compelled Indian leaders despite their moral
reservations to develop nuclear weapons capabilities for India.
Nehru himselfwas concerned that India's previously backward military
technology had allowed foreign occupation.232 He therefore sought to support India's
science and technology, including in the nuclear field. Nehru also seemed to be
significantly influenced by the need to pursue nuclear capabilities, heightened by India's
regional security problems. As early as 1958, while claiming that India would never build
nuclear weapons, he also claimed that India could have a bomb in as early as 3-4 years.233
In retrospect this was clearly an exaggeration of the progress and pace of Indian
development, but also suggests that Nehru was aware of the potential deterrence aspect of
the bomb. As it were, India would not have the material, equipment, and designs
necessary for detonating a nuclear weapon in anything like three or four years from
1958-indeed it would take until 1974 before India has the requisite research and
technology to test.234
Not only did Nehru suggest a potential deterrent function for the nuclear program,
he furthered the nuclear program. Nehru appointed Dr. Bhabha to the head of the Indian
Atomic Energy Commission-who ardently believed in India having the capability to
232 Donnelly, "India and Nuclear Weapons," no. NP02483, 5.
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234 Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb, 35.
232
build nuclear weapons-and provided the resources to create a scientific base on which
the nuclear explosive program would be built. Nehru also kept India from giving up the
option early on under safeguard agreements.
As the Indian security environment only continued to worsen on a regional level
throughout the 1960's with the 1962 border war with China, 1964 Chinese nuclear test at
Lop Nur, security considerations played an important role in Nehru's decision-making. It
was Nehru who, in 1962, while being "vehemently against a test" reportedly told Bhabha
to "speed up efforts to develop the capability for a peaceful nuclear explosion."235
Further, during this time period that a general waning of India's global disarmament
approach began with only initiating four initiatives proposed from 1960-1974.236
The moral stance was further weakened when Shastri and Indira Gandhi strayed
from the rigid no-use policy and turned to more ambiguous stance based on security
concerns.23? In 1964 Shastri came to power following Nehru and as "a Gandhian, was
initially horrified at the prospect of India ever developing nuclear weapons.,,238 Shastri
further sought to limit India's regional engagements to prevent an arms race given the
domestic problems of food shortages and sought security commitments abroad to avoid
235 Chengappa, Weapons ofPeace, 89.
236 Dixit, "Status Quo: Maintaining Nuclear Ambiguity," 58.
237 Dixit, "Status Quo: Maintaining Nuclear Ambiguity," 59.
238 Chengappa, Weapons of Peace, 89. Others dispute that Nehru truly believed in pacifism as inherited
from Mahatma Gandhi. For example, Bharat Karnad argues that Nehru's moral stance was a strategy
designed to deflect external pressure on India's nuclear program, which Nehru saw as having a weapons
component. Nehru thus used the moral stance as a practical response to further India's security goals.
Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons & Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (Delhi:
Macmillan India Limited, 2002), 71.
233
developing a nuclear capability. However, the established nuclear weapons states were
unwilling to provide guarantees and he ultimately allowed the scientists to go ahead with
developing a peaceful nuclear weapons device.239 Thus, while Shastri was personally
opposed to nuclear weapons, he also took a further step towards an Indian nuclear option
by acknowledging to the Indian parliament that India had a right to conduct peaceful
nuclear explosions, which opened the door for India to develop a bomb,z4o
Shastri died of a heart attack in 1966 and Indira Gandhi succeeded him in office.
Gandhi herself did not appear to be morally concerned with the nature of nuclear
weapons and made the series of decisions necessary to conduct the nuclear tests.241 Her
perspective was supported by other scientists and politicians, that according to U.S.
authors, "cast Ahisma (doctrine of harmlessness to all that lives) to the winds" in reaction
to the Chinese space launch and thus would never sign the non-proliferation treaty. 242
When Indira Gandhi chose to test in 1974 as soon as India had the technical
ability, she carefully emphasized the "nonviolent" aspects of the tests by arguing that
they were "peaceful nuclear explosion" which would ultimately help Indian development.
Yet, there is little indication that she was restrained in declaring India a nuclear weapons
state by focusing on the "peaceful" aspects of nuclear development because she was
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informed by the same moral considerations as her father, Nehru. Indeed, given earlier
analysis in this chapter, her description of the explosion was largely seen as an
international justification for what at the time was an arguably legitimate pursuit of
nuclear power.
In short, even India's most vocal proponents of the evils of nuclear bombs took
steps to further India's own weapons program. This suggests at a minimum, regional
security concerns outweighed Indian preferences to refrain from acquiring nuclear
weapons. Additionally, there were Indian leaders with no significant moral reservations
that did not declare India a nuclear weapons state, including Indira Gandhi. This suggests
that other factors are more relevant for determining India's nuclear posture.
II. Explaining Indian Nuclear Ambiguity, 1974-1990
These trends are despite the host of domestic challenges and significant regional
security pressures that have faced India since independence in 1947. The reality is that
India as a developing power has been subject to a myriad of concerns that have
threatened to undermine the viability of it as a nation-state and its leaders have had to
balance these demands while seeking to throw offthe history of colonialism. Throughout
its post-independence history, India has had to democratically govern one ofworld's
largest and poorest populations, cope with internal identity conflicts, and fight four major
wars with its neighbors China and Pakistan while simultaneously battling famine, slow
economic growth and legacies of colonialism. It is against this background that India has
developed, considerably through indigenous channels, a civil and military nuclear
program.
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In particular, the challenges of nation building have made Indian leaders
vulnerable to the economic, material and technological non-proliferation constraints
imposed by the United States and have led to an opaque nuclear posture for most of
India's nuclear development. A state that is facing these kinds of domestic and
international challenges can ill afford to be denied technology, development aid and
loans, or face economic sanctions for openly defying U.S. non-proliferation efforts.
These lessons were learned by India after the 1974 tests and have played an important
role in Indian decision-making calculations. Not only has India sought to avoid the
negative ramifications of economic and technologic denial, India has attempted, with
varying degrees of intensity and success, to engage the United States enough to garner
trade and advanced technology benefits. Even during the Cold War and since the early
1980s, India has identified the United States as its preferred source of high technology
and trade and Indian efforts to gain access to these resources has led to mutual exchange
in which India has maintained a restrained nuclear posture in return for some cooperation
in these areas with the United States.243
Moreover, given the domestic demands on the economy associate with a large,
divided and very poor population with basic services to provide, India could not afford to
spark costly confrontations or provoking an arms race with its neighbors Pakistan and
243 Stephen P. Cohen, "Why Did India "Go Nuclear"?" in India's Nuclear Security, Raju G. C. Thomas and
Amit Gupta, eds. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 16. During most of the Cold War, India had
a closer political and military alliance with the Soviet Union, which provided India with a significant
portion of its conventional weaponry. Further, India's economy has been relatively closed to external trade
for most of its history; however, with each effort to liberalize its economy or to gain advanced technology,
India has always preferred to do so with the West rather than the SovietslRussia. Nicholas Platt to Robert
C. McFarlane, "Fact Sheets for the President's Use During Meetings with Rajiv Gandhi," Memorandum,
31 May 1985, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and
ProQuest/Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. NP02225.
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China. Indian economic and scientific struggle from 1974 through the mid-1990s,
combined with external constraints in the form ofD.S. non-proliferation pressures,
suggest important reasons for Indian restraint that has prevented it from overtly
demonstrating its nuclear capabilities and intentions through 1998.
The following traces India's struggle to consolidate the state while developing a
nuclear capability, with several turning points in its history, following the 1974 tests, the
consideration of testing from 1980-1984, 1995 and again in 1996. The final culmination
of decades of research and investment in a nuclear program finally came to fruition in
1998 when India tested a series of nuclear explosions and declared itself a nuclear
weapons state. This change in posture occurred after India was able to establish a closer
relationship to the United States, combined with significant economic growth and
generally benign security environment during the 1990s, creating the permissive
conditions for India to test its nuclear capabilities that had been in development for
decades.
A. Description of Indian Ambiguity 1974-1990
After the 1974 nuclear test, Indian leaders reverted back to an ambiguous posture
that did not include further peaceful nuclear explosions or declaring itself a nuclear
weapons state. This stance primarily consisted of Indian leaders denying that India
possessed nuclear weapons and claiming that the nuclear program was for peaceful
purposes only. However, India reserved the right to change its nuclear policy, meaning it
retained the option to build nuclear weapons. And as Pakistan continued to develop its
nuclear weapons program, Indian leaders increasingly began to make India's restraint
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contingent on Pakistani nuclear intentions and also began to further emphasize that India
had the capability to produce nuclear weapons.
For example, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi stated in the mid-1980s that India had
the ability to make nuclear weapons "for almost eleven years now, and we have not
transformed that capability into weapons."Z44 He also implied that India might change its
policy and produce nuclear weapons ifPakistan went too far with its nuclear activities, as
"possession of nuclear weapons by Pakistan is very disturbing. Islamabad has already
attacked us three times. If they have the bomb that would change all the rules of the
game."Z45 Gandhi further stated that if India decided to become a nuclear weapons state,
"it would take a few weeks or a few months."z46 Thus, India's official policy was one of
not producing nuclear weapons, but it maintained a hedge by reserving the option.
India also retained the right to conduct further tests, although it did not do so.
While Indian leaders also did not give up the option of further testing, there were some
differences between Prime Ministers as to the value of conducting further peaceful
nuclear tests.' For example, a few years after the test, India's new Prime Minister Morarji
Desai signaled that the government did not believe in nuclear weapons and further
doubted the necessity of conducting peaceful nuclear explosions.z47 Indira Gandhi
returned to power in 1980 and she did not rule out the possibility of further tests. She
244 Donnelly, "India and Nuclear Weapons," no. NP02483, 4.
245 Donnelly, "India and Nuclear Weapons," no. NP02483, 4.
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indicated that while the government was committed to the use of atomic energy for
peaceful uses only, it would not hesitate from carrying out nuclear explosions or
"whatever is necessary in the national interests. ,,248 While reserving the right to conduct
peaceful nuclear explosions, the government nonetheless refrained from doing so.
Against this backdrop, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi considered testing in 1981
and again in 1983-194. During the 1990s, Indian Prime Ministers again calculated the
consequences of nuclear testing in 1992-1993,1995, 1996, and then finally did so in
1998. The following discusses the circumstances causing to Indian nuclear restraint
during these critical junctures.
B. Regional Security Environment
After the 1974 nuclear test, Pakistan was motivated to speed up its nuclear
weapons development. This meant that from the late1970s through the late 1980s,
India's security planners had to figure out the best way to deal with Pakistan's growing
capability. At the same time, Indian leaders had a broader interest in avoiding a regional
arms race or conflict with its neighbors. Nuclear ambiguity facilitated Indian navigation
of these countervailing demands.
The following details the impact of the Indian nuclear test on Pakistani nuclear
motivations and India's response to this growing threat. India initially responded by
trying to reassure Islamabad that it would not produce nuclear weapons; this helped calm
Pakistani fears but did not stop the latter's efforts to develop nuclear weapons. India in
248 "Mrs. Gandhi Leaves Open Her Nuclear Options," Associated Press, 13 March 1980, in Lexis-Nexis
Academic Universe, http://web.1exis-nexis.com.
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turn kept its nuclear option open while choosing restraint from testing and attacking
Pakistan's nuclear facilities. India also sought to keep U.S. non-proliferation interests
engaged in preventing Pakistani proliferation, and New Delhi and Pakistan were able to
agree to a few nascent confidence-building measures to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict
during the transition for both states. China also figured into Indian calculations, mainly
as related to China's assistance to Pakistan.
1. Indian Nuclear Test Affects Chinese and Pakistani Security
Calculations
Notwithstanding Indian declarations that its 1974 nuclear test was for "peaceful
purposes," the test was widely perceived as a conclusive demonstration that India was
capable ofmaking nuclear weapons.249 That is, while uncertainty existed as to whether
India intended to produce nuclear weapons, there was no question that it could do so.
While the Indian test had long-term implications for China, an Indian nuclear capability
did not immediately affect Chinese security. This was a troubling threat though for
Pakistan as India's weaker neighbor that had neither the conventional nor nuclear ability
to offset India's greater strength. The primary regional result from the demonstration was
to set back Indian efforts to normalize relations with Pakistan, which in turn further
motivated Islamabad to develop its own nuclear capability.
As to China, India's decision to test was based at least in part on China's nuclear
status and capability?50 For its part, China had little public reaction to Indian test. The
249 Donnelly, "India and Nuclear Weapons," no. NP02483, 2.
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240
Chinese news service made a short, factual announcement approximately 24 hours after
the test and was not accompanied by government comment.251 This muted reaction was
likely based on two factors. First, in justifying its own program as peaceful and
denouncing the Partial Test Ban Treaty and NPT, China had upheld the right of states to
test and develop nuclear weapons.252 Second, Chinese leadership likely did not perceive
the Indian tests as an immediate security problem because India lacked a long-range
delivery capability. While China probably calculated that the Indian nuclear weapons
program would eventually develop, it would take a number of years before India was able
to alter the balance ofpower or threaten Chinese targets. 253 This meant that even though
China looked on New Delhi as a rival in South Asia,254 there was little to gain by publicly
addressing the test.
Pakistan's security calculations were substantially different from China's. The
Indian decision to test was a "severe jolt to Islamabad.,,255 The immediate result was to
intensify Pakistan's security concerns and setback normalization efforts between the two
adversaries. Pakistani Prime Zulfikar Ali Bhutto issued a "hard-hitting" public statement
Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. WM00283, 1. There was also some question as to how an
Indian nuclear capability would affect its relationship with the USSR and the latter's interests in South
Asia, particularly with regard to China.
251 Central Intelligence Agency, "Central Intelligence Bulletin-India," no. WMOOl67, 2.
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in response that Pakistan would not be intimidated by India or succumb to "nuclear
blackmail." 256 Bhutto further declared that a no-war pact between India and Pakistan
was out of the question, otherwise Pakistan would be capitulating to blackmail.257
Nonetheless, Pakistan was in a similar situation that India was in when China tested-
Pakistan had no immediate ability to respond to the Indian tests with its own nuclear
capability.
Instead Pakistan began a campaign seeking political assurances and protection
from the nuclear powers, in particular the United States and China. Pakistani officials
also re-approached the United States in an effort to ease existing restrictions on
conventional arms supplies.258 Islamabad's argument was that the Soviets were arming
India and putting the Pakistani's in a "tight squeeze" that required military aid.259 U.S.
officials relayed to the Pakistani delegation that there was some agreement that India's
test was not merely for peaceful purposes, and that the U.S. would make a statement
"supporting Pakistan's independence and territorial integrity," while looking into
Congressional interest in renewing aid to Pakistan.26o
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The Indian test further prompted Pakistan to accelerate its own nuclear weapons
program and soon began nuclear explosive design and development work.261 Thus,
Pakistan's decision to develop a nuclear weapons capability was an outgrowth ofIndia's
nuclear program and was meant to serve as a deterrent to Indian aggression.262 The
Pakistani rationale for pursuing nuclear weapons was that "a small nuclear program
would enable the Pakistanis to do in nuclear terms what their ground and air forces could
not do in conventional terms: threaten to punish any Indian attack so severely that
consideration of such an attack would be deterred from the onset.,,263 Washington further
understood that Islamabad would likely approach China and seek to expand the military
relationship to include nuclear weapons,264 as Pakistan lagged significantly behind Indian
nuclear development.
None of these developments were in New Delhi's interests. A renewal of
conventional arms to Pakistan from the U.S. meant that India would have to spend more
on its own forces in order to maintain its superiority. Further cooperation between China
and Pakistan was also antithetical to India's interests, as not only was there conventional
cooperation, but nuclear assistance would substantially speed up Pakistan's own nuclear
261 Amstutz, "Journalist Alleges India Has One Atomic Bomb Ready in Reserve," no. NP01915, 1; U.S.
Department of State, "The Pakistani Nuclear Program," Secret Briefing Paper, 23 June 1983, Nuclear Non-
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D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. WM00247, 1.
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program. Given the dearth of discussion about Pakistan prior to the tests, it is possible
the Gandhi underestimated the Pakistani response. Or it is possible that Pakistan's
nuclear efforts were already known and New Delhi believed that a nuclear South Asia
was inevitable. Irrespective oflndia's calculations prior to the tests, the Indian leadership
now set about managing the rift the tests created with its neighbor.
2. Indian Response to Pakistani Nuclear Developments
By the early 1980s, it was becoming apparent that Pakistan was developing a
nuclear weapons capability. Adding to this concern was increasing evidence suggesting
that China was assisting the Pakistani nuclear program. Additionally, the United States
was again reengaged in South Asia with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This meant
that there was an increased flow of conventional weapons into Pakistan that caused alarm
within India. At the same time, the U.S. remained a source of pressure on the Pakistani
nuclear program.
Indian nuclear policy was largely a response to these security requirements
combined with an effort to improve the Indian economy and technology with increased
trade and contacts with the United States. India's nuclear policy sought to keep Indian
options open while deflecting external pressures. India responded Pakistan's nuclear
developments by signaling that India was prepared to move forward with its own
program if necessary. India also gave serious consideration to either testing or attacking
Pakistani nuclear facilities in the early 1980s, although decided against both of these
options. Instead India pushed the United States to pressure Pakistan to stop the nuclear
program-which Washington was more willing to do in the form of sanctions during the
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1990s-and worked with Pakistan on a bilateral basis to reduce the risk of nuclear
conflict between the two states.
a) India Keeps Its Nuclear Option Open
After the 1974 test, India publicly declared that it had no interest in developing a
weapons capability. For example, India's Minister ofDefense noted to the Lok Saba
(lower house of parliament) that "[0Jur consistent nuclear policy, so far, has been that we
would employ nuclear energy for peaceful and constructive purposes only.,,265 Indian
leaders did leave open the possibility of conducting further PNEs, which was a
justification to retain its nuclear explosives program while New Delhi determined the
course Pakistan would chart.266 For example, in an address to parliament, Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi stated that the government remained committed to the use of atomic
energy for peaceful purpose and "would not hesitate from carrying out nuclear
I . h' . h . I . " 267exp OSlOns...or w atever IS necessary m t e natlOna mterests.
Additionally, Indian statements left open the possibility that Indian policy could
change in the future. Reports of Pakistani advancements would trigger statements by
Indian leaders that India's policy was under review and would respond as needed. For
example, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi addressed the Indian parliament and noted that if
265 Robert F. Goheen, "Indian Nuclear Policy," Unclassified Cable 05298, 13 March 1980, Nuclear Non-
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Pakistan developed nuclear devices that India would be forced to revise its nuclear
program and develop its own weapons.268 Similarly, Rajiv Gandhi stated, as Prime
Minister, that India would have to review its policy to counter the imbalance that would
be created if there were nuclear weapons in South Asia. 269
Overall, India thus designed its nuclear policy with sufficient flexibility to
respond to Pakistan's program, which included calculating whether Pakistan would
decide to test, explode a single device or a series, and refined a weapons design. 270
Indian statements to this end accomplished a number of purposes. It retained flexibility
in India's nuclear policy to respond to Pakistani developments, while also serving as a
warning to Islamabad. At the same time, by making its posture contingent on Pakistan's,
India framed Pakistan as the proliferation threat. Additionally, by having its development
linked with Pakistan's, India did not need to spend more than necessary to keep pace.
b) India's Restrained Response to Pakistani Proliferation
Pakistan repeatedly denied that it was developing a nuclear weapons capability,
but it became increasing clear that Islamabad had undertaken a clandestine program.271
Pakistani Prime Minister Zia's near-term goal appeared to be to acquire a testing
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Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com; S.G. Roy "India Warns Pakistan against
Making Nuclear Bomb," United Press International, 10 April 1981, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe,
http;llweb.lexis-nexis.com.
269 Donnelly, "India and Nuclear Weapons," no. NP02483, 8.
270 Central Intelligence Agency, "Indian Nuclear Policies in the 1980s," no. WM00251, 1.
271 U.S. Department of State, "India-Pakistan: Pressures for Nuclear Proliferation," no. WM00283, 1.
246
capability, followed by the longer-tenn goal of establishing deterrence with India.272
There were some indications during 1981 that Pakistan was considering testing a device
in 1982.273 The Indian media further reported in 1983 that Pakistan had tested nuclear
triggers and Indian official alleged that Pakistan was "fairly close to manufacturing a
weapon.,,274 Pakistan denied these allegations.
In response, India continued to high priority to its own nuclear program,275 while
evaluating whether it should continue testing or attack Pakistan's nuclear facilities.
Indian leaders decided against both of these options, although both were seriously
considered. India instead chose the course of maintaining the same pace as Pakistani
proliferation, while seeking to rely on U.S. pressures to constrain Islamabad's
proliferation.
First, with reports that Pakistan was considering testing, India prepared to respond
accordingly. In 1981 there were signs that both states were preparing for underground
nuclear tests. 276 Indian preparations for a second nuclear test were largely viewed as a
reaction to Pakistan's nuclear activities.277 Prime Minister Gandhi privately
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acknowledged to U.S. officials that India was prepared for a "peaceful nuclear explosion"
but that a decision was not yet made as to timing. This further suggests that India was
waiting on Pakistan's decision as to whether it would test or not.278 Still, India test
preparations served to remind Islamabad that Indian nuclear development was
considerably ahead and cautioned the Pakistanis to not proceed with a testing program,z79
Prime Minister Gandhi further warned that a Pakistani nuclear test would have "grave
and irreversible" consequences for regional re1ations.28o
While India was not initiating the test, it was important to New Delhi to be
positioned to respond to the Pakistan's test.281 In particular, Pakistan's previous position
to the Indian nuclear test was that there was no such thing as a peaceful nuclear
explosion.282 This meant that if Pakistan tested it would be signaling that it was pursuing
nuclear weapons. India would then respond in order to demonstrate both its resolve and
technological superiority. 283
At the same time, India was motivated to refrain from testing first. India had
already proved that it had a nuclear capability and further testing at that time without
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significant advancements would have added little to its posture. New Delhi also
preferred to place the moral blame from testing on Pakistan,284 so that international
reactions would largely be directed at Islamabad. An additional incentive for India to
refrain from initiating testing is that it could wait and see ifU.S. non-proliferation efforts
would be successful vis-a.-vis Pakistan. Indeed, U.S. pressure is credited as forcing
Pakistan to put off its nuclear testing plans in early 1980s; otherwise Washington's
renewed generosity for providing military and economic assistance in the face of the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan would be cut offby explicit requirements ofU.S.
domestic law. When it became clear that Pakistan would forego testing, New Delhi
further signaled to Washington that it did not intend to detonate a second nuclear blast in
the near term.285 In short, India was prepared to respond to Pakistani provocations ifit
tested, but Indian leaders preferred to keep the nuclear testing issue off the table.
Second, India also considered attacking Pakistani nuclear facilities during the
1980s. India first conducted a study of the feasibility of taking out Pakistan's Kahuta
facility in 1981. Prime Minister Gandhi ruled out the attack in 1982 with concerns about
Pakistani retaliation, although she reportedly kept the attack option on the table if
Pakistan was on the verge of acquiring a weapons capability.286 There were also reports
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in 1983 that the Indian Air Force was preparing for a pre-emptive strike, but that U.S.
officials informed Pakistan, which put its Air Force on alert?87 As late as 1984, there
were Pakistani contentions that India planned to launch an attack.288 There were some
reports suggesting merit to Pakistan's position. India and Israel allegedly had discussed a
joint strike on Pakistan's Kahuta facility.289 However, U.S. pressures are credited with
causing Prime Minister Gandhi to veto the plan?90 Indian officials publicly denied all
reports that India planned to attack Pakistani nuclear facilities.
There are multiple reasons why India chose against a pre-emptive strike. New
Delhi could not be entirely sure that the attack would be successful in wiping out
Pakistan's well-defended facilities. 291 There was the additional problem of radiation
contamination, either from the Pakistani facilities or from a retaliatory strike on India's
nuclear facilities. The latter would further cripple India's own nuclear program.
Additionally, an attack against Pakistani facilities "almost inevitably would mean war
with Pakistan.,,292 Even ifIndia was successful with the strike, it likely would have faced
diplomatic disapprobation.293 India would risk damaging the gradually warming relations
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with the United States and could further provoke China, which might result in Pakistani
sympathy from both states.
Instead, Indian leaders came to the realization that they would have to live with
Pakistan's nuclear capability.294 India sought a less provocative path, one that relied on
keeping paced development with Pakistan. For example, by late 1985, India was
concerned that Pakistan had enough nuclear weapons grade material for constructing
three to five nuclear bombs, notwithstanding Pakistani denials that its program was for
peaceful purposes?95 While India signaled that it had not changed its nuclear policy, "the
fact that Pakistan's going ahead with a nuclear weapons program introduces a new
element into the entire security dimension in this region.,,296 India continued to review its
nuclear policy amidst reports ofPakistani progress and it is believed that Prime Minister
Gandhi made the decision to weaponize India's nuclear capability in 1987. India's delay
in weaponizing its capability until Pakistan had reached this threshold is further evidence
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India's overall strategy was relatively conservative as related to Pakistani nuclear
development. India's nuclear policy reflected a desire in New Delhi to not further
exacerbate regional tensions, which in turn would require increased spending on both
conventional and nuclear systems. Yet, Indian readiness to test if Pakistan did so, the
repeated threats to Pakistani nuclear facilities, and India's own retained option all served
as a warning about seriousness with which New Delhi perceived the threat to its security
from Pakistan's nuclear program. India further sought to address its security concerns by
seeking to direct U.S. non-proliferation pressures on Pakistan.
c) India Seeks Assistance in Constraining Pakistan
Indian and American relations began to improve during the 1980s and throughout
the 1990s. These contacts afforded Indian leaders the opportunity to press Washington in
particular to take a tougher non-proliferation stance with Pakistan. As part of this effort,
India would point to its own restrained nuclear posture-with the implicit threat that this
could change however-that it was behaving responsibly. By restraining its own nuclear
posture, Indian leaders were able to keep the U.S. non-proliferation spotlight on Pakistan.
For example, during the 1985 visit to the U.S., Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi
asked the Reagan administration to put greater pressure on Pakistan to stop if from going
forward with its nuclear program.298 Similarly, Gandhi expressed his frustration in a
298 U.S. Information Agency, "Pakistan's Testing ofNuclear Triggers," no. NP02241, 6.
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public interview, arguing that Pakistan was continuing a program to build nuclear
weapons, which the U.S. knew about and was doing nothing to prevent.299
Indian officials were further concerned about the influx of economic and
conventional military aid the U.S. provided Pakistan during the 1990s. The Indians
contended that U.S. economic assistance was enabling the Pakistani to divert more funds
to their nuclear program, and argued that Pakistan would be more likely to stop its
nuclear program if Washington cut off aid. 300 The provision of conventional weapons
was also seen as upsetting the balance of power in South Asia. Indian officials argued
that New Delhi was required to divert its own resources from development programs in
order to counter Pakistan's increased conventional capability.30! The Indians bristled at
doing so, stating that "we are very keen not to embark on an arms race with Pakistan.
Our object is to reduce the arms in the region.,,302
While drawing American attention to the Pakistani program, Indian officials
sought to emphasize their nuclear restraint. For example, Prime Minister Gandhi
characterized the 1974 test as an experiment, pointed to the fact that India had not
continued a program of testing, did not have a stockpile, did not have nuclear weapons,
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and ruled out an attack on Pakistani nuclear facilities. 303 At the same time, the Indian
policy of restraint was subject to review, and Gandhi noted that if Pakistan produced
nuclear weapons then '''we would have to really re-think all our polices. ",304 The
implicit threat that India could go nuclear if Pakistan did so served to remind the
Americans of the dangers of proliferation in South Asia.
Washington responded with reassurances that it was responsive to the Pakistani
nuclear program, and was "doing all it could to discourage Islamabad." 305 As to the
conventional arms concerns, the Reagan administration's response was that its objective
was to render Pakistan's nuclear program unnecessary.306 Similarly, during Gandhi's
1987 visit to Washington, U.S. officials reiterated that they understood Indian concerns
and would review with Gandhi the steps Washington had taken to prevent the outbreak of
a nuclear arms race in South Asia.307 Administration officials further praised Indian
nuclear restraint by not moving from the 1974 test to a dedicated nuclear weapons
program.308
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By 1990 Washington was willing to impose the sanctions India sought. The
Soviets had withdrawn from Afghanistan, changing American priorities in the region.
Additionally, there was no question that Pakistan was developing nuclear weapons.
Moreover, even though India had begun weaponizing in 1987, its restrained nuclear
posture enabled it to avoid sanctions, and continue with growing economic and technical
cooperation with the U.S. throughout the 1990s.
d) Learning to Live With Nuclear South Asia:
Relations between India and Pakistan were often tense, if not in direct conflict,
based primarily on developments in Kashmir. Tensions were further increased after the
Indian test in 1974. Against this backdrop, Indian leaders at several points made an effort
to normalize its relations with Pakistan and specifically rejected a more robust nuclear
policy that would undermine these attempts. Further, India and Pakistan were able to
implement some confidence-building measures designed to reduce the dangers ofthe
nuclear programs.
As characterized by one commentator, the Indian tests could not have come at a
worse time for the gradually improving relations between the two states shortly after the
1971 war.3°9 Prime Minister Gandhi went to work to try to allay Pakistani concerns. She
wrote Bhutto a letter stating that India remained committed to its traditional policy of
309 U.S. Department of State, "India: Uncertainty over Nuclear Policy," no. WM00169, 3.
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nuclear development for peaceful purposes only and that India would seek to settled all
differences peacefully through the Simla Agreement.310
Prime Minister Mormji Desai came to power following Indira Gandhi and further
sought to improve relations with Pakistan. Desai instituted a number of measures that
resulted in full diplomatic and consular relations, as well as air, land, communications,
and trade links.311 Desai also refused to put pressure on Pakistan, at the behest the Soviet
Union, over Afghanistan and this was viewed with considerable appreciation by
Islamabad.312 Additionally, according to Pakistani leadership, during this time "they had
had full and frank discussions with Indian officials on the nuclear question and that India
accepted Pakistani assurances ofpeaceful intent at face value.,,313 For its part, India
could afford to wait for further nuclear development, as estimates in early 1975 were that
Pakistan was still eight to nine years away from developing an atomic device.314
Thus, by not testing further and maintaining that the Indian nuclear program was
for peaceful purposes only, this strategy was reasonably successful in reducing tensions
between India and Pakistan. From the Pakistani perspective, relations were the best they
310 Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb, 185.
311 U.S. Department of State, "Pakistan's Short Term Prospects," Secret Report, 24 August 1979, Nuclear
Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no.
NP01657,5.
312 Cyrus R. Vance to U.S. Embassy Pakistan, "U.S.-Pak. Talks: Regional Issues," Confidential Cable
277901,24 October 1979, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive
and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. NP01670, 4.
313 Vance, "U.S.-Pak. Talks: Regional Issues," no. NP01670, 5.
314 David T. Schneider to U.S. Department of State, "Indian Space and Indian and Pakistani Atomic Energy
Programs," Unclassified Airgram, 21 February 1975, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The
National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. NP01398, 2.
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had ever been in 1979, although India remained Pakistan's main long-term security
threat. Tensions increased in the early 1980s as each side grappled with the best way to
provide for their security in the face of both states developing nuclear weapons.
However, beginning in 1985 with Prime Minister Zia's visit to New Delhi, India
and Pakistan inched forward towards confidence building. At this meeting, Zia and
Gandhi announced that they had agreed to not attack each other's nuclear facilities. This
announcement came at the same time that India and Pakistan were seeking to increase
trade and economic ties and reduce border tensions.315 It further reflected the gradually
warming relations that began when Rajiv Gandhi came to power. 316
In particular, the India-Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement provided that both sides
would refrain from directly attacking, encouraging, or participating in any action aimed at
destroying or damaging any nuclear facility.317 The agreement was formalized in writing
several years later in1988?18 It was entered into force in 1991, and India and Pakistan
exchanged lists of their nuclear facilities in 1992 and 1993. India and Pakistan also
agreed to a hotline after the 1987 Brasstacks Crisis,319 and additional notification
315 Stephen Wilson, "India and Pakistan Pledge Not to Destroy Each Other's Nuclear Plants," Associated
Press, 17 December 1985, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://web.1exis-nexis.com; Steven
Weisman, "Gandhi-Zia Talks Said to Bear Fruit," The New York Times, 18 December 1985, 3.
316 U.S. Information Agency, "Media Reaction Report No. 133," no. NP02332, 1. The major exception to
this was in 1987 with the Brasstacks Crisis.
317 Shahid Ur-Rehman, "India and Pakistan Pledge No Harm to Nuclear Facilities," Nucleonics Week, 5
January 1989, 8-9.
318 Donnelly, "India and Nuclear Weapons," no. NP02483, 8.
319 A specific nuclear hotline was not established until 2004. See John Lancaster, "India, Pakistan to Set
Up Hotline: Talks End With Deal to Maintain Moratorium on Nuclear Testing," Washington Post Foreign
Service, 21 June 2004, A12.
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measures for troop movements and exercises, air-space regulations, and increased
military contacts after the 1990 Indo-Pakistani crisis.
However, there were clear limits as to the extent of nuclear cooperation in South
Asia. India continued to reject Pakistani proposals for a regional nuclear free zone and
test ban in South Asia, arguing that Pakistan should instead stop from clandestinely
developing nuclear weapons. At the same time, India continued to march forward with
its own nuclear weapons development and delivery capabilities.
When Prime Minister Rao subsequently came to power in 1991 and met Bill
Clinton, he indicated that in addition to concerns about economic growth, he understood
that testing would potentially start an arms race in the region, something that India did
not want to initiate.32o Similarly, when Deve Gowda succeeded the two-week Vajpayee
government in 1996, he calculated that a test, in addition to harming the economy, would
be too damaging to India's foreign relations. He is quoted as saying, "'[a]part from the
economy I also wanted to focus on improving relations with other countries. We had
made efforts to focus on bettering relations with Pakistan. We were keen on stabilizing
relations with Russia and China and improving relations with the US. ",321
Washington further underscored Indian concerns and urged India to develop
nuclear weapons because it would exacerbate regional tensions rather than enhance
national security, as well as trigger a nearly complete cut-off of financial assistance from
320 Chengappa, Weapons of Peace, 388.
321 Chengappa, Weapons of Peace, 398.
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the United States.322 Even after the 1998 nuclear tests, India has maintained that it seeks
a minimal nuclear deterrent and does not want to "impoverish itself by emulating the
extensive and costly capabilities possessed by the US and the Soviet Union during the
Cold War.,,323
3. China
India's security concerns vis-a.-vis China was both a source ofmotivation for the
Indian nuclear program as well as a countervailing reason to retain an ambiguous nuclear
posture while India improved its weapon and delivery capabilities. China's nuclear
assistance to Pakistan was a further complicating factor that India necessarily
incorporated into its nuclear policy. These dynamics are discussed below.
India's immediate threat perceptions of China have varied over time and generally
improved during India's period of nuclear ambiguity. After the 1962 Himalayan war,
followed shortly by Chinese nuclear testing in 1964, tensions gradually eased in the
following decades. However, it is clear that Indian security planners have taken a long-
range view ofIndia's role in South Asia and anticipate that Indian and Chinese policies
have the potential to conflict in the future as both states continue developing. As stated
by Prime Minister Gandhi to the Indian parliament, "India could handle the problem of
322 "US Accepts India Will Not Test N-Weapon," Reuters, 19 January 1996; in Compuserve-Executive
News Service; Sid Ba1man Jr, "India Assures US on Nuke Test," Reuters, 19 January 1996, in
Compuserve-Executive News Service.
323 Hilary Synnott, The Causes and Consequences of South Asia's Nuclear Tests, Adelphi Paper no. 332
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1999),
58. The idea of India maintaining a minimal but effective nuclear deterrent as a cost effective strategy has
been suggested by a number of Indian strategists, including General K. Sundariji, "India's Nuclear
Weapons Policy," in Nuclear Rivalry and International Order, Jorn Gjelstad and Olav Njostad, eds.
(London: Sage Publications, 1996), and K. Subrahmanyan, "Indian Nuclear Policy - 1964-98," in Nuclear
India, Jasjit Singh, ed. (New Delhi: Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 1998).
259
Pakistan's nuclear program but India's security was linked with the much larger question
of the presence of nuclear weapons in the Indian Ocean area and in the neighborhood of
Asia.,,324
This means that India regards an at least a minimum nuclear deterrence capability
against China as crucial for its long-term security and is a significant factor driving the
Indian nuclear weapons program.325 At the same time, Indian nuclear weapons
development has persistently lagged behind China's much more advanced weapons and
sophisticated delivery systems.326 India signaled that it had the capability of constructing
nuclear explosive devices in 1974, but it wasn't until 1996 that it made arrangements to
purchase the Sukhoi-30 aircraft from Russia, which are capable ofcarrying nuclear
bombs to high value targets in China.327
Moreover, it wasn't until 1999 that India tested its Agni-I1 missile with a range of
2500 km. This was India's first nuclear capable missile that could reach much of China's
southern, western, and central areas. This was an enormous advancement as India's
previous Agni-I was ranged at 700-800 km. Still, it wasn't until the development of the
324 James A. McGinley to U.S. Information Agency, "PM Gandhi's Parliament Statement on His U.S.
Visit," Unclassified Cable 27419, 12 November 1987, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The
National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. NP02551, 1.
325 U.S. Department of State, "Indian-Pakistani Views on a Nuclear Weapons Option," no. WM00247, 1.
326 U.S. estimates predicted in the early 1980s that India would wait for an open weapons capability until at
least the late 1980s as, in addition to the delivery requirements, by then India would have sufficient
fissionable materials for a "respectable nuclear arsenal." U.S. Department of State, "Indian-Pakistani Views
on a Nuclear Weapons Option," no. WM00247, 5.
327 Certainly India had other planes that could have made one-way flights to drop nuclear bombs if
necessary, but that did not constitute a particularly robust delivery mechanism. See Kamad, Nuclear
Weapons & Indian Security.
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Agni-III with a range of3500 kIn that India could reach Beijing or Shanghai, some of the
furthest high value targets.
India therefore has lacked the necessary sophisticated delivery systems to strike
targets in China until the late 1990s. This meant that India was not even in the realm of
being able to establish credible nuclear deterrence with China before it tested in 1998.
Because of the requirements for an advanced nuclear program, India had little incentive
to continue testing for purposes of addressing its security problems with China. India had
already proven its explosive capability so further testing would have added little until
India was closer to having delivery mechanisms. Conceivably India could have tested a
thermonuclear device earlier to signal its continued advancement, but again without a
delivery system this does little to establish deterrence with China. Without a clear benefit
to continue testing, India's security problems with Pakistan and its efforts to increase its
economic base clearly outweighed any consideration related to China specifically leading
up to 1998.
While there was no clear deterrence benefit India would have gained with China,
testing likely would have further exacerbated India's security with Pakistan by increasing
Chinese incentives to assist the latter. India had long resented Chinese support to
Pakistan during the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pak wars. Additionally, Indian leaders were
aware early on that China was assisting the Pakistani nuclear program.
For example, by the early 1980s China had already been cooperating in the
nuclear field for several years. China assisted in the operation of the KANUPP power
reactor at Karachi, and likely also cooperated in fissile material production, and the
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provision of a nuclear device design.328 There were public reports of Chinese atomic
scientists working in Pakistani nuclear plants in 1984.329 That same year the Indian press
reported that Pakistan had manufactured a nuclear device, and that China may have
assisted Islamabad in testing in China's Takala Makan Desert. Indian officials
categorically denied this story, although Indian Foreign Secretary Rasgotra also indicated
that Pakistan possibly already had a nuclear bomb. 330 Nonetheless, reports of Chinese
nuclear cooperation were of significant concern to India. 331
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, India had further concerns related to Chinese
ballistic missile assistance. By this time there were reports that China provided Pakistan
with M-ll missile capabilities, which could be armed with nuclear warheads.332 Further,
with a range of300 km, New Delhi was at risk from the M-lls (designated Shaheen)
when they were finally tested in 1999. Prior to this, Pakistan tested the Ghauri missile
April 1998, and at a range of 1500 km could reach most of India. 333
In this context, India had little reason to speed up and publicly demonstrate its
continued nuclear development. IfNew Delhi had done so, then it would have further
328 U.S. Department of State, "The Pakistani Nuclear Program," no. NP02057, 6.
329 U.S. Embassy Pakistan, "Pakistan's Nuclear Program: Press Reports of Chinese Involvement,"
Confidential Cable 06864, 6 August 1984, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National
Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. NP02144, 1.
330 Harry G. Barnes to U.S. Department of State, "Indo-Pakistan Relations: Mistaken AP Story of Pakistani
Nuclear Blast in China," Confidential Cable 16186,27 March 1984, Nuclear Non-Proliferation
(Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. NP02123, 1.
331 U.S. Department of State, "India-Pakistan: Pressures for Nuclear Proliferation," no. WM00283, 4.
332 It was the transfer of these missiles that led the U.S. to imposed sanctions on China in 1991 and 1993.
333 It is widely believed that North Korea transferred its No-dong missile technology to Pakistan, from
which the Ghauri was derived.
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stoked Pakistani security concerns. Pakistan's historic reaction was to then reach out to
its supplier states for increased conventional assistance. In the case of China, it was also
willing to provide nuclear assistance. India did not need to provide its adversaries with
additional reasons to further cooperate at Indian expense. By keeping paced development
with Pakistan under cover of an ambiguous posture, India ensured that it had the
capability to respond while at the same time focus on its economic priorities and make
steady progress towards delivery capabilities that would enable it to establish deterrence
with China.
C. Patron State Incentives: Indo-U.S. Relations
Following the Indian test in 1974, U.S. and India relations were characterized by:
(1) an increase in U.S. international efforts to stall horizontal proliferation, and (2) direct
pressure on India in the form of already existing nuclear cooperation, promises of
technology exchange, and the threat of economic repercussions. The U.S. position
signaled its non-proliferation stance by encouraging compliance with the NPT and later
the CTBT, tightening domestic non-proliferation laws, and engaging in diplomatic
exchanges with Indian leaders. India responded to U.S. non-proliferation pressures by
deflecting calls for it to join the NPT as a non-nuclear state, emphasizing its own restraint
in developing a nuclear arsenal, and highlighting Pakistani nuclear weapons efforts and
calling on the super powers to restrain Pakistan. Nuclear ambiguity was an important
part ofthis strategy, enabling India to avoid provoking the U.S., keeping the pressure on
Pakistan as weapons proliferator, while at the same time keeping its weapons option
open.
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Further, the United States was able to leverage enough material resources on the
weak Indian economy via economic and technological aid to for Indian leaders to
consider what an overt demonstration of Indian nuclear progress would mean for its
further development and position in the international system. This strategy was
successful to the extent that it coincided with Indian goals to reduce a risk of an arms race
in South Asia while at the same time engaging the U.S. as India began to liberalize its
economy. These dynamics are discussed more fully below.
1. U.S. Non-Proliferation Interests
The 1974 Indian nuclear test prompted the United States to more directly address
growing concerns about nuclear proliferation. Generally, American interests were to
maintain the NPT and to keep other threshold states from going nuclear.334 Additionally,
an intensified program to stop further nuclear explosions-including those labeled
"peaceful"-was identified as being within U.S. interests.335 Related to its general non-
proliferation concerns, Washington was also concerned that the Indian test would further
Pakistani incentives to acquire nuclear weapons. Fearing Pakistani proliferation, the U.S.
wanted to hold India to its 1974 posture that the test was for peaceful purposes only, and
to further "minimize the scope, pace, and military dimensions of [India's] nuclear
explosive program.,,336 This meant keeping continued pressure on India to "adhere to its
334 Sober, "Press Coverage ofIndia's Developing Nuclear Capability," no. PR01076, ii.
335 Robert S. Ingersoll to Gerald R. Ford, "U.S. Nuclear Non-proliferation Policy," Secret Memorandum, 4
December 1974, Presidential Directives II (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and
Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. PR01263, 1 and 3.
336 Ingersoll, "U.S. Nuclear Non-proliferation Policy," no. PR01263, 5.
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declared intention to eschew development of military weapons capabilities.,,33? And even
if Washington failed to stem proliferation, it was nonetheless concluded that U.S.
national security objectives would be served with an only partially effective non-
proliferation strategy that at least delayed further proliferation.338
The primary method to stop further proliferation was to tighten controls of
material and technology for weapons production, including requiring that exported
nuclear material not be used for peaceful nuclear explosions.339 As applied to India, this
approach was also designed to "make an Indian decision to seek a sophisticated weapons
and delivery system as costly and as time-consuming as possible... especially with regard
to India's acquiring a ballistic missile or long-range bomber capability.,,34o At the same
time, there was reluctance in Washington impair the prospects of better bilateral relations
by threatening the withdrawal of aid to India.341
This approach reflected the dilemma as how to most effectively influence India's
program. On the one hand, Washington was concerned that if the U.S. response was not
harsh enough to the Indian test, this would be taken as a signal that the U.S. was not
337 Sober, "Press Coverage ofIndia's Developing Nuclear Capability," no. PR01076, 24.
338 Ingersoll, "U.S. Nuclear Non-proliferation Policy," no. PR01263, 1-2.
339 Ingersoll, "U.S. Nuclear Non-proliferation Policy," no. PRO 1263, 3.
340 Sober, "Press Coverage ofIndia's Developing Nuclear Capability," no. PR01076, iii.
341 George S. Springsteen to Brent Scowcroft, "Indian Nuclear Developments: NSSM 156," Secret
Memorandum, 11 July 1974, Presidential Directives II (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive
and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. PRO 11077, 3. It was noted that other Western aid donors, with the
exception of Canada, had actually pledged increased economic assistance to India and agreed to World
Bank proposals for increased debt rescheduling. Ibid.
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committed to nuclear non-proliferation. Yet the other concern was that is Washington's
reaction was too punitive it would be counterproductive by reducing u.s. ability to deter
Indian pursuit of nuclear weapons.342 Washington was further limited with India to the
extent that it did not want to drive New Delhi into closer cooperation with the Soviets.
This dilemma would also be a recurring theme in U.S. policy towards Pakistan. U.S.
policy towards India generally charted a course between these two extremes. U.S.
nuclear export and safeguards policy slowed Indian nuclear development to some extent,
but in exchange for continued ambiguity, Washington and New Delhi achieved some
measures of economic and technical cooperation.
2. U.S. Non-Proliferation Policy Changes
Consistent with U.S. goals of non-proliferation, the Ford administration signaled
that the U.S. was further changing its nuclear policy. In the fall of 1974, President Ford
sought to strengthened non-proliferation measures with the UN. The first nuclear
supplier state meeting was held in 1975, with the goal of raising the standards governing
the export of nuclear supplies and materials.343
The successive Carter administration was similarly concerned with nuclear non-
proliferation. President Carter signaled in April 1977 that "the United States would
'make clear to all potential recipients [of nuclear assistance] and to other nuclear
suppliers that our first preference, and continuing objective, is universal adherence to the
342 Sober, "Press Coverage ofIndia's Developing Nuclear Capability," no. PR01076, 45.
343 Robert W. Fri to Jimmy Carter, "Press Conference," Press Briefing, 28 October 1976, Nuclear Non-
Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no.
NP01518,1.
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Non-Proliferation Treaty. ",344 In addition to encouraging countries to sign the NPT, the
Carter administration also pushed for all nuclear facilities to be placed under IAEA
safeguards.345
The U.S. Congress also sought to increase export controls and restrict advanced
technology by passing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act in 1978. This law prohibited
u.s. cooperation with civilian nuclear programs in countries that would not allow full-
scope IAEA nuclear facility inspections, or manufactured or conducted peaceful nuclear
explosions. This meant that because India had not "acceded to the NPT or otherwise
accepted full-scope safeguards, u.s. law and policy preclude[d] any significant [nuclear]
cooperation.,,346 This change in U.S. domestic law led to a crisis in relations between
Washington and New Delhi as there was an existing contractual relationship for the U.S.
to provide fuel and spare parts for India's Tarapur reactor.
3. U.S. Efforts to Leverage Nuclear Cooperation with India
Prior to the 1974 PNE, the U.S. had provided fuel for India's Tarapur reactor, and
continued to do so afterwards, with the understanding that India would refrain from
344 U.S. Department of State, "Report by the Secretary of State on Recent Activities by the United States
Government in Encouraging Adherence to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation ofNuclear Weapons (NPT)
Made Pursuant to Section 507 (b) of the International Development Cooperation Act of 1979," Non-
Classified Report, 1 November 1979, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security
Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. NP01686, 1.
345 U.S. Department of State, "Report by the Secretary of State," no. NP01686, 1.
346 U.S. Department of State, "U.S.-USSR Non-Proliferation Bilaterals--Regional Aspects of Non-
Proliferation," Confidential Background Paper, 20 July 1987, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (WashingtonD.C.:
The National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. NP02498, 4.
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further explosions.347 During the Carter administration, the U.S. Congress was
increasingly reluctant to continue to provide fuel for the Tarapur reactor since India
would not comply with IAEA full scope safeguards on all its reactors, even though the
administration sought to link the provision of fuel to the "Government of India
assurances on forbearing nuclear explosives and keeping open our dialogue on nuclear
issues. ,,348 In a letter to Prime Minister Gandhi in 1980, Carter indicated that he would
authorize further shipments via Executive Order, if India provided the "assurances which
had been available to us earlier" which entailed in part, "continued Indian forbearance
concerning nuclear explosive development and testing.,,349 The administration also
suggested to Gandhi that given Congressional reluctance, she was urged to practice
discretion on the nuclear issue, "during this sensitive period.,,35o The U.S. Congress was
also likely to call for stopping bilateral aid to India in the event ofa test. 351
While the United States did not have extensive nuclear cooperation with India
prior to and after the 1974 nuclear test, Washington did seek to leverage existing contacts
to convince the Indians to forego further testing and to not produce nuclear weapons.
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Because India was highly dependent on external sources of support for its nuclear
program, it was vulnerable to U.S. pressures in this area. In particular, the Tarapur fuel
incident highlighted the transformation of U.S. non-proliferation policy and the
subsequent effects on Indian nuclear policy.
The Tarapur nuclear reactor was of U.S. origin and subject to safeguards.
Pursuant to the contract between Washington and New Delhi, the U.S. was obligated to
provide enriched uranium fuel and spare parts to run the reactor. However, after the 1974
Indian test and the subsequent passage of the 1978 Nuclear Non-proliferation Act
(NNPA), U.S. law now required that all ofIndia's facilities be subject to full-scope
safeguards or the U.S. could not cooperate in the nuclear area. This new obligation put
the existing Tarapur agreement under scrutiny because it did only provided for safeguards
on the Tarapur facility.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission subsequently held up fuel shipments
because India did not meet the requirements of the NNPA. India rejected U.S. demands
to subject all of its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspections as a condition of the U.S.
sending fuel for Tarapur. As a compromise solution, U.S. President Carter allowed fuel
to be shipped to India in exchange for India promising to refrain from developing nuclear
weapons, conducting any further nuclear explosions-even for peaceful purposes, and
agreed to discuss non-proliferation. 352
352 Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb, 201-202; Robert B. Cullen "US May Still Ship Nuclear Fuel to
India," Associated Press, 10 March 1980, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com;
S.G. Roy, United Press International, 29 July 1981, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://web.lexis-
nexis.com.
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This alternative was offered in part because the Carter administration was
concerned that if the U.S. entirely reneged on its contractual obligations that New Delhi
would reciprocate and no longer subject the Tarapur facility to safeguards. President
Carter further justified the administration's action in a message to Congress, arguing that
"to deny a sale would hurt the prospects for getting India to accept stricter nuclear
safeguards and other US nonproliferation goals.,,353 Further, Prime Minister Desai was
willing to give a personal commitment to refrain from further detonating nuclear
explosive devices, which the Carter administration accepted. 354
However, Prime Minister Gandhi was not so forthcoming when she came to
power and she would not rule out the possibility of conducting further "peaceful nuclear
experiments" ifit was in India's interests.355 Nonetheless, more fuel was approved
because ofconcerns that the Soviet Union might "supplant the United States" if the latter
refused to supply the fuel to India, and if the U.S. provided the fuel it would "encourage
India in the long term to act in ways consistent with US interests.,,356
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As the long-tenn fulfillment of the contract was untenable, both the U.S. and
India sought to find a mutually agreeable solution to tenninate the agreement. Both sides
had incentives to part amicably, as the U.S. wanted India to retain safeguards on Tarapur
and India had an incentive in maintaining good relations with the U.S. to further its other
economic and technological interests. Ultimately, through a three party agreement,
France took over the contract to provide enriched uranium and India maintained existing
safeguards on the facility.
The dispute over Tarapur fuel and spare parts served as resetting the cooperation
benchmark between the U.S. and India after the 1974 nuclear tests. In particular, there
was a heightened priority on the part of the Americans that India refrain from further
public demonstrations. Additionally, Canada, who was a major supplier of nuclear
materials and technology for India's civilian nuclear program, withdrew cooperation after
the 1974 test, creating additional pressure on the nuclear establishment to indigenously
produce its own nuclear components and materials for the weapons program.357
The extent to which the United State and Canada refused further cooperation
caught India off guard, as they had anticipated that the U.S. would at least honor prior
agreements. That is, while the U.S. and Canada had sought to link their earlier
cooperation with Indian restraint on testing, they had not actually specified the measures
they would take if India violated this understanding,358 and the extent to which the U.S.
was willing to withdraw cooperation surprised many in the Indian government. It also
357 Aabha Dixit, "Status Quo: Maintaining Nuclear Ambiguity," 61.
358 Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb, 174.
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motivated the Indians to seek further self-reliance in the nuclear field so that it would not
be dependent on outside resources to continue its development.359
As a result, these non-proliferation measures imposed on India became extremely
costly for India's economic and scientific development. As Cohen notes,
The U.S.-led response to the 1974 Pokhran test revived the economic
factor in Indian nuclear calculations. New Delhi was surprised at the
intensity of the international reaction and shocked by the severity of the
sanctions imposed upon the Indian civilian nuclear program. Subsequent
U.S. legislation... and the establishment of various international regimes to
deny dual-use technology to incipient nuclear weapons states reintroduce
and transformed the idea of 'cost' .360
The practical result is that U.S. non-proliferation policy slowed the pace and
quality of India's nuclear development, although it did not succeed in stopping it.361
Rather, these non-proliferation efforts kept the program from public eye and increased
Indian efforts to indigenously produce the necessary components for a nuclear weapons
capability. Additionally, the increased economic aid in the amount of $200 million
dollars by the U.S. and several other Western countries served as an additional source of
leverage on the Indian program.362 These incentives also served, in conjunction with the
threat of sanctions, to help keep Indian nuclear ambitious ambiguous later in the early
1980s when Gandhi considered testing again.
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Nonetheless, the further result ofthe Tarapur incident is that the U.S. would
. minimal cooperation with India on nuclear matters.363 No longer having nuclear
leverage, the U.S. sought to further link its economic and technical avenues of
cooperation with continued Indian restraint. These dynamics are discussed below.
4. U.S. Economic and Technological Leverage
During the 1980s and 1990s, India's Prime Ministers began liberalizing the Indian
economy. This led the Indians to seek increased economic and technical cooperation
with the United States. This strategy had a twofold effect on Indian nuclear policy. On
the one hand, increased cooperation with the United States was an important factor in
maintaining nuclear ambiguity; Indian leaders did not want to jeopardize increasing
access to markets and technology by triggering U.S. mandatory non-proliferation
sanctions by testing. At the same time, India's economic growth, combined with better
relations with the U.S., put the Indians in a better position to withstand the sanctions
resulting from a test.
a) I. Gandhi Begins India's Economic Liberalization
When Indira Gandhi returned to power in 1980, she sought to further advance the
Indian nuclear weapons progress that she had begun during her first tenure in office.
Hidden from public purview, she authorized programs to fund research and development
on five different nuclear missile delivery options and pursued an Indian lease of a Soviet
363 U.S. Department of State, "India's Nuclear Energy Program--1987 Update," Confidential Cable 24852,
10 October 1987, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and
Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. NP02526, 10.
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nuclear submarine. In public, she maintained the ambiguous nuclear stance in which she
neither denied Indian nuclear development, but did not suggest that India was
'weaponizing' its capability either. Consistent with this posture, from 1980 through 1982
she issued a number of public statements indicating that while India's nuclear program
was for peaceful purposes, if tests were necessary to further these scientific applications,
India would do so. She indicated that it was "not our policy to make bombs", but also
"we should not be caught napping.,,364
Behind the scenes, Gandhi seriously considered conducting more nuclear tests
and in February 1981 she went so far as having the two testing shafts to be cleared and
the instructed the bomb team to 'have the devices ready' .365 It appears as if she was
keeping the option open to test at least through 1982, when again there were reports of
activity in the Pokhran Desert that suggested test preparations. In May of 1982, the U.S.
Embassy in India cabled back an Indian news article reporting on increased activity at the
test site.366 However, in order to squash these reports in public, Gandhi again publicly
declared to the press later in the month that India would not test.367
364 Harry G. Barnes Jr. to Secstate, "Status ofIndia's Nuclear Program and Policy," New Delhi, cable, 11
June 1982, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwick-
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When Gandhi was questioned by her top nuclear scientist for the reasons why she
had decided not to go ahead with the test, she reportedly replied, "[d]o you want our
skulls cracked?,,368 This comment was believed to be in reference to her concerns over a
u.s. reaction and the difficulties that would pose to the economic trouble she was
facing. 369 Prime Minister Gandhi further indicated that the primary task of her
government was to restore the nation's suffering economy and bring it back to the road of
development.370
To illustrate the depth ofIndian economic difficulties, from 1971 through 1979,
India had averaged only 2.6% GDP growth and had -5% growth in 1979.371 India was
also heavily dependent on foreign assistance from the World Bank and the IMF during
this time period,372 resources that would be vulnerable to U.S. pressures to stop lending.
Given this dismal state of affairs, economic growth and closer cooperation with the
United States was attractive and Gandhi's motivations to refrain from testing seemed to
be largely linked to her efforts to balance economic growth in India with military security
considerations.
Moreover, Prime Minister Gandhi had gotten on remarkably well with President
Reagan during their first meeting in Mexico and a subsequent visit was scheduled for her
368 Chengappa, Weapons of Peace, 260.
369 Chengappa, Weapons of Peace, 260.
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to meet with the President at the White House. By 1982 two-way trade between the
United States and India had reached $3 billion a year and Indira Gandhi was planning
another visit to Washington to "examine ways to expand trade more rapidly and to
increase economic cooperation in general.,,373 Her visit to the U.S. was a chance to
increase economic cooperation with the U.S. after a period of tense relations, although
India continued to rely on the Soviet Union and France for its supply ofmilitary arms.374
The potential for her visit and the general warming of relations with the West,
which in turn might yield economic and technical cooperation, appeared to have affected
Gandhi's desire to avoid upsetting the U.S. with nuclear tests. Consistent with this
approach, when Prime Minister Gandhi visited the United States, it was clear that
economic priorities were on her mind during her visit from July 2ih-August 2nd 1982.375
Prime Minister Gandhi's message on economic issues was that India needed concessional
credits to assist her policy of gradual economic liberalization.376
Her efforts to embrace economic and technical cooperation with the United
States, at the expense of overtly going nuclear, paid dividends with the visit. There was
373 Henry Barnes to U.S. Department of State, "Official Informal No. 402," Confidential Cable 11098, 9
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agreement between New Delhi and Washington that increased consultations and
enhanced Indo-US. trade could be helpful for her policies of economic liberalization.377
Further initiatives between the two states were announced, relating to expanded
scientific, cultural and educational programs; promotion of commercial relations; and
reinstitution of annual official level talks between the State Department and the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs. 378
Increased cooperation also led to the Reagan-Gandhi Science and Technology
Initiative (STI) in 1982 and the 1984 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The MOU
addressed sensitive military equipment, including radars, air navigation systems and other
military hardware. It also provided for the sale of high technology products and
technology transfers, including supercomputers for civilian use. Previously, the United
States had blocked the sale of computers to India based on concerns that the technology
would be used to support India's nuclear weapons program or would be transferred to the
Soviet Union.379
This meant that the MOU, with its emphasis on advanced technology and military
links, was particularly contingent on the Indian's ability to assure the United States that it
was not utilizing these resources for its nuclear program nor sharing the technology with
377 U.S. Department of State, "Visit of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi," no. NP01982, 1.
378 U.S. Department of State, "Visit oflndian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi," no. NP01982, 1.
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other states.380 Clearly, moves towards more overt nuclear development would sabotage
these efforts and were ruled out.
Subsequently, during the rest ofthe 1980s, the United States became the primary
source for Indian acquisitions of electronics, computers and telecommunications
equipment. During this time period, Indira Gandhi put nuclear testing on the backburner
and instead she authorized India's most ambitious efforts to date to gain delivery
capabilities when she approved funding for the missile programs. She was politically
able to continue with these measures for a nuclear delivery capability, as there were not
yet any immediate external pressures by the United States against the Indian missile
program.381
The U.S., for its part, was clear that it expected forbearance on nuclear testing in
exchange for continued cooperation. The U.S. had previously signaled its impatience
with nuclear proliferation over the Tarapur fuel crisis. And the U.S. Congress had made
it clear that it would stop providing aid to India if it detonated another nuclear device,
regardless of whether it was labeled a peaceful nuclear exp10sion.382 These signals from
the U.S. were understood in India. For example, when Indian General Rao inquired again
380 Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, "Enhancing Indo-US Strategic Cooperation," Adelphi Paper 313 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1997) 43.
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in 1983 as to whether Prime Minister Gandhi would conduct more tests, she was even
clearer that there was an economic liability to testing nuclear weapons.383
Thus, while Gandhi considered testing in the early 1980s, addressing economic
weakness was a higher priority and the Indian government took care not to provoke the
renewed patronage of the United States. Subsequent Prime Ministers largely followed
this pattern and Indian leaders would not seriously consider testing again until 1995.
b) India's Continued Economic Liberalization Under R.
Gandhi
Rajiv Gandhi, Indira's son, came to power after her assassination in 1984, and
similarly considered the importance ofIndian economic and technological development
at the expense of an overt nuclear option. Rajiv Gandhi began some market liberalization
efforts during his tenure, primarily aimed at reducing Indian tariffs, which were some of
the highest in the world at 40-250% and sought to slowly move India away from a 'self-
sufficient' market. 384 While seeking to slowly liberalize India's economy, the Prime
Minister also made it a priority to gain access to American high technology. Consistent
with this approach, India sought to maintain relations with the U.S. in order to further its
access to technology, which would be hindered ifIndia publicly acknowledged its
nuclear progress.
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Rajiv Gandhi's first visit to the United States as Prime Minister was in 1985, and
marked a further shift in better relations between the two states.385 This visit with Reagan
encouraged more space cooperation, the implementation of the MOU on sharing
advanced U.S. technology in the areas of telecommunications and electronics, but did not
include arms sales.386 India was also sensitive to the fact that the U.S. had blocked
international financial aid to India in the past. At the time, India was the largest borrower
from the World Bank's "soft" and "hard" loans, ofwhich the U.S. was the largest single
donor.387 By 1985 the U.S. was also India's largest trading partner and source ofjoint
ventures.388 During his visit, Prime Minister Gandhi assured the Reagan administration
that India had not continued its nuclear explosive program after the 1974 test.389
The 1985 visit was followed by a trip in 1987, during which Prime Minister
Gandhi noted the "tremendous achievement" in the relationship based on increased
export licenses to India (which included a supercomputer), further cooperation in defense
production, especially for Indian manufacture of light combat aircraft, and more trade and
business collaboration.39o Further, the U.S. was willing to continue to assist in the launch
385 U.S. Information Agency, "P.M. Gandhi's U.S. Visit," no. NP02238, 1-4.
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of Indian satellites and to renew the "Reagan-Indira Gandhi Science and Technology
Initiative" for an additional three years beyond 1988.391 At this time, the United States
was India's largest trading partner, with imports and exports volume reaching
approximately 4 billion each year since 1984.392
However, the agreement to exchange the supercomputer again brought up the
issue of India's nuclear intentions. The United States understood that it had leverage
over India because ofNew Delhi's desire to cooperate with the West rather than the
Soviet Union for advance technology.393 With concerns that India might use the
computer for its nuclear program, the U.S. approved a less sophisticated model than
requested by the Indian govemment,394 and linked the computer to Indian nuclear
restraint by requiring that India to restrict their uses to "peaceful purposes only.,,395
Prime Minister Gandhi again sought to reassure the United States during the visit that
India preferred to not pay the costs of acquiring nuclear weapons. In a press conference,
he revealed some of the constraints facing India, stating that, "[w]e feel that costs of
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going nuclear, not just the money costs but all the other costs, are much too heavy and we
would like to do anything to prevent ourselves going nuclear.,,396
And as previously discussed, increased contacts between New Delhi and
Washington afforded Indian leaders the opportunity to press the Reagan administration to
more effectively deal with Pakistani nuclear proliferation. Indian restraint combined with
the implicit threat that India would also test or build nuclear weapons if Pakistan did so
was designed to signal to Washington that India was not the proliferation problem.
c) India's Economic Growth in the 1990s
The decade leading up to the tests in 1998 resulted in significant changes for the
relationship between the United States and India. Better relations with India continued to
develop as economic and even military cooperation flourished. Nonetheless,
Washington's concerns with non-proliferation continued to be a source of friction
between the two states. In particular, the U.S. under the Clinton administration sought to
further the international non-proliferation regime through the permanent extension of the
NPT and sought acceptance of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ("CTBT"). Yet,
notwithstanding these very public non-proliferation measures, there were also some
subtle signals from Washington that it was willing to cooperate with a nuclear India.
These signals, combined with Indian economic growth, positioned India to test after the
major campaign for the NPT and CTBT were over. The following discusses India's
396 At this same press conference, Rajiv Gandhi acknowledged that Pakistan probably already had a
"workable device." u.s. Department of State, "Transcript of Press Conference Held by PM," no. NP02534.
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primary focus on economic growth for the first part of the decade, and the gradual
transformation ofthe U.S.-Indo relationship leading up to the test.
Early in 1990, when PV Narasimha Rao was elected Prime Minister, he was very
much concerned with balancing economic growth with India's nuclear policy. During
this timeframe, Rao's primary accomplishment was instituting major economic
liberalization and correspondingly began to integrate India into the global economy.
These economic reforms became largely responsible for the substantial 6.9% annual
economic growth India saw for the rest of the decade.397 During his tenure in office,
which lasted until 1996, Rao also had to face the additional challenges of resisting U.S.
non-proliferation efforts in the post-Cold War world, which centered on a permanent
extension of the NPT in 1995 and the CTBT in 1996. These dual concerns caused Rao's
foreign policy to focus on "economic modernization and keeping a low international
profile. ,,398
Given Rao's efforts to open up India's traditionally closed economy, he
specifically sought to engage the world's sole remaining super power and champion of
economic liberalization, the United States. As part of these efforts, Rao was careful to
accommodate U.S. requests to remain quiet about its nuclear development in order to
maximize its economic opportunities. In one of the meetings Strobe Talbott, acting as
Deputy Secretary of State, remarks that,
Rao would have had me believe he was predisposed to maintain Indira
Gandhi's policy of nuclear ambiguity... [he] understood that security
397 World Bank Data cited in Paul and Nayar, India in the World Order, 43.
398 Lesson learned from China, Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon, 154.
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depended on prosperity. Prosperity, in tum, depended on integration into
world markets and close relations with the United States. That objective,
he seemed to recognize, would be in jeopardy ifIndia overplayed its
nuclear card. 399
To buy time while working towards economic reform, Rao engaged in prolonged
dialogues with the United States regarding the NPT and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT). Essentially, Rao conducted a two-track policy, which was to accede to
discussion with the United States in order to promote economic cooperation, while
secretly furthering Indian nuclear weapons development.4oo Rao also sought to have the
United States put increased non-proliferation pressure on China and Pakistan to slow the
apparent nuclear and missile collaboration.
Against this backdrop, Rao ensured the Indian nuclear option by providing
funding and moving forward with ballistic missile tests against U.S. wishes.401 It was
during this period that India made significant strides towards more reliable delivery
options with its ballistic missile program by successfully testing the Agni class missiles.
Indeed, it was in 1994 that India had made its most significant advancements in
becoming a nuclear weapons state, having achieved this qualitative increase in its missile
program. Still, these developments were largely kept from the Indian public402 and the
399 Strobe Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and The Bomb (Washington D.C.: Brookings
Institution Press, 2004), 31.
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401 Chengappa, Weapons of Peace, 369.
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,284
United States largely ignored these developments, turning instead its attention towards
winning an indefinite extension of the NPT.403
For his part, Rao sought to keep the continued nuclear developments a carefully
guarded secret, given that part of the bargain with the United State was that India would
not publicly acknowledge its nuclear capabilities. The scientists and others 'in the know'
were required to maintain strict secrecy regarding their progress with the bomb program
and to this end, funds were even channeled through other departments outside the DRDO
in order to avoid leaking the ongoing efforts of the weaponeers.404 Rao is quoted as
instructing the scientists, "Do whatever is necessary to keep us in a constant state of
readiness on the nuclear front. But do it quietly. Never mind if we are criticized for not
pursuing it aggressively. I have my hands full with the economy and I don't want to get
diverted on any other issues.,,405
Reportedly, Prime Minister Rao authorized Foreign Secretary J.N. Dixit to inform
the U.S. government that India will most likely conduct nuclear tests no later than 1992-
93. The Indian government demanded that in return for not springing smprises on the
Clinton administration and communicating clarity ofpmpose, the United States avoid
imposing economic sanctions on India. Tamoff and Pickering inform Dixit that the
Indian government should not inform Washington of its proposed actions beforehand as
the U.S. government will be compelled to act to stop the tests. Pickering also assures
403 Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb, 40.
404 Chengappa, Weapons of Peace, 389.
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Dixit that the United States will not use force in the event India conducts nuclear tests,
but that it has other means to take action against India.406
By 1995, the efforts for economic refonn had started to payoff, giving India more
economic and political leverage with the rest of the world and the United States.407
Under these conditions, Rao reconsidered the nuclear option in light of India's economic
growth and had the finance and external affairs ministries study the economic effects of
testing India's nuclear weapons.408
Yet, when Rao consulted his advisors, they were concerned that the economic
gains that had been made the last few years would be lost. Moreover, "Rao's advisers
believed that there should be a clear sequence to such events. They believed that such
tests needed at least two years of preparation to girdle up India to face the economic
isolation that may result. The argument was to first build some economic muscle.,,409
Additionally, the U.S. put direct diplomatic pressure on India, and "Rao did, as Clinton
hoped he would, pull the plug on the test, largely because he did not want to provoke
sanctions that would do hann to the Indian economy.,,410 Thus, while Rao considered the
option of testing, he ultimately decided against it based on his advisor's concerns over the
economy and its vulnerability vis-a.-vis the likely imposition ofD.S. sanctions.
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If the economy would have been strong enough, the evidence suggests that he
would have conducted the tests; however, given the calculated costs of U.S. sanctions,
Rao determined that it was not yet India's time to publicly declare its nuclear status. In
short, Rao " ...decided that a nuclear test was not in India's interest, primarily because he
concluded that the economy was not yet strong enough to withstand the inflationary
effects of international sanctions. He concluded that inflation was more important to the
national interest and in electoral politics, than was nuclear weapon testing.,,411 Almost
like clockwork, India waited several years and continued nuclear preparation in secrecy
until Vajpayee and the BJP came to power in India.
D. International Non-proliferation Regime
India's stance toward the non-proliferation regime agreements remained
consistent after is 1974 nuclear test. In particular, India rej ected the NPT and later the
CTBT as discriminatory because they entrenched existing nuclear weapons states.
Nonetheless, India was still affected by the institutions and agreements among nuclear
suppliers and the 1974 test triggered a backlash that among some Western states. This
slowed down and damaged the Indian nuclear energy and weapons program. Therefore,
the primary affect the international non-proliferation regime had on India's nuclear policy
was material. While India often spoke of disarmament publicly, arms control or other
agreements were not even a remote possibility in light of China's refusal to participate in
the NPT. However, China and France's position changed during the 1990s. India still
411 Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb, 34.
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rejected the pennanent extension ofthe NPT and the initiation ofthe CTBT as
discriminatory, but it became more isolated as a result.
1. International Reaction to the 1974 Test
India's 1974 nuclear test was viewed as a non-proliferation set back by the United
States and other Western nuclear suppliers because it set a precedent for other states to
cross the nuclear threshold by labeling tests PNES.412 There was further concern that the
Indian test would further contribute to proliferation by motivating Pakistan to seek
nuclear weapons.413
As such, the goal for willing supplier states was to make the test costly so that
other threshold states would not follow suit. To this end, the U.S. sought to encourage
other nuclear suppliers to abide by the NPT and to not export nuclear technology or
materials to non-recognized nuclear weapons states such as India in the absence of full-
scope safeguards.414 For example, as previously discussed, the U.S. had begun to seek
ways to extract itself from its contract commitments related to the Tarapur reactor.
Canada imposed restrictions, but the Soviet Union and France were less willing to punish
New Delhi for its nuclear explosion.
With the exception ofPakistan, Canada had the strongest reaction to India's 1974
nuclear test. Like the United States, Canada had sought to forestall testing by previously
412 Sober, "Press Coverage oflndia's Developing Nuclear Capability," no. PROI076, i and 10.
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warning India that "an explosion did not constitute a peaceful use.,,415 When the test
occurred, Canadian officials were particularly dismayed by the test because Canada had
provided India with a substantial amount ofnuclear assistance, and the explosive device
likely had incorporated plutonium from the Canada supplied CIRUS reactor.416
As a result of the test, Ottawa suspended all nuclear cooperation and assistance
and reviewed all other forms of economic aid, except food and agricultural assistance.417
The Canadian response almost immediately affected India's nuclear energy program, as
for example, India had uncompleted construction on a Canadian supplied reactor.418
Additionally, because India was unwilling to provide the Canadian government with
assurances that it would give up the option to further test and would not accept
safeguards on all its nuclear facilities, Ottawa concluded that further nuclear cooperation
with India was not possible under the terms ofthe NPT.419 Because Canada had closely
cooperated with the Indian nuclear program, the nuclear embargo crippled India's
program and required it to tum to other sources and indigenous measures to continued
progress. In short, as Indian Prime Minister Desai acknowledged a few years later, the
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1974 nuclear test caused severe difficulties for India in maintaining its nuclear research
and development program.420 However, Canada's response represented one end of the
spectrum. The Soviet Union and France's reactions were considerably weaker.
The Soviet Union's position remained consistent with its approach prior to the
1974 test. In particular, while Moscow generally identified non-proliferation as being in
its interests, it was unwilling to damage its relationship with India over the test.421 After
the 1974 test, the Soviets largely reported the event as a "peaceful exp10sion,,,422 and
were unwilling to publicly "chastise the Indians.,,423 The lack of Soviet response was not
particularly important in material terms because India had cooperated more extensively
with the U.S. and Canada on nuclear matters.424 As such, the Soviet approach was to
generally neither condemn nor condone the test.
Additionally, the Soviets were willing to provide some limited nuclear material
assistance, which was useful for India in the wake of U.S. and Canadian response. There
were some media reports during the 1980s that the Soviets had violated its international
obligations by supplying heavy water to India, which was used in part in a reactor that
was a source of plutonium for weapons.425 However, this was not a particularly extensive
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supply relationship. As such, the USSR's general approach to Indian proliferation neither
helped nor hindered it. For this reason, the Soviet Union was not a particularly important
factor, as either a patron state or as related to its international non-proliferation
obligations, in determining India's nuclear posture.
Similarly, France was not willing to take India to task for testing. Indeed, France
was reluctant in general to participate in any non-proliferation measures until acceding to
the NPT in 1995 and signing the CTBT in 1996. For example, the Chairman of the
French Atomic Energy Commission publicly congratulated the Indians after the 1974
test.426 More telling, the French were willing to help India construct two unsafeguarded
power reactors and a fast breeder reactor.427 Thus, while most other major nuclear
suppliers cooperated, broadly speaking, in making India's nuclear program harder,
France was a major exception.
France's conduct was a clear signal that the non-proliferation regime was at this
time largely based on U.S. efforts.428 The U.S. further recognized that France was a weak
link in the non-proliferation regime and that its cooperation was necessary in order to
tighten export controls, and sought to have France shut offthe spigot.429 However, India
had little concern as related directly to France, and thus the latter was not a significant
factor in Indian nuclear decision-making.
426 Sober, "Press Coverage ofIndia's Developing Nuclear Capability," no. PROI076, 9.
427 Sober, "Press Coverage ofIndia's Developing Nuclear Capability," no. PROI076, 9.
428 Surnit Ganguly, "Explaining the Indian Nuclear Tests of 1998," in India's Nuclear Security, Raju G. C.
Thomas and Amit Gupta, eds. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 47.
429 Springsteen, "Indian Nuclear Developments: NSSM 156," no. PROIlO77, 5.
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2. India Avoids International and Regional Non-Proliferation
Restrictions
After the 1974 nuclear test, India maintained a consistent position of rejecting
international and regional non-proliferation agreements and proposals that did not restrict
China's nuclear weapons capabilities. This meant that India continued to stay largely
outside of the direct obligations of the international non-proliferation regime. Rather, by
avoiding nuclear safeguards and treaty commitments, India preserved its nuclear option
that would enable it to develop weapons in the future to address its long-term security
concerns vis-a.-vis China.43o
Prior to the test, New Delhi had signed and ratified the Partial Test Ban Treaty
and subjected some of its facilities to IAEA safeguards, although not all of its facilities
were covered, including its own indigenous plants and materials.431 India was not a
member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. And of course, New Delhi refused to join the
NPT, arguing that it was discriminatory because it did not require nuclear weapons states
to disarm, and that India had the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.432
India also specifically criticized the NPT for not constraining China's nuclear forces.
The further impact of India not signing the NPT is that Pakistan was likewise unwilling
to give up its nuclear ambitions while India retained its option.
430 Central Intelligence Agency, "Indian Nuclear Policies in the 1980s," no. WM00251 , 1.
431 Donnelly, "India and Nuclear Weapons," no. NP02483, 4.
432 U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, "Mrs. Gandhi on Nuclear Policy, Soviet Intervention," no.
NP017l8, 1.
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At the same time that India rejected international restrictions on its nuclear option,
New Delhi also sought to portray its stance as consistent with non-proliferation. Its
argument against the NPT was based on the discriminatory nature of the agreement, and
India supported the overall goals of disarmament. Additionally, India would point to its
own restraint as related to weapons proliferation and contrast its conduct with Pakistan's
clandestine nuclear activities.433
In addition to rejecting international non-proliferation agreements that would limit
India nuclear option, New Delhi also refused to seriously consider any Pakistani
proposals. Over time Islamabad put forward a number of options to limit the
development of nuclear weapons in South Asia, including: the establishment of a nuclear
weapons free zone in South Asia (1974); joint declaration renouncing the acquisition or
manufacture of nuclear weapons (1978); mutual inspection of nuclear facilities (1979);
simultaneous adherence to the NPT by India and Pakistan; acceptance of IAEA
safeguards (1979); and bilateral/regional nuclear test ban (1987).434 The main
impediment remained the fact that any bilateral or regional agreements would not
constrain the China's nuclear weapons capability. As such, the Pakistani proposals were
433 U.S. Department of State, "Transcript of PM's Press Conference," Press Conference, 20 October 1987,
Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992),
no. NP02533, 16.
434 Jamsheed K.A. Markter to John Glenn, "Pakistan's Policy on Nuclear Non-Proliferation," Letter, 20
January 1988, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwick-
Healey, 1992), no. NP02590, 2.
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not a realistic option for India, and New Delhi rejected them because China was not
included.435
In short, the non-proliferation regime mattered early on to the extent some of
India's important suppliers began denying India access to previously available nuclear
technology and materials. India was willing absorb these material costs in order to retain
its nuclear option, especially because its two main adversaries-China and Pakistan-
remained outside of the institutional frameworks.
At the same time, it wasn't the goals of the non-proliferation regime that India
objected to, but rather its ineffectiveness at addressing the threats posed by China and
Pakistan's nuclear weapons programs. As such, India viewed the nuclear option as a
security requirement it could not afford to trade away by agreement. Additionally,
emphasizing Indian support of disarmament goals and own restrained conduct allowed it
to credibly argue that Pakistan was the proliferation threat. If India had continued testing,
in addition risking further material disadvantages, it would have lost the diplomatic
stance that other states should be seeking to restrain Pakistani nuclear activities.
3. The Permanent Extension of the NPT and CTBT
India again was under increased non-proliferation pressure during the 1990s as
the permanent extension for the NPT became due in 1995 and the Clinton administration
sought the passage of the CTBT. While India was unwilling to give up its nuclear option,
it also sought to not directly undermine either agreement, likely because it did not want to
increase existing friction with Washington over the issue. This time period was
435 Donnelly, "India and Nuclear Weapons," no. NP02483, 4.
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complicated for India diplomatically as it sought to maintain economic and technical
cooperation with the U.S. while at the same time deflecting pressure on its nuclear
program.
The negotiations for the permanent extension of the NPT and CTBT occurred at
the same time that India dusted off its nuclear testing sites. Some observers saw this
move as a protest to the non-proliferation measures,436 but at the same time India chose to
wait to test until after the agreements were signed. Given Indian interests in better
relations with the U.S., it would have been inopportune to test while the U.S. was pushing
the CTBT.437 In this way, India could avoid disapprobation for directly challenging the
non-proliferation regime, but at the same time clearly signal that it remained outside of
the framework.
However, India's position on the NPT and later the CTBT became increasingly
isolated during the 1990s as two long-standing holdouts-China and France-acceded to
the treaties. This put increasing pressure on India to sign the agreements, which it
steadfastly resisted. But it also put India on the defensive to the extent that its long
standing justification that it would not sign a treaty that China was not a party to was
insufficient. India had to rely on the continued justification of the discriminatory nature
of the agreements to implicitly remind other states that its real reason for not signing the
treaties is because India would not be considered a nuclear weapons state like China.
436 Kamad, Nuclear Weapons & Indian Security, 373-374.
437 Chengappa, Weapons of Peace, 399.
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E. Domestic Politics
There was general support for the Indian nuclear weapons program from a broad
spectrum of sources that crossed party lines and included special interests and elite and
mass public opinion. Public support for nuclear weapons was largely based on reports of
Pakistani nuclear progress. Nonetheless, Indian Prime Ministers retained the nuclear
portfolio, and while they authorized efforts to increase India's ability to produce and
deliver nuclear weapons, these efforts were kept largely private. This meant that while
public opinion was not in and of itself a determinative factor in India retaining an
ambiguous posture; indeed, public support was a pressure for a more transparent nuclear
policy. Additionally, with increases in the Indian nuclear weapons program, there is little
evidence that moral reservation was a primary consideration for India's leaders.
1. Domestic Political Interests
Following the 1974 nuclear test, there remained strong public support for India to
have a more robust nuclear posture, which included at a minimum continued testing.
Support for India's nuclear option was spread across a wide range of interests groups,
political parties, and the general population. This mean that India's Prime Ministers
could have capitalized on popular support for nuclear weapons, but clearly this was not
the case as only two different Prime Ministers have ever exercised the option.438 Instead,
Indian leaders have generally sought to balance other priorities as the expense of
438 Additionally, the issue of 'weak governments' cannot be a causal factor given the fact many
governments in India history are weak. Since Independence in 1947, India has had at least seven Prime
Ministers that have held power for less than two years.
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exercising the nuclear option. This is consistent with the other issues such as poverty
alleviation and addressing government and business corruption that most Indians find
more important. Moreover, while the test may have been authorized, in part, based on
domestic political calculations, after the 1974 tests India had "learned" its lesson and as it
sought to further economic and scientific progress with the U.S., policies that would
gamer more public support than a public display of India's nuclear progress.
There was continued support for India's nuclear program following the 1974 test,
with the same general political lines drawn as before the explosion. In the immediate
aftermath of the test, all of India's major political parties "welcomed the explosion in the
Rajasthani desert.,,439 Additionally, popular sentiment generally favored a nuclear
capability.440 A poll conducted in 15 cities in 1981 showed that 70% of urban residents
believed that India should develop nuclear weapons.441 This strong pro-bomb
constituency continued in India, especially in light ofPakistan's nuclear development.
Additionally, there was no corresponding popular anti-nuclear movement in India.442
There also still existed a number ofdomestic political actors that called for India
to revise its nuclear policy and adopt an open posture. These factions primarily consisted
ofmilitary leaders, scientists who supported testing, and opposition political parties. For
example, there were several high profile military leaders such as K. Subrahmanyan in the
439 U.S. Department of State, "India: Uncertainty over Nuclear Policy," no. WMOOI69, 1.
440 Donnelly, "India and Nuclear Weapons," no. NP02483, 5-6.
441 Donnelly, "India and Nuclear Weapons," no. NP02483, 6.
442 U.S. Department of State, "India-Pakistan: Pressures for Nuclear Proliferation," no. WM00283, 2-3.
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Defence Ministry and Army Chief General K. Sundarji who were well known to support
India having nuclear weapons to deter Pakistan.443
Moreover, calls for an Indian nuclear weapons capability increased with
corresponding evidence ofPakistan's nuclear progress, creating more pressure on the
government to respond. For example, after Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi stated that
Pakistan was close to manufacturing a nuclear weapon, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
urged the government to build nuclear weapons in response.444 This pattern-reports of
Pakistani nuclear weapons, followed by calls from the BJP to immediately build nuclear
weapons-eontinued throughout the late 1970s until India tested in 1998.445 Similarly,
members of India's parliament, cutting across party lines, appealed to Prime Minister
Rajiv Gandhi to revise India's nuclear policy because of the reported increase in Pakistan
nuclear capability.446 Those calling for an open nuclear posture included members of the
Congress Party, which essentially controlled India for most of the 1980s. In short, calls
for an overt nuclear stance came from both special interests, as well as cut across party
lines.
However, Indian Prime Ministers steadfastly resisted pressures to resume testing
or publicly declare India a nuclear weapon state. Instead the general government
443 John Gunther Dean to U.S. Department of State, "Article on the Pak Nuclear Program," Unclassified
Cable 07381, March 1987, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive
and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. NP02444, 6.
444 "India Rightists want Bomb," The New York Times, 23 June 1985, 3.
445 See, e.g., Donnelly, "India and Nuclear Weapons," no. NP02483, 8.
446 "India MPs call for 'Deterrent' Against Pakistan's Nuclear Capability," Press Trust ofIndia, 8 December
1986, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.
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response was to indicate that India was prepared to respond to the Pakistani threat if
circumstances warranted it.447 In short, appeals for India across the domestic spectrum
were not strong enough for the ruling government to choose a nuclear option, one that
would have been quite popular at the time.
This is not to say that there was universal support for a nuclear weapons program.
There was however a broad base consensus supporting continued testing and nuclear
development,448 IfIndia's nuclear posture was entirely dependent on elite and popular
support, at a minimum it should have continued testing after 1974. Nonetheless, Indian
Prime Ministers, who traditionally retained the nuclear portfolio,449 refused to bend to
these calls beyond stating that India was keeping its option open. This is because the
Indian Prime Minister had a set of complicating factors to balance and garnering public
support through the nuclear program generally took less priority than cultivating
economic programs and preventing a regional arms race.
For example, in 1982 Indian nuclear scientists and the Chief of Army Staff Rao
reportedly approached Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and lobbied her to continue testing
and create an overt deterrent.45o She took their arguments under advisement, and then
later rejected the prospect of testing, citing economic constraints as the reason.451 Rajiv
447 Donnelly, "India and Nuclear Weapons," no. NP02483, 8.
448 U.S. Department of State, "India: Uncertainty over Nuclear Policy," no. WMOO169, 4.
449 Following the example ofIndia's prime ministers, Rajiv Gandhi retained the portfolios of atomic energy,
high technology, and related industry. See "Briefly: India," Nucleonics Week, 10 January 1985, 13.
450 Chengappa, Weapons of Peace, 253-255; Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb, 242.
45\ Chengappa, Weapons of Peace, 286-287.
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Gandhi generally followed this approach during his tenure in office through 1989. When
he did seek to gamer public support for military security with the ill-fated Brasstacks
Exercises, he still largely avoided the nuclear issue. Similarly, in 1995 when Prime
Minister Rao considered testing, domestic political factors were not the primary concern
for him. For example, when the scientists suggested that a test would boost his
popularity, he reportedly snapped, "let me worry about that.,,452
Even Prime Minister Vajpayee, who ultimately authorized the 1998 nuclear tests,
was influenced by factors other than widespread support for testing, as demonstrated
when he cancelled tests during his first tenure in office in 1996. Atal Behari Vajpayee
and the BJP came to power briefly in 1996 for two weeks and during this short duration
in power, Vajpayee ordered and then retracted the decision to conduct nuclear tests. The
nationalist BJP party had campaigned on a platform ofHindutva, which entailed a
number ofpolicies that, if enacted, would move India further away from its secular
identity and embrace a nationalist Hindu policy. Part of this platform called for India to
'induct' its nuclear weapons capability. Given the fact that the BJP needed public
support given its rather tenuous hold on power, making a public statement by testing
would show that the BJP would 'do what it had said it would do' .453 These domestic
political motivations were probably responsible for Vajpayee sending for India's two top
nuclear scientists, Kalam and Chidambaram to brief him on the status India's nuclear
452 Chengappa, Weapons of Peace.
453 See Chengappa, Weapons of Peace, 31.
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program immediately after being sworn in as Prime Minister.454 Interestingly, Rao had
sent Vajpayee a handwritten note the day he was sworn in, telling him to see Kalam
about the "N issue".455
In any event, the effort to conduct test during the two-week tenure in 1996
ultimately failed on a number of levels. First, Vajpayee had trouble locating Kalam for
several days. Additionally, there was reportedly pressure by Indian advisors to Vajpayee
to forgo the tests as the expected international fallout would be more difficult to weather
ifthere was not a government in place, a likely possibility given the twenty-four party
coalition that was barely holding.456 These fears were furthered when U.S. satellites
picked up the activity in the Rajasthan Desert and mustered diplomatic pressure on the
BJP to refrain from testing. Finally, after just thirteen days in office, the BJP lost the vote
of confidence to form a government. The significance of this event suggests that while
the tests were largely ordered to bolster the BJP's domestic posture, the decision to
retract the tests was due in large part to the direct pressure the U.S. was able to bring to
bear on the vulnerable government. Had the U.S. not been a factor in Vajpayee's
calculations, he would have been more likely to follow through with the testing.
However, he understood that leaving India susceptible to external pressures without a
government in place would be more detrimental to Indian interests than the benefits of
testing.
454 Chengappa, in reporting this meeting, recognizes the tenuousness of the government, given the shaky
coalition that the BJP had cobbled together to form a government. Chengappa, Weapons of Peace, 29.
455 See Chengappa, Weapons of Peace, 31.
456 Chengappa, Weapons of Peace, 32.
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After the BJP government fell, a new coalition was fonned under the United Front
Party, with Gowda as Prime Minister and "in public they adopted a more conciliatory
stance toward India's neighbors and sent signals to Washington suggesting that they
would not go ahead with the test that Vajpayee had authorized.,,457 This stance
essentially remained through the successive administration of Gujral, also from the
United Front Party, through November of 1997, followed by the BJP returning to power
in 1998.
In short, there was a broad spectrum of interests that supported a more robust
nuclear policy in India. Certainly within this category there remained differences as to
the best way to provide for Indian security and whether this included an overt nuclear
deterrence posture, as highlighted in the initial debate regarding China's first nuclear
tests. Nonetheless, Indian Prime Ministers did little to capitalize on this support and
instead focused on balancing India's regional threats with efforts to increase economic
growth. This strategy was facilitated by an ambiguous posture.
2. Moral Constraints
There is little evidence that moral reservation was a detenninative factor for
India's restrained nuclear posture between 1974 and 1998. In particular, during this time
period there was only one prime minister that was morally opposed to nuclear weapons,
Prime Minister Desai, and he also furthered the Indian nuclear weapons program. The
fact that there was not further testing with Prime Ministers who did not share these
reservations suggests that other factors were at play.
457 Talbott, Engaging India, 39.
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Prime Minister Mormji Desai came to power in March 1977 when the Janata
party won over the Congress Party and Indira Gandhi. Desai reportedly was very
influenced by Gandhi's beliefs and "had always been vehemently opposed to India
developing nuclear weapons.,,458 Further, Desai was concerned about India's economic
position and concerned about entering into a nuclear arms race that "[e]conomically, it
will hurt us greatly if we try to enter the nuclear race because of its fantastic cost.'>459
Still, in an effort to preserve India's nuclear option, Desai resisted pressures to sign the
NPT, gave permission to refine the designs of the explosive device and allowed the
purchase ofthe Jaguar aircraft that, ifproperly fitted, would be able to carry a nuclear
payload.460
When Indira Gandhi returned to power in 1979, she "began where she left off'
and appointed scientist Ramanna, a proponent of a nuclear capable India, as head of
India's nuclear development to get things going.461 This effort included clearing the test
shafts, piloting a nuclear sub study and authorizing work on five different types of
missiles to deliver India's nuclear warheads. Given the fact that Indira had little moral
compunction about the role of nuclear capability for India, it is unclear from this
perspective why she did not test again from 1980-1984. That is, if morality is the
variable that has provided constraint on the nuclear weapons program, then we should see
testing when a leader does not have this personal restraint, but this is not the case with
458 Chengappa, Weapons of Peace, 217.
459 Chengappa, Weapons of Peace, 218.
460 Chengappa, Weapons of Peace, 226-227.
461 Chengappa, Weapons of Peace, 203.
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either Gandhi in the 1980s or Vajpayee in 1996 when he retracted the decision to test.
Other factors than morality clearly played a role in determining India's nuclear posture.
Indira Gandhi was assassinated in 1984 and her son Rajiv succeeded her. Rajiv
Gandhi seemed to be influenced by the moral implications of nuclear weapons but, as his
predecessors before him, implemented programs that significantly furthered India's trend
towards weaponizing its nuclear capabilities. During Rajiv's tenure in office, he tested
authorized testing of the Prithvi, Agni and Nag missiles, and reportedly also approved of
weaponization for the first time in Indian history.462
These programs were all build on later by Rao, who was in office from 1991-
1996, despite the fact that he was a well know opponent of nuclear weapons personally.
During Rao's tenure, he had the tests shafts prepared for testing as well as allowing the
further testing of the Prithvi and Agni missile tests, which are designed to carry nuclear
warheads. It was also during Rao's tenure that India was officially a nuclear weapons
state in terms of both nuclear and delivery capability via missiles.
For a short period to time following Rao's five-year term in office and before the
BJP came to power again in 1998, the United Front Party had two Prime Ministers, Deve
Gowda and Gujral. From 1996-1997, these governments deployed the Prithvi missiles,
allowed the mating of warheads to missiles and allowed three additional test shafts to be
dug. Additionally, Gujral awarded Kalam in 1997, one of India's top nuclear scientists
the Bharat Ratna given to civilians for their service.
462 "Indian Nuclear Weapons," Federation of Atomic Scientists,
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/nuke/index.htmlFederation of atomic scientists, accessed August
2004.
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By the time the BJP came into power in 1998 then, successive generations of
Indian leaders had developed a nuclear capability for India despite moral reservations.
So while moral considerations may have personally influenced Indian leaders, they
clearly took substantial steps to further India's nuclear capabilities given the security and
prestige motivations. Further, there is little evidence that the population at large is
primarily opposed to nuclear weapons for moral reasons, with only eight percent
objecting to nuclear weapons development based on this reason.463
In short, while much of India rhetoric has highlighted the moral ambiguities of
nuclear weapons, it has consistently sought to develop this capability for a variety of
motivations including security and domestic and international prestige. Still, while these
considerations explain the motivations for Indian nuclear development, it does not
address India's opaque nuclear posture. In order to fully understand why Indian
development has largely occurred the way that it has, external constraints coupled with
India's domestic weakness464 are important factors shaping its nuclear behavior. India
has sought to develop a military capability with minimal outside influence while
simultaneously maximizing its economic and political leverage. Further, while it may be
true that Indian strategic culture reflects "a deep streak of ambivalence and historical
463 Cortright and Mattoo, India and the Bomb: Public Opinion and Nuclear Options, 17.
464 In addition to economic weakness, India's technological development has struggled to indigenously
design a nuclear capability. Indeed, this factor is often overlooked, but important to consider in
conjunction with India's economic goals. Sidhu attributes technological weakness as a larger factor than
Indian morality in explaining Indian posture until the 1980s. See, Sidhu, "India's Nuclear Use Doctrine".
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reticence against costly, risky, and irrevocable decisions ... ,,465 the basis for this 'costly
and risky' strategy is also largely calculated on the likely responses of regional and
international actors, in particular Pakistan, China, and the United States. These dictates
are largely responsible for India's decades of nuclear restraint more so than the moral
considerations that leaders have felt.
III. Explaining the 1998 Nuclear Tests
On May 11, 1998 and again on May 13th, India conducted a series of nuclear tests
at the Pokhran site. In all, the Indian government reported five tests. One of the tests
was possibly of a thermonuclear device. Shortly after the tests on May 11 th, Vajpayee
unambiguously declared India a nuclear weapons state. While signaling a shift in Indian
nuclear posture after four decades, immediately after the tests, Vajpayee also sought to
re-engage the international community, in particular the United States, and minimize the
external ramifications of the tests. To this end, after the May 13th tests, Vajpayee
cancelled further planned tests in the series and indicated that while India would not sign
the CTBT, it would place a voluntary moratorium on any further testing.
The 1998 nuclear tests were the result of a number of factors. First, India was in a
relatively propitious security environment when the tests were approved. That is, the
tests were not the result of an immediate security threat. At the same time, both India and
Pakistan had continued to make significant advancements in missile delivery systems,
and shortly after the 1998 tests, India was able to reach significant targets in China.
465 Deepa M. Ollapally, "Mixed Motives In India's Search for Nuclear Status," Asian Survey 41, no. 6
(2001), 932.
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Second, India had cultivated a stronger economic and trade relationship with the
United States, starting in the 1980s. While there was some disagreement among the
Indian leadership as to whether India's economic base was stable enough to withstand
sanctions from the tests, India's general growth and U.S. interests in short-lived sanctions
were in India's favor. An additional consideration is that there was a subtle shift in U.S.
non-proliferation policy under the Clinton administration, which signaled that it would be
able to live with a nuclear India.
Changes in the international non-proliferation regime likely also had some effect
on India's posture. Consistent with its previous policy, India deflected U.S. pressures
and steadfastly resisted signing the permanent extension to the NPT in 1995 and rejected
the CTBT in 1996. What was a significant change however is that two longstanding
holdouts to these agreements-France and China-had now agreed to formally join the
treaty obligations. This left India more isolated in its posture as New Delhi had
previously based its unwillingness to join the agreements, in part, on China's refusal to
sign. Nonetheless, India would not accept an international order where it was considered
a non-nuclear weapons state while China was accorded this status. Thus, there was some
impetus for India to signal that it was a nuclear weapons state, notwithstanding the
international order.
Domestic political factors, mainly the election of the nationalist BJP party, also
played a role in the tests, particularly as to timing. The BJP party had included the
induction of nuclear weapons into its party platform, and for years as the opposition party
had called on the government to adopt nuclear weapons. Thus, it was not surprising
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when it was under the BJP's leadership that India chose to test. However, this
explanation should be viewed within the context ofIndia's overall regional and
international environment, as well as development history. It was not a foregone
conclusion that the BJP would test, given these other factors, or that the BJP would have
been the only party to choose testing on behalf ofIndia. Finally, the moral stance of
India's leaders does not appear to have been a factor in the tests. The following evaluates
each of these factors.
A. Regional Security Environment
By the late 1990s, India had seen significant development in its economic and
scientific arenas. As part of this development, India was seeing advancements in its
nuclear delivery systems, such that it would be able to reach its long-term goal ofbeing
able to establish nuclear deterrence with China. At the same time, Pakistan was relatively
weak during the 1990s vis-a-vis India, particularly in the economic and conventional
military realms as the U.S. imposed sanctions for most of this period. The Pakistani
nuclear program continued to march forward however, and there was little indication that
Islamabad would stop or rollback its program. Thus, while not facing an immediate
security threat, India was now in a position to credibly establish itself as a nuclear
weapons state with China and Pakistan.
1. Developing India with Long-Term Security Challenges
While India was establishing closer economic and military linkages with the
United States, Pakistan during the 1990s was subjected to increased U.S. non-
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proliferation efforts in the form of diplomatic pressures and sanctions. By the time the
1990 crisis between India and Pakistan was over, the United States was exerting
considerable diplomatic pressure on Pakistan to practice restraint, particularly since in
every war game scenario the Pentagon ran, Pakistan emerged as the clear loser to
India.466 Another important development for India during 1990 came when the United
States refused to recertify Pakistan's nuclear program and imposed economic and
military sanctions on Pakistan under the Pressler Amendment.
These non-proliferation efforts towards Pakistan ensured that its economic
development was very slow compared to India. Indeed, while India was growing at an
average of6.9% per year during the 1990s, Pakistan's growth stagnated at 3 percent.467
Further, as the Indians correctly calculated, Pakistan would also be subject the Glenn
Amendment sanctions by the United States if it followed India's nuclear tests with its
own. Indeed, given that the sanctions after both states tested affected Pakistan more
harshly468, and given Pakistan's already weakened position, there is some speculation that
India 'sucker punched' Pakistan into testing when Pakistan could least afford to manage
the international ramifications.469
Additionally, Pakistan was making gains with its Ghauri missile system, which
would enable it to reach most of India with nuclear warheads. India already had the
466 Ganguly, "Explaining the Indian Nuclear Tests of 1998", 52. Under the "Gates Mission", the U.S. sent a
high level contingent to South Asia during the 1990 crisis, fearful that under the umbrella of nuclear
capabilities, the crisis would get out of hand. See Devin T. Hagerty, "Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia:
The 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis," International Security 20, no. 3 (Winter 1995), 101.
467 Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon, 193.
468 Joeck, "Nuclear Developments in India and Pakistan," 31.
469 Talbott, Engaging India.
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ability to reach most Pakistani targets, so Pakistan's missile system did not upset the
balance of power in the area, although it did come closer to equalizing it for deterrence
purposes. The fact that Pakistan would be able to reach Indian targets with nuclear
missiles meant that there was no reason to demonstrate Indian restraint in an effort to
slow down the Pakistani program-rather, Pakistan had reached or was ready to reach the
goal it had been striving for since 1971. This remained a constant to some extent
however, as Pakistan had previously had the capability to deliver nuclear devices via the
F-l6s the U.S. had provided Islamabad. What this meant is that refraining from
competition with Pakistan was not a particularly compelling motivation to refrain from
testing.
At the same time, India still had an eye to its longer-term security vis-a.-vis China.
This is not to say that India tested in reaction to an immediate Chinese threat. Rather,
India has always viewed China as a competitor in Asia and New Delhi was coming closer
to realizing its goals of having a credible nuclear force that would be able to reach distant
Chinese targets. At the same time, China had increased its nuclear testing during the
mid-l990s to enable it to sign the CTBT. This was not an option for Indian leaders as
they refused to sign any agreement that would cement India as being a non-nuclear
weapons state. Taken together, these factors meant that at some point India was in a
position to assert its nuclear weapons capability with China, but the timing was relatively
open ended once it reach the basic threshold. As such, India's regional environment
explains Indian motivations for testing, but does not answer the question of timing, which
requires recognition of the role of the u.s. and the BJP.
-----------------------
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2. Short-term Insecurity Was Not A Significant Factor
Some scholars seeking to explain India's decision to test in 1998 argue that India
did so to bolster its military security, which arguably had deteriorated throughout the
1990s for several reasons. First, it became increasingly apparent that China and Pakistan
had colluded to provide Pakistan with advanced nuclear material, designs and ballistic
missile delivery systems. Second, with the drawdown of the Soviet Union, India had lost
an important military and political ally in providing for its security, especially in terms of
conventional weaponry support. Third, the United States, in an effort to permanently
extend the NPT and gain support for the CTBT, was putting enormous non-proliferation
effort on India, to the extent that India had to test or risk losing this option in the future.
These arguments are each considered in turn.
a) Pakistani and Chinese Threats
During the mid-1990s, evidence ofPakistani nuclear and missile collusion with
China became increasingly apparent through a series of media reports. These missile
capabilities, the short range M-ll missile deployed along the Indo-Pakistani border and
longer range No Dong missile, renamed the Ghauri, are believed to have been transferred
from China.470 The fruits of this cooperation resulted in a significant qualitative increase
in Pakistan's ballistic missile technology, which would enable the delivery of nuclear
warheads to India's interior, a capability that Pakistan had not previously developed. The
470 In the case of the No Dong, it is estimated that China transferred the technology to North Korea, which
then transferred it to Pakistan. See Joseph Cirincione, Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass
Destruction (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), 213-215, for a
summary of Pakistan's ballistic missile development during this time period.
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Ghauri, tested April 6, 1998, could reach targets deep within the Indian state. The
argument then, is that these changing strategic realities forced India, out of concern for its
own security, to respond by shifting its previous policy of ambiguity to clarify its own
burgeoning nuclear capabi1ities.471
However, the proliferation relationship between Pakistan and China was not new
one and the security pressures this has created for India has been a constant feature of the
region for decades. Indeed, even in the early 1980s India was protesting the nuclear
assistance that Pakistan was receiving from China. Of central concern to India in 1983
were reports that began to surface suggesting China had provided Pakistan with a
'blueprint' for a bomb as well as enough weapons grade uranium for one or two
weapons.472 Spector suggests that these revelations, amid press reports that Indira
Gandhi was considering preemptive strikes on Pakistan's Kahuta nuclear facility,
significantly increased the nuclear tension between India and Pakistan.473 In the
background of these events, debates within India were renewed over whether or not it
471 Ashley J. Tellis, India's Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal
(Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), 114. Malik also finds that Chinese assistance forced India out of the nuclear
closet, Malik, "Nuclear Proliferation In Asia". Jaswant Singh, Vajpayee's Foreign Minister publicly
justified India's decision to conduct the tests based on India's "deteriorating security environment", in
which he also included US non-proliferation pressures discussed below.
472 For a detailed chronology regarding China's assistance to Pakistan's nuclear and missile program, see
"Resources on India and Pakistan," The Center for Nonproliferation Studies, at
http://cns.miis.edu/researchlindia; accessed January, 2005.
473 Leonard S. Spector, The Undeclared Bomb (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1988),84.
Reportedly Indira Gandhi did not approve of the attacks, fearing that it would lead to retaliation and full
scale war. Sidhu, "India's Nuclear Use Doctrine".
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was time to 'go public' with India's nuclear capability or to continue to rely on
conventional deterrence, with the latter prevailing.474
The nuclear tensions between Pakistan and India continued through 1985 and
prompted Rajiv Gandhi to publicly decry Pakistan's efforts towards weaponization and
indicated that India would reconsider its own stance on nuclear arms.475 In 1987, in the
wake of the Brasstacks crisis, it was clear that Pakistan had both the necessary material to
construct a nuclear device and had derived significant benefits from Chinese assistance in
supplying "weapons designs, components, and technology for fissile material
production.,,476 In addition to this sustained nuclear cooperation, China has staunchly
supported Pakistan from the early 1960's in terms ofKashmir as well as supplying
conventional weaponry.477 In short, the relatively constant Chinese military assistance to
Pakistan has been occurring for decades.478
Even during times of extreme crisis, such as in 1983, 1987 or 1990 when India
and Pakistan were engaged in armed conflict over the Kashmir border disputes, India did
not overtly demonstrate its nuclear capability. Indeed, India was much more insecure in
the sense that there was active shooting during the 1987 and 1990 crisis that was absent
in 1998, so immediate security concerns do not seem to have been a motivating factor in
474 Sidhu, "India's Nuclear Use Doctrine," 133.
475 Spector, The Undeclared Bomb, 85.
476 Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb, 37.
477 Mark W. Frazier, "China-India Relations Since Pokhran II: Assessing Sources of Conflict and
Cooperation," Access Asia Review 3, no. 2 (July 2000), 16.
478 Kapur suggestes that Chinese assistance to Pakistan is an indicator that China is reluctant to overtly
threaten India with its nuclear capability and has thus contributed to an opaque nuclear stance in India.
Kapur, "Nuclear Development of India and Pakistan".
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the tests. Even in 1994 when Pakistan's former Prime Minister Sharifdeclared the
Pakistan possessed an atomic bomb,479 India did not publicly reveal that fact that it had
successfully mated warheads to missiles.48o Deterrence optimists further suggest that
nuclear deterrence, albeit in existential form until 1998, has been successfully operating
in South Asia since the 1987 Brasstacks Crisis and has been a plausible factor in
dampening conventional crisis between India and Pakistan.481
In terms of the Ghauri test in 1998, some suggest that this was a turning point for
Indian decision makers as it had surprised the Indians that Pakistan was as advanced as it
was in its missile development and could now reach targets deep within India.482
However, for this single missile test to be an immediate cause of the tests in May 1998
ignores the years of missile testing Pakistan had already conducted, the ability to drop
bombs from airplanes, nuclear threats tendered by Pakistan during the 1987 and 1990
crises, as well as the fact that the Indian test shafts had already been prepared for years.
Indeed, there is also some inconclusive evidence that suggests that Vajpayee ordered the
479 Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington
D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Special Studies, 1995), 192.
480 There is also the question of whether India really believed that Pakistan had a functional nuclear
deterrent leading up to the tests. From 1987 until Pakistan's tests in 1998, some Indian leaders consistently
downp1ayed whether or not Pakistan even had the nuclear capabilities that they suggested they did. Arnett,
"Nuclear Tests by India and Pakistan," 380. Whether these statements were for public consumption or
were truly believed is unknown.
481 Devin T. Hagerty, "The Power of Suggestion: Opaque Proliferation, Existential Deterrence, and the
South Asian Nuclear Arms Competition," in The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread and
What Results, Zackary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel, eds. (Portland: Frank Cass & Co., 1993); Reiss,
Bridled Ambition, 184-185; and Saira Khan, Nuclear Proliferation Dynamics in Protracted Conflict
Regions: A Comparative Study of South Asia and the Middle East (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2002).
482 Cirincione, Deadly Arsenals.
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tests prior to the Ghauri missile test,483 and seemed to actually be disappointed that the
nuclear tests would be seen as a response to Pakistan's move.484 In short, while the
missile tests remain an important component in Indian defense calculations, as has been
the case historically, they do not seem to be so significant as to be the primary reason for
the tests in May.
In conventional military terms, India continued to outstrip Pakistan significantly
from 1989-1998, averaging 7.99 billion U.S. dollars per year compared to Pakistan's rate
at 3.02 billion per year.485 These figures are even more telling when one considers that,
on average, for the same time period, India could afford to spend 2.53% of its GDP for
military expenditures and Pakistan, with its economy teetering on disaster, was spending
6.17% respectively.486 Moreover, most of U.S. conventional assistance to Pakistan was
halted in 1990 when the U.S. no longer certified Pakistan's nuclear program under the
Pressler Amendment. This led Pakistan to increasingly rely on Chinese conventional
arms, which were lagging technologically to the advanced conventional weapons systems
that India was able to acquire from virtually every major arms supplier worldwide.487 In
short, India was quantitatively and qualitatively outstripping Pakistan in conventional
483 Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb.
484 Chengappa, Weapons of Peace.
485 Averages are calculated from the SIPRI Yearbook 1999 South Asia estimates on military expenditures.
ForIndia, during 1997 and 1998, military expenditures actually reached 9.1% and 9.8% respectively.
Elisabth Skons, Agnes Courades Allebeck, Evamaria Loose-Weintraub, and Petter Stalenheim, "Military
Expenditure," in Armaments. Disarmament and International Security, Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute, compo (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999),284.
486 Skons, et. aI., "Military Expenditure," 284.
487 Arnett, "Nuclear Tests by India and Pakistan," 377.
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tenns while still being able to keep from ruining its economy. According to the logic of
insecurity leading to nuclear testing, Pakistan, not India, should have conducted the tests
first.
Similarly, the military threat from China was less in 1998 than in previous times.
Since 1988, India and China have sought to stabilize regional relations through a series of
military and security dialogues and the implementation of regional confidence building
measures. These measures were initiated during Rajiv Gandhi's tenure as Prime Minister
and part of a larger concern for nonnalized relations with India's northern neighbor.488
These efforts have included high level visits between Indian and Chinese leaders,
including three Prime Minister meetings from 1987-1993 and again in 1996, as well as a
series of confidence-building measures in implemented 1993 and more in 1996, in order
to maintain bolster peace along the Lines of Control in the border dispute between China
and India.489 Moreover, from a military standpoint, India has not acted as if China were a
threat in any other way.490 The reality is that both China and India have actually reduced
the number of forces on each side of the border disputes during the 1990s.491
488 Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon, 143.
489 Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon, 144. India and China have also discussed 'resisting U.S. hegemony' as
a reason for further cooperation, while the United States has considered India an important counter balance
to China in Asia. Moreover, India's nuclear posture resembles that of China during the 1960s where it has
sought to define its own role in the international system outside of the external constraints facing it. See
Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon, 150-153, for lessons learned by India for China's strategy to manage as an
up and coming power.
490 Eric Arnett, "What Threat?" The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 53, no. 2 (March 1997-April 1997),
details the lack of threat both states pose to each other and the fact that their military postures reflect this
reality.
491 Hilary Synnott, The Causes and Consequences of South Asia's Nuclear Tests, 16.
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Additionally, during the 1990s, both sides sought to increase bilateral trade as well,
resulting in $1,094 billion U.S. dollars in combined imports and exports in 1995, to reach
$7,543 billion in 2003.492 Compared to the total bilateral trade in 1990 at $49 million,
Sino-Indian trade has exploded in the last decade.493 Consistent with these efforts, Indian
elite public opinion seemed also to view China as a lesser threat in 1998, with only 20
percent concerned about security threats from China.494
Gains in the relationship were somewhat disrupted when India listed China as the
primary security factor in its decision to test in 1998, but in all reality the response of the
Chinese government was both muted and it largely refrained from instituting economic
sanctions.495 Following the tests, India and China have been able to solidify and
strengthen the gains they made prior to the tests. In 1999, China refused to side with
Pakistan during the Kargil crisis and by 2000, most ofthe previous dialogue efforts
between the two countries had resumed.496 This is not to say that India and China do not
eye each other with a certain amount of suspicion regarding each other's future regional
aspirations or weapons modernization programs, and India has continued to feel that
492 Figures compiled from the Asian Development Bank, "Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific
Countries," accessed March 2005,
http://www.adb.orglDocumentslBookslKey_Indicators/2004/pdf/IND.pdf.
493 Figures compiled from the Asian Development Bank, "Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific
Countries."
494 Cortright and Mattoo, India and the Bomb, 12. Fifty-seven percent did consider a nuclear Pakistan to be
a security threat. Ibid.
495 Frazier, "China-India Relations Since Pokhran II," 16.
496 Frazier, "China-India Relations Since Pokhran II" 16.
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Chinese treatment has bordered on contemptuous.497 However, these potential long-term
threats are not immediate security concerns that would lead India to test in 1998.498
b) Loss of Soviet Support
The second cause for Indian security concerns was the uncertainty arising from
the end of the Cold War and India losing an important military and political ally with the
collapse of the Soviet Union. As Russia sought to warm relations with the West while
grappling with economic and political collapse, the traditional relationship between India
and Russia was in question. Most important from the Indian standpoint, its ongoing
military relationship with Russia was in jeopardy. The Russian defense establishment
was in such financial and political disarray that it was unable to provide spare parts and
other materials to the Indian military. The result was that India lost a significant source
of conventional weaponry, which had been provided in conjunction with generous
purchasing terms since the 1960s.499
Yet, this was not the first time that the Indian's had been vulnerable to receiving
its weapons in a timely manner from their primary supplier and they had previously
opened up other defense channels prior to this crisis that they could rely on. Mainly,
during the 1980s India sought to widen the range of states it purchased weapons from as
497 Hilary Synnott, The Causes and Consequences of South Asia's Nuclear Tests, 16.
498 Dipankar Banetjee, "The New Strategic Environment," in India's Nuclear Deterrent: Pokhran II and
Beyond, Amitabh Mattoo, ed. (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications PVT LTD, 1999), 272-273, similarly
notes that the Indian security environment was relatively benign in 1998. This does not eliminate the
possibility that Indian leaders misperceived this balance, but the arguments centered on security point to a
real threat, not misperception.
499 Both the former Soviet Union and India had minimal trade ties outside of defense related issues.
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well as increasing indigenous efforts, given concerns about Soviet reliability as well as
avoiding the pitfalls of being too dependent on their supp1ier.soo During the transition
time, India simply relied on these other sources and its own indigenous capability to
provide for its conventional needs. Further, despite the upheaval at the beginning of the
1990s, by the mid-1990s Russia and India had resumed their former arms relationship in
which India was able to purchase a full range of advanced weapons system.501 Indeed,
given Russia's need for hard currency and to keep its defense industry going, Indian
acquisitions outstripped what the Russian military itself was capable ofpurchasing given
the post-Cold War environment,s02
Arguably another potential way that the Indian-Russian relationship was
threatened was based on U.S. non-proliferation efforts. Post-Cold War Russia, in an
effort to make much needed economic reforms became extremely susceptible the U.S.
influences. To this end, the United States pressured the Russian government in the early
1990s to stop the sale to India of space-based components, namely cryogenic engines,
which would enable India to build intercontinental ballistic missiles. Initially, Russia
under pressure, reneged on the deal with India. Ultimately, however India and Russia
were able to forge a new strategic partnership in which Russia went ahead with the
500 Sidhu, Enhancing Indo-US Strategic Cooperation, 40.
501 Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon, 128.
502 Deepa Ollapally, "Indo-Russian Strategic Relations: New Choices and Constraints," in India As An
Emerging Power, Sumit Ganguly, ed. (Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003),143-144.
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cryogenic .engines sale against U.S. wishes and Indian and Russia maintained their
strategic relationship in a similar vein as with the conventional weapons.S03
Moreover, India and Russia have agreed to various technology transfers and have
planned to work together in the future on joint development projects. S04 SO, in all
actuality, not only was India was able to shore up its relationship with Russia by 1994,
but the Indian's were also able to find further avenues of cooperative development that
reassured India's longstanding partnership with Russia. For these reasons, it seems
unlikely that post Cold War insecurity vis-a.-vis India's relationship with Russia was a
significant factor in Indian calculations for testing. Rather, ongoing Russian cooperation
was stabilized, expected and politically helpful for India to weather the wrath of the
United States post testing.
c) U.S. Non-Proliferation Pressures
The third security consideration, and the one often given the most weight by
scholars, is related to the significant increase in United States non-proliferation pressures
during the 1990s as it sought the permanent renewal of the NPT and support for the
CTBT. The general argument is that non-proliferation efforts undertaken by the United
States pressured India so much, that it actually backfired by compelling "India to come
out of the closet and declare itself a nuclear weapon state."sos Similarly, Indian scholars
and government officials have attributed significant weight to U.S. actions as forcing
503 Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon, 128.
504 Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon, 128.
505 Paul and Nayar, India in the World Order, 86.
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India to forgo its nuclear option and pushing it into the open based on the tightening of
non-proliferation regime. 506
With the renewal of the NPT in 1995 and pressures to sign the CTBT, these
factors together significantly fueled India's concerns that its window of opportunity to
become a nuclear power was rapidly shutting. India was loath to sign these agreements
as they would permanently categorize India as a "non-nuclear weapon" state and limit its
ability to further develop its nuclear capability without going against the terms of the
obligations. The pressure to join the NPT was heightened when two longstanding
holdouts, France and China signed the NPT and it was extended indefinitely with little
resistance in 1995.
Further, the momentum was building for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in
1996, which would prohibit the option of further physical tests in the future. This treaty
was particularly distressing to the Indians, whom had not continued testing up to and
through the 1990s as the five 'declared' states had, and thus, did not have a database with
which to conduct further test simulations. Moreover, some Indians were concerned with
the language of a treaty, which, even if not signed by India, would be 'universalized' if
enough countries ratified it and its terms would be applicable to all countries.507 As
Talbott explained, the effects of 'universalizing' the treaty for India would make "the test
ban applicable to all countries, whether they join the treaty or not - thereby foreclosing
506 Jasjit Singh, "Why Nuclear Weapons" in Singh, Defending India.
507 It is doubtful that this would be 'legal' in the sense ofintemationallaw, but the precedent would be set
that other countries would be bound to stop testing.
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India's option of further testing and consigning India forever to a kind of purgatory in the
eyes of the rest of the world for its refusal to sign the NPT and CTBT.,,508
It is true that during the 1990s India was under increased nuclear non-proliferation
pressures. However, these pressures seem to be a weak explanatory factor leading up to
the tests in 1998 for several reasons. First, India has been subject to U.S. non-
proliferation efforts for most of its nuclear development and especially after 1974. It is
unclear why these efforts during the 1990s were significantly more threatening to India in
general and specifically why they were still threatening in 1998 when India actually
tested. India had already 'ridden out' the 1995 permanent extension to the NPT and had
publicly voted against signing the CTBT in 1996. What these events suggest is that India
had faced more non-proliferation pressure 1994-1996 than it did when it actually tested.
Additionally, at the height of U.S. efforts to get support for the CTBT, there was some
belief in the Indian government early on that the CTBT would not receive universal
support in the long run. 509 This prediction was later proven accurate when the treaty
stalled in the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1997.510 Iflndia was seeking
to "break free" from the existing nuclear order, it seems that it should have done so when
the pressure was the most intense and when it could have undermined the non-
proliferation regime. However, this clearly was not the case.
508 Talbott, Engaging India, 36.
509 Sidhu, Enhancing Indo-US Strategic Cooperation, 30.
510 Shannon Kile, "Nuclear Arms Control and Non-Proliferation," in SIPRI 1999 Yearbook: Armaments,
Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999),528.
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Further, not only has India been subject to U.S. non-proliferation pressures in the
past, but there is no indication that the U.S. was particularly threatening as it sought to
gain support for the treaties. Indeed, in India's case, the opposite claim can be made. As
previously discussed, the U.S. had shifted from seeking to have India stop its nuclear
development and 'rollback' progress to halting further development. In 1994, before the
NPT came up for review in 1995, there were already signals on Washington's part that if
India would 'cap' its current development, the U.S. could live with an opaque nuclear
India.511 This stance was further entrenched in 1995 when U.S. Defense Secretary
William Perry visited India acknowledged that they had a nuclear capability, but did not
push the issue.512 Consistent with this policy, India and the U.S. actually seemed to have
worked out a deal that India would not stand in the way of the CTBT if the U.S. let up on
denuclearization pressure for India.513 Further, against the backdrop of non-proliferation,
the fact of the matter is that Indian and U.S. relations continued to significantly improve
during this period and lead to some of the most significant economic and technologic
cooperation that has occurred during the rocky relationship between the two largest
democracies.514
A more likely explanation is that the U.S. leadership knew that India would not
sign either treaty and sought to keep India engaged. In exchange, India did not seek to
511 Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb, 345-346.
512 Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb, 355.
513 Sidhu, Enhancing Indo-US Strategic Cooperation, 30.
514 See Kux for elaboration on other points of contention, in addition to nuclear issues, during the Cold
War.
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unduly thwart the U.S. and undennine the established non-proliferation regime by testing
while the negotiations were going on.515 Instead, testing afterward both made India's
nuclear point while not making it a 'nuclear pariah' because it conducted them at a time
that the U.S. was willing to 'move forward'. Given these issues, it seems that Indian
justifications for testing on basis of non-proliferation pressures were more rhetoric for
public consumption at home where India could be seen as defying the U.S. than based on
the reality of international politics.
In sum, the immediate security justifications provided by scholars and Indian
leaders as reasons motivating the test in 1998 seem to be based more on rhetoric than
facts 'on the ground' and other evidence ofIndian behavior at the time. While India
clearly has long-tenn security motivations for developing nuclear weapons this factor has
remained constant through much of India history. What did change in the 1990s was
India's ability to reach Chinese targets, China's signature on the NPT and CTBT, and the
economic and technological advancements that coincided with a more stable relationship
with the United States. These factors together created conditions conducive to India
changing its nuclear posture that the BJP capitalized on when it came to power.
B. Patron States Incentives: U.S. Lives With a Nuclear India
Leading up to the actual decision to test, during the 1990s, India made important
gains on the economic, technological and international politics stage, and in particular
with the United States, that would enable it to withstand temporary international pressure
515 IfIndia is ever accepted as a nuclear weapons state, it would probably uphold the 'have' versus 'have
not' divide as well and have an interest in preventing further proliferation worldwide.
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while moving forward as a nuclear weapons state. This was the result of Indian strategy
"enmesh" the U.S. and other Western states with India's economy, such that they would
be unwilling to impose punitive measures after India tested again. 516
For most of the decade, Rao's relatively successful efforts at economic reform
through liberalization had increased India's ability to attract foreign investment, spur
domestic growth, and enhance high technology and information systems capabilities.
Bilateral trade between India and the United States also increased substantially during
this period, increasing from $5,329 U.S. billion dollars in 1990 to $8,649 billion U.S.
dollars by 1995.517 These numbers reached $11,252 billion dollars by 1999 and have
continued to increase each year. 518 The United States, whose computer and information-
based economy was growing rapidly, understandably remained India's preferred source
of advanced technology. Enhancing these areas of cooperation were Indian immigrants
who were rising in economic and political influence in the United States.519 Given this
important voting demographic, many of these entrepreneurs were able to further
encourage economic ties based on computer and technology advancements between the
U.S. and India.52o The economic results of these measures led the World Bank
516 Kamad, Nuclear Weapons & Indian Security, 371.
517 As a point of comparison, bilateral trade in 1985 totaled 3,333. Figures compiled from the Asian
Development Bank, "Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries."
518 Figures compiled from the Asian Development Bank, "Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific
Countries."
519 Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon, 86.
520 Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon, 86.
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considered India one state quickly integrating with the world economy, and the United
States to label India as one of ten Big Emerging Markets.521
As India's relationship with the United States had warmed considerably since the
end of the Cold War, this transition also heralded improved military and defense
cooperation. As one American official indicated in 1995, "US-Indian defense ties are
better now than at any time in the past 30 years."S22 To this end, India and the U.S.
engaged in "modest arms sales and technology transfers, occasional military exercises,
and a limited 'strategic dialogue"S23, all of which signaled improved relations.
Even more significant for Indian nuclear development, the United States appeared
to have made a quiet, but significant shift its stance towards the Indian nuclear weapons
capability. Previously, India was pressured to stop and "rollback" its nuclear
development. While Washington continued to push India to halt fissile material
production, there were signals that the U.S. stance was softening. Of significance, the
U.S. Joint Senate and House Committee decided not to extend the Pressler Amendment
to India, and Senator Pressler remarked that India's nuclear concerns were well taken.524
Instead, Senator Pressler proposed a U.S. sponsored summit between India and Pakistan
to resolve the nuclear issues. India agreed to hold talks with the U.S. regarding nuclear
proliferation, notwithstanding criticisms from opposition parties charging that the Indian
521 Sidhu, Enhancing Indo-US Strategic Cooperation, 12.
522 Bruce O. Riedel in 1995 to Congressional House, Committee on International Relations. Quoted in
Arnett, "Nuclear Tests by India and Pakistan," 376.
523 Tellis, India's Emerging Nuclear Posture, 82.
524 "India, Pakistan Summit to Resolve Nuclear Issue Suggested by US Senator," Xinhua General Overseas
News Service, 11 January 1992, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http;llweb.lexis-nexis.com.
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government had succumbed to U.S. pressure. 525 The announcement of the talks was
made at the same time as it was confirmed that the U.S. and India would conduct joint
naval exercises in the Indian Ocean for the first time.526
Further, the Clinton administration desired to engage rather than isolate India, and
even though it continued to press for non-proliferation in South Asia, it also seemed to
recognize that India's nuclear progress would not be subject to a 'rolling back' of
capabi1ities.527 That is, for the first time, the U.S. seemed to be willing to live with an
opaque nuclear posture on India's part. For example, allegedly the Rao government told
the U.S. that India would test by the end of 1993, but was told by U.S. officials that India
should do what it wanted, but should not inform Washington beforehand because then the
u.s. government would be compelled to try to stop the tests.528 In a much less direct
manner, Talbott argues that in 1995 as the U.S. sought to engage India in strategic
dialogue, "the United States was making a concession of its own: by proposing the
discussions, our government was tacitly signaling a willingness to live with India's and
Pakistan's undeclared, untested, but undisputed nuclear capabilities rather than insisting
on their formal accession to the NPT.,,529 Further, by 1998, just before the tests, the U.S.
525 David Housego, "Indians Shift Stance on N-Weapons," Financial Times, 17 March 1992; Sanjoy
Hazarika "India Moves to Improve Relations with US," International Herald Tribune, 16 March 1992.
526 HOllsego, "Indians Shift Stance on N-Weapons;" Hazarika "India Moves to Improve Relations with US."
527 C. Raja Mohan, "Fostering Strategic Stability and Promoting Regional Cooperation," in Engaging India:
US Strategic Relations With the World's Largest Democracy, Gary K. Bertsch, Seema Gahluat, and
Anupam Srivestava, eds. (New York: Routledge, 1999),28.
528 Karnad, Nuclear Weapons & Indian Security, 370.
529 Talbott, Engaging India, 33.
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assistant secretary of state for South Asian affairs, Karl Inderfurth, while still urging
restraint, noted that India's weapons program was based on "very real national security
concems.,,530
While such statements clearly are not an endorsement of an overt Indian nuclear
weapons posture, they were perceived by some India's as the United States finally
understanding Indian reasons for proliferation, something that had previously been
lacking from U.S. foreign policy rhetoric.53 ! Cohen reports that some Indian leaders
thought that the nuclear issue was "no longer a critical issue" and that ifIndia tested
sooner than later, it would be able to mend relations in time for Clinton to still visit
India. 532 Even more significant for Indian calculations, prior to the tests in 1998, and
shortly after Vajpayee came to power, Clinton did not bring up the nuclear issue directly,
not wanting to 'lecture' Vajpayee on the issue.533
The lack of direct diplomatic pressure on Vajpayee could have reinforced the
perception that the U.S. was prepared to live with a nuclear India. This is not to entirely
530 Quoted in Virginia 1. Foran, "Indo-US Relations After the 1998 Tests: Sanctions Versus Incentives," in
Engaging India: US Strategic Relations With the World's Largest Democracy, Gary K. Bertsch, Seema
Gahlaut, and Anupam Srivestava, eds. (New York: Routledge, 1999),54.
531 How much the U.S. stance shifted is open for debate. Under Clinton, the U.S. was clearly interested in
engaging India. However, some scholars have suggested that some Indian leaders engaged in 'wishful'
thinking that the U.S. had changed its stance towards Indian nuclear development. Consistent with this,
there were a number of high level officials that appeared surprised by U.S. reactions to the tests and the
subsequent imposition of sanctions. Regardless, Vajpayee, who was ultimately responsible for the tests,
seemed to have correctly understood that both the U.S. would impose sanctions, but really did not want to,
which increased the propensity for India to ride out the sanctions and still be able to declare itself a nuclear
power.
532 Cohen, "Why Did India "Go Nuclear"?" 30. If one accepts the U.S. was putting less non-proliferation
pressure on India, one potential reason for this is that India will be better able to balance China in the
future, an idea that the U.S. toyed with in the early 1960s just prior to the first Chinese nuclear explosion.
533 Talbott, Engaging India.
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discount that U.S. non-proliferation efforts to bring India as source of friction during the
1990s, or on that, the other hand, that some Indian leaders might have engaged in
'wishful' thinking that the an overt nuclear posture on India's behalf would ignored by
the U.S. However, as the above evidence indicates, India had gained several political
advantages that would help it weather the storm of testing even ifit could not entirely
avert it.534
Despite a number ofpositive trends for India in the 1990s, Vajpayee was still
concerned over how to best manage U.S. reactions to testing in order to minimize
economic recriminations. Some members of the BlP wanted to take a hard line and ride
out the sanctions without negotiating with the U.S., but Vajpayee decided to forgo further
testing that had been planned535 in order to re-engage the United States. He argued that,
"India had made its point - now it should set about mending relations as much as possible
with a country that was key to India's integration into the world economy.,,536
Reportedly, Vajpayee projected that with some diplomatic efforts on India's
behalf, the worst would be over six months past the test and that the Indian economy
would be able to withstand sanctions for up to a year. 537 In order to do this, immediately
after the test, India imposed a voluntary moratorium on future tests, saying that they
534 Another positive development for India is that it was able to stabilize political relations with China and
Pakistan to some extent in the early 1990s. There was a significant crisis between India and Pakistan in
1990 as Pakistani militants continued to cross the line of control in Kashmir. This was the last "major
crisis" until the 1999 Kargil Crisis, after the weapons were tested.
535 See Tellis, India's Emerging Nuclear Posture, footnote, 93.
536 Talbott, Engaging India, 74.
537 Chengappa, Weapons of Peace, 48.
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would comply 'with the spirit' of the CTBT, as well as entertain negotiations on the
(FMCT). Additionally, India sent Jaswant Singh, the Indian Foreign Minister, to engage
in high-level talks with Strobe Talbott, the Deputy Secretary of State for the next year
and a half. Singh indicated that the talks were based on efforts to "engage with the great
powers much more purposefully and productively" than in the past. 538 For its part, the
United States justified the talks as a way to engage rather than isolate India after the tests.
To minimize the economic ramifications of the test, India sought to limit the
effects and duration of sanctions by pushing through further economic liberalization
measures, in particular to draw in foreign multinational investment. These efforts were
designed in part to influence U.S. politics by suggesting to U.S. corporations that they
would not be able to cash in these measures if the U.S. maintained sanctions.539 Further,
by naming China as the main security reason to test, India also sought to capitalize on the
powerful anti-China lobby in order to divide U.S. opinion and "soften the blow of
sanctions.,,54o As it turns out, these calculations largely bore out, with some U.S.
sanctions only lasting a few months and all of them were lifted after three and a half
years.
The Clinton Administration, for its part, was required by Congressional statute to
levy sanctions, but was clearly loath to do so. In particular, the administration argued
that the U.S. had welcomed India's efforts to liberalize its economic policy and
"sanctions were considered unhelpful at a time when Washington was calling on the
538 Singh quoted in Hilary Synnott, The Causes and Consequences of South Asia's Nuclear Tests, 34.
539 "Who's Afraid of the BJP?," Economist 346, no. 8062 (April 1998).
540 Chengappa, Weapons ofPeace, 49.
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Indian Government to renew its commitment to reform.,,541 For these reasons, the
Clinton administration sought from the beginning to modify portions of the Glenn
Amendment and grant the president some flexibility in both implementing the sanctions
and ability to remove them. This effort led to the 1999 the Brownback Amendment
passed in the U.S. Congress, which restored monies for military training and firms doing
business in India.542 With the sanctions enduring for a relatively short time,543 given the
general lack of U.S. and international support, the direct effects of the sanctions were
rather limited.544 Indeed, not only did the sanctions have a marginal economic effect in
the short term, but actually enabled the BJP to argue persuasively that further economic
liberalization measures were needed and thus in the long run may have served a positive
economic function within India.545 Ongoing relations have continued to strengthen
between India and the United States since George W. Bush entered office. With
President Bush's clear reluctance to promote international institutions, he has also largely
541 Ian Anthony and Elisabeth M. French, "Non-Cooperative Responses to Proliferation: Multilateral
Dimensions," in SIPRI Yearbook 1999: Armaments. Disarmament and International Security (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1999), 682.
542 Prem Shankar Jha, "The Indian Economy After Pokhran II," in India's Nuclear Security, Raju G. C.
Thomas and Amit Gupta, eds. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 223.
543 By September 2001 and U.S. concerns regarding the "War on Terror" all sanctions related to the 1998
nuclear tests were lifted on both India and Pakistan. Most had been lifted prior to this event for India.
544 Jha, "The Indian Economy After Pokhran II,", 221. Certainly, India has economic issues to manage;
however, the sanctions only exacerbated the situation, but were not the source of these difficulties, Jha
finds.
545 Devesh Kapur, "The Domestic Consequences ofIndia's Nuclear Tests," in Nuclear India in the Twenty-
First Century, D. R. SarDesai and Raju G. C. Thomas, eds. (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 240. India was
also not affected as much as the other Southeast Asian states by the 1997 economic crisis.
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avoided the issue of India and the topic ofnon-proliferation.546 In short, Vajpayee and
the BJP were correct when they calculated that the "West would get used to a nuclear
India and learn to live with it.,,547
c. Non-Proliferation Regime Lack of Response
India had already rejected the main non-proliferation agreements prior to testing.
Moreover, given the relative lack of response by other states in the international
community, the idea that India has restrained its nuclear ability based on material and
normative pressures by the larger international non-proliferation regime seems weak.
Prior to the test in May 1998, non-proliferation scholars suggested that, "although the
international community has tolerated 'nuclear ambiguity' in India and Pakistan, it likely
would react harshly if either country tested a weapon, openly declared that is possessed
nuclear weapons or deployed nuclear arms.,,548 Yet, clearly this prediction was false.
It is true that in addition to the United States implementing sanctions, Canada,
Japan, the UK and Australia followed suit. However, as previously noted, the U.S.
sought relatively early in the process to derail the harshest of its own domestic sanctions.
Of the other states, Japan's development aid at 1.2 billion dollars was the most significant
loss to India, but even in this circumstance Japan did not restrict trade or other private
546 Robert M. Hathaway, "The US-India Courtship: From Clinton to Bush," in India As An Emerging
Power, Sumit Ganguly, ed. (Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003),10-12.
547 Thomas and Gupta, India's Nuclear Security, 6.
548 Reiss, Bridled Ambition, 208.
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investment with India.549 Similarly, the United Kingdom was less than enthusiastic about
full sanctions and joined France in questioning the utility of applying punitive measures
after the fact. 550 Canada and Australia, while withdrawing some forms of support for
development loans, largely signaled that they preferred engagement to sanctions as
well.55! In short, the efforts to impose sanctions were in all reality a symbolic protest
over India's decision to 'go nuclear' but were not designed to force India to rollback or
dismantle its capabilities.
Moreover, France and Russia were actually very quiet in their reproach of India.
Together, they opposed sanctions from the outset and made it clear that they would
continue already established defense ties.552 In public, France was more 'understanding'
ofIndia's nuclear choices and sought to lessen the international reaction of other states
that implemented sanctions.553 Further, within weeks of the 1998 tests, France and India
sought to engage in strategic dialogue and have continued to cooperate on a range of
military and security issues.554 For its part, Russia was offended, not because of the tests,
but because India had not warned their traditional political and military ally in advance
549 Jha, "The Indian Economy After Pokhran II,", 221. Kapur, "The Domestic Consequences of India's
Nuclear Tests,", 246.
550 Kile, "Nuclear Arms Control and Non-Proliferation," 522.
551 Anthony and French, "Non-Cooperative Responses to Proliferation: Multilateral Dimensions," 684.
552 Hilary Synnott, The Causes and Consequences of South Asia's Nuclear Tests, 30.
553 For ongoing French and Indian cooperation, see Jean-Luc Racine, "The Indo-French Strategic Dialogue:
Bilateralism and World Perceptions," in India As An Emerging World Power, Sumit Ganguly, ed.
(Portland: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003).
554 Racine, "The Indo-French Strategic Dialogue: Bilateralism and World Perceptions".
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that it would test. Still, the day after the first tests at Pokhran, Russia started voicing
opposition to the idea of implementing sanctions.555 Moreover, the Indian tests did not
hinder the cooperation between Russia and India regarding conventional weapons and in
fact, following the tests, Russia sought a closer relationship with India in which they have
begun exploring joint military and technical cooperation and development.556
Even more interesting, Chinese reactions were fairly mute initially and China
indicated that it would not seek sanctions against India.55? The relatively low-key initial
response by China changed to a sharp outcry after the Indian letter to President Clinton
identified China as the primary security risk to India, rather than Pakistan, and thus a
reason for the tests. However, when the Chinese rhetoric became more strident, India
dispatched diplomatic missions immediately to salvage a decade of closer relations and in
the end China chose to continue to oppose material recriminations for the tests.
In short, given the summary of the international community's response, India
correctly calculated that the United States was the primary concern in responding to its
test. In addition to wanting to keep India engaged, the international non-proliferation
regime at large also has difficulty in justifying the use of sanctions against a state that has
refused to agree to the standards it has sought to perpetuate. In this sense, it is unrealistic
to expect the main tools of the non-proliferation regime, international treaties, to be a
significant source of pressure on India as it has chosen to remain outside of most of these
555 Hilary Synnott, The Causes and Consequences of South Asia's Nuclear Tests, 30.
556 Anthony and French, "Non-Cooperative Responses to Proliferation: Multilateral Dimensions," 688.
557 Anthony quotes Chinese officials indicating their disinterest in sanctions. Anthony and French, "Non-
. Cooperative Responses to Proliferation: Multilateral Dimensions," 681.
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frameworks such as the NPT that would hinder its ability to 'legally' acquire nuclear
weapons. Together, these points suggest that U.S. foreign policy, rather than the non-
proliferation regime, has been a more significant constraint on Indian opaque nuclear
development.
D. Domestic Politics: The BJP
The first explanation, consistent with explaining the 1974 nuclear test, is that
Vajpayee came to power on a nationalist platfonn with the BJP party that included the
induction ofnuclear weapons. The second explanation emphasizes India's general
restraint in publicly acknowledging its capabilities throughout the course of its nuclear
development and suggests that India's leaders have traditionally held moral and ethical
reservations against relying on nuclear weapons for state security. In order to explain the
tests in 1998, this explanation argues that India's gradually shifting political culture has
increasingly embraced an overt nuclear posture, supporting a Prime Minister that did not
have the same moral reservations as other leaders in Indian history.
This study finds that while domestic calculations do playa role in infonning
Indian nuclear motivations, they are less compelling as explanatory factors than the
economic and regional factors in infonning India's largely opaque nuclear posture
through 1998 and the subsequent decision to test. The domestic political impetus from
Vajpayee and the BJP can explain the timing of the test, but it was neither a necessary nor
sufficient factor as the history suggests. Rather, all Indian leaders made decisions that led
India towards a nuclear weapons capability. And while Vajpayee was willing to bear the
costs of going nuclear that the opposition party candidates may not have undertaken,
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Indian leaders likely would have chosen to test in the future as well. This estimate is
based on the increased willingness for Indian Prime Ministers to revisit the testing option
and the development of India's long-range delivery capabilities during the 1990s. Both
domestic level perspectives and associated critiques are addressed below, as well as the
BJPs willingness to invoke the costs from testing.
1. Public Support for Testing, Vajpayee and the BJP in 1996 & 1998
The development of a nuclear capability in India, both as a security buffer against
Pakistan and to demonstrate Indian scientific and technical development, generally
receives widespread political support from the domestic population at large. Proponents
ofthe domestic politics argument suggest that this factor played an important role in
Indira Gandhi's decision to test in 1974, and again in 1998 when Vajpayee sought to
implement the nuclear platform the BJP came to power on. Both governments were
relatively weak and in the case of the BJP, its leaders had made campaign promises that it
would 'induct' India's nuclear weapons capabilities. Nonetheless, the BJP did not test on
first coming to power. This suggests that Vajpayee was not immune to the same
constraints other Indian leaders considered.
While Indira Gandhi and the Congress Party were responsible for the first nuclear
test, ongoing domestic problems largely removed the nuclear issue from public purview
until the BJP brought it to the forefront again during the 1990s in their bid for electoral
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votes.558 Then, in 1998 as Ata1 Behari Vajpayee and the BJP came to power on shaky
coalitional politics and a decidedly nationalist platform, for the first time since 1974 India
conducted a series of nuclear tests and Vajpayee formally declared India a nuclear
weapons state. Given the fact that during the 1990s, three different governments
considered testing, but only the BJP did so, has led some to argue that, "the political party
in power appears to have been a critical variab1e.,,559
As previously discussed, there was some precedent for the decision taken by
Vajpayee as in 1996, when he came to power for a short two week stint for the first time,
he appeared to have ordered the tests to be conducted then. This decision appears to have
been largely politically motivated. Not only would it provide attention to the BJP, which
had a tenuous hold on power, but also would show that the BJP did what it had said it
would do when it came to power.560 While Vajpayee immediately ordered the tests after
coming into office, as previously discussed, the logistical difficulties in conducting the
tests as well as direct pressure from the United States caused him to call of the tests until
a propitious time in 1998. Finally, after just thirteen days in office, the BJP lost the vote
of confidence to form a government and the testing would not occur until 1998.
While similar in many ways to the 1996 attempted but failed nuclear policy shift,
in 1998 the BJP was more successful in bringing India's nuclear capabilities to the
forefront by authorizing and ultimately carrying out a series of nuclear tests. When
558 Technically the nuclear issue became part of the BJP's platform in 1985, but they had so little electoral
success given their rather extreme brand of Hindu nationalism that it was not an issue. Chengappa,
Weapons of Peace, 39.
559 Joeck, "Nuclear Developments in India and Pakistan," 12.
560 Chengappa, Weapons of Peace, 31.
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Vajpayee came to power as Prime Minister in March 1998, he was again facing the
challenges of fractional parliamentary politics. Arguably, Vajpayee was even more
determined to carry out the nuclear tests this time around as this was likely the only
policy of the BJPs nationalist campaign platform that it would be able to carry through.
Given the political necessity of cooperating with the other parties and compromising
other more extremist Hindutva policies, the BJP had already abandoned several other
campaign promises.56! The nuclear tests were thus necessary in order to assure the
voters who had supported the BJP during the elections.562 In short, as Hagerty argues,
"no previous government had ever staked its political life on restoring the Indian people
to national greatness, at least not to the extent that the BJP had in its campaign
rhetoric .. .In India today, there are very few votes to be found in a posture of dovishness
on the nuclear issue.,,563
To this end, immediately after being sworn into office, Vajpayee told the
scientists to prepare for the tests. He was able to order the tests with relative autonomy
from the other political parties given the highly closed nature of nuclear decision-making
in India. That is, the Prime Minister in conjunction with a few advisors determines
nuclear policy and on this particular issue, Vajpayee did not have to get permission from
the other coalitions. Within this highly closed group, the scientists were clearly lobbying
for testing, arguing that India's nuclear option would be permanently closed both by the
561 Although, unlike during 1996, the BJP was likely to be in office for a year, making the issue of testing
quickly a lesser imperative for gaining needed votes. Cohen, "Why Did India "Go Nuclear"?" 29.
562 Hilary Synnott, The Causes and Consequences of South Asia's Nuclear Tests, 19.
563 Hagerty, "South Asia's Big Bangs: Causes, Consequences, and Prospects," 21.
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international non-proliferation regime and losing scientists to other programs. As a final
push towards the tests, in the first week in April, Pakistan tested its Ghauri missile.
Arguably, the Pakistani missile test, which was capable of reaching deep within India
with a nuclear warhead, ratcheted-up the domestic pressure on Vajpayee to respond by
declaring India's nuclear weapons capability.
a) Lack of U.S. Pressure
Additionally, Vajpayee, either by design or because a decision had not been truly
made yet regarding a nuclear test, was able to largely avoid direct international pressure.
In particular, direct diplomatic pressure from the U.S. was not applied given Vajpayee's
and the nuclear scientists' ability to keep the preparations secret. As previously
discussed, the United States may have inadvertently sent false signals to India that the
U.S. was willing to ignore India's proliferation in order to better engage India during the
Clinton administration. When Vajpayee came back into power, Clinton did not want to
'lecture' him on nuclear weapons, so he did not bring it up, and Vajpayee, for his part,
"seemed to be treading carefully. In his own public comments, he resorted to a variant of
Indira Gandhi's mantra for two decades earlier about 'keeping all options open' .,,564
In this context, the scientists were instructed to undertake their preparations for
the nuclear tests under extreme secrecy to avoid diplomatic pressure. These measures
included that everyone working on the tests wore fatigues to make them look like military
officials, did much of the work at night and under camouflage to avoid the prying eyes of
564 Talbott, Engaging India, 46.
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u.s. satellites.565 In short, it is unclear what would have happened if the U.S. had
detected the BJP's preparations, but regardless, the practical implication is that the U.S.
did not employ aggressive diplomacy to stop it as it had in the past.
b) Weighing the Domestic Politics Explanation
While there were several factors affecting the BJPs domestic political calculations
in favor of conducting nuclear tests, the evidence also illustrates that this decision was
neither a foregone conclusion, nor the only political party likely to make the same
decisions. Rather, the historical record suggests that internal and external factors
coincided with the political stance of the BJP that that led to testing.
First, there is not a clear correlation between considering, deciding to test, and the
political party in office. The Congress Party was in power during the 1974 tests, and
again under Indira Gandhi, considered testing in 1980-1984. Similarly, the Congress
Party was again in power from 1991 through 1996 under the leadership ofNarashima
Rao, who strongly considered testing in 1995. During this time, the test sites were kept
in a constant state of prepared and testing seemed imminent until the U.S. diplomatically
intervened and strongly pressured India to refrain.566 For example, as Talbott recounts
that in December of 1995, U.S. satellites detected activity at the Pokhran site and sent
Frank Wisner to India to warn that the United States would sanction India under the
Glenn amendment, and put additional pressure on by Clinton placing a followed up by a
565 Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb and Chengappa, Weapons of Peace both note the extreme secrecy
measures.
566 Tellis, India's Emerging Nuclear Posture, 101.
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phone call reiterating the United States stance.567 Similarly, the following two United
Front governments under Gowda and Gujral, respectively, also considered testing from
1996-1997, but decided not to based on pressure, even though believing that testing must
ultimately be carried out.568 In short, "[t]he evidence thus suggests that even the
Congress and UF governments - regimes that were unquestionably moderate in their
political inclinations - had contemplated the idea of altering India's nuclear posture and
would probably have done so in the absence ofpressures emanating from the United
States.,,569
Moreover, the Congress Party and the United Front party were mainly responsible
for the series of preparations over the years that allowed the BJP to test. What was
different between previous Indian governments and the BJP was the willingness to draw
attention to the Indian nuclear program while it was still in development. That is, leaders
in both parties agreed with Indian nuclear weapons development generally, what they
disagreed on was when to make this public.570 Opponents argued that "the Vajpayee
government's decision to test only compromised what the country had been secretly
doing all along, and by opening the door to renewed external pressures, actually
567 Talbott, Engaging India, 37.
568 Tellis, India's Emerging Nuclear Posture, 101.
569 Tellis, India's Emerging Nuclear Posture, 101.
570 Within each of the parties themselves there are divides between bomb proponents and opponents.
Cohen, "Why Did India "Go Nuclear"?" 18-19.
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compromised India's ability to continue the covert development of its nuclear
weaponry. ,,571
In terms of the BJP and Vajpayee, both can be traced through historical roots back
to the Jana Sangh Party, which played a significant role in 1977 when the Janata Party
first came to power and considered nuclear testing during its tenure. While it is unclear
from the historical record whether India actually had enough enriched uranium at the
time for further testing, it is recorded that Vajpayee himself, serving as Foreign Minister,
had argued against nuclear weaponization in 1977, believing that India would suffer
internationally for such a decision.572 Vajpayee also reportedly did not agree to testing in
the late 1970s because he did not want to offer any provocation to the Pakistanis.573
Subsequently, the Janata Party fractured with Indira Gandhi's return to power in early
1980, and a nationalist Hindutva lobby formed the BJP. These justifications suggest that
he was aware of the ramifications ofIndia changing its nuclear posture.
In coming to power in 1996, Vajpayee clearly had to weigh other factors in the
decision to test-that is, he was not so intent on declaring India a nuclear weapons state
that he did not carefully calculate the pros and cons of doing so. Indeed, in 1996, it
appeared that the fragile government was likely to fall, and the lack of an installed
government to handle international diplomacy following the tests weighed heavily on his
mind when he decided to postpone the tests. Similarly in 1998, Vajpayee carefully
57\ Tellis, India's Emerging Nuclear Posture, 102.
572Chengappa, Weapons of Peace, 39.
573 Karnad, Nuclear Weapons & Indian Security, 341.
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calculated both anticipated international fallout and how to deal with it best
diplomatically to stave off the worst of likely sanctions. The BJP was in power for six
years following the tests, but did really did not 'push' the nuclear issue during this time
period, but instead sought the mend relations with the world and continue forward. 574
Thus, throughout Indian nuclear development, the decisions between party lines were
remarkably similar, given the fact that many of the same factors ultimately informed
Indian decision-making, as summarized in Figure 3.
Figure 3 - Indian Nuclear Decisions by Political Party
Year Prime Minister Political Party Testing
1974 I. Gandhi Congress Party Conducted
1980-1984 I. Gandhi Congress Party Considered
1995 N.Rao Congress Party Considered
1996 Vajpayee BJP Considered
1998 Vajpayee BJP Conducted
In terms of domestic politics in 1998, Vajpayee was able to conduct the tests with
relatively few advisers and scientists "in the know" and largely out of the purview of his
party, other coalition members and the opposition parties. Given this reality of Indian
politics, and since Vajpayee did not have to gain political consensus from other members
of the coalition, the tests actually caught the other political parties by surprise. This
suggests that much of the leadership within India had not taken much of the BJP's
nuclear rhetoric seriously to realize that Vajpayee was going to test. Additionally, other
574 The BJP lost a significant number of seats in the fall before regaining them again.
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India politicians had traditionally considered Vajpayee to personally be moderated by
both his 'hard' and 'soft views'. 575 And the ability for the BJP to have a more moderate
stance than, for example, the RSS, strengthened its ability to form political alliances and
gamer some political success.576
Vajpayee was also reluctant to fully cash in on the domestic political effects of the
test, for example, refraining from the suggestion by other party members to have sand.
brought in for ceremonies by citing concerns that it might be radioactive.577 He also did
not immediately call for a general election despite the popularity of the test with many
Indian voters.578 Moreover, the basis of the domestic political argument for testing
nuclear weapons rests on public support for a nuclear India, and it is not clear that there
was an increased priority for overtly going nuclear for the BJP to capitalize on.
Historically, Indian public opinion has been tricky for Indian leaders to capitalize on
given the fact that most Indian's generally support an Indian nuclear capabi1ity,579 but
that this priority is far less important than domestic concerns for a poor country.
As early as 1968 Indian leaders were well aware that economic and social
considerations outweighed many India considerations of nuclear weapons. During this
575 Chengappa, Weapons of Peace, 7.
576 Thomas Blom Hansen and Christophe Jaffrelot, eds., The BJP and the Compulsions of Politics In India,
(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998).
577 "Whose Afraid of the BJP?"
578 "Whose Afraid of the BJP?"
579 Itty Abraham links the general support as being based on Indian identity as a postcolonial state seeking
advanced nuclear technology as a mechanism to prove India as an independent nation state. See Abraham,
The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb.
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time period, "Indian public opinion wanted to see the nuclear weapon as part of the
country's 'prestige,' but this attitude was tempered by a sense of realism over the
potential economic costs of such a policy.,,58o Indeed, while the public generally
supported Gandhi's tests in 1974, the political effects quickly faded away and within
months she was back to facing the same political challenges as before the tests.
In a poll conducted by the Indian Institute of Public Opinion in 1980, 70 percent
of the population supported Indian development ofnuclear weapons.581 In another poll
published in 1996, there were similar findings in which the "nuclear issue ranked very
low in salience" - seventh out often issues considered.582 Problems such as
communalism, poverty and economic stability topped the list as being more important
concerns for the Indian public.583 Moreover, this same poll found that the majority of
Indians polled, around 57 percent, actually favored a policy of continued ambiguity
compared to 33 percent that supported weaponization and an overt nuclear posture. 584
This suggests the relatively constant nature of Indian public opinion, in which it broadly
supports a nuclear option, but not at the expense of other priorities. These polls would
seem to indicate also that many voters that elected the BJP did so for reasons other than
their nuclear platform. This is reinforced by the fact that within six months of the test,
580 Dixit, "Status Quo: Maintaining Nuclear Ambiguity," 60.
581 Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb, 230.
582 Cortright and Mattoo, India and the Bomb, 17. Most Indians also felt that there was very little
information available regarding India's nuclear capabilities or policies.
583 Cortright and Mattoo, India and the Bomb, 17.
584 Cortright and Mattoo, India and the Bomb, 11.
345
the BJP actually lost significantly in the state assembly elections in November 1998,
reinforcing a need to scale back extreme Hindu rhetoric while focusing on economic
priorities.585
Another oft cited domestic pressure is from the scientists who had spent their
lives working on India's nuclear capabilities and very much wanted testing in order to
verify the validity of their designs.586 In advancing their arguments, the scientists pointed
to u.s. non-proliferation efforts in the form of the CTBT as potentially closing a window
of opportunity for India to truly become a nuclear power. However, this pressure was
largely in private and was not being waged on a public domestic level that Vajpayee
would have to contend with. Moreover, this pressure has essentially been constant since
the beginning of the nuclear weapons program and there is no indicated that it mounted a
more substantial pressure or the Vajpayee was particularly vulnerable to it. Rather, it did
exist as a reason to factor into the calculations, but was not in and of itself an overriding
factor.
The constant presence of domestic level factors, and the similarities of
calculations made by other parties suggest that decisions for conducting India's nuclear
weapons was strongly affected by other factors than simply the party in power. Also,
Vajpayee was sensitive to many of the external costs that had faced the other parties, but
had the additional benefit of working from a stronger economic basis than most Indian
Prime Ministers and the ability to avoid immediate u.s. diplomatic pressure through
585011apally, "Mixed Motives In India's Search for Nuclear Status," 941.
586 The military has not been involved on any significant level with Indian nuclear development and in fact
has largely been opposed to such efforts for fear of taking away conventional resources.
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strict secrecy. These factors together enabled him to follow through on a previously
contemplated course of action throughout Indian history.
2. Lack of Evidence for Moral Constraint Argument
Additionally, there is little evidence that Indian leaders chose a restrained nuclear
posture in response to their own moral reservations. As illustrated below, even Indian
leaders that opposed the development ofnuclear weapons based on moral reservations
were compelled to make decisions that furthered India's nuclear weapons programs.
There simply is no correlation between leadership behavior and moral stance. For
example, Shastri was a well-know opponent of nuclear weapons and he authorized the
program that would lead to the first nuclear test in 1974. Similarly, during the mid-
1990s, both Prime Ministers Gowda and Gujra1 appeared to have opposed nuclear
weapons on moral grounds, but both authorized additional testing shafts to be
constructed. In short, other factors were informing Indian decision making rather than
personal views on the immorality of nuclear weapons. More likely some leaders
considered opposed to nuclear weapons successfully made convincing arguments that
morality played a role in what was really practical considerations in maintaining a
nuclear option. In short, given the full weight ofIndian nuclear development, there is
little evidence supporting this hypothesis. Figure 4 lists the political and moral stances of
the Indian leadership at critical time periods.
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Figure 4 - Political and Moral Stance of Indian Leadership Regarding Nuclear Decisions
Prime Delivery Moral
Date Minister Political Party Nuclear Development Development Stance
8/15/1947 - Strongly
5/27/1964 Nehru Congress Party Prepare for PNE Opposed
6/9/1964 - Approves subterranean
1/11/1966 Shastri Congress Party nuclear explosion project Opposed
11241966 - Indira 1970 Missile
3124/1977 Gandhi Congress Party 1974 PNE development started Open option
3124/1977 -
7128/1979 Desai Janata Party Refine explosive device Purchased Jaguars Opposed
1979 SLV-3 launched
1/14/1980 - Indira 1980 Nuclear sub
10/31/1984 Gandhi Congress Party 1981 - Clears test shaft study Open option
1983 approves
development of 5
missiles classes
10/31/1984 - Rajiv 1984/85 began work on
12/1/1989587 Gandhi Congress Party thermonuclear weapons Test flights ASLV Opposed
I
Manufacture bomb
components
(weaponization) - 1987 1988 Prithvi test fired
1989 Agni and Nag
tested
6121/1991 -
5/10/1996 Rao Congress Party Test Shafts Prepared Agni test flight Opposed
1992 Prithvi test
Rejected NPT flight
5/16 -
6/1/1996 Vajpayee BJP Started test preparations Open option
6/1/1996 -
4/21/1997 Gowda United Front Voted against CTBT Deployed Prithvi Opposed
Authorized construction
of 2 additional test shafts
4121/1997 - Authorized construction
11/28/1997 Gujral United Front of 6th test shaft Opposed
Awarded Kalam Bharat
RatnaAward
3/19/1998 -
512212004 Vajpayee BJP 1998 tests Trishul missile tested Open option
587 From 1989 to 1991, India had four prime ministers. During this political turmoil, little was done to
change or affect India's nuclear posture.
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IV. Conclusion
Opaque nuclear proliferation has defined the nuclear postures of second-
generation nuclear states, including India, Israel, and Pakistan. In the case of India, as
with Pakistan and Israel, the regional security environment was a compelling reason to
acquire a nuclear weapons option. After the Chinese nuclear test in 1964, followed by
continued rapid development, Indian security planners were under pressure to respond.
By 1974 India had the capability to test and did so. However, the characterization of the
test as a "peaceful nuclear explosion" in part reflected India's competing priorities: to
respond to China, although indirectly as India did not have the necessary long-range
delivery capabilities to establish a secure second strike capability.
After conducting the test in 1974, India would be forced to recognize Pakistani
security concerns and how India's test accelerated Pakistan's nuclear development with
China's help. Seeking to keep its own development within and affordable cost range
during the long-term transition to having a credible deterrent vis-a.-vis China was
therefore an important incentive for maintaining an ambiguous posture until the late
1990s. By the 1998 nuclear test, Pakistan had developed its own deliverable capability
against India and the latter was moving into range of Chinese targets. In short, there were
few regional incentives to maintaining an ambiguous posture when development had
India on the threshold of having a credible nuclear capability.
Additionally, the research in this chapter suggests that patron state pressures from
U.S. non-proliferation measures-in the form of economic and technology inducements
combined with the threat of sanctions-significantly affected the calculations of Indian
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leaders to remain ambiguous regarding their nuclear capabilities and intentions after
India's 1974 'peaceful nuclear explosion' through 1998. Prior to the 1974 nuclear test,
the U.S. had limited cooperation with which to pressure the Indians and was not
successful in preventing New Delhi from testing. After the 1974 test, India, sought to
establish economic and technology links with the United States, as well as stabilize
relations with its regional neighbors. In order to pursue these priorities, India continued
to develop its nuclear capability, but it did so largely out of the public purview.
Indian vulnerability to external pressures began to change during the 1990s as
India made significant economic, political and technological gains. These factors,
combined with the lack of direct U.S. pressure in 1998, led to Vajpayee and the BJP to
openly declare India as a nuclear weapons capable state. These conditions enabled India
. to incur the costs of openly testing, having provided New Delhi with leverage to
minimize the extent and length repercussions of the tests. And Vajpayee's interest in
testing, as part of the BJP's nationalist platform, further helps explain the timing of the
test.
Notably, most of the external pressure on India came directly from the U.S.,
suggesting that the international non-proliferation regime was not a significant factor in
Indian decision-making. That said, Canada also joined the U.S. in seeking to prohibit
peaceful nuclear explosions prior to the 1974 test, a position that India rejected. Still,
India's characterization of the explosion as peaceful was likely an attempt by New Delhi
to remain within the parameters of existing nuclear contracts with Canada and the U.S.
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Nonetheless, after the test, Canada and the U.S. were no longer willing to
cooperate in the area of nuclear technology. This in tum hindered both India's civilian
and military nuclear program, forcing India to rely on other states and its own indigenous
efforts. India similarly calculated the material ramifications of its 1998 nuclear test.
New Delhi concluded that while some states would impose sanctions, they likely would
be neither extraordinarily harsh nor long lasting and therefore India could weather the
punitive measures. In short, the evidence supports the conclusion that the non-
proliferation regime mattered to the extent that it factored into India's material costs, but
given New Delhi's reluctance to join treaties, its ongoing criticisms of the discriminatory
nature of the regime, and its willingness to test suggest that it did not adopt or internalize
to any significant extent any of the non-proliferation nonns.
In terms of domestic politics, there is some evidentiary support for the position
that domestic pressures contributed to Prime Minister Gandhi's decision to test in 1974,
and the BJP's rise to power can explain the timing of the 1998 test. As to 1974, China's
nuclear weapons advancements created a flurry of cross-party calls, including from the
ruling Congress Party, for India to adopt a more robust nuclear posture. These calls
continued to increase and Gandhi authorized the tests as soon as the technology was
available. This explanation does, however, militate against the long-standing proposition
that the timing of the test was based on Gandhi's desire to capitalize on popular support
from the public for testing.
As to the 1998 nuclear tests, the BJP had a longstanding party platform to make
India a nuclear weapons state on coming to power. Prime Minister Vajpayee's actions
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were at this time consistent with this approach. However, the overall history of India's
nuclear weapons program suggests that the BJP was neither a necessary nor sufficient
condition. A different political party, the Congress Party, ruled during the 1974 test and
several Prime Minister's considered and prepared for testing during the 1990s.
Additionally, Vajpayee in both 1977 and later as Prime Minister in 1996 counseled
against testing. This evidence suggests that India was already on the verge of testing in
the 1990s, as well as the fact that circumstance had to be propitious for Vajpayee to
authorize the tests.
The research findings further suggest that a common attribution of India's nuclear
posture to moral reservations regarding nuclear weapons is flawed. Rather, India's
leaders steadily marched towards a weapons option notwithstanding their personal
beliefs, while at the same time balancing domestic priorities, regional security
constraints, and international pressures.
Figure 5 - Summary of the Presence ofExplanatory Factors in the Indian Case
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Hypothesis Predictions 1974 Test 1974-1998 1998 Test
Reg. Sec. Env. Deterrence Medium-High High Very High
Signals
Conservative Medium High Medium
Nuclear Strategy
Limited Low Medium Low-
Cooperation Medium
Patron State Issue Linkages Low High Medium
Conforming Low-Medium High Low-
Dependent States (labeled PNE) Medium
Nuclear Priority Medium High Medium-
for Patron High
Int'l Non-Prolif. Material Costs Low Medium (higher Low
Regime vulnerability)
Norm Low-Medium Low-Medium Low
Recognition
Internalized Low Low Low
Norms
Domestic Bargaining and Low Low Low
Politics Compromise
Posture is in Low-Medium Low Medium
interest of
centralized
decision-maker
Moral/Cultural Expressions of Medium Medium Low
Constraints Nuclear Doubt
Nuclear Low-Medium Low-Medium Low
Weapons Not an
Option
Lack of Low Low Non-existent
questioning
existing policy
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CHAPTER V
PAKISTAN
Despite almost insunnountable obstacles, Pakistan has persistently pursued and
eventually acquired a nuclear weapons capability. Pakistan's determined efforts to
acquire a nuclear option are largely attributable to its severe security dilemma vis-a.-vis
India, its historic adversary. Nonetheless, Pakistan chose not to publicly test or officially
declare itself a nuclear weapons state until after India did so in 1998. Why did Pakistan
not test when it first had the capability to do so in 198571 What factors did it take into
account when it finally tested in response to India in 19987
This study finds that Pakistan pursued a policy of ambiguity as a way to balance a
set of complicated, countervailing demands. The primary determinant of Pakistan's
nuclear policy was its regional security environment vis-a.-vis India. Pakistani insecurity,
caused by both its conventional and nuclear inferiority to its neighbor, was both the cause
of Islamabad deciding on a nuclear option, as well as the decision to keep its nuclear
development intentionally ambiguous.
On the one hand, an ambiguous posture allowed Pakistan some measure of
deterrence through uncertainty with India. At the same time, an ambiguous posture
1 Pakistan appeared technically ready to "cold test" its nuclear design in 1983-1984 and was prepared for a
"hard test" by 1985. Samina Yasmeen, "Pakistan's Nuclear Tests: Domestic Debate and International
Determinants," Australian Journal ofInternational Affairs 53, no. 1 (1999),44. See also, U.S. Department
of State, "The Pakistani Nuclear Program," Secret Paper, 23 June 1983, Weapons of Mass Destruction
(Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. WM00275, 5.
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allowed Pakistan to minimize provoking India into an overt arms race and potential direct
conflict. When Pakistan did test in 1998, it was in direct response to India's tests
conducted a few weeks prior. Pakistani leaders felt it necessary for their security to
respond to India by demonstrating that it had a credible nuclear deterrent,
notwithstanding the economic crisis this would create from sanctions.
Pressure from one of Pakistan's patrons, the United States, also played a role in
creating incentives to keep the nuclear weapons program hidden from public purview.
By not declaring its nuclear intentions, Pakistan was able to leverage conventional
military and economic assistance from the United States when the Americans were
engaged in South Asia. Pakistan's other long-time patron state, China, actually assisted
the Pakistani nuclear program and likely was not a relevant source of constraint on
Islamabad's posture. Secrecy assisted Pakistan and China in deflecting some non-
proliferation pressure from other states, but this was a tertiary concern to the latter.
The international non-proliferation regime had a relatively little direct effect on
Pakistan's nuclear posture. Pakistan has remained largely outside of the international
framework, and the main effect on Pakistani policy was by supplier states restricting
technology and materials that made it more difficult for Pakistan to develop its nuclear
program. At the same time, denials that Pakistan sought a weapons capability, combined
with public declarations that it was willing to follow international non-proliferation
guidelines if India did so, allowed Pakistan the ability deflect external pressures while it
created its nuclear option. But the institutions and regimes themselves did little to shape
Pakistan's posture.
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Similarly, there is little evidence that domestic politics were responsible either for
Pakistan's ambiguous posture or its 1998 nuclear tests. The Pakistani military has
dominated nuclear decision-making for most ofPakistan's history. The military, while
supporting a nuclear option, has also placed a high priority on maintaining its
conventional forces. Various Pakistani politicians have had to balance these preferences,
or risk losing the support of the military and therefore governing power. Additionally,
while the Pakistani population supports the nuclear weapons program, and
enthusiastically responded to the 1998 tests, there is little evidence to suggest that the
nuclear nationalism Pakistani leaders had previously created was a direct cause of the
decision to test. Rather, it was a permissive condition.
the following explanation for Pakistan's nuclear posture begins with a
description ofPakistani nuclear ambiguity, the dependent variable in this study. This is
followed by a historical analysis of the relative effect of each hypothesized relationship
between the independent variables and Pakistan's retained posture ofnuclear ambiguity
until the 1998 nuclear tests.
I. Explaining Pakistani Ambiguity, 1972-1998
A. Pakistani Nuclear Ambiguity
Since choosing to pursue a nuclear weapons option, Pakistan has adopted a
posture of nuclear ambiguity through 1998, when it publicly declared itself a nuclear
weapons state and conducted underground tests.2 Nuclear ambiguity in this case
2 Ambiguity was adopted after Pakistan's President Zulfikar Bhutto decided to acquire a nuclear weapons
capability in early 1972. Prior to this point Bhutto had made the public claim that ifIndia obtained nuclear
356
primarily consisted of Pakistani leaders officially denying the Pakistan was pursuing a
nuclear weapons option and claiming that its program was for peaceful purposes only.
While Pakistani leaders denied that the nuclear program was weapons oriented,
they retained the right to conduct peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs). Further, Pakistani
leaders would sometimes also indicate that Pakistan had the technical ability to produce
nuclear weapons if the circumstances with India warranted it. The addition of the
qualification that Pakistan could respond to an Indian nuclear threat occurred primarily in
the late 1980s through the 1990s, although Pakistan's ability to produce nuclear weapons
was claimed by Zia in the early 1980s.
I now tum to each theoretical explanation for Pakistan's ambiguous posture for
most of its nuclear history. This is followed by a discussion of the effect ofIndia's
nuclear tests in 1998 on Pakistani security and its tests in response.
B. Regional Security Environment: Avoiding Indian Provocation
A nuclear option and even weapons capability make sense from the
Pakistan perspective where the target is India. But India is a sleeping
giant and one should not unnecessarily twist its tail. 3
India, as Pakistan's historic regional adversary, is the primary the source of
motivation for Pakistan to develop nuclear weapons. As a weaker state, nuclear weapons
were seen by some as an attractive way for Pakistan to provide for its security by
deterring a much stronger regional rival. At the same time, Pakistan's weakness vis-a.-vis
weapons, Pakistan would as well even ifit required Pakistanis to "eat grass or leaves." Before he became
President, Bhutto often made the public case for Pakistan acquiring nuclear weapons, contrary to the then
existing policy of the government.
3 Ashok Kapur, Pakistan's Nuclear Development (New York: Croom Helm, 1987),218.
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India is a significant factor in causing Pakistani leadership to choose a policy of nuclear
ambiguity.
In particular, Pakistan's nascent nuclear program was vulnerable to attack early
on in its development, and Pakistani provocations might have encouraged Indian attacks
on its nuclear facilities before it had the chance to create a retaliatory capability.
Additionally, India could outstrip Pakistan in an overt arms race and further exacerbate
Pakistani security concerns. As such, Pakistan has sought throughout most of its nuclear
history to avoid provoking a regional arms race by maintaining an opaque posture.
Finally, Pakistan sought to portray its program as peaceful, and at most, a defensive
hedge in response to Indian proliferation, in order to redirect international attention on the
India program as leverage to slow it down. In short, nuclear ambiguity served to protect
the program by avoiding a posture that would overtly provoke a response from India.
Each of these constraints, and the affect on Pakistani nuclear strategy, are discussed
below.
1. Pakistani Regional Insecurity and Nuclear Ambitions
Pakistan's insecurity vis-a.-vis India is the primary driver behind its determined
efforts to develop a nuclear weapons capability.4 Given its security environment,
Pakistan's fear for survival motivated it to invest in a nuclear option despite being a poor
country that lacked a technological base to indigenously research and manufacture
nuclear weapons.
4 An additional motivation, perhaps, was an "Islamic Bomb," where Pakistan may have desired an
enhanced status in the Arab world. There are a number of reports of Arab financing ofPakistan's nuclear
program, as a possible counter to Israel's program. Warren H. Donnelly, "Pakistan and Nuclear Weapons,"
Congressional Research Service, Issue Brief 2512 (5 August 1987), 7.
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In comparison to India, Pakistan has always been the weaker state, lacking
economic, demographic and technological resources to sustain an equivalent
conventional military force. There are a number of factors that have contributed to
Pakistan's military weakness. Geography initially meant that Pakistan was split between
East and West on either side ofIndia, providing an impractical barrier to governing both
territories. With the loss of East Pakistan, the remaining territory in the West is smaller
and narrower, lacking the comparative depth that India enjoys. India has also always had
a stronger economy with a larger geographic and demographic base.s Further, India has a
greater defense capability because of a strong industrial base and technological
superiority.6 Pakistan's unenviable geographic position, combined with its inherent
economic and technical weakness has resulted in a severe security dilemma vis-a.-vis
India.
Moreover, since independence, Pakistan has lost three major wars with India.
Pakistan's insecurity began with independence in 1947 and the partition of the former
British colony. The division between Pakistan and India was particularly acrimonious
given the disputed territory of Kashmir between the two countries, leading to the first war
in 1947. In 1965, Pakistan lost the Second Kashmir War. Further, Pakistan suffered a
devastating defeat in 1971 and lost its territory in East Pakistan, resulting in the
independent nation of Bangladesh. In 1987 the Brasstacks crisis, and again in the 1990
Kashmir crisis, full-scale war threatened to breakout in the shadow of both states having
5 Zafar Iqbal Cheema, "Pakistan's Nuclear Policy Under Z.A. Bhutlo and Zia-UI-Haq: An Assessment,"
Strategic Studies 14, no. 4 (Summer 1992), 8.
6 Cheema, "Pakistan's Nuclear Policy," 8.
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achieved a nuclear capability. In addition to the major conflicts, border skirmishes
continue between the two states, primarily in the disputed region ofKashmir.7 There
have been some efforts to reduce tensions between the states at various times since
independence; nonetheless, very real security concerns still exist between the two states.
Because of its conventional military deficiencies, Pakistan has historically relied
on external allies, including the United States. However, this dependency has often left
Pakistan insecure as well when its allies prove umeliable in a conflict. For example,
during both the 1965 and 1971 wars, the United States stopped providing military
assistance to both Pakistan and India. While the US would not ship arms to either
country, Pakistan clearly suffered the effects of the embargo more deeply, given its
relative weakness to India.
Based on these constraints, Pakistan clearly is unable to compete on a
conventional level with India. Further, by 1971 it was becoming increasingly clear that
India was pursuing a nuclear program. Thus, Pakistan's conventional capabilities would
continue to be an insufficient answer to Pakistan's military problems, particularly in the
face of increasing evidence of Indian nuclear development.
Given this regional security environment, coupled with Pakistan's chronically
inferior indigenous capabilities, and a dearth of reliable allies during times of crisis,
Pakistan has sought to compensate through the development of a nuclear weapons
capability. In other words, Pakistan's nuclear policy has been India reactive, a trend that
continued throughout its development and ultimately through the 1998 nuclear tests. The
7 Donnelly, "Pakistan and Nuclear Weapons," 6.
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following discusses the background leading to nuclear weapons decision and the slide
into ambiguity once the decision was made.
2. The Nuclear Answer and Origins of Ambiguity
While India was, and remains, the driving force behind Pakistani security policy,
early nuclear discussion did not reflect a consensus among Pakistani leaders about how
best to provide for its security. Ultimately, they decided to pursue a nuclear answer to
Pakistan's chronic security problems with India in 1972. It was shortly after this decision
that the most publicly vocal proponent of weapons program, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, adopted
an ambiguous posture that would remain the hallmark of the Pakistani program until
1998.
Prior to 1972, Pakistan joined the Atoms for Peace Program for civilian nuclear
power purposes and initially had its nuclear reactors under international safeguards
through the IAEA. President Ayub Khan was reluctant to pursue a nuclear program,
given the severe domestic constraints already facing the country. For example, he is
recounted as saying to Bhutto, Foreign Minister at the time and a strong proponent of a
nuclear weapons program, "[w]hat do we need a bomb for? Pakistan is a poor country.
We can't afford it ...we should put our money into schools, maybe hospitals, and
industry."g In addition to domestic constraints, many members of the military were
resistant to developing nuclear weapons. Rather, early on in the Cold War, they were
g Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosney, The Islamic Bomb: The Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle
East (New York: Times Books, 1981),49.
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recipients of large-scale Western military and economic assistance, which enabled them
to expand the military establishment and consolidate their political standing.9
However, after the 1965 defeat, some ofPakistani leadership began to rethink its
previous reluctance to pursue a nuclear weapons program. Not only had Pakistan
suffered a resounding defeat, but the U.S. had also begun to distance itself in terms of
military support. This led the Pakistani military to change its stance towards nuclear
weapons as well,lo particularly since efforts to modernize Pakistan's conventional forces
was viewed as largely insufficient to deter Indian aggression. I I Moreover, it was
becoming increasingly apparent that India was pursuing its own nuclear weapons
program.
One of the most vocal proponents of a nuclear program at this time was then
Foreign Minister Bhutto, who would eventually become President ofPakistan in 1971.
Bhutto ultimately became the architect ofPakistan's nuclear weapons program and early
on he waged a public battle to convince Pakistan to go nuclear. He firmly believed that
India would successfully pursue a nuclear program, in the wake of Chinese
developments, and that Pakistan needed to follow suit for its own security.12 Even
though his sentiments were not unanimously shared by top Pakistani leaders, as early as
1965 Bhutto infamously stated that "even ifPakistanis have to eat grass, we will make
9 Samina Ahmed and David Cortright, eds., Pakistan and the Bomb: Public Opinion and Nuclear Options
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998),9.
10 Ahmed and Cortright, Pakistan and the Bomb, 9.
II P. R. Chari, Indo-Pak Nuclear Standoff: The Role of the United States (New Delhi: Manohar, 1995),22.
12 Cheema, "Pakistan's Nuclear Policy," 6.
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the bomb.,,13 In 1967, he left the government, but was even more outspoken about the
need for Pakistan to go nuclear. 14
By 1971, Bhutto returned to power in the wake of the regional pressures that had
caught up with Pakistan. Pakistan's third devastating defeat heightened insecurity about
the viability of the state. It was also becoming increasingly clear that India would soon
become a nuclear weapons power. 15 Further exacerbating Pakistan's security was the
closer cooperation between India and the USSR, which might continue shift the regional
balance of power in favor of India. India's continued dominance in the region, combined
with the loss ofU.S. conventional support during the conflict,16 strongly favored Pakistan
pursuing a nuclear weapons option to compensate for its vulnerability.
Bhutto ascended to power in December 1971 and by January he held the secret
meeting that decided the Pakistani nuclear weapons prograrn. 17 For Pakistan, this was a
major decision for a country that at the time did not have a metallurgical industry and
reportedly "there was not a single steel mill in the country."I8 These deficiencies, as well
13 Bhutto quoted in Samina Ahmed, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning Points and Nuclear
Choices," International Security 23, no. 4 (1999), 183.
14 Cheema, "Pakistan's Nuclear Policy," 6.
15 Ahmed and Cortright, Pakistan and the Bomb, 9.
16 While the U.S. was distancing itself from Pakistan, relations with China began to bear fruit in the form of
increased conventional support. Still, even with Chinese support, there was a clear qualitative and
quantitative difference between Pakistan and India's conventional capabilities and these deficiencies
continued to inform Pakistani decisions to acquire a nuclear capability. Ahmed, "Pakistan's Nuclear
Weapons Program," 182.
17 Weissman, The Islamic Bomb, 42.
18 Weissman, The Islamic Bomb, 46-47.
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as economic difficulties, would largely contribute Pakistan's clandestine approach in
'begging, buying and stealing' its way to a nuclear capability in subsequent decades.
For the political elite, they viewed the "nuclear option as the instrument of
national salvation, by providing a reliable strategic deterrent against superior Indian
conventional capability. National prestige was less weighty a factor in Pakistani thinking
than in Indian. For Pakistan, the nuclear weapons option was more an act ofdesperation,
to build a weapon of 'last resort' .,,19 Thus, for many Pakistani leaders, a nuclear
capability provides part of the answer seeing the weapons as a way to gamer credible
deterrence. By creating uncertainty among the Indian leadership, Pakistan desired the
ability to "preserves a broad equilibrium with India" and neutralize any Indian "nuclear
threat or blackmail.,,2o India itself was reaching the nuclear threshold and would by 1974
conduct its first "smiling Buddha test." Under Bhutto's leadership, Pakistan responded
b I " I 21Yacce eratmg Its nuc ear program.
In addition to the security threat posed by India, Pakistani insecurity was further
heightened with the 1979 Soviet invasion ofAfghanistan. Having an additional threat
front made it increasing difficult for Pakistani leaders to prepare an adequate
conventional force plan. This meant that there was increased interest in nuclear weapons
19 Shirin R. Tahir-Kheli, India, Pakistan and the United States: Breaking with the Past (New York: Council
on Foreign Relations, 1997),71-72.
20 Hasan-Askari Rizvi, "Pakistan's Nuclear Testing," in South Asia's Nuclear Security Dilemma: India,
Pakistan and China, Lowell Dittmer, ed. (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2005), 99.
21 Tahir-Kheli, India, Pakistan and the United States, 7. Pakistan also considered responding to this threat
by making major changes to its conventional forces and/or obtaining nuclear security guarantees from other
nuclear powers. Ultimately, the conventional alternatives were unsatisfactory and in the case of security
guarantees, not forthcoming.
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for deterrence, although the military would not trade away conventional strength for a
I . 22nuc ear optIOn.
This meant that nuclear weapons were only a partial answer to Pakistan's security
problems. As Bhutto was aware early on, the nascent program was susceptible to attack
by India.23 Further, the U.S. was becoming increasingly concerned with horizontal
proliferation. Bhutto recognized that his efforts to pursue a nuclear weapons capability
could severely compromise his relations with the United States.24 Additionally,
Pakistan's military was not willing to trade away efforts to bolster conventional forces for
a nuclear option. For a state dependent on external assistance, this meant that Pakistan
had to cooperate with its external suppliers, including the United States. These factors
combined meant that the nuclear weapons development was better conducted in secrecy.
Coinciding with the decision to undertake a weapons program, Pakistani
leadership, primarily through the voice of Bhutto, now more quietly went about building
a weapons capability. Once a vocal proponent of Pakistan pursuing the weapons option,
Bhutto was now much more circumscribed in publicly commenting on Pakistan's
intentions. It was during this time Pakistan's ambiguous nuclear stance was adopted.
Pakistan's nuclear program was described as "peaceful" and Bhutto's declaratory policy
on Pakistani intentions was deliberately ambiguous. In short, once the program was
22 Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., U.S. Department of State to U.S. Embassy, "Pakistan: Security Planning and the
Nuclear Option," Limited Official Use, Cable 056987, 6 March 1981, Weapons of Mass Destruction
(Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. WM00245.
23 Tahir-Kheli, India, Pakistan and the United States, 7.
24 Tahir-Kheli, India, Pakistan and the United States, 7.
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initiated, Bhutto changed his public posture to accommodate the countervailing pressures
on the program.
From its inception then, Pakistani leaders have sought to shield the nuclear
weapons program through secrecy and to protect it from outside interference. This
ambiguity was also derived in part from necessity, given the fact that Pakistan had few
resources to indigenously build a bomb and had to rely on outside assistance and its own
efforts to acquire the needed scientists, technology, and material. This ambiguity would
deepen over time as the Pakistani program continued to face external pressure from the
United States, and Pakistan sought to keep the arms race with India dampened. At the
same time, the posture of ambiguity was an attempt to garner the benefits of deterrence
vis-a.-vis India. Thus, ambiguity was a way to achieve military parity with India, while
deflecting external pressures from India and the United States.
3. Risk of Attack On Pakistani Nuclear Facilities, 1981-1984
Newly developed nuclear states, prior to having a second-strike capability, are
particularly susceptible to preventive attack by their adversaries?5 The incentive is to
strike before a secure second-strike capability is achieved, that is, before nuclear
deterrence is established. At a minimum, a successful attack on an adversary's nuclear
facilities sets the program back decades, as the case with Israel destroying Iraq's Osiraq
reactor in 1981. Nonetheless, there are a number of factors militating against a
preventive strike, including the likelihood of destroying the facility, prospect for the
25 See Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, 2003).
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renewal of the program, the ability of the target state to retaliate, and international
condemnation.26 In Pakistan's case, the threat of a preventive strike against its nuclear
facilities was very real from India, and the evidence also suggests, potentially Israel.
India had a strong incentive to eliminate Pakistan's nascent nuclear ability before
it acquired an effective deterrent. According to U.S. estimates, this threat mainly existed
in the early 1980s, when Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi considered, but ultimately
decided against, destroying Pakistan's Kahuta nuclear reactor. 27 As later reported, "[i]f
American intelligence reports are correct, Mrs. Gandhi seriously contemplated a pre-
emptive strike against Pakistani nuclear targets last year [1982]." 28 During this time
period, India likely considered a military strike on Pakistani nuclear facilities as the
window was rapidly closing based on when Pakistan would be ready to test a nuclear
device.29 U.S. intelligence reported that at this time that there were signs that both India
and Pakistan were preparing for underground tests.30 Publicly, there were also rumors
circulating that Pakistan was preparing a site to test a nuclear device and that "all the
26 Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 19.
27 There is evidence that some Indian military leaders also hoped to strike Pakistani nuclear facilities during
the 1987 Brasstacks crisis. Sagan and Waltz, The Spread ofNuclear Weapons, 94.
28 John J. Louis, Jr. to U.S. Department of State, "Observer Article on Indo-Pak Nuclear Issue," Limited
Official Use, Cable 00067, 4 January 1983, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National
Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. NP02005. India continued to consider a preventive
attack through 1984, and there were further rumors in 1987.
29 By 1982 information was also publicly available that China was providing Pakistan with significant
technical and material support for its nuclear program, including enriched uranium. For India, the Sino-Pak
nuclear collaboration was particularly threatening given the border conflicts India shared with both
countries.
30 U.S. Department of State, "Indian-Pakistani Views on a Nuclear Weapons Option and Potential
Repercussions," Confidential Report 169-AR, 25 June 1981, Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington
D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. WM00247, 1.
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signs pointed to an immiment {sic} Pakistani nuclear test.,,3! IfIndia was going to take
out Pakistani nuclear facilities, it was running out of time.
Moreover, circumstantial evidence suggests that India was not the only threat to
the Pakistani program at this time. Israel was also closely monitoring Pakistan's nuclear
progress.32 Israel, for its part, was concerned that "Arab enemies will use the lever of
Islam to buy nuclear secrets from Pakistan.,,33 Additionally, there is some evidence of
discussions between India and Israel over Pakistan's nuclear progress and whether or not
to launch a preventive strike on its nuclear facilities. 34 High-level Indian parliamentarian,
Subramanian Swamy visited Jerusalem, and reportedly asked whether Israel would
consider a strike against Pakistani nuclear facilities, similar to those carried out against
Iraq's Osiraq reactor.35 The alleged reply was 'yes', contingent on India providing
refueling facilities south of the Pakistani border.36 Therefore, "if Pakistan demonstrated
or announced a nuclear weapons capability, this could evoke a preemptive strike by Israel
against Pakistan's nuclear facilities similar to the 1981 Israeli air strike against an Iraqi
nuclear reactor.,,37
31 Louis, "Observer Article on Indo-Pak Nuclear Issue," no. NP02005. These preparations were a contrast
to Zia's studied public stance that Pakistan was not interested in testing.
32 Louis, "Observer Article on Indo-Pak Nuclear Issue," no. NP02005.
33 Louis, "Observer Article on Indo-Pak Nuclear Issue," no. NP02005.
34 Louis, "Observer Article on Indo-Pak Nuclear Issue," no. NP02005.
35 Louis, "Observer Article on Indo-Pak Nuclear Issue," no. NP02005.
36 Louis, "Observer Article on Indo-Pak Nuclear Issue," no. NP02005.
37 Donnelly, "Pakistan and Nuclear Weapons," 7.
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Predictably, reports that India might strike Pakistan's nuclear facilities fueled
concerns that India would destroy its nascent nuclear weapons program.38 Indeed, some
evidence suggests that the Pakistani leaders were extremely worried about the threat to
the nuclear program. For example, in a remarkable event at an international conference,
Pakistan's Munir Ahmad Khan, as chairman of the AEC, discussed these fears with
India's Raja Ramanna, India's new chairman of the AEC and a noted nuclear hawk.
Allegedly, Khan went to Ramanna's hotel room very early in the morning and requested
that he "[p]lease tell Mrs. Gandhi that all we want is peace.,,39 Decades later, Khan
reported to Perkovich that he emphasized to Ramanna the potential for a radiation
disaster and "it would be better that India and Pakistan should not attack each other's
facilities.,,4o
Pakistan was aware of the danger facing its program, recognizing that it was at
risk of losing its hard won nuclear facilities. If attacked, this would threaten the very
survival of the nascent Pakistani nuclear program, and at a minimum, would set the
program back for decades if successfu1.41 Even rebuilding would be extremely
expensive, particularly since Pakistan was not able to indigenously build its program but
was reliant on external assistance and pilfering efforts. For these reasons, Pakistan had
38 Cheema, "Pakistan's Nuclear Policy," 15.
39 Louis, "Observer Article on Indo-Pak Nuclear Issue," no. NP02005. Ramanna, similar to Khan, urged
India to develop a nuclear weapons capability.
40 George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1999),241.
41 Indeed, it is not even clear today that Pakistan has a survivable force, nonetheless during most of the
history of the program.
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strong incentives to downplay its nuclear ambitions and not provoke India by testing or
publicly declaring its intentions. This is particularly the case as India had previously
threatened Islamabad that it would respond to Pakistan going nuclear. Thus, "[a]t least as
important a disincentive for Pakistan going nuclear has been the fear of what India might
do in return...Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the Indian Prime Minister, told Parliament that India
would 'respond' in an appropriate way' if Pakistan went nuclear.,,42 She further indicated
that a Pakistani nuclear test would have "grave and irreversible" consequences for
regional relations.43
While India contemplated its options, Pakistan also had to consider the reactions
of other countries in deciding whether to conduct public tests, particularly in the context
of the Cold War. Because there was an ongoing strategic relationship between the USSR
and India, Pakistan was concerned that any provocation in its part would also invoke a
hostile response from the Soviets, and potentially Iran.44 In short, an "overt nuclear
posture could unite India, Iran, and the Soviet Union against Pakistan.,,45 Moreover, as
previously discussed, Israel carefully monitored the Pakistani nuclear program, fearing
that nuclear technology would be shared among Islamic states.
Ultimately, India decided against attacking Pakistan's nuclear facilities. Even if
its nuclear facilities were destroyed, Pakistan could still use its conventional forces to
42 Louis, "Observer Article on Indo-Pak Nuclear Issue," no. NP02005.
43 U.S. Department of State, "Indian-Pakistani Views on a Nuclear Weapons Option and Potential
Repercussions," no. WM00247, 5.
44 Kapur, Pakistan's Nuclear Development, 21. Additionally, Pakistan was already covertly assisting the
Afghan resistance at the time and did not need an additional front opened with the USSR.
45 Donnelly, "Pakistan and Nuclear Weapons," 7.
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attack Indian nuclear reactors. And Pakistani leadership threatened that they could take
out India's Bombay facilities in a retaliatory strike.46 This threat of retaliation was
apparently enough for India to reconsider the wisdom of a preventive attack. Reportedly,
Prime Minister Gandhi chose not to strike Pakistan's nuclear targets, "out of fear that
Pakistan would retaliate and inflict equal damage on Indian nuclear centers.,,47
Further, these flashpoints could foreseeably escalate into a wider and more
destructive war. When an Indian former director of operations was interviewed by
Perkovich, he indicated that Israel's model of attacking Osiraq would not work for India.
Rather, "Pakistan would go to war. The international community would condemn us for
doing something in peacetime, which the Israelis could get away with but India would
not be able to get away with. In the end it will result in a war.,,48 Predictably, India has
always formally denied contemplating an attack on Pakistan's nuclear facilities. 49 And
by 1988, India and Pakistan formally agreed to not attack each other's nuclear
installations.
In the end, Pakistan did not test and India did not preemptively strike Pakistan's
nuclear facilities. As demonstrated by the complex relationship between India and
Pakistan in the early 1980s, ambiguity on Pakistan's part was an important strategy to
46 Wheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, "India's Nuclear Use Doctrine," in Planning the Unthinkable: How New
Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons, Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan and James J.
Wirtz, eds. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 133. Another consideration would be radioactive
contamination. India also has nuclear installations close to large populations, threatening a larger
catastrophe.
47 Louis, "Observer Article on Indo-Pak Nuclear Issue," no. NP02005.
48 Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb, 240.
49 See, e.g., Louis, "Observer Article on Indo-Pak Nuclear Issue," no. NP02005.
371
decrease the likelihood of provoking a preventive strike on Pakistan's nuclear facilities.
By Pakistan showing restraint, any Indian aggression to preventively strike its facilities
would potentially swing international opinion in Pakistan's favor. Moreover, as long as
Pakistan was not publicly signaling its nuclear progress, India could more effectively
downplay any threat and refrain from taking any actions to address it. On the other hand,
India was certainly likely to respond to any Pakistani moves to test, at a minimum with a
round of testing itself. In short, India was more willing to live with nuclear Pakistan, as
long as it did not publicly force India's hand to respond.
Deterrence was also already operating to the extent that India feared losing its
own nuclear installations from conventional retaliation, and the bearing the associated
costs ofplutonium fallout near its population centers. Nonetheless, absent Pakistan
testing, India had less of an incentive to attack Pakistan's nuclear facilities. Thus, by
Pakistan choosing a low profile for its nuclear program, it helped swing another factor in
favor of Indian restraint in preventively attacking.
For these reasons, ambiguity helped Pakistan protect its program during the time
that India most seriously contemplated destroying Pakistan's nascent nuclear program.
Fears of an Indian attack on Pakistani facilities would return again, however.
Reminiscent of the concerns in the early 1980s, it was the rumors of a preventive strike
on Pakistani facilities that would further push Pakistan's leaders to choose testing in
1998, in the wake of renewed Indian testing.
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4. Minimize Risk of Open Arms Race with India
The regional rivalry with India has contributed significantly to Pakistan's desire
to acquire a nuclear option. Through ambiguity Pakistan has also sought to avoid
provoking India into an overt nuclear arms race, characterized by testing and possibly
spiraling into a conflict. Given Pakistani weakness vis-a.-vis India, Pakistan could ill-
afford a direct and public arms race that it was sure to lose. Further, a more public
nuclear stance would do little to enhance Pakistani security, and would provide India with
the justification to continue its nuclear development in the open. By practicing restraint,
Pakistan was able to dampen the competition and continue with its efforts to keep the
international spotlight on the Indian program. This strategy worked, in part, because
India also had incentives to keep its program ambiguous, and the two adversaries
mutually reinforced each other's opaque nuclear postures. These dynamics are discussed
below.
a) India's Advanced Nuclear Program Vis-a-vis Pakistan
First, because Pakistan was so weak in comparison to India, it had little incentive
to provoke an intense arms race that it would surely lose and could not afford. In terms
of nuclear development, India's indigenous research and delivery capabilities have
always been much more advanced. Additionally, India has always had the power and
capability to produce a greater number of nuclear weapons.50
50 Pervez Hoodbhoy, "Nuclear Myths and Realities," in Pakistan's Atomic Bomb and the Search for
Security, Zia Mian, ed. (Lahore: Gautam Publishers, 1995), 34.
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In contrast, Pakistan's development has primarily relied on acquiring nuclear
technology and materials from external sources, as it lacked the indigenous capability to
develop nuclear weapons. For example, Pakistan was already struggling by the early
1980s to build a nuclear weapons program. As such, it likely only had a limited amount
of nuclear material on hand and would have preferred to not use it in a test. 51 Further,
with the Chinese provision a nuclear bomb blueprint, "there would have been less need
for Islamabad to conduct a test to have confidence that her weapons design would
function properly."52
India would also have a public justification for continued nuclear development if
Pakistan overtly demonstrated its posture. For example, in the early 1980s, Indian
officials warned Pakistan that if it tested, then India would resume with its own nuclear
tests.53 India was already speeding up its nuclear development amid reports that China
had provided Pakistan with a bomb design and technical assistance for uranium
emichment.54 As such, any public move by Pakistan would likely prompt further Indian
testing.
Early on, Pakistan also had a small stockpile of fissionable material and it would
have been dangerous to test without having more to build bomb with. Moreover, if
Pakistan exploded a nuclear device before it had the capability to weaponize-
51 Mitchell Reiss, "The Illusion ofInfluence: The United States and Pakistan's Nuclear Programme," RUSI
Journal (1991), 49.
52 Reiss, "The Illusion ofInfluence," 49.
53 Donnelly, "Pakistan and Nuclear Weapons," 6.
54 Cheema, "Pakistan's Nuclear Policy," 15.
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particularly in light of India already having both tested and the ability to develop nuclear
weapons-this would tilt the balance of military power even more strongly in favor of
India.55 This meant that Pakistan had strong incentives to not test, or it might provoke
India into demonstrating its strategic superiority and prompt weaponization sooner rather
than later. Further, if India began building nuclear weapons, it could outstrip Pakistani
abilities to construct their own.56 With Pakistan lagging behind, this would further
contribute to Pakistani insecurities.
Because Pakistan would then be caught in the public competition that it would
most certainly lose, there was little incentive to publicly provoke India. As summarized
by U.S. analysts,
The incentive for Pakistan to halt the spiral toward nuclear weapons seems
marginally greater than that for India. Pakistan has little hope of
developing a nuclear capability that India would not quickly overmatch.
Thus, ifby building its own atomic bombs Pakistan drives India toward
developing nuclear weapons, Pakistan could face suicide. For if Pakistan
uses nuclear weapons against India, India very likely will retaliate by
destroying Pakistan.57
Indeed, there is some speculation that the Pakistani strategy of a low nuclear
profile at the time worked, with Indira Gandhi taking into account Pakistani restraint in
deciding not to conduct its own tests at this time.58 Later, as Indian nuclear development
55 Central Intelligence Agency, "Pakistan's Nuclear Program," Top Secret Intelligence Report, 26 April
1978, Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwick-
Healey, 1992), no. WM00212, 3.
56 U.S. Department of State, "Indian-Pakistani Views on a Nuclear Weapons Option and Potential
Repercussions," no. WM00247, 3.
57 U.S. Department of State, "Indian-Pakistani Views on a Nuclear Weapons Option and Potential
Repercussions," no. WM00247, ii.
58 Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb, 243-244.
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continued, it gained the capability to test thermonuclear devices, compared to the more
rudimentary systems developed by the Pakistanis. The result of testing then would be
India asserting primacy in the nuclear field over Pakistan, giving the latter little incentive
to provoke this public revelation.59 In short, Pakistani testing would result in a response
from India, which could publicly justify a response while at the same time demonstrate
its superior nuclear development. Pakistan wanted to avoid both.
b) Risk of Provoking War With India
Also a significant factor, Pakistan did not want to provoke India into war. By
testing, Pakistan would have risked escalating tensions with India and the chance that an
overt arms race would spiral into direct military conflict. Pakistan was already defeated
in three conflicts with India, and there was little subsequent change in the balance of
power that would favor Pakistan. Rather, U.S. estimates have consistently suggested that
Pakistan will always come out a loser in any direct confrontation with India, given the
dearth ofPakistani resources.60 Pakistani security concerns were high during the early
1980s, as nuclear activity might have also provoked India's ally, the Soviet Union, to
take a more aggressive stance against Pakistan, while simultaneously risking its supply of
conventional weapons from the u.S.61
59 Reiss, "The Illusion ofInfluence," 49.
60 U.S. Ambassador Deane R. Hinton to U.S. Department of State, "U.S. Policy on Non-Proliferation:
'Amoral but Practical, '" Unclassified Cable 03689, 21 February 1985, Nuclear Non-Proliferation
(Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. NP02193.
61 U.S. Department of State, "Indian-Pakistani Views on a Nuclear Weapons Option and Potential
Repercussions," no. WM00247, 4.
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Moreover, there have been persistent concerns that nuclear deterrence between
India and Pakistan would not be stable as that between the U.S. and Soviets. For
example, in 1985, Richard Cronin, a specialist in South Asian affairs for the
Congressional Research Services, went to Pakistan. There, he explained to Pakistani
officials from the Ministry of Defence, Institute of Strategic Studies, other professors and
the media, these differences. He emphasized that "[t]he Indo-Pak situation is much more
unstable because of questions of the border, the fact that there have already been three
wars between India and Pakistan, allegations of destablilizing efforts in Punjab, internal
political difficulties, etc. The acquisition of nuclear arms by both sides would add to this
instability.,,62 Additionally, Pakistan suffers a geographic disadvantage compared to
India, which has a greater capability to survive and sustain a nuclear attack,63
There are some indications however the Pakistan privately relied on its nuclear
capability to deter India during the 1987 Brasstacks Crisis. Reportedly, Pakistani Foreign
Minister Noorani advised Indian Ambassador Singh that if India took any action that
threatened the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Pakistan, Islamabad would inflict
"unacceptable damage on India.,,64 Additionally, Pakistan's Dr. Khan publicly suggested
in an interview with an Indianjoumalist that Pakistan had a nuclear weapons capability.
The interview was released after the Brasstacks Crisis, and Dr. Khan quickly "clarified"
the interview after negative international reaction, that Pakistan had the capability to
62 Hinton, "U.S. Policy on Non-Proliferation: 'Amoral but Practical,'" no. NP02193.
63 Hoodbhoy, Nuclear Myths and Realities, 34. For more on difference between the cases, see the
Waltz/Sagan debate in The Spread of Nuclear Weapons.
64 "The Nuclear Backdrop," From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report (New
Delhi: Sage Publications, 15 December 1999), 191.
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produce nuclear weapons, but had no intention of doing so. These incidents are
significant to the extent that Pakistan, during a time of crisis, appears to have been
relying on its nuclear capability to deter India. However, the alleged official threat was
private, and the Pakistani government did not support Dr. Khan's eventually retracted
statements.
Thus, Pakistan has gone to considerable lengths to avoid publicly disclosing its
actual nuclear capability, even in times of crisis when it has sought to rely on deterrence
to some extent. Rather, Pakistan had a strong incentive to not test and avoid provoking
India unnecessarily. While Pakistan's security was generally enhanced by its nuclear
development, an overt arms race would have threatened its security by forcing it to
respond and simultaneously highlighting its weakness vis-a.-vis India. At worst case, the
arms race could have spiraled into open conflict, leaving Pakistan the likely loser in any
direct war, particularly if deterrence between the two states was as unstable as analysis
has suggested.
c) Economic Costs of an Arms Race
Not only would Pakistan lose at the military level, but it also could ill-afford to
pay for accelerated nuclear development, and its already precarious economic condition
would be threatened by an overt arms race. As with India, Pakistan faced severe
financial constraints in developing a nuclear weapons capability, complete with reliable
delivery systems, that could provide credible deterrence. While Islamabad could afford,
relatively, to develop and test a nuclear device, it initially had no indigenous capability to
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product aircraft or missiles.65 Correcting these deficiencies would cost Pakistan a
significant investment of time, technical resources, and money.66
There is further evidence that Pakistan, while always moving towards achieving
an independent nuclear capability, did not undertake a "crash program" when it could
avoid excess expenditures. For example, relations between India and Pakistan began to
normalize in the late 1970s, as result, in part, of Indian Prime Minister Desai's
reassurances that India would not further test or develop nuclear weapons. The bettering
of Indo-Pak relations combined with continued Pakistani financial problems led to a
reduced the "sense of urgency" with its nuclear program.67
Further, Pakistan's economy would suffer significantly more than India in an
overt and extended arms race because of its reliance on economic aid and the inability to
withstand sanctions as long. Indeed, these constraints have plagued Pakistan throughout
the entirety of its nuclear program. For example, in the mid-1990s, analysts suggested
that the same military and economic weakness provided Pakistan with a strong incentive
to maintain its ambiguity. IfPakistan tested, the result would be "the West, led by the
US, turning hostile toward Pakistan, most sources for foreign aid to Pakistan would dry
up as soon as Pakistan takes the final plunge. On the other hand, the penalty for
65 Central Intelligence Agency, "Pakistan's Nuclear Program," no. WM00212, 6. Pakistan did have the
"highly vulnerable" and "obsolete" B-57 that it could use to drop rudimentary bombs.
66 Central Intelligence Agency, "Pakistan's Nuclear Program," no. WM00212, 6.
67 Central Intelligence Agency, "Pakistan's Nuclear Program," no. WM00212, 7.
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escalating the arms race to India would not be as severe and debilitating. It can sustain
the race without any external assistance longer than Pakistan.,,68
Indeed, this forecast is precisely what happened in 1998 when India tested,
forcing Pakistan's hand to respond. Both states tested, but for Pakistan, the real threat
was the immediate weakness of the economy from sanctions. This weakness threatened a
complete economic meltdown in Pakistan, analogous to the Soviet collapse, whereas
India was able to ride the international fallout more comfortably.
In short, because Pakistan was more vulnerable to external pressures, combined
with its inherent weakness vis-a.-vis India, is had far more to lose in an overt arms race.
For these reasons, it was "in Pakistan's interest to go out of its way to prevent such a race
from occurring.,,69 Rather, maintaining an ambiguous posture permitted Pakistan to
continue with its program at a slower pace and with much less economic cost than an
overt arms race would have incurred.7o Further, Pakistan was still able to benefit from
some nuclear deterrence, but by practicing public restraint, did not have to pay the higher
costs associated with an open arms race with India.
At the same time, Pakistan's posture was linked to India's ambiguous status; it
could only maintain ambiguity as long as India did not resume testing. As previously
discussed, India, also had reasons to maintain an opaque nuclear posture. The result was
mutually reinforcing ambiguity between the two nuclear adversaries. As long as one side
68 D.R. Inayatullah, "The Nuclear Arms Race and Fall of the Soviet Union," in Pakistan's Atomic Bomb
and the Search for Security, Zia Mian, ed. (Lahore: Gautam Publishers, 1995),93.
69 Hoodbhoy, Nuclear Myths and Realities, 27.
70 Reiss, "The Illusion oflnfluence," 49. Reiss suggests that this was one of the most important factors
behind Pakistan's ambiguous posture.
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remained ambiguous with its nuclear intentions, at least publicly, then the other side also
had the ability to practice restraint in the public eye.
5. Redirect Non-proliferation Pressures on India
Pakistan also had a strong incentive to maintain an ambiguous posture vis-a.-vis
India in an effort to portray its nuclear option as a defensive response to Indian
aggression. That is, Pakistan did not want to appear to the world as being responsible for
provoking a nuclear arms race in South Asia. Instead, Pakistan has sought to deflect
external pressure on its own program, while highlighting India's nuclear progress as a
way to increase outside pressure on India and slow its program. However, ifPakistan
were to overtly demonstrate its capabilities before India, it would lose this important
source of leverage on the Indian program.
Pakistan portrayed its own military activities, both nuclear and conventional as
defensive. For example, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan once
again became a recipient of American military largesse. After the Carter administration
announced its proposed package, which Zia referred to a "peanuts," Zia nonetheless
sought to publicly reassure India that the conventional weapons were not a threat. He
told reporters that, "Pakistan does not want any weapons which could create a scare in
our neighbors, particularly India, that Pakistan is arming itself for aggressive designs
against anyone of her neighbors, no. All we want is a good defensive capability.'.7l
71 Barrington King to U.S. Department of State, "Zia's Remarks to U.S. Newsmen on U.S. Air Offer,
Bilateral Agreement, Nuclear Issue," Confidential Cable 00449, 18 January 1980, Nuclear Non-
Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no.
NPOI720,2.
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Certainly, public rhetoric is cheap, with little costly signaling, but nonetheless was part of
Pakistan's strategy to minimize threats and risk of escalation.
In addition to couching its activities as defensive, Pakistan has also sought to
point the international non-proliferation spotlight on India. Given Pakistan's overall
weakness compared to its neighbor, its justification that it cannot unilaterally give away
the right to develop a nuclear weapons capability, if needed, is compelling. As such,
Pakistani leaders have used the rivalry to justify its decisions, including explicitly linking
Islamabad's willingness to join the nuclear non-proliferation regime to India. By hinging
its willingness to join international non-proliferation treaties and inspection to India's
unlikely decision to participate in the same, Pakistan has sought to leverage international
pressure on India. Also, by linking the programs, Pakistan may have been seeking to
force India to negotiate. However, ifPakistan tested or publicly declared its nuclear
status before India, it would be seen as the nuclear aggressor and subjected itselfto the
same pressures it hoped the international community would focus on India.
Bhutto was the first leader to link Pakistan's non-proliferation stance to India.
Once he made the decision to pursue a nuclear weapons program, he also sought to mask
the decision with public rhetoric that Pakistan was willing to participate in the NPT if
India did so. Indeed, "the bomb decision was a turning point because it led Bhutto, under
the advice of his diplomatic advisers, to give Pakistan's NPT diplomacy an anti-India
focus and to launch a peace offensive to mask the bomb decision."n
72 Kapur, Pakistan's Nuclear Development, 155.
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So, in 1972, and a couple of months after he decided to develop a weapons option,
Bhutto suggested the idea of a nuclear free zone in South Asia.73 Predictably, India
rejected these overtures. In 1974, Pakistan again proposed a nuclear free zone in South
Asia, and "here again India has rejected the proposal, arguing that China should be
included." 74 Pakistan followed up again in 1987, with its foreign minister calling for a
regional non-proliferation treaty.75 In 1991, Pakistan's increasingly public rhetoric about
is nuclear intentions was also seen by some as a move that, in part, was seen as an effort
to force India back to nuclear negotiations.76 In addition to suggesting regional non-
proliferation measures, Pakistan has also explicitly linked its NPT stance to that of India.
Essentially, the Pakistani position was that it would sign the NPT if India did SO.77
Similarly, Pakistan linked its willingness to allow nuclear facility inspection on
whether India would also agree to open up its nuclear installations. For example, when
Zia was asked if he would open up Pakistani nuclear facilities to American inspection, he
predictably replied,
"No, not on a unilateral basis. But we have offered inspection on non-
discriminatory nature. But if other countries can be treated like this and I
won't go further, I will just say take next-door India. If the US can get an
agreement of inspection of nuclear facilities of India I would go out of my
way not only to have those nuclear facilities inspected by the US or by an
international agency, but before anybody else...The US and myself we are
73 Kapur, Pakistan's Nuclear Development, 138.
74 Donnelly, "Pakistan and Nuclear Weapons."
75 Donnelly, "Pakistan and Nuclear Weapons."
76 T.V. Paul, "Influence Through Arms Transfers: Lessons from the U.S.-Pakistani Relationship," Asian
Survey 32, no. 12 (December 1992),1090.
77 Donnelly, "Pakistan and Nuclear Weapons."
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in an argument on technical grounds because the US government is
following a policy of non-proliferation of weapons to which we fully,
wholeheartedly support.,,78
India, of course, rejected such suggestions, arguing that the inspections would not be
sufficient to verify whether Pakistan was making nuclear weapons or not.79
For Pakistan, linking its non-proliferation stance to India was safe because it was
clear that India would not give up its weapons option. India had made its position clear,
that it would not sign the NPT or other treaties unless other nuclear weapons states
disarmed. 80 For India, this was nonnegotiable, given its security concerns vis-a-vis
China. For Pakistan, this also diffused international censure because it was not the only
state refusing to become a member of the NPT and indeed, signaled that it was willing to
do so if only India was not so recalcitrant. Additionally, Pakistan's seeming support of
non-proliferation measures was perhaps also an effort to force India to negotiate with it.
That is, it forced India to consider its nuclear policy in relationship to Pakistan and
perhaps made it more amenable to agreements limiting the danger of the arms race.
In short, Pakistan has proposed a number of non-proliferation measures, while
clearly linking its willingness to cooperate based on India. In this way, Pakistan could
focus international attention on India's nuclear stance, while at the same time portraying
its own position as negotiable. An opaque nuclear posture facilitated this strategy,
whereas a more open posture would have made the Pakistanis a more visible target than
India.
7& King, "Zia's Remarks to U.S. Newsmen," no. NPOl720, 2.
79 Donnelly, "Pakistan and Nuclear Weapons."
80 Donnelly, "Pakistan and Nuclear Weapons."
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In sum, Pakistan's regional security environment fundamentally shaped both
Islamabad's motivations to acquire a nuclear capability, while also creating incentives for
ambiguity. In particular, as the weaker state lagging behind Indian conventional and
nuclear development, Pakistan could ill-afford an overt arms race with its more powerful
neighbor. A more direct competition could have resulted in attacks on Pakistan's nuclear
facilities, a public justification for India's own further development, and a requirement of
scarce funds to pay for a crash program. Additionally, as discussed below, Pakistan's
reliance on conventional assistance provided a further incentive to maintain an
ambiguous posture, lest it lose the patronage of the United States.
At the same time, it is important to understand that Pakistan was also relying on
the nuclear uncertainty its program had created for deterrence vis-a-vis India. A sure
response to attacks on Pakistani nuclear facilities appears to have dissuaded Prime
Minister Gandhi from seeking to destroy Pakistan's nascent nuclear capability in the
early 1980s. Additionally, veiled Pakistani comments suggesting it had nuclear weapons
during the late 1980s and early 1990s are credited with deterring a more direct conflict
with India, notwithstanding any public retractions that followed.
C. Patron State Constraints - u.S. Direct Non-Proliferation Pressures
For most of Pakistan's post-independence history, it has relied on U.S. patronage
for military and economic assistance. Pakistan's dependence on U.S. assistance for the
majority of its conventional armaments and substantial economic aid made Islamabad
vulnerable to U.S. non-proliferation pressures. The United States exerted non-
proliferation pressure on Pakistan in two ways: 1) directly through incentives or
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sanctions; and 2) indirectly by encouraging other states to not assist Pakistan in
developing a nuclear capability and to impose sanctions. The following section addresses
United States direct pressure on Pakistan, which has varied significantly between
sanctions and aid depending on U.S. security interests in the region.
Pakistan-in response to U.S. diplomacy, aid, and sanctions-has sought to keep
its nuclear profile opaque in an effort to further its nuclear program while at the same
time leveraging conventional assistance. The U.S. was well aware ofIslamabad's efforts
to acquire a nuclear option, so the success ofPakistan's strategy was highly contingent on
the U.S. willingly ignoring its ally's continued progress. This complex relationship is
discussed below.
After the Indian test in 1974, the United States pushed harder for the advancement
of the non-proliferation regime and Islamabad was subject to these pressures even though
it has not tested in response to India's test. However, by the early 1980s, following the
Soviet invasion ofAfghanistan, President Reagan was willing to overlook Pakistani
efforts to develop a nuclear capability, although he had a somewhat reluctant U.S.
Congress to contend with in this regard. Non-proliferation pressures mounted again in
the early 1990s as the Cold War waned and with it U.S. interests in the region. Indeed,
by the time Pakistan tested publicly for the first time in 1998, the U.S. had less leverage
to persuade Islamabad to refrain from testing as it already had imposed significant
sanctions in the early 1990s.
As this historical pattern suggests, when the United States was concerned with its
security interests in the region, as affected by its rivalry the Soviet Union, it was willing
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to overlook Pakistan's nuclear development. In contrast, when the U.S. had fewer
security concerns in South Asia, it was much more willingly imposed punitive measures
to slow proliferation. When the U.S. sought to stop the Pakistani nuclear program, it was
only able to slow progress and further discourage Pakistan's leadership from publicly
declaring Pakistan a nuclear weapons state. The U.S. was never really in a position to
convince the Pakistanis from developing a nuclear option.
In terms ofPakistani decision-making, it faced more complicated external and
internal variables affecting its decision on whether to publicize its nuclear capabilities, as
compared to India. Given Pakistan's relatively weak position, it has heavily relied on
external allies to buttress its economic and military position. Pakistan has sought to
cultivate strategic relationships with the United States, China and France in order to
acquire military equipment and balance a much stronger India. As discussed below,
while China and France have been much more willing to provide the Pakistanis with
nuclear technology, the United States has explicitly linked its economic and military aid
to Pakistani restraint, particularly in terms of possessing or testing a nuclear explosive
device.
From the Pakistani point of view, it has recognized that the U.S. is often an
umeliable ally, with American favor shifting with its security interests in South Asia.
Additionally, Pakistan has had to rely on external sources for its nuclear development.
This has also encouraged Pakistan to adopt a posture of ambiguity, in part, as a way to
protect its acquisition of nuclear knowledge and materials that it was incapable of
producing indigenously. These factors combined have made Pakistan both particularly
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susceptible to U.S. non-proliferation pressures while simultaneously increasing its
incentives to acquire a nuclear deterrent capability, albeit under the guise of an
ambiguous nuclear posture.
As such, Pakistan has sought to use its nuclear opacity to curry favor with the
United States while at the same time using it as a source ofleverage to promote its
security. During times of coopcration with the United States, this strategy ensured a
steady flow of economic and military assistance. When relations were poor, Pakistan
sought to maintain the ability to achieve nuclear materials and technology from abroad
despite U.S. sanctions, while at the same time seeking to regain favor with the U.S. in
order to renew the fonner economic and military aid supply. The strategies employed to
do so have varied betwecn seeking to downplay Pakistani nuclear developments to using
the program as a bargaining chip, in particular to gain better conventional support. Thus,
Pakistan was a contentious client for the United States. In short, this case demonstrates
both the impact and limits of external pressures on Pakistan's nuclear posture, given the
complicated set of countervailing constraints facing Pakistani decision makers.
1. The U.S. Increases Non-Proliferation Pressures After the 1974
Indian Nuclear Test
The Indian test changed the strategic environment surrounding the Pakistani
nuclear program in significant ways. It strongly motivated Pakistan to speed up its
pursuit of a nuclear option. Simultaneously, the United States increased its efforts to stop
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horizontal proliferation. 81 These countervailing pressures, in part, contributed to
deepening Pakistani opacity. Additionally, because the U.S. was so interested in
preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, Pakistan sought to use its program as leverage
to gain military and economic concessions from the U.S., although ultimately these
efforts failed until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
First, the Indian nuclear test provided the incentive for Pakistan to speed up the
conversion its civilian nuclear capacity into a dual program that included a weapons
option. In much the same way that China's 1964 nuclear explosion entrenched the Indian
nuclear program, India's 1974 nuclear test similarly heightened Pakistani resolve to
provide for its security through nuclear weapons. The United States, monitoring the
Pakistani program, noted that "[fjollowing the Indian nuclear explosion, the Pakistan
Government embarked on an ambitious program to accelerate development of indigenous
capabilities regarding nuclear energy.,,82
However, Bhutto's public response to the Indian test was predictably coy. Once
an outspoken proponent of Pakistan acquiring a nuclear capability, Bhutto now was much
more circumscribed about Pakistani intentions in public. For example, during a 1976
visit to Iran, he was asked if Pakistan would respond to India's tests, labeled the "smiling
Buddha." Bhutto responded that "[bJack home, we have the statute of a starving
81 Technically, the U.S. started nuclear non-proliferation measures earlier, as did Pakistan's pursuit ofa
nuclear option. However, after the test, both states increased their respective measures.
82 Adolph Dubs to George S. Vest, "Nuclear Problems with Pakistan," Secret Memorandum, 18 April 1975,
Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992),
no. NP01411.
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Buddha.,,83 Bhutto could have publicly argued that given the Indian tests, Pakistan was
fully pursuing its own nuclear weapons program in order to provide for security against
its neighbor. However, he did not do so. Rather, this deception served to protect the no
longer "peaceful" program from external interference.
Bhutto's public volte-face was in part based on Pakistan's scientific and technical
weakness. Pakistan necessarily relied on outside resources acquired through trading,
borrowing and stealing nuclear technology. Because ofD.S. and other states non-
proliferation efforts, as well as Pakistan's desire to keep the arms race with India
minimized, it required that Pakistan proliferate surreptitiously.
Indeed, the "Pakistani nuclear weapons effort relied on a massive smuggling
program, which began with the clandestine acquisitions of key technology."84 From the
mid-1970s, Pakistan sought to acquire enrichment and reprocessing plants from other
states. Fromthis, the Kahuta enrichment plant "was built using technology, equipment,
and materials obtained secretly from a number ofEuropean countries," with the plans
stolen by the infamous A.Q. Khan, working in the Netherlands.85 Once built, the
unsafeguarded Kahuta facility would serve as Pakistan's primary indigenous source of
enriched uranium. Additionally, the same year that India tested, the Khan took over as
head of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program. It was further reported that in 1975
83 Cheema, "Pakistan's Nuclear Policy," 8.
84 Mark McDonough and Rodney W. Jones, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide In Maps and Charts
(Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment, 1998), 139, note 10.
85 Donnelly, "Pakistan and Nuclear Weapons."
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Bhutto ordered Munir Khan to be ready to conduct a peaceful nuclear explosion within
four years. 86
Pakistani motivation notwithstanding, Islamabad clearly faced substantial
obstacles in developing a viable nuclear weapons program. At a minimum, these barriers
served to slow down progress and U.S. estimates at the time suggested that the earliest
the Pakistani's might be able to test would be in 1980.87 Over time, U.S. non-
proliferation efforts would also continue to seriously slow Pakistan's ability to gain
external resources, but would not eliminate Pakistan's desire for a nuclear deterrent.88
Second, U.S. non-proliferation pressures dramatically increased in the immediate
wake of the Indian test in 1974, as U.S. leaders were fearful that it was the precursor to
horizontal proliferation. Immediately after the Indian test, the U.S. was aware that
Pakistan was seeking to bolster its weapons program in reaction to the Indian tests.89 As
a result, the U.S. sought to directly pressure Pakistan into stopping its development of a
nuclear option, or at least to throw up enough barriers that the program would be slowed.
86 Gordon M. Jones, u.s. Department of State, to Clay G. Nettles, "Discussion of Pakistan's Nuclear
Program," Confidential Letter, 1 April 1975, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National
Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. NP0140l, 1.
87 R. Gallucci, "Draft: Pakistan and the Non-Proliferation Issue," Secret, 22 January 1975, (Washington
D.C.: The National Security Archive) 3, available at
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB6/ipn20_l.htm.
88 An interesting tension was embedded in U.S. non-proliferation policy early on. If the U.S. withheld
conventional armaments, it would be a significant sanction to Pakistan that may discourage proliferation.
Yet, providing conventional weapons was also seen as a way to obviate Pakistan's need for nuclear
weapons; but if Washington was too generous, it would threaten Indian security and New Delhi then would
likely turn to nuclear weapons. As such, the problem was seen as "one of degree" as the U.S. sought to
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Because of the Indian Explosion, the Pakistanis have a solid incentive to
produce a bomb and they can also do so with less world condemnation
than might otherwise be expected. If an explosion is perceived as a source
of political cohesion, current disintegrative tendencies within Pakistan
may be seen as more reason to acquire the status of a nuclear weapons
state. In sum the Pakistanies [sic] appear quite prepared to proceed to a
weapons capability, but they may encounter difficulties if political barriers
are sustained.90
Towards this end, the U.S. Congress sought to deter Pakistan by passing a series
of legislative amendments directly targeting Pakistani nuclear activities. Through the
1976 Symington and 1977 Glenn Amendments, penalties were increased on Pakistan for
proliferation activities. For example, the Symington Amendment required that "no funds
can be appropriated under the Foreign Assistance Act or the Arms Export Control Act to
countries receiving nuclear enrichment equipment, material or technology from any other
country after August 4, 1978.'.9l In addition to engaging in enrichment or reprocessing
trade with other states, nuclear detonations were also added to the list of specifically
prohibited activities.92 The Symington Act also explicitly barred U.S. military and
economic assistance to states with unsafeguarded nuclear installations, which had
implications for Pakistan's Kahuta facility. Thus, if Pakistan continued with these
proliferation activities, it would be subject to a range of foreign assistance penalties that
would affect aid, financing, government contracts and military sales.93
90 Gallucci, "Draft: Pakistan and the Non-Proliferation Issue," 3.
91 U.S. Department of State, "Current Foreign Relations [Bhutto Execution and U.S. Aid Cutoff to
Pakistan]," Confidential Cable, 11 April 1979, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National
Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. NP01630, 2.
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In addition to Congressional concerns, the Carter Administration was similarly
concerned about nuclear proliferation. Indeed, one of the major issues President Carter
had campaigned on was the threat posed by nuclear proliferation.94 Further, because
there were diminished American interests in South Asia, the Carter Administration was
willing to hold Pakistan accountable for its nuclear activities.
As such, the Carter Administration twice cut off military and economic aid to
Pakistan. The first time, President Carter stopped aid because of concerns over
Pakistan's Chasma plant. The plutonium separation facility was being built with French
assistance and the U.S. was putting pressure on both states over how the reprocessed fuel
would be disposed. While the French began to drag their feet on the deal, at U.S.
insistence,. the Pakistani's continued to pressure the French to follow through with the
contract. The U.S. was increasingly dissatisfied with the arrangement and "decided that
Islamabad was going too far.,,95 So, in September 1977, the administration cut off
military and economic aid, without invoking the Symington Amendment, in the hopes of
stopping completion of the Chasma facility. The French, for their part, began to
drastically slow down work on the facility and in 1978 Carter restored aid to Pakistan.96
However, this was not the end of the story, as Pakistan began to search for
alternate avenues to acquire nuclear fuel. Concerns over Pakistani nuclear activities
94 William Burr, ed., "China, Pakistan, and the Bomb: The Declassified File on U.S. Policy, 1977-1997,"
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 114 (March 5, 2004).
95 Burr, "China, Pakistan, and the Bomb."
96 Burr, "China, Pakistan, and the Bomb."
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again prompted the U.S. to withhold economic and military aid again in 1979. This time
the administration invoked the Glenn-Symington Amendment, arguing that Pakistan was
in violation of the law because it "imported equipment for its secret uranium-enrichment
plant at Kahuta," which remained outside ofIAEA safeguards.97
Nonetheless, convincing Pakistan to refrain from its nuclear activities proved to
be a losing proposition. The most U.S. leadership was able to accomplish was keeping
the program below the public eye and slowing it down; however, the Pakistanis were
determined to have a nuclear option and would continue on this course regardless of
external pressure. Still, U.S. non-proliferation efforts in this period did slow down the
program and provided an additional incentive to for Pakistan to keep is posture opaque.
After all, when a state has to beg, borrow and steal a nuclear capability, openness does
little to further these efforts, especially when one of the aid benefactors is intent on
stopping the spread of nuclear weapons. Thus, Pakistan also had an incentive to not
provoke either the Carter Administration or the U.S. Congress into withholding economic
and military aid. On the other hand, because the U.S. was so committed to stopping
Pakistani proliferation, Bhutto, and later Zia, sought to use the program as a source of
leverage for access to greater conventional assistance from the United States. This
dynamic is discussed below.
97 McDonough and Jones, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, 131.
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2. Pakistani Attempts to Leverage Conventional Weapons
Pakistan was determined to build a nuclear weapons program, particularly after
India's 1974 nuclear test. 98 Given U.S. interests in non-proliferation, the two states were
set on a collision course. Yet, Pakistan was not entirely without bargaining leverage
because the U.S. was determined to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. For this reason,
Bhutto reportedly saw the program as "diplomatic leverage against friends and foes
alike." 99
As Washington predicted, the Indian nuclear test brought the Pakistani's back to
the Americans (and China as well) in search ofpolitical support, promises to protect
Pakistan from Indian "nuclear blackmail", possibly a nuclear umbrella, and conventional
weapons. IOO After the Indian test, a contingent of Pakistani leaders met with U.S.
Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, to make their case that the administration should
resume its military aid to Pakistan. Kissinger was responded sympathetically, that he
also did not believe that India's explosion was 'peaceful', but also that he was "strongly
98 It is possible that Pakistan would have been willing to trade the program away under certain
circumstances. For example, a nuclear security guarantee from either China or the United States might
have sufficed. However, given the gap between what Pakistan required for its security to forgo nuclear
weapons and what other powers were willing to provide, it was, essentially, a non-feasible option.
Alternatively, India could have disarmed its nuclear capacity, but this was also just as unlikely, given its
concerns over China.
99 Cheema, "Pakistan's Nuclear Policy," 8.
100 Theodore 1. Eliot, Jr., U.S. Department of State, to Henry A. Kissinger, "NSSM 156 on Indian Nuclear
Developments," Secret Cover Memorandum, NSSM 156 Related, 11 September 1972, Presidential
Directives, Part II (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no.
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allergic to placing the full weight of American prestige against an accomplished fact."IOI
Kissinger promised that the Administration would make a public statement "supporting
Pakistan's independence and territorial integrity" and that he would approach Congress
regarding military aid. l02 The United States resumed financial and military assistance in
1975.
An ambiguous posture facilitated Pakistan's position, as it had not publicly
committed yet to whether or not it would continue with its weapons program. Rather, for
the right trade, Pakistan implied that it might be willing to give up its nuclear ambitions.
For example, this strategy was apparent early on, as Bhutto hoped to exchange Pakistani
nuclear restraint for U.S. conventional arms supply. 103 Benazir Bhutto also claimed that
her father's immediate objective "was a trade-off for seeking conventional weapons.,,104
Mainly, he sought to use the nuclear program as a bargaining chip to have the arms
embargo lifted. l05 Bhutto also proposed that he would slow down Pakistan's
reprocessing program in exchange for sophisticated conventional arms from the u.S. 106
On the other hand, there was also the threat that "Pakistan's nuclear option would
101 u.s. Department of State, "Military Supply for Pakistan," Secret Memorandum of Conversation, 3 June
1974, Kissinger Transcripts (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey,
1992), no. KT012l5, 7.
102 U.S. Department of State, "Military Supply for Pakistan," no. KTO 1215, 7.
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become inevitable if Pakistan saw itself in a back to the wall situation.,,107 In short, the
U.S. was told that conventional assistance would ameliorate Pakistan's security concerns
and reduce the need to acquire a nuclear capacity.
In this way, while ambiguity served to shield the program from external pressures,
it also served as a bargaining chip with the United States. If Pakistan simply publicly
declared that it was pursuing a nuclear weapons program, despite the costs, it would have
little to ostensibly trade for conventional assistance. Instead, by maintaining ambiguity,
Bhutto was able to use the threat of developing a program as a bargaining chip that it was
willing to trade away for other concessions from allies. This gave the nuclear weapons
program a purpose beyond just balancing India; rather, as a Bhutto confidante reportedly
claimed, it was a "trump card" in Bhutto's foreign policy. 108
The United States clearly understood that Pakistan was seeking to leverage its
program into conventional assistance, noting behind the scenes that, "Bhutto may again
suggest that Pakistan's decision of whether or not to acquire nuclear weapons is related to
U.S. willingness to supply them with the necessary conventional weapons for their
security.,,109 It was proposed that the U.S. resist linking Pakistani nuclear restraint to
conventional weapons and instead threaten to increase U.S. non-proliferation pressures:
"[w]e should probably resist the connection of the two issues as suggested
by Bhutto, indicting that U.S. policy on the supply of conventional
weapons is dependent on a quite different set of well established criteria.
We might also take the opportunity to tum the leverage about and say that
107 Kapur, Pakistan's Nuclear Development, 162.
108 Kapur, Pakistan's Nuclear Development, 157.
109 Gallucci, "Draft: Pakistan and the Non-Proliferation Issue," 5.
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although the issues are not specifically linked we would expect that if
Pakistan behaves as though it is seeking a nuclear weapons capability,
U.S. policy is likely to be sensitive to such an important and unfortunate
tum of events.,,11O
Initially, the U.S. was unwilling to reward Bhutto's proposal to exchange nuclear
restraint for lifting the arms embargo and providing modem conventional weapons. This
decision was likely made, in part, because of the extreme distrust of the Bhutto
government. Even though Bhutto allegedly was willing to forgo some immediate nuclear
advancements in exchange for U.S. supplied conventional weapons, the Americans
simply did not trust that he would do so. III This assessment was probably correct, as
there is little evidence that Bhutto would really have traded away a nuclear option with
the U.S. Bhutto himself harbored animosity towards the U.S. and express distrust that it
would follow through with any agreements. IIZ Because of this, he was unlikely to stake
Pakistan's security on an agreement with the Americans.
More telling was that even when offered incentives by the U.S., Bhutto was still
unwilling to take any actions that would hinder the nuclear weapons program. The
conflict over the French supplied reprocessing plant illustrates this dynamic. With
relations slightly improving, the U.S. eventually lifted the arms embargo, which opened
up the option for Pakistan to buy aircraft and missiles on a cash basis. 113 At the same
time, Pakistan had contracted with France for a nuclear reprocessing plant. Predictably,
110 Gallucci, "Draft: Pakistan and the Non-Proliferation Issue," 5.
III Kapur, Pakistan's Nuclear Development, 151.
112 Kapur, Pakistan's Nuclear Development, 151.
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the US. sought to have the deal cancelled unless an appropriate monitoring and
inspection regime was implemented.
In order to kill the deal, the US. sought to impress on the Pakistanis via its
diplomatic channels that it was taking seriously Islamabad's nuclear efforts. For
example, Kissinger went to Pakistan in August 1976 to negotiate Pakistan canceling the
reprocessing deal in exchange for 110 advanced A-7 aircraft. Kissinger failed to
convince Bhutto to take the deal. No one, not even the military with rapidly deteriorating
conventional arms, was willing to give up the reprocessing plant for the possible future
supply ofUS. aircraft. I 14 Pakistan refused to budge and the Carter Administration cut
off military and economic aid in 1977.115 These conflicts over the Pakistani nuclear
program served to again exacerbate relations between the two states. The conflict over
the French reprocessing facility continued, and the new Zia regime shortly inherited the
nuclear sticking point between the two states.
3. Pakistani Ambiguity Deepens As Zia Responds to U.S. Non-
Proliferation Pressures
Muhammad Zia ul-Haq came to power in 1977 through a military coup and
inherited both Pakistan's nuclear posture from his predecessor and the US. imposed
sanctions. 116 He continued many of Bhutto's former policies, including the development
114 Tahir-Kheli, India, Pakistan and the United States, 72-73.
liS Cheema, "Pakistan's Nuclear Policy," 9.
116 When Zia came to power, it was also a turning point as the nuclear program was brought under the
control of the military. Kapur, Pakistan's Nuclear Development, 151.
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of an independent nuclear option. I I? The U.S., for its part, estimated that Pakistan would
continue with its nuclear development under Zia's leadership, albeit in an opaque fashion,
and that these activities would lead to confrontation between the states. I 18 Yet, while Zia
sought to further the weapons program, he also felt that Bhutto was too outspoken with
his nuclear intentions and this had caused Pakistan to suffer military and economic costs.
For this reason, Zia sought over time to deepen Pakistan's ambiguous posture to deflect
external pressures while resolutely pursuing Pakistan's nuclear option.
The first nuclear proliferation crisis Zia inherited from the Bhutto regime was the
dispute with United States over the French reprocessing plant that Pakistan had
contracted to purchase. The Carter Administration had already imposed sanctions on
Pakistan by the time Zia came to power, over Pakistan's refusal to either cancel the
contract or safeguard the facility. Once France decided to kill the deal under U.S.
pressure, some military and economic aid was resumed in 1978.
However, the renewed assistance was very short-lived. Pakistan's continued
nuclear progress created rumors that the government was considering testing. The United
States suspected that Pakistan was pursuing a nuclear explosive capability, although there
were conflicting reports on when it would be able to conduct a test. I19 In order to buy
time for development, U.S. analysts reported that Pakistan "appears to be attempting to
117 Barrington King to u.s. Department of State, "Pakistan and Zia ul-Haq at the Two Year Mark," Secret
Cable 07789, II July 1979, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive
and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. NP01645, 96.
118 U.S. Department of State, "Pakistan's Short Term Prospects," Secret Report, 24 August 1979, Nuclear
Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no.
NPOI657,54.
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mask its effort with the label of 'research and development.' The Pakistanis seem bent
on stringing out negotiations with the US and other Western countries in order to gain
time for their scientists.,,12o Similarly, other estimates suggested that "there have been
repeated rumors that, for political purposes since the Zia government faces reelection in
November - - if they go through with having their elections - - that, pollitically {sic}, it
would be handy for them to have a show of strength at that time. So we are concerned
that they may, in fact, try to pull off an explosion there.,,121
If Pakistan did test a device, the United States predicted that they would follow
the Indian example and claim that it was a peaceful nuclear explosion, rather than for
military purposes. 122 Seeking to preempt the Pakistani position, the U.S. sought to
undermine the credibility of this reasoning with other states. 123 Additionally, the United
States sought to deter Pakistan from testing an explosive devise. For example, U.S.
Ambassador to Pakistan, Arthur Hummel, reported that he had "embarked on step by step
scenario designed gradually to expose to GOP our knowledge ofPak activities/intentions
in nuclear field, and to impress on Paks the dangers and penalties of proceeding down
that road.,,124 Further, by April 1979, fears of an imminent Pakistani nuclear test
120 U.S. Department of State, "Pakistan's Short Term Prospects," 54.
121 U.S. Department of State, "General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament," Secret,
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prompted the United States to impose sanctions on Pakistan under the Glenn and
Symington Amendments. The immediate goal was to apply domestic laws to forestall
Pakistan from testing, and even possibly compel it to abandon its weapons program. 125
However, even though the sanctions required cutting off military and economic aid, the
assistance was not very extensive and did not provide the U.S. with significant
leverage. 126
Even though the U.S. provided minimal aid, the Pakistani leadership strongly
protested the sanctions. Pakistan's foreign affairs advisor publicly stated that the
sanctions were unwarranted as its nuclear program was entirely for peaceful purposes,
and further argued that the move was discriminatory and anti-Muslim. 127 The Pakistanis
strongly resented the sanctions, and relations between the states were further strained.
U.S. analysts reported that the result of the sanctions is that "[i]t certainly has caused
so[intelligble] very bad blood with Pakistan, and it may be counter-productive in our
efforts to work out a solution, but we didn't have any choice because, literally, the terms
of the law were triggered.,,128
As this report suggests, there were concerns that imposing sanctions would
ultimately be counter-productive to U.S. non-proliferation efforts because of the damaged
relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan. There was, however, a belief that this was
125 Bhumitra Chakma, "Road to Chagai: Pakistan's Nuclear Programme, Its Sources and Motivations,"
Modem Asian Studies 36, no. 4 (2002), 893.
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unavoidable given the requirements ofD.S. law. Under the terms of the law, the only
way that the provisions could be waived was if the President received reliable assurances
that Pakistan was not pursuing a nuclear weapons option. However, as noted in the
report, this was extraordinarily unlikely to happen as the law was interpreted at that time.
Mainly, "[t]he emphasis there is on "reliable," because while they [the Pakistanis] have
asserted that they are not pursuing nuclear weapons, their actions are totally inconsistent
with that.,,129 This restrictive interpretation ofD.S. law would shortly change when
Reagan became President, and what constituted "reliable" enough information to waive
the legal requirements was viewed more broadly.
In the meantime, there was a crisis "underway in Pakistan's relationship with its
oldest patron, the United States, over the nuclea {sic} issue; it shows no sign of
resolution or abatement as the irresistible force of Pakistan's proliferation policy meets
head-on the immovable objective ofAmerican non-proliferation policy.,,130 This
confrontation with the United States left Pakistan with the feeling that it was alone facing
a host of security threats that it was ill-equipped to meet. Rather,
"because our single-minded pursuit of non-proliferation and theri {sic}
equally single-minded pursuit of a nuclear option which they feel
somehow will ease their chronic sense of insecurity, this sense of
'aloneness' is compounded by the inability to obtain modem arms, the
unrealiability ofArab friends, the uncompromising pressure of the Soviet
Union, and the limited scope for additional assistance and assurance form
{sic} the Chinese..."131
129 U.S. Department of State, "General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament," 314.
130 King, "Pakistan and Zia ul-Haq at the Two Year Mark," no. NP01645, 104.
131 King, "Pakistan and Zia ul-Haq at the Two Year Mark," no. NP01645, 104.
403
The practical result ofPakistan's nuclear policies is that they resulted in tensions
with the West and further affected Pakistan's technical ability to fulfill its nuclear goals.
Zia inherited these problems stemming from Bhutto's policies. Zia himself reportedly
thought that Bhutto had too openly talked of developing nuclear weapons, which was
"irresponsible" and the reason for Pakistan's increasing international isolation. 132 While
Zia was not able to immediately change the consequences, he learned that directly
confronting the West was counterproductive and sought greater ambiguity by neither
confirming nor denying that Pakistan was pursuing a nuclear weapons program.
For example, in contrast to Bhutto's initial stance, Zia did not publicly discuss the
rationale for Pakistan to develop a nuclear deterrent. 133 Additionally, rather than
choosing to formally declare Pakistan's intentions, or to demonstrate or test a device, Zia
continued Pakistan's program in secrecy. When pushed to further clarify Pakistan's
nuclear position, he would claim that Pakistan's nuclear program was for peaceful
purposes only. Even the enrichment program was labeled as necessary for "peaceful
purposes," despite the fact that other states viewed it has having no relevance whatsoever
to Pakistan's civilian program. 134 And, like his predecessor, Zia also proposed a number
of regional nuclear non-proliferation measures that India was unlikely to accept. This
move was seen as an effort to buttress the claim that Pakistan's program was for peaceful
\32 Zafar Iqbal Cheema, "Pakistan's Nuclear Use Doctrine and Command and Control," in Planning the
Unthinkable, Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan and James J. Wirtz, eds._{Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
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purposes and to relieve U.S. non-proliferation pressures. 135 In this way, Zia would
neither admit nor deny that Pakistan was pursuing a military component of the program.
Regardless of these efforts, United States did not believe that Pakistan's nuclear
program was for civilian purposes only. Rather, Zia's posture was seen as a "Pakistani
public relations campaign on the nuclear issue.,,136 Hummel reported that the "drumbeat"
to "set the record" straight where Pakistan denied having a nuclear weapons program
would continue. 13? This effort, he noted, was a "deliberate GOP smokescreen.,,138 As the
United States did not buy Zia's ambiguous posture, and was still intent on promoting
non-proliferation, the relationship between the two states did not improve until the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan. At this point, the Reagan Administration would choose to
ignore Pakistan's nuclear development, while some in the U.S. Congress would continue
to push for stricter application of U.S. domestic non-proliferation laws.
4. Security Environment Shifts in South Asia-Soviet Invasion of
Afghanistan
When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, the United States had renewed interest in
supporting its South Asian ally. The Reagan Administration effectively formed an
agreement with Pakistan, where it justified providing conventional assistance in return for
public Pakistani nuclear restraint. In effect, the U.S. was now willing to ignore
135 Ahmed, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program," 186.
136 Ambassador Humme11abe1ed his cable in this fashion. Arthur W. Hummel, Jr. to U.S. Department of
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Pakistan's nuclear progress as long as it did not draw public attention to it. Nonetheless,
some members of the U.S. Congress remained concerned about Pakistan's nuclear
activities and U.S. domestic law continued to impose constraints. This necessarily
entailed Pakistan reassuring President Reagan that is was not developing nuclear
weapons and relying on the Administration to keep Congress from imposing sanctions.
At the same time, President Reagan kept pressure on the Pakistanis, realizing that it
would not be able to keep Congress in check if Pakistan publicly demonstrated its nuclear
intentions. Predictably, when the Soviets finally withdrew from Afghanistan and the
Cold War began to wind down, so too did U.S. interests in supporting Pakistan.
Pakistan was suffering financially and militarily, and was diplomatically isolated
from the United States at the time of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. According to
U.S. estimates, Pakistan was on the verge of bankruptcy, much of its armed forces were
relying on outdated and poorly maintained equipment and it had "recklessly pursued an
independent nuclear weapons option at the cost of his relationship with what is still
Pakistan's most important patron, the United States ... ,,139
The Carter Administration, while still seeking to further nuclear non-proliferation,
now had to also worry about the Soviet's intentions in South Asia. This concern was
substantial enough that constraining Pakistan's nuclear program was no longer the
highest priority. 140 Towards this end, the Carter Administration offered the Pakistanis
$400 million dollars assistance package in February of 1980. Zia promptly rejected the
139 King, "Pakistan and Zia ul-Haq at the Two Year Mark," no. NPOl645, 97.
140 Chakma, "Road to Chagai," 894.
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aid package. In a well-known incident, Zia publicly scorned the offer, saying that it was
"peanuts." Instead, Zia proclaimed that for Pakistani security, it must rely on its
indigenous efforts, with support from the Islamic world, other non-aligned nations, and
its "time-tested friendship with China.,,141
While Zia publicly rejected the offer from the United States, he was likely hoping
to leverage the denial into a more attractive offer from the Reagan Administration, which
would shortly take office. Indeed, he sought additional economic and military aid, and
actually would have preferred a defense treaty with the United States. 142 In short, the
$400 million dollar offer was too little to pay for substantial security cooperation. 143
Moreover, Zia was suspicious that "acceptance of the aid package could affect the pursuit
of our nuclear research and development programme as long as the aid relationship
continued."144
While Zia was reluctant to link the acceptance of aid to Pakistani nuclear restraint,
he nonetheless sought to deprioritize the issue compared to the Soviet invasion. In the
same press conference where he referred to the American offer as peanuts, he reiterated
his stance on Pakistan's nuclear weapons program,
"I tell you know with all the emphasis at my command that Pakistan is not
making a bomb. Where lies the question of the nuclear facility, yes we are
enriching uranium. I've said so on top ofmy voice. But it is a very
141 Barrington King to U.S. Department of State, "Shahi Publicly Rejects Proposed U.S. Assistance
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humble, modest experiment. ..and for the .. .last three weeks, this question
has not appeared in our talks and our considerations and I hoped that with
the situation that we are faced today [unclear word, likely we] can keep
this problem aside for the time being until we have resolved greater issues.
And then you can come across on the nuclear issue.,,145
For its part, the Carter Administration was reluctant to waive the sanctions
imposed on Pakistan because of the uranium enrichment program. The Administration
was concerned that it could not certify that it had received "reliable assurances" from
Pakistan that it was not constructing nuclear weapons, based on the information it had
about the program. 146 The Administration was also worried that if it waived the sanctions
and Pakistan subsequently exploded a device, President Carter would be extremely
embarrassed. 147
5. The Reagan Administration Shifts Course
The Reagan Administration did not have the same non-proliferation reservations
that plagued the Carter Presidency. In addition to offering the Pakistanis a $3.2 billion
dollar aid package for 1981, Reagan was also willing to suspend the sanctions imposed
under the Glenn-Symington Amendment. 148 Pakistan would shortly become a recipient
of multi-year programs entailing significant amounts of economic and military assistance
to buoy resistance to the Soviets via the mujahideen in Afghanistan. From 1981 through
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1986, Pakistan ranked third among states receiving U.S. military aid, falling only behind
Israel and Egypt. 149 On the approval of the aid package in 1986 for the years 1987-1993,
the amount rose to $4.02 billion dollars and placed Pakistan as the second largest
recipient of American aid, following Israel.I 50 Additionally, aid was not contingent on
Pakistan entirely forgoing its nuclear program, but rather would be based on it
demonstrating public restraint that justified Reagan waiving further sanctions. I51
a) The Reagan Administration Justifies Aid for Non-
Proliferation
The Reagan Administration justified the volte-face in American non-proliferation
policy by highlighting the changed security environment in South Asia and suggesting
that Pakistan would be less likely to go nuclear ifit felt secure in its conventional
capability. With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan now emerged as a
strategically important state that justified economic and military support to thwart the
Soviets, regardless of its nuclear ambitions. 152 The Reagan Administration further
justified renewed security cooperation with Pakistan as a way to influence its decision
against choosing to develop nuclear weapons. The Administration argued that if Pakistan
had a sufficient conventional force, then it would be less inclined to invest in a nuclear
weapons capability. One report argued that "[o]ur assistance program for Pakistan is our
most effective weapon in dissuading that nation from continuing its nuclear explosives
149 Reiss, "The Illusion ofInfluence," 49.
ISO Paul, "Influence Through Arms Transfers," 1084.
151 Kapur, Pakistan's Nuclear Development, 183.
152 Paul, "Influence Through Arms Transfers," 1084.
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program. Our program is designed to help Pakistan address its legitimate security needs
thereby removing Pakistan's principle incentive for acquiring nuclear weapons.,,153
In this way, the policy focus shifted from undertaking punitive measures to induce
the Pakistanis to give up their program. Rather, the new approach was that the United
States could most effectively shape Pakistan's nuclear policy by cooperating with them
on security matters, rather than isolating them. Ironically, this argument did little to
address Pakistan's security concerns vis-a.-vis India, its historic adversary and the
principle motivation behind it developing a weapons capability. Conceivably, a
conventional force would also mitigate the security problems with India; however, prior
to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, U.S. policymakers did not seriously consider
conventional support as a viable option to "buy-out" Pakistan's nuclear weapons
program.
Because the United States wanted to provide aid to Pakistan, and at the same time
retain some measure of non-proliferation pressure, it now sought to link the two as a way
to induce Pakistani restraint and quell U.S. domestic concerns that it was abandoning
nuclear non-proliferation. For example, it was suggested that the Administration still
recognize the "serious problem posed by Pakistan's nuclear explosive program" and use
the "new security relationship to influence Pakistani nuclear decision-making."154 This
153 U.S. Department of State, "Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 735 of the International Security and
Development Cooperation Act of 1981: Pakistan's Nuclear Program," Secret Report, 14 March 1983,
Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992),
no. NP02022, 6.
154 Nicholas A. Veliotes to William P. Clark, "SIG Meeting on Pakistan," Secret Action Memorandum, 7
March 1981, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwick-
Healey, 1992), no. NP01870, 2.
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was particularly the case as the U.S. Congress expected that the Pakistanis would be
made aware of the non-proliferation concerns despite providing economic and military
assistance. 155
The reality, however, is that many within the Reagan Administration were
skeptical that the United States would be able to convince Pakistan to forego a nuclear
option altogether. Because the Pakistanis were so committed to developing an
independent nuclear option, the Administration determined that they would not be able to
come up with enough money to change Zia's mind about the program. 156 As such, they
largely treated the proliferation as inevitable. 15?
Instead of forcefully seeking to have the program stopped, which was seen as
futile, the Administration sought to have it slowed down and buried well below public
purview. The Reagan Administration had its own interests in Pakistan keeping its
nuclear progress secret; otherwise, the Administration would be embarrassed that it
waived sanctions and would be forced to cut off assistance as mandated by U.S. domestic
law. At the same time, the threat of cutting off aid if Pakistan dropped its ambiguous
posture was hoped to serve as a deterrent that would compel Pakistan to delay publicly
testing an explosive device. 158
155 Veliotes, "SIG Meeting on Pakistan," no. NP01870, 2.
156 Weissman, The Islamic Bomb, 320.
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Not only did the Administration change its policy of assisting Pakistan despite its
nuclear activities, it also moved the baseline of what constituted acceptable nuclear
activities. Prior to the Reagan Administration, sanctions were imposed on Pakistan for
enriching uranium. Now the rhetoric shifted from the previously disallowed pursuit of a
nuclear option, to drawing the bright line at forbidding Pakistan to build a weapons
capability.159 The emphasis was no longer on whether Pakistan was developing the
ability to build nuclear weapons, but shifted to whether Pakistan was actually building a
nuclear explosive device.
The Reagan Administration also sought a change in Congressional policy and
pushed for amendments to U.S. domestic non-proliferation laws to accommodate the new
strategy. The primary focus was on discrepancies in the preexisting statutory
amendments governing non-proliferation. The main difference was between the
Symington and Glenn amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act, where the
Administration argued that section 669 conflicted with section 670. 160 Under the
Symington amendment, the President could waive the requirements if termination of
assistance "would have serious adverse effect on vital United States interests" and "he
has received reliable assurances that the country in question will not acquire or develop
nuclear weapons.,,161 In contrast, the Glenn Amendment permitted waiver "if the
159 Weissman, The Islamic Bomb, 317.
160 Jane A. Coon, "Testimony Before the Subcommittees on Asian and Pacific Affairs," Unclassified, 27
April 1981, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive, 1992), no.
NP01879,2.
161 U.S. Department of State, "Talking Points on Pakistan," Secret Talking Points, 1 March 1981, Nuclear
Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive, 1992), no. NP01867, 3.
412
President detennines and certifies that termination of assistance 'would be seriously
prejudicial to the achievement of United State non-proliferation objectives or otherwise
jeopardize the common defense and security. ",162
The Administration argued that the latter fonnulation was preferable because it
allowed the President "appropriate flexibility to respond to US national security and non-
proliferation interests.,,163 While Congress was willing to underwrite these changes
because ofthe changed security environment in South Asia, it nonetheless expected the
Administration to have "thought through the nuclear problem in the context ofour new
relationship and will expect [the Administration] to discuss our concerns with the
Pakistanis.,,164 Thus, even though the President could now certify that Pakistan did not
have nuclear weapons and continue aid, the government of Pakistan was given
subsequent warnings that they should take Congressional concerns seriously when
"framing future policies. ,,165
These changes requiring only Presidential certification would later be utilized to
justify waivers even as the Reagan Administration was increasingly confronted with
evidence of Pakistan's continued nuclear development. For example, by 1987 President
162 U.S. Department of State, "Talking Points on Pakistan," no. NP01867, 2.
163 U.S. Department of State, "Talking Points on Pakistan," no. NP01867, 2.
164 Veliotes, "SIG Meeting on Pakistan," no. NP01870, 2.
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Reagan was required to seek waiver under both the Symington and Solarz Amendments.
When the Administration justified its waiver, it argued that:
"[this] action was based on the recognition that disrupting one of the
pillars of the U.S. relationship with Pakistan would be counterproductive
for the strategic interests of the United States, destabilizing for South Asia,
and unlikely to achieve the nonproliferation objectives sought by the
sponsors. The Government of Pakistan is aware of our continuing concern
over certain aspects of its nuclear program. Despite these problem areas,
there are crucial non-proliferation criteria which Pakistan continues to
honor. The United State will insist on the maintenance of these
restraints ..." 166
The Administration further reiterated its policy that U.S. assistance strengthened
American influence on Pakistan's nuclear decision-making and that threatening Pakistan
would be counterproductive by increasing the likelihood that it would choose a nuclear
option. For example,
"[d]evelopment of a close and reliable security partnership with Pakistan
gives Pakistan an alternative to nuclear weapons to meet its legitimate
security needs, and strengthens our influence on Pakistan's nuclear
decision making. Shifting to a policy ofthreats and public ultimata would
in our view decrease, not increase, the likelihood that we would achieve
our non-proliferation goals. Undermining the credibility of the security
relationship with the U.S. would itself create incentives for Pakistan to
ignore our concerns and push forward in the direction of nuclear weapons
acquisition. ,,167
In this way, the Reagan Administration justified waiving sanctions on Pakistan
and was further willing to overlook its nuclear developments as long as it had an interest
in South Asia and Pakistan did not publicly embarrass the United States by declaring or
166 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Presidential Waivers of Symington and Solarz
Amendments," 15 January 1987, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security
Archive, 1992), no. NP02410, 1.
167 "Pakistan Nuclear Issue," Press Guidance, 9 March 1987, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.:
The National Security Archive, 1992), no. NP02434, 1.
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testing a device. U.S. pressures to ensure that Pakistan would not choose to demonstrate
its nuclear ambitions are discussed below.
b) U.S. Efforts to Directly Pressure the Pakistanis
In an effort to make sure that Pakistan would retain an ambiguous posture, the
United States sought reassurances about its nuclear intentions. Washington also sought
to "educate" the Pakistani leadership as to the fallout of an open nuclear posture and
threatened that Congressional disapproval could cut off aid. There is some evidence that
these efforts were influential, in conjunction with the aid relationship, and factored into
the Pakistani calculations against testing when they had the technical capability to do so.
The United States sought reassurance from the Pakistani leadership that they
would not declare Pakistan a nuclear state or test a nuclear explosive device. The reasons
for these reassurances were twofold. First, before Congress approved amendments to the
Foreign Assistance Act, the President had to have reliable assurances that Pakistan was
not acquiring nuclear weapons. In 1981, these "assurances provided the basis for seeking
and obtaining legislation from Congress authorizing a waiver of the Symington
amendment for the duration ofthe five-year assistance program, without which the
president would have had to certify the Pakistan had ceased all efforts to acquire a
nuclear weapon." 168 For his part, "Zia understood that the condition that American law
168 Tahir-Kheli, India, Pakistan and the United States, 75.
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precluded aid without a specific presidential request for a waiver in the interest ofD.S.
national security.,,169
While Zia did finally provide assurances that Pakistan did not intend to develop
nuclear weapons, his language was nonetheless carefully crafted and did not include
assurances that it would stop seeking the ability to make weapons or conduct a 'peaceful
nuclear explosion.' 170 Zia's assurance was duly noted by then Under-Secretary of State
James Buckley when he urged the House Foreign Affairs Committee to remove the ban
on aid.171 However, Buckley also acknowledged that he believed that Pakistan intended
to move forward with their nuclear development program, and refused to clearly state that
the U.s. would cut off aid if Pakistan exploded a nuclear device. 172 A couple of days
later, Zia reiterated that Pakistan would not produce or acquire a nuclear bomb, while
also affirming that Pakistan would not give up the right to possess nuclear technology. 173
Second, the Administration wanted to ensure that it would not be publicly
embarrassed by Pakistan, since it was claiming that it had a justified reason to waive the
non-proliferation measures. And President Reagan received further assurances from Zia
that he would not embarrass the United States in the nuclear area. Some analysts
169 Tahir-Kheli, India, Pakistan and the United States, 75.
170 Judith Miller, "US Cites Pakistani Pledge Not to Make Atom Arms," Foreign Desk, The New York
Times, 25 June 1981, A6.
171 Bernard Gwertzman, "Pakistan Blast Could End Aid," Foreign Desk, The New York Times, 17
September 1981, AI.
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attributed Zia' s willingness to now provide assurances as predicated on the renewed
economic and military assistance. They noted that,
"Prior to the renewal ofour security assistance program the government of
Pakistan refused to renounce the development of 'peaceful nuclear
explosives.' During our discussion about renewing security assistance
U.S. government officials were assured by the Pakistani government that it
'would not embarrass us', presumably by a nuclear device. Recently, as
our economic and security assistance has begun to flow, we have been
assured by President Zia that Pakistan has no intention of testing a nuclear
device of any kind.,,174
Another factor that Zia likely took into consideration was that Pakistan was
already struggling to gain access to enough fissile material to build a device. 175 Not only
would testing deplete its already small supply of materials, but also it would ensure that
economic and military aid would again be cutoff. Thus, Zia likely calculated that
Pakistan could wait to test a device. It was further in his interest to reassure the U.S. of
this intention, which Zia did with public and private announcements that he had no
intention of detonating a nuclear explosive device. 176
However, the Reagan Administration also wanted to make sure that there was no
confusion on Pakistan's part over the new limits imposed on the nuclear program.
Towards this end, the U.S. sought to influence Pakistani decision-making by clearly
infonning the leadership of the legal and political constraints associated with the aid
package.
174 Joseph DeThomas, "Report to Congress: Pakistan's Nuclear Program," Secret Report, 14 March 1983,
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President Reagan himself made it a priority to discuss with Zia on his visit to
Washington D.C. that "nuclear weapons development is inconsistent with the
continuation of the u.s. security and economic assistance program. 177 The Reagan
Administration further reassured the U.S. domestic audience that it was carefully
monitoring the nuclear program and continued to send representatives to Pakistan to
underscore American concerns in this regard. 178
Of course, this did not mean that Pakistan gave up on its nuclear program. To the
contrary, it continued development the best it could under secrecy. So, for example,
when Vice-President Bush traveled to Pakistan in 1984, he again reiterated that the
relationship between the two states could be threatened by Pakistan's nuclear program.
Zia reportedly assured Bush that the program was peaceful. 179 Nonetheless, by then
Pakistan had already conducted a cold test of an atomic device. 180 Reagan also sent a
letter to Zia in 1984, "expressing his 'deep concern' that Pakistan's pursuit of these
weapons could undermine relations between the two countries." 181 This was seen as a
177 DeThomas, "Report to Congress: Pakistan's Nuclear Program," no. NP02022, 6.
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"useful declaration" because the White House had not visibly paid attention to the
dangers of proliferation during the previous four years. 182
The U.S. continued to send officials and scientists to Pakistan and inform the
Pakistanis on the rationale limiting American policy as related to the nuclear program. In
1985, Specialist in South Asian Affairs Richard Cronin went to Pakistan to highlight the
differences in the strategic environment between India and Pakistan as compared to the
U.S. and U.S.S.R. He further underscored the difficulties in accepting Zia's blatant
assurances without outside inspectors being able to verify the accuracy of these
statements.
In 1986, the U.S. took the opportunity to further inform new Prime Minister
Junejo on U.S. perspectives of Pakistan's nuclear policy. In anticipation of negotiating
the new aid package with Junejo as the head of the new civilian government, the
Administration wanted to make sure that they had the opportunity to "educate him on US
political process, and expose him first-hand to the issues in US-Pak relations.,,183 The
Administration was concerned that as a new player in Pakistani politics, Junejo might not
realize how serious of a threat Pakistan's continued nuclear activities was to the aid
package. 184
182 Shultz, "Washington Post Editorial on Pak Nuke Program," no. NP02l58, 2.
183 George P. Shultz, "Official Visit of Pakistan Prime Minister Junejo," Secret Briefing Memorandum, 1
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The Administration wanted the Junejo to be reminded of Zia's previous
assurances, in 1982 and 1984, promising restraint of the nuclear program. The threat was
that if "Pak actions to restrain the program are not forthcoming, our entire relationship
and the basis for our aid could be undennined...We must have positive Pak actions to
help convince the Congress to grant another waiver of Symington amendment, the sine
qua non for a follow-on program.,,185 They further hoped that part of the outcome of the
dialogue would be to gain Junejo's support in "genuine[ly] restrain[ing]" Pakistan's
nuclear program in order to maintain the assistance program. 186 Thus, in addition to
soliciting reassurances from Zia and outlining U.S. perspectives on Pakistan's
proliferation policy, the Reagan Administration also sought to remind the Pakistanis of
Congressionally imposed constraints on continuing aid.
Moreover, the Reagan Administration had to simultaneously ease the non-
proliferation concerns of an increasingly skeptical Congress that threatened to cut off
assistance and had passed further legislation that specifically targeted Pakistan. By 1985
the U.S. Congress was at odds with the Reagan administration's apparent willingness to
overlook Pakistani nuclear progress and its refusal to stop development. Congress
responded by passing two pieces of legislation aimed at countering Pakistan's continued
nuclear progress.
First, Congress passed the Solarz Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act. In
relevant part, the Amendment prohibited military and economic assistance to any non-
185 Murphy, "Briefing the President," no. NP02309, 4-5.
186 Shultz, "Official Visit of Pakistan Prime Minister Junejo," no. NP02308, 2.
420
nuclear state that illegally exported items from the United States that would significantly
contribute to that country's ability to make a nuclear explosive device. During the same
time, Congress also passed the Pressler Amendment. Under the Pressler Amendment, the
President was now required the President to certify annually that Pakistan did not possess
a nuclear explosive device. Continued military assistance was now contingent on this
certification. 187
The nuclear issue continued to pose major problems for U.S.-Pakistani
relations. 188 Despite Reagan's initial willingness to ignore Pakistani nuclear progress, the
U.S. Congress had placed legal and political constraints on the extent to which the
President could ignore the program. These constraints came to a head again as the first
five-year aid package to Pakistan was set to expire in 1987. In order to renew military
and economic assistance to Pakistan, the Administration, the Pakistani government, and
the U.S. Congress had to address continued evidence of Pakistani nuclear progress,
despite official denials to the contrary.
The first prerequisite for Pakistan to receive aid was another waiver of the
Symington Amendment. In 1981, Congress had passed a six-year waiver that was set to
shortly expire. Renewed assistance was contingent again on Congressional waiver of the
187 Technically, the Amendment also required that the President justify that the assistance would reduce the
risk that Pakistan would acquire a nuclear device. However, the Reagan Administration ignored this and
Congress did not challenge the Administration. See for example, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington
D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. NP0009.
188 Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey,
1992),no.NP0009.
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Symington Amendment. 189 Additionally, under the Pressler Amendment, the President
was also required to provide an annual certification "that Pakistan does not possess
nuclear device and that our aid program significantly reduces risk ofthis.,,190 Continued
concerns over Pakistan's nuclear activities posed a major problem in fulfilling both of
these requirements in order to provide security assistance. 191
The Presidential Administration recognized that without Pakistani restraint, "Pak
activities in this area make annual certification-and even Congressional waiver-very
problematic."192 Turning to Islamabad, the Administration impressed on Prime Minister
Junejo that "Pak unsafeguarded uranium enrichment, other activities, pose added
difficulties for USG in justifying new aid to Pakistan and in certifying annually that
Pakistan does not possess nuclear device ...Pak nuclear restraint absolutely critical to
continued US aid relationship."193 Notwithstanding the Reagan Administration's desire
to provide Pakistani assistance, public evidence of nuclear progress continued to pose a
problem.
In addition to having to annually certify that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear
device, the Reagan Administration also had to convince Congress to yet again waive the
189 Shultz, "Official Visit of Pakistan Prime Minister Junejo," NP02308, 2.
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weapons but do not have a device yet.
192 Shultz, "Official Visit of Pakistan Prime Minister Junejo," no. NP02308, 2.
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Symington Amendment for aid beyond 1987. By the time the next five-year aid package
was considered in Congress in 1986, it had grown increasingly impatient with the
obvious evidence that Pakistan was unwilling to abandon its nuclear program. This
included clear indications that China had helped Pakistan's nuclear weapons program in
significant ways. There were also a number of highly publicized incidents where
individuals were caught attempting to smuggle nuclear materials and information back to
Pakistan. These events generated opposition in Congress against sending more aid
without receiving assurances from the President that the Administration was committed
to stopping Pakistani proliferation.
Pakistan, for its part, issued a series of denials that it was developing nuclear
weapons and made another round ofproposals for a nuclear free zone in South Asia. In
particular, in 1986, the infamous Dr. A.Q. Khan declared that Pakistan's nuclear program
was peaceful, given that Zia had committed to not enriching uranium past 5%.194 A
month later, Prime Minister Junejo testified before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. He reiterated that Pakistan had no intentions to build a nuclear bomb and
was following Reagan's guidelines that uranium was only enriched at 5% at the Kahuta
facility.195 The Reagan Administration itself expressed concern over Pakistan's
unsafeguarded facilities but indicated that it did not have evidence that "Islamabad had
194 "Pakistani Efforts For Indigenous Reactor, Fuel Cycle Confirmed," Nucleonics Weekly, 26 June 1986,
1-3.
195 "An Assertion That Pakistan Is Not Building Nuclear Weapons," Nuclear News, 16 July 1986, 29.
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exploded a bomb.,,196 Shortly thereafter the U.S. reportedly warned Pakistan that it
would cut off aid if Islamabad continued with a program to make a nuclear bomb.197
Islamabad, for its part, issued further denials that its program was weapons
oriented. Rather, a spokesman indicated that Pakistan's nuclear program "is of a peaceful
nature, which has been proved during the last six or seven years. Pakistan has no
intention of carrying out a nuclear explosion and is ready to accept the control and
safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)."198 Even with the
assurances, the Reagan Administration had "U.S. Ambassador Hinton in Islamabad
warned Pakistan about nuclear activities inconsistent with a purely peaceful program and
cautioned that 'it is open to question whether the President could so certify were he to
conclude that Pakistan had in hand, but not assembled, all the needed components for a
nuclear explosive device.",I99
Nonetheless, the Reagan Administration went to Congress, seeking "a renewed
expression of support from the Congress to the long-tenn security and economic well-
being ofPakistan.,,2oo Specifically, the Administration sought additional economic and
military assistance and the necessary waiver of the Symington Amendment. In order to
196 "Reagan Administration Concerned Despite No Evidence of Pakistani Bomb," The Associated Press, 4
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197 "U.S. Dangles Aid to Halt Pak N-Efforts," The Times ofIndia, 7 November 1986.
198 "Spokesman Affirms Peaceful Nuclear Program," Karachi Domestic Service, 11 February 1987, in NTI
Nuclear and Missile Database, http://www.ntLorg/db/nuc1ear.
199 Donnelly, "Pakistan and Nuclear Weapons," 3.
200 Robert A. Peck, "Statement of Robert A. Peck to Subcommittee," Testimony, 5 March 1987, Nuclear
Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no.
NP02432,1.
424
ease Congressional concerns, the Administration pointed to both its previous efforts to
influence the Pakistani leadership to practice restraint and evidence that Pakistan had
done so. For example, in 1987 Peck emphasized that the U.S. had worked hard to
prevent nuclear proliferation in South Asia and have "raised our concerns about Pakistani
nuclear activities with that country's leaders at every opportunity. We have made it very
clear to them that provision of US security assistance requires Pakistani restraint in its
nuclear development program.,,20!
Peck further noted that the Administration's line in the sane had not yet been
crossed. He acknowledged that while "Pakistan appears to have acquired much of what it
needs to build nuclear weapons, our assessment remains-as the President certified in
October 1986-that it 'does not possess a nuclear explosive device' ...We believe this
situation reflects Pakistani awareness that acquisition of nuclear weapons would mean the
end of the US assistance program.,,202 Peck also reminded Congress that in 1982, the
U.S. was very concerned that Pakistan would proceed to test a nuclear device or transfer
nuclear technology to another country. He argued, "[n]one of these fears have
materialized. We should not underestimate the importance of this evidence of
restraint. ..Pakistan itself has publicly disclaimed any interest in building nuclear
weapons.,,203 Additionally, Peck stressed Pakistan's willingness to engage India with the
1985 informal agreement to not attack each other's nuclear facilities, and that Pakistan
201 Peck, "Statement of Robert A. Peck to Subcommittee," no. NP02432, 11.
202 Peck, "Statement of Robert A. Peck to Subcommittee," no. NP02432, 12.
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had recommend a number of non-proliferation measures, conditioned on Indian
acceptance.204
Still, Peck subtly acknowledged that Pakistan was furthering its nuclear
capability. He sought to emphasize that both India and Pakistan were creating a weapons
option, but that did not mean they would inevitably proceed to build weapons.205
Nonetheless, he suggested that a cut-off in aid would be detrimental to U.S. security
concerns in South Asia and would reduce the ability of Washington to influence the
Pakistani nuclear program. He argued,
"[i]n our view, continuation ofall US aid programs to Pakistan is an
essential to accomplishment ofour non-proliferation goals as it is to
pursuit of our regional security strategy. Whatever influence we have over
the thrust and direction of Pakistan's nuclear activities derives from our
strong security links. We have been down the cut-off road before and
know that any action which would cut off, curtail, or cast doubt on the
continuation of our assistance would be counter-productive, because it
would grievously undercut our influence over Pakistan's nuclear decision-
making. We therefore urge the Congress to act favorably on our request to
extend for the duration of our follow-on aid package the authorization
provided in section 620E of the Foreign Assistance Act to waive the
SYmington Amendment sanctions that would otherwise apply to
Pakistan. ,,206
Despite concerns over Pakistan's obvious continuation of a nuclear program,
Washington approved a continuation of military and economic aid. As part of the deal
however, Congress also wanted verifiable assurances from Pakistan that it would not
204 Peck, "Statement of Robert A. Peck to Subcommittee," no. NP02432, 14.
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produce weapons grade uranium.207 In fall of 1987, Islamabad again publicly proclaimed
that it was not enriching uranium above 5% levels, with 90% levels required for nuclear
weapons.208 Congress sought to hold the Pakistani government to their public posture
and passed an amendment to the aid package that required a cut off in assistance if
Pakistan enriched uranium over the 5% level. However, the amendment did not require
inspections to maintain aid, a condition that Pakistan most certainly would have rejected
as it had previously done. As such, there was no practicable way to verify that Pakistan
was following the conditions of the Amendment, other than its public statements. As this
event suggests, the U.S. Congress essentially set the law at the level that the Pakistani's
publicly acknowledged, and hoped that would at least slow the program down.
As a necessary component ofthe funding, Congress also ultimately waived the
Symington Amendment for another thirty months. In announcing the deal, the White
House emphasized that the Government of Pakistan was aware of Washington's concerns
and had adhered to crucial non-proliferation criteria.209 The Administration promised to
continue to persuade the Pakistanis to forgo a nuclear option and was still required to
certify annually that Pakistan did not posses a nuclear option.210
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c) Effects of U.S. Non-Proliferation Policy on Pakistani
Ambiguity
American non-proliferation policy towards Pakistan did not stop it from
developing a nuclear weapons option. It slowed down Pakistan's progress primarily
through denying it materials and technology through international export controls.
However, by explicitly linking aid to Pakistani nuclear restraint, U.S. non-proliferation
policy did operate as another incentive for Pakistan to maintain an ambiguous nuclear
posture. In particular, as an aid recipient during the 1980s, after the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, Pakistan did not publicly declare its status or test a nuclear explosive
device. It mainly denied that it was seeking nuclear weapons, and framed its nuclear
program as peaceful, while not giving up the right to nuclear development.
First, Pakistan did not test a nuclear explosive device while receiving U.S. aid.
Rather, publicly testing a nuclear explosive device would have created a direct
confrontation with the United States. As dictated by its domestic non-proliferation laws,
it would have required that the U.S. immediately cut-off military and economic assistance
to Pakistan. It would have further required that the United States directly evaluate the
threat of the Soviets in South Asia as compared to its credibility in pushing for
international non-proliferation. However, by waiting to test, Pakistan was able to
maintain the flow of aid, while also not triggering other effects, such as an Indian
response. For these reasons, Pakistan's forbearance in conducting a nuclear test during
the 1980s was likely in part the result ofU.S. aid.
For example, in December 1981, the CIA prepared a report that "Pakistan is
partly deterred from conducting a nuclear test by President Reagan's military and
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economic packages which will be withdrawn once Pakistan tests a nuclear device.,,211
Even though an imminent Pakistani test was not expected, the analysis further predicted
that Pakistan would not stop developing and stockpiling fissile materials for a nuclear
device.212
Similarly, in January 1983 an article appeared entitled "Zia forced to put off
nuclear test.,,213 The article credited, in part, American pressure as responsible for
delaying "an imminent Pakistani nuclear test.,,214 Even though Western intelligence
experts had noticed preparations for a potential underground test in the Chagmai Hills,
the article noted that Zia has "cultivated a studied lack of interest in nuclear testing.'.215 It
further noted that this stance, "first noticed earlier last year and strenuously displayed last
month in Washington, is explicable for the most part in terms of keeping Washington
happy. At stake is more than dollars 3 billion in direct military aid as well as the delivery
of 40 F-16 Fighters, the first of which began arriving in Pakistan later this year. Non-
military aid from Washington, the World Bank and the IMF is also in the pipeline.,,216
Another report surfaced in 1985 suggesting the same dynamics. The report indicated that
while Pakistan had not given up its nuclear program, it predicted that Zia would not
211 Judith Miller, "US Says Pakistan's Nuclear Potential Is Growing," Foreign Desk, The New York Times,
24 January 1982, Section 1, part 1, 6.
212 Judith Miller, "US Says Pakistan's Nuclear Potential Is Growing."
213 Louis, "Observer Article on Indo-Pak Nuclear Issue," no. NP02005.
214 Louis, "Observer Article on Indo-Pak Nuclear Issue," no. NP02005.
215 Louis, "Observer Article on Indo-Pak Nuclear Issue," no. NP02005.
216 Louis, "Observer Article on Indo-Pak Nuclear Issue," no. NP02005.
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explode a bomb in the near future as such a move would disrupt the relationship between
the United States and Pakistan?l?
While Pakistan chose not to publicly test a device,218 it nonetheless explicitly did
not give up the right to do so. For example, Pakistan's Foreign Minister Agha Shahi
indicated that Pakistan had not ruled out the possibility of a detonation if it was necessary
for its program.219 In the same statement he acknowledge that U.S. law required a cut-off
in aid, but expressed some doubt as to whether the Reagan Administration would really
do so given the strategic reality in South Asia.220 He also hedged the statement by
indicating that, "we make a distinction between an explosion and weapons.,,221 Later Zia
clearly reiterated that Pakistan did not have the intention to explode a nuclear device.222
Second, while Pakistan chose not to publicly test, its rhetoric was more
ambiguous during this time period. The Pakistani government would indicate that it had
the ability to build nuclear weapons, but had no intention of doing so. Likely this
approach to the public rhetoric served four purposes: 1) it was ambiguous enough that the
217 Foreign Broadcast Information Service, "Bomb Program Reportedly Slowed," Non-Classified Article,
30 April 1985, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and
Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. NP022l7, 1.
218 There were rumors in that Pakistan had conducted a test in conjunction with China. These reports were
publicly denied by both states. If it had done so, this would have reduced the technological need to conduct
tests in Pakistan. Also, by denying the tests, it enabled Pakistan to avoid confrontation with the United
States, something that it could not have done ifit had publicly tested and declared in Pakistan.
219 Alain Cass, "Pakistan Denies Giving Pledge on N-Testing," Overseas News, Financial Times, 15
January 1982, Section 1,3.
220 Cass, "Pakistan Denies Giving Pledge on N-Testing."
221 Cass, "Pakistan Denies Giving Pledge on N-Testing."
222 "Pakistani Denies He Will Hold Talks in Paris on Atom Plant,"Foreign Desk, The New York Times, 20
January 1982, A2.
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u.s. did not cutoff aid; 2) it helped bolster deterrence through uncertainty with India; 3)
it maintained a hedge that Pakistan might develop weapons in the future; and 4) some of
the statements were for domestic purposes.223 The primary pattern that developed is that
someone within the Pakistani leadership would claim that Pakistan had the technical
ability to make nuclear weapons, followed by a disclaimer that it had no intention to
make them.
For example, Prime Minister Zia claimed in a 1981 interview that, "we are proud
to say that Pakistan can make the bomb.,,224 The next day, Islamabad released an official
statement that Zia's response to the question was misinterpreted. The statement clarified
Pakistan's position that it had the right to acquire nuclear technology, which was different
than intending to produce an atomic bomb.225 Still, Zia also maintained that Pakistan had
the right to acquire nuclear technology, even if "we have to beg, borrow or steal.,,226 In
another interview in 1982, Zia stated that Pakistan's uranium enrichment effort was a
"modest, humble program" for using the technology for its nuclear power reactors.227 He
223 The United States also had to be careful in how much it publicly pressured Pakistan to restrain its
nuclear program. Washington recognized that Pakistan faced "domestic political sensitivities" and wished
to "avoid public confrontation or challenge to Pak sovereignty" Murphy, "Briefing the President," no.
NP02309,4.
224 "Other Reports on Korea; Turkish Leaders' Visit to Pakistan," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 26
November 1981, part 3, cited in http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/PakistanfNuclear.
225 "Turkish Leader's Visit to Pakistan; Pakistan Denies It Intends to Make Bomb," BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, 27 November 1981, part 3, cited in
http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/PakistanlNuclear.
226 Pearl Marshall, "Pakistan Hope LWR Fuel Supply Capability," Nuclear Fuel, 16 August 1982, no. 17,7,
summary available at http://www.nti.org/eJesearchiprofiles/Pakistan/Nuclear.
227 Mary Anne Weaver, "Zia: Pakistan's Military Ruler, and 'The Bomb'," Monitor Interview, Christian
Science Monitor, 30 November 1982, 12.
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also rejected allegations that Pakistan is developing a nuclear weapons capability, against
the backdrop of being accused of importing yellowcake from Niger.228 Similarly,
following the Brasstacks crisis in 1987, Dr. A.Q. Khan suggested that Pakistan had
produced nuclear weapon. Khan later denied that he even gave the interview, in the face
of diplomatic backlash and because American aid could be cut off under the Pressler
Amendment.229
6. Diplomatic Leverage with the United States
Under Zia, nuclear ambiguity also served as a source of leverage for Pakistan to
modernize its conventional forces with U.S. assistance. More specifically, by
maintaining ambiguity regarding Pakistan's nuclear intentions and not publicly
demonstrating its nuclear capability, Zia was able to trade ambiguity for conventional
assistance. Still, the threat ofthe nuclear program was always a factor in the relationship
and provided Zia with a bargaining chip and ready justification for garnering continued
support. In this manner, Zia accomplished what Bhutto was not able to because the U.S.
was once again engaged in the region because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. As
one scholar phrased it, Zia "synchronized Pakistan's pursuit of nuclear weapons with the
U.S. effort to modernize Pakistan's conventional forces during the Afghan conflict.,,230
The first reason Zia was able to leverage that United States is that the Reagan
Administration cared more about thwarting the Soviets in Afghanistan than preventing
228 Weaver, "Zia: Pakistan's Military Ruler, and 'The Bomb'," 2.
229 Chakma, "Road to Chagai," 900.
230 Cheema, "Pakistan's Nuclear Use Doctrine," 162.
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Pakistani proliferation. That is, the United States was so intent on countering the Soviet
threat in South Asia that it was willing to trade away its previously more restrictive
stance on non-proliferation. Certainly, measures were taken to intercept materials and
technology from reaching Pakistan, as well as to exert non-proliferation pressure on
Pakistan. Yet, the Administration was well aware that Pakistan continued its
proliferation activities. It simply sought to keep them below the public eye to ensure that
Congress continued to fund aid rather than invoking U.S. non-proliferation laws. As
Islamabad correctly perceived, U.S. non-proliferation pressures could be managed
through shrewd Pakistani diplomacy.231
Second, Zia never expressly promised to forego a nuclear option. Rather, he
stressed that Pakistan had no intention of developing nuclear weapons. This left open the
threat that Pakistan could go nuclear in the future. The further implication from Pakistan
was that it was particularly likely to pursue the nuclear weapons route ifits security needs
were not met, that is, if it no longer received conventional U.S. assistance. Thus, the
threat was that without receiving U.S. conventional assistance, Pakistan would more
readily convert its peaceful nuclear program into a weapons option.
The Reagan Administration also took this tact with the U.S. Congress as well,
arguing that it could best influence the Pakistan's nuclear program by staying engaged in
the region and directly contributing to Pakistani security. For example, when the U.S.
Congress considered its supply of aircraft to Pakistan, it was advised that any significant
changes in number ofnature ofthe planes would lead Pakistan to review it relationship
231 Kapur, Pakistan's Nuclear Development, 183.
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with the U.S. and move the country closer to a nuclear explosion.232 In this way, Pakistan
was relatively successful in securing U.S. arms and economic assistance through
leveraging its nuclear program?33 And part of this bargain was that Pakistan had to keep
its declarations ambiguous enough to not provoke the U.S. Congress. and refrain from
testing nuclear device.
In short, by capitalizing on its strategic significance, Pakistan was able to both
modernize its military while continuing progress on its nuclear program, as long as
Islamabad maintained ambiguity regarding its nuclear intentions.234 Ambiguity therefore
served as both a sword and a shield for Pakistan. Additionally, the foregoing suggests
that ambiguity was an arrangement the enabled both the United States and Pakistan to
further their own security goals. The United States kept its part of the arrangement by
providing weapons and encouraging Pakistan to keep its program out of the public eye.
Pakistan, for its part, maintained ambiguity and did not force the United States to directly
confront whether it would support an overt demonstration of Pakistan's nuclear
ambitions. Nonetheless, these dynamics changed yet again when the Soviets withdrew
from Afghanistan and the United States no longer had a strong of a security interest in
South Asia. Predictably U.S. non-proliferation efforts again rose to the forefront, to
Pakistan's military and economic detriment.
232 Paul, "Influence Through Arms Transfers," 1086.
233 Paul, "Influence Through Arms Transfers," 1087. Kapur has characterized it as "nuclear blackmail."
Kapur, Pakistan's Nuclear Development, 229.
234 Kapur, Pakistan's Nuclear Development, 185.
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7. The End of Looking the Other Way-Soviet Withdrawal from
Afghanistan
Tough times followed for Pakistan with the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Pakistan continued to develop its nuclear weapons capability but the United States was
no longer willing to look the other way. With the drawdown of the Cold War, the US
increased its non-proliferation pressure and warned Pakistan to cease nuclear weapons
development and 'rollback' its current capabilities.
The United States was now more willing to back up its non-proliferation demands
and began to impose punitive measures on Pakistan. For example, Prime Minister
Benazir Bhutto assured the U.S. Congress in 1989 that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear
device, and did not have any intent to make one.235 However, such reassures did not
carry much credibility as they echoed the late President Zia's similar claims that were at
odds with Pakistan's continued nuclear development. In response, President Bush
informed Bhutto that he would cut off aid ifhe found that Pakistan possessed a nuclear
weapon.236 President Bush did, however, agree to extend certification for one last year,
after Pakistan promised that it would cap its military nuclear program at current levels.237
Unwilling to jeopardize U.S. economic and military assistance, Pakistan
ostensibly gave in to U.S. pressure and stopped nuclear development for two years. 238 At
the same time, even some of the strongest proponents of Pakistan's nuclear program were
235 "Bhutto Denies Pakistan Has Weapons," The Christian Science Monitor, 9 June 1989,7-8.
236 "Bhutto Denies Pakistan Has Weapons," 7-8.
237 Chari, Indo-Pak Nuclear Standoff, 75.
238 Ahmed, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program," 189.
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concerned that the time was not yet ripe to declare Pakistan a nuclear weapons state. For
lexamp1e, Chiefof Army Staff General Beg argued that based on "the global scenario, the
IregiOna1 security, and the pressing needs of economic aid, it was decided that only in the
first phase...Pakistan should temporarily put a 'restraint' on its efforts, or so to say, a
policy of restraint was adopted.,,239
However, the next year, the United State imposed sanctions. In 1990, President
Bush was no longer willing to provide certification that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear
bomb and did not contend that U.S. aid was dissuading Islamabad from building nuclear
weapons. 240 So the U.S. Congress cut off aid, which amounted to approximately $500
million per year, because of suspicions that Pakistan was developing nuclear weapons.241
By invoking the Pressler Amendment, the delivery of the previously paid for F-16 fighter
aircraft were also put on hold. In short, Pakistan no longer had the patronization from the
Americans and was now suffering under punitive sanctions. 242 Washington further
signaled its impatience in 1991 and threatened that it would list Pakistan as a terrorist
state if it did not abandon its nuclear program and stop backing Kashmiri mi1itants.243
239 Cheema, "Pakistan's Nuclear Use Doctrine," 163.
240 "Pakistan Chief Asks US Talks On Atom Issue," The New York Times, 30 November 1990, A8.
Ironically, some scholars note that this actually bolstered Pakistani deterrence by enhancing the credibility
of Pakistan's nuclear program. Reiss, "The Illusion ofinfluence." See also, Chari, Indo-Pak Nuclear
Standoff, noting that U.S. sanctions lent a greater legitimacy and credibility to Pakistan's nuclear program.
241 "Pakistan Chief Asks US Talks On Atom Issue," A8.
242 Chakma, "Road to Chagai," 901.
243 Chakma, "Road to Chagai," 902.
436
The message was clear to Pakistan that if it wanted to receive aid, it would have
to stop its proliferation efforts. For example, in June 1991, the U.S. proposed to supply
Pakistan with conventional weapons if it promised that it will not attempt to buy or
develop nuclear weapons.244 The same message was given to a group of Pakistani
Senators who later visited Washington D.C.; they were informed that suspension of
economic and military aid would continue until Pakistan proved that it did not have
nuclear weapons and was not building them.245
For its part, Pakistan very much wanted the sanctions under the Pressler
Amendment removed and the resumption of military and economic aid. Islamabad
claimed that its program was peaceful, but also used regional security justifications as a
reason that it needed the nuclear option. Islamabad argued that Pakistan had legitimate
security concerns vis-a.-vis India that required nuclear weapons and US negative
sanctions only served to diminish Washington's ability to influence its policies.246 To
further promote the idea that Pakistan opposed proliferation, Islamabad again proposed
creating a nuclear free zone in South Asia.247 India promptly rejected the suggestion as a
ploy by Pakistan for renewed military aid.248
244 "Pakistan May Get Weapons in Gulf," The Washington Times, 11 June 1991, A8.
245 "Pakistan May Get Weapons in Gulf," A8.
246 Ahmed, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program," 191.
247 "Editorial on Pakistan, India 'Nuclear Luxury'" Nuclear Developments, 24 July 1991, in NT! Nuclear
and Missile Database, http://nti.org/db/nuclear, 13.
248 "Editorial on Pakistan, India 'Nuclear Luxury'" 13.
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As a result of pressure from the U.S., Pakistan allegedly froze its uranium
enrichment leve1s.249 However, Pakistan would not give in on key issues of its nuclear
program. Pakistan refused to reverse or abandon its program as it likely correctly
calculated that it still would not receive the largesse the Cold War afforded?50 Pakistan
also refused to sign the NPT, unless India did so first,25! However, Pakistan's delegation
also reported to the United Nations that Pakistan was committed to nuclear non-
proliferation and peaceful nuclear energy.252 The same year, 1990, Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif came to power and reiterated that Pakistan did not have a nuclear bomb
and would be happy to sign the NPT ifIndia did SO.253 Statements of this nature
continued, as well as overtures by Islamabad that it would negotiate, as Pakistani officials
lobbied for the resumption of aid.
At the same time, the official leadership did generally acknowledge that Pakistan
had the capability to produce nuclear weapons, even if it did not intend on doing so.
Likely this was to bolster deterrence vis-a-vis India and encourage negotiations with
Pakistan, while still seeking to reengage the U.S.
249 Matinuddin, The Nuclearization of South Asia, 96. Predictably, General Beg denied that it was US
pressure but rather that Pakistan had achieved the desired level of emiched uranium. Ibid.
250 Ahmed and Cortright, Pakistan and the Bomb, 12.
251 "Minister Refutes Bhutto's Allegation," Islamabad Domestic Service, 20 October 1990, in NIT Nuclear
and Missile Database, http://nti.org/db/nuclear.
252 "UN Delegate Reaffirins Peaceful Use," Islamabad Domestic Service, 26 October 1990, in NIT Nuclear
and Missile Database, http://nti.org/db/nuclear.
253 "Pakistan: Nuclear Program Can Be Independent, Khan Says," Nucleonics Week, 15 November 1990,
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It wasn't until the Clinton Administration that Washington sought to more fully
reengage with Pakistan. In seeking a renewal of assistance, Pakistani Prime Minister
Qureshi indicated that Pakistan had suspended its nuclear program and that he wanted the
u.s. to review its embargo on economic and military aid to Pakistan.254 He further
reiterated that Pakistan was not working on making any nuclear weapons.255 While
Pakistan's public stance remained the same, President Clinton was willing to be more
flexible towards Pakistan. In 1993 the Clinton Administration offered a one-time waiver
under the Pressler Amendment in order to deliver the 28 F-16s that were ordered prior to
the sanctions, as well as other forms ofmilitary hardware reportedly worth $368 million
u.s. dollars.256 The aid was contingent on Pakistan capping its weapons-grade material
at current levels. This move by Washington effectively signaled to some Pakistani
policymakers that the U.S. had accepted Pakistan as a de facto nuclear state by no longer
insisting that Pakistan roll back its progress.257
For her part, now Prime Minister Bhutto argued that Pakistan had shown
tremendous restraint by not testing a nuclear weapon, despite the fact that India had
previously conducted a nuclear test and now more recently was test-firing the Prithvi
missile system.258 She indicated that Pakistan should receive recognition for refraining
254 "Pakistani Premier Says Nuclear Programme On Hold," Reuters (Islamabad), 24 September 1993, in
NTI Nuclear and Missile Database, http://www.nti.org/db/nuclear.
255 "Pakistani Premier Says Nuclear Programme On Hold."
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from detonating a nuclear device even though the U.S. had cut off assistance in 1994.259
At the same time, the Prime Minister acknowledged that Pakistan had the materials and
knowledge to construct a nuclear weapon,260 and suggested that Washington was
strengthening the position of nuclear hardliners by not delivery the previously paid for F-
16 jets.261
After the initial waiver, the Clinton Administration followed up and sought
modification of the Pressler Amendment.262 Senator Brown supported the change,
arguing that the Pressler Amendment had a negative effect on a major U.S.-Pakistan
conventional arms deal. 263 So in 1995, a further $368 million dollar package of weapons
and military equipment was approved for Pakistan.264 Congress further approved
restoration of military training assistance for the Pakistani armed forces in 1997, and
justified that by doing so, it would strengthen U.S. influence with the Pakistani armed
forces. 265
In sum, the United States attempted to leverage its role as Pakistan's patron state
to prevent Pakistan from obtaining nuclear weapons and, failing that, to maintain an
259 "Bhutto Says U.S. Moves Promote Nuclear Spread," Reuters, 26 November 1994, in NT! Nuclear and
Missile Database, http://www.nti.org/db/nuclear.
260 "Pakistan's Bhutto Seeks Regional Nuclear Arms Ban," Reuters, 15 September 1994, in NT! Nuclear
and Missile Database, http://www.nti.org/db/nuclear.
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ambiguous posture. The latter was a consolation prize. During the 1980s, Pakistani
ambiguity meant that the Reagan administration could send funds to Pakistan in an effort
to hinder the Soviets in Afghanistan and also to maintain the American stance against
proliferation in public. In return for U.S. largesse in the form of economic and
conventional military assistance, Pakistani leaders were required to reassure a skeptical
U.S. Congress that Islamabad had no intentions to conduct nuclear tests or produce
nuclear weapons.
Notwithstanding these declarations that were contrary to continued reports of
Pakistani nuclear progress, the U.S. imposed sanctions again once its strategic interests
waned in South Asia with the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. At this
point, U.S. non-proliferation pressures again demanded more than the Pakistanis were
willing to give-stopping or rolling back the nuclear program. Despite Pakistani
protestations that their nuclear program was for peaceful purposes (which was effective
during the 1980s), the U.S. imposed sanctions.
D. Lack of Patron State Constraints - Chinese Cooperation
While the U.S. is considered an unreliable ally in Islamabad, China is viewed as a
long-term patron supporter ofPakistan, having provided decades of conventional and
nuclear assistance. Based on this close relationship between China and Pakistan, the
United States has also sought to pressure China to restrict exporting nuclear materials and
technology that would further Pakistan's weapons program. However, the U.S. has
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generally had little success to show for these efforts and China has served as a very
important nuclear supplier for Pakistan throughout the course of several decades. 266
In the mid-1960s, Pakistan turned to China for conventional arms after United
States embargoed weapons shipments during the Indo-Pak war. The relationship between
China and Pakistan would blossom into a nuclear one by the 1970s. For its part, Pakistan
sought to strengthen its relationship with China as way to create more options for its
security vis-a.-vis India. 267 China's motivations were, in part, to balance India militarily
and politically.268 In terms of conventional assistance, China has supplied military
equipment including: tanks, naval vessels, aircraft, missiles, and weapons technology.269
It is also likely that China also eventually supply Pakistan with nuclear materials, designs
for a rudimentary bomb, and missile delivery capabilities. While the extent of Chinese
assistance is not precisely known, U.S. intelligence sources have contended that Pakistan
would not have been able to complete their bomb project without Chinese support.270
266 There is considerable suspicion within the U.S. government that Pakistan and North Korea engaged in
quid pro quo exchange of uranium emichment technology for long-range missile development. See
"Weapons of Mass Destruction." It was also widely reported that Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Iran provided
funding for the Pakistani nuclear program.
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By 1979, there was speculation that China had provided Pakistan with sufficient
weapons-grade uranium to conduct a nuclear test,271 Pakistan necessarily would have
had to rely on outside sources at this point because it did not have either a reprocessing
plant or uranium enrichment plant operating at full capacity.272 There was public
information in 1980 that Chinese experts were assisting Pakistan in its efforts to enrich
uranium.273 This was quickly followed by reports that China and Pakistan had come to
agreement that China would permit Pakistan to test nuclear devices on Chinese territory
and supervised by Chinese and Pakistani scientists.274
By 1983 there were also reports that China had provided Pakistan with the design
of a nuclear weapon,275 and that China sold enriched uranium to Pakistan.276 Some
nuclear experts also believed that China conducted a test for Pakistan in the Sinkiang
desert.277 Further, much of Pakistan's missile development has also been dependent on
China, including the Ghauri missile tested in 1998, which is designed to carry nuclear
271 "Pakistan: A Clue to the Bomb Mystery," World Politics and Current Affairs, Intemation, Economist,
14 July 1979, 60.
272 "Pakistan: A Clue to the Bomb Mystery," 60.
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275 Donnelly, "Pakistan and Nuclear Weapons," 5. See also U.S. Department of State, "The Pakistani
Nuclear Program," no. WM00275, 6.
276 Louis, "Observer Article on Indo-Pak Nuclear Issue," no. NP02005, 1.
277 "U.S. Dangles Aid to Halt Pak N-Efforts."
443
warheads.278 In short, a close military supply relationship existed between Pakistan and
China, one which has spanned spanning decades and included the provision of important
and sensitive nuclear weapons related technology and materials.
Both Pakistan and China have consistently denied reports of nuclear links
between the two countries. For example, speaking at a press conference in Beijing, Zia
stated that China was not involved in Pakistan's peaceful nuclear energy program, which
was completely indigenous.279 Similarly, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang insisted that
China would not help other countries develop nuclear weapons. He assured the U.S. that
"we do not advocate or encourage nuclear proliferation, nor will we ourselves practice
nuclear proliferation or help other countries to develop nuclear arms.,,280 When later
accused of nuclear cooperation, China would reiterate that it only assisted programs that
were for "peaceful purposes.,,281 China further endorsed the proposal for the creation of a
nuclear free zone in South Asia.282 Later, Beijing indicated that it would request that
nuclear recipient states accept safeguards in accordance with IAEA requirements.283 In
278 Milind Thakar, "Coping with Insecurity: The Pakistani Variable in Indo-US Relations," in Engaging
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addition to these general pronouncements, China has specifically denied that it assisted
Pakistan in developing nuclear weapons.284
1. U.S. Efforts to Pressure the Chinese
Given this relationship between China and Pakistan, the United States has sought
to pressure China to practice restraint in supplying nuclear knowledge, technology, and
materials. For example, by 1982, one of the factors obstructing a bilateral nuclear
agreement between the U.S. and China were the reports that China was supplying
Pakistan with items other than fuel related materials.285 Shortly thereafter, the U.S. put
on hold bilateral nuclear cooperation talks with China because of intelligence reports that
it helped Pakistan produce weapons grade plutonium. 286
The nuclear relationship between Pakistan and China continued to hinder the
latter's efforts to forge ties with Washington because of U.S. Congressional concerns. By
1984, Reagan had visited China and received a pledge that it would not assist other
countries in developing nuclear weapons, in order to gain nuclear cooperation with the
u.S.287 Yet, with reports that Pakistan had tested a nuclear device on Chinese territory,
Congress sought additional reassurances before passing the agreement, which China was
284 Donnelly, "Pakistan and Nuclear Weapons," 5. See also U.S. Embassy China to U.S. Department of
State, "Ranking MFA Official on PRC Nuclear Matters: No Proliferation or Subs for Pakistan," Secret
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unwilling to give.288 There were also the reports to contend with that the Reagan
Administration suspected that in 1983 China had given Pakistan a bomb design.289
Given Congressional concerns, the Administration waited to submit the
agreement to Congress. Reportedly, the "Administration has never offered an
explanation for this long delay, but the reasons evidently involve the accusations that the
Chinese have been helping Pakistan develop nuclear weapons. Since the Chinese
vigorously deny it, Mr. Reagan's handling of the nuclear agreement has become a central
issue between the two governments.,,290
China's continued supply relationship with Pakistan again disrupted ties with the
United States in the early 1990s. Washington became increasingly concerned over
reports that China was providing Pakistan with M-11 missiles that violated MTCR
guidelines. The result of these suspected activities was the US refusing to continue
extending Most Favored Nation status to China. Beijing responded with assurances that
it was in compliance, leading to a restored status.291 The U.S. initiated another round of
sanctions in 1993 based on concerns that the transfers continued. This led to renewed
sanctions against China, which were waived shortly after imposition. 292
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More recently, China has increasingly sought to playa greater role in
international affairs. Consistent with this approach, during the 1990s China's non-
proliferation policies changed considerably as it signed the previously shunned NPT, the
Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.293 China has
also started to "adopt a legally based export control system covering a variety ofsensitive
materials, equipment and technologies.,,294 It remains to be seen whether China will
fulfill its commitments under these agreements. If not, the incentives remain to keep
nuclear and missile exchanges with proliferators private.
2. Incentives for Secrecy
Based on this supplier relationship, and external pressures from the United States,
both China and Pakistan have incentives to keep a low profile surrounding their
exchanges. For China, undetected cooperation would insulate it from U.S. sanctions and
other measures designed to encourage Chinese participation in the non-proliferation
regime. Additionally, China has even less incentive to be linked to Pakistan's nuclear
program if it is seeking to enhance its international image.295
Likely an additional consideration for China is that it does not want to be drawn
into the conflict between India and Pakistan. For example, India previously threatened to
destroy China's rocket and nuclear weapons facilities at Lop Nor ifBeijing did not stay
293 Bates Gill and Evan S. Medeiros, "Foreign and Domestic Influences on China's Arms Control and
Nonproliferation Policies," The China Quarterly 161 (March 2000),66. China has signed, but not ratified,
the CTBT.
294 Gill and Medeiros, "Foreign and Domestic Influences on China's Arms Control," 66.
295 Kapur, Pakistan's Nuclear Development, 247.
447
out of the 1971 Indo-Pak war.296 More recently, India and China have seen a reduction in
tensions and growing relationship between the two countries. This has to the observation
that "Pakistan's long-time ally China has given conflicting and confusing signals about
its support for development of nuclear weapons by Pakistan. With the emerging detente
between China and India, there will be additional reasons for China not to encourage
Pakistan to join or continue the arms race with India.,,297
That said, there is little direct evidence ofChina's stance in its diplomatic
relations with Pakistan and whether it has linked the supply of nuclear technology to
Pakistani ambiguity. Given the importance of the relationship to Pakistan, it is likely that
Chinese policy has considerable influence over Pakistan's posture. Still, even though
China may not want to be publicly held as a nuclear supplier does not automatically
extend to preferring that Pakistan itself remain ambiguous.
In sum, the international non-proliferation regime, led by the U.S., has created
some incentives for both proliferating and supplier states to conduct exchanges well
below the public eye. For the supplier states, they are susceptible, to varying degrees, of
U.S. pressures to forgo providing nuclear assistance to Pakistan. At the same time,
because Pakistan was so heavily reliant on external sources of support for its nuclear
program, it also had very strong motivations to keep hidden any information that it was
receiving assistance with its nuclear program.
296 Weissman, The Islamic Bomb, 51.
297 Inayatul1ah, The Nuclear Arms Race, 94.
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E. International and Regional Non-Proliferation Pressures
Pakistan has avoided membership in the major international non-proliferation
agreements. While this has limited Pakistani obligations, Islamabad has still been subject
to the proliferation policies of some member states that refuse to supply technology and
materials to states such as Pakistan that do not provide safeguards on all of their nuclear
facilities. The primary effect of this was to slow down Pakistani proliferation,
particularly as it had to acquire its technology from other sources. Still, other states such
as France were more willing to continue cooperating with the Pakistanis, unless the
United States interfered. The French reprocessing deal with Pakistan demonstrates these
dynamics.
Pakistan has also proposed a number of regional non-proliferation measures over
time, although most of them were not given serious consideration by India. As such,
regional measures have not played a role in Pakistan's nuclear posture. The regional
measures are also further discussed below.
1. Lack of Membership in International Non-Proliferation Regimes
Pakistan has refused to sign the major international non-proliferation agreements,
including the NPT and the CTBT. Pakistan indicated that it would sign the NPT and
open all of its nuclear facilities to international inspection ifIndia also agreed to the same
commitments. However, India refuses to sign any agreements that would restrict its
nuclear program, particularly agreements that China has refused to participate in.
449
Pakistan therefore refused to sign the NPT because India was not a party. For the same
reasons Pakistan has not signed the CTBT.
Pakistan did sign the PTBT and has some of its facilities under IAEA inspections.
However, its major nuclear facilities used for enriched uranium are not subject to
safeguards. Thus, because Pakistan remains largely outside of the nuclear non-
proliferation institutions, it is not subject to the obligations imposed by the agreements.
So the effects of the regime have had limited direct effect on Pakistan's nuclear program.
States that comply with international agreements to limit the diffusion of nuclear
technology and materials have, however, affected the Pakistani nuclear program. This is
primarily because Pakistan has for most of its history been reliant on external assistance
for is nuclear energy program. This means that the more concerns the Pakistani nuclear
program generated within the international community, the more difficult it was for it to
gamer technical assistance it needed for both nuclear power and its weapons program.
For example, the reduction of nuclear assistance, particularly from Western
supplier countries has had a significant effect on Pakistan's nuclear program.298 For
example, Pakistan was dependent on Canada for fuel, spare parts, and heavy water for its
KANUPP reactor. Canada subsequently suspended cooperation in 1976 after Pakistan
refused to accept either full-scope safeguards or sign the NPT. While other states did not
have such a rigid non-proliferation stance, if Pakistan chose to publicly acknowledge its
nuclear intentions, it would further risk losing the remaining assistance it both had and
hoped to get from Western sources. However, the threat of Western cut off in aid was
298 Central Intelligence Agency, "Pakistan's Nuclear Program," no. WM00212, 3.
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not a foolproof non-proliferation plan, as Pakistan turned to developing indigenous
sources of fuel and to its ally China for nuclear assistance.
2. U.S. Indirect Pressure: The French Reprocessing Facility
"Oh ye of little faith, I would appreciate some day (at your leisure) an
account of what mysterious signs in the entrails led you all to conclude at
the last minute that the French would not do it. I realize that a high-
minded Frenchman with idealist concerns for humanity is not everybody's
image ofM. Dupont. But is our intelligence solely based on images!"
Hartman299
When the U.S. is made non-proliferation a priority, the US. indirectly affected
Pakistani nuclear policy by pressuring other states to refrain from cooperation.
Washington did so by pressuring other states to forgo cooperation that would assist
Pakistan in its nuclear program and to shore up safeguards and other denial mechanisms.
This source of bilateral pressure was particularly important in the Pakistani case because
was largely impervious to direct institutional pressures such as the NPT, having refused
to join the treaty. Still, not all states shared the US. non-proliferation goals to the same
extent. The following reviews an example of successful US. pressures on France to
forego the sale of the reprocessing plant to Pakistan. This stands in contrast to the largely
unsuccessfully efforts to convince China to stop the spread of nuclear proliferation.
France contractually agreed to provide Pakistan with a nuclear reprocessing
facility in 1974. The United States was becoming increasingly apprehensive that
Pakistan was seeking to develop a weapons option under the guise of its civilian nuclear
299 Arthur A. Hartman to U.S. Department of State, "Department of Higher Intelligence - Pakistan
Reprocessing Division," Secret Cable 22584, 18 July 1978, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.:
The National Security Archive, 1992), no. NP01600.
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program.300 As such, Washington objected to this agreement and exerted pressure on
both Pakistan and France to kill the deal. The U.S. was ultimately successful in doing so.
This episode provides a vignette ofhow Washington sought to stop Pakistani
proliferation by pressuring other states to not export materials or technology that could be
used for dual purposes.301
Almost immediately on making the decision to pursue nuclear weapons in 1972,
Pakistan began its efforts to acquire a nuclear fuel reprocessing facility in order to
produce weapons grade plutonium. Towards this end, Pakistan began negotiations with
Belgian and French companies to purchase a facility.302 In April 1974, Pakistan signed a
contract with a French firm, with terms stipulating that it would supply Pakistan a nuclear
fuel reprocessing plant to be constructed at Chasma.303
For their part, the French had publicly declared that they would follow the 1968
NPT agreement, even though they were not yet signatories. Nonetheless, they were
willing to sell the reprocessing plant to Pakistan, even though confidential French
documents suggest that the French government had knowledge that Pakistan intended to
300 "Apprehensions Regarding Pakistan's Nuclear Intentions," Confidential Memorandum of Conversation,
3 September 1975, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive, 1992),
no. NP01433.
301 Of course, the U.S. sought to use its influence to persuade other countries to also exert non-proliferation
pressure on Pakistan in other ways. For example, in 1979 a secret briefing paper suggested making the
point that the U.S. hoped that other states would also make it clear that a nuclear test would have a negative
effect on bilateral relations. "Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Pakistan and Argentina," Secret Briefing Paper,
19 November 1979, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive, 1992),
no. NP01693.
302 Shahid-ur-Rehrnan, "Long Road to Chagai," cited in NTI chronology.
303 Economist, 14 April 1979.
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pursue nuclear weapons.304 Viewing nuclear proliferation as inevitable, France sought to
further its political and commercial interests, rather than non-proliferation.305
However, the agreement between France and Pakistan for the reprocessing plant
caused significant concern with the U.S. because the facility was not subject to stringent
enough safeguards. As the U.S. suspected, Pakistan intended to use the facility to
produce nuclear weapons by processing spent plutonium.306 Both states came under
intense pressure from the United States to stop the dea1.307
First, the United States sought to persuade Pakistan to abandon the contract
through both incentives and threats.308 In terms of incentives, the U.S. offered to sell
Pakistan 110 Vought A-7 aircraft if Pakistan agreed to not purchase the nuclear reactor
from France.309 By this time, the U.S. also had domestic non-proliferation laws on the
books that it could invoke ifPakistan did not give up the contract. The U.S. further
sought to discourage Pakistan through diplomacy.
304 Kapur, Pakistan's Nuclear Development, 143.
305 Kapur, Pakistan's Nuclear Development, 143.
306 "Information Bank Abstracts," The New York Times, 24 February 1976.
307 Joseph P. Sisco to Henry A. Kissinger, "Problems in Regard to a Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plant,"
Confidential Memorandum, 11 February 1976, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National
Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. NP01449.
308 Canada also sought to pressure Pakistan to accept safeguards in order to ensure the new facility is not
used for weapons proliferation. In refusing, Bhutto contended that Pakistan was not interested in nuclear
explosives and that the IAEA had approved the deal between France and Pakistan. "Information Bank
Abstracts," The New York Times, 26 February 1976.
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According to U.S. documents, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger met with
Bhutto in New York where he expressed U.S. concerns about Pakistan acquiring sensitive
nuclear technology and requested that Bhutto reconsider such purchases.310 Bhutto later
alleged that Kissinger told him that he would make a "horrible example" out ofhim ifhe
did not give up his nuclear ambitions.311 In any event, Bhutto refused to cancel the
agreement and indicated that Pakistan would proceed with the purchase of the plant
despite objections from the u.S.312 Pakistan further publicly reiterated its commitment to
a 'peaceful' nuclear program and sought to draw attention to India's continued nuclear
development in order to retain French assistance.313
At the same time that the U.S. pressured Pakistan to cancel the contract for the
reprocessing plant, Washington also sought to persuade France to forego the deal.
Because Pakistan's nuclear intentions were already clear, and the French reprocessing
plant did not provide safeguards against the diversion of materials, the U.S. sought to
have safeguards imposed on all of Pakistan's existing research and power facilities. 314
Kissinger also had contact with the French government, sending a letter specifically
310 Shahid-ur-Rehman, "Long Road to Chagai," cited in NTI chronology (April 1976), 1461.
311 Ahmed, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program," 273, quoting Stanley Wolpert, Zulfi Bhutto of
Pakistan: His Life and Times (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). It is not possible to verify that
Kissinger actually made this statement.
312 "Information Bank Abstracts," The New York Times, 11 August 1976.
313 Ahmed, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program," 185.
314 Tahir-Kheli, India. Pakistan and the United States, 72.
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asking them to not proceed with the sale of the reprocessing plant,315 The French
however, were not pleased to be subjected to U.S. non-proliferation pressures over the
fuel reprocessing deal, and initially refused to cancel the sale.316 France further stated
that the plant was in compliance with all international agreements, including the IAEA, to
ensure that facility was used for peaceful nuclear purposes only.317 Prime Minister
Chirac also rejected proposals by U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger for three way talks
over the sale of the facility, indicating that only France and Pakistan were involved in the
issue.318 France continued to assert that it would continue with the deal.
Part of the reason for French resistant to cancel the deal, in addition to not
wanting to publicly bend to U.S. pressure, was that Paris interpreted its international non-
proliferation obligations differently. While the U.S. sought to stop any exchanges until
all ofPakistan's nuclear facilities were under full-scope safeguards, other states such as
France, West Germany and Italy just sought to have safeguards apply to the facility that
they were selling.319 Indeed, the French argued that ifit did not sell safeguarded nuclear
facilities to Pakistan, other states such as Brazil or South Korea would and that this would
315 Shahid-ur-Rehman, "Long Road to Chagai," 1461. Kissinger also noted that France responded that it
would proceed with the deal, although it might not have adverse reactions if Pakistan reconsidered the
facility.
316 "Information Bank Abstracts," The New York Times, 9 August 1976.
317 "Information Bank Abstracts," The New York Times, 9 August 1976.
318 "Information Bank Abstracts," The New York Times, 12 August 1976.
319 Judith Miller, "Pakistan Seeking 2D Atom Reactor," Foreign Desk, The New York Times, 3 December
1982, A6.
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be the "worst thing.,,32o And of course, as the French later noted, it was ironic that the
u.s. was denying Pakistan peaceful nuclear technology while at the same time supplying
it with advanced F-16 fighter planes.321
However, in a later volte face, Paris indicated that it was unlikely to proceed with
the deal. Arguing that France sought to prevent the proliferation of weapons, French
officials signaled that France would be happy, and was hopeful, that Pakistan would
cancel the deal. 322 Still, France did not rescind its part of the bargain because of domestic
political pressure. 323 Pakistan refused to unilaterally withdraw from the agreement.
With Pakistan refusing to cancel the contract, France began to seek ways to
modify the existing contract in order to limit Pakistan's ability to produce weapons grade
plutonium.324 Pakistan promptly rejected any proposals by the French to modify the
contract.325 Shortly thereafter, French President Valery d'Estaing officially canceled the
deal in a letter to Zia, citing proliferation concerns.326 Allegedly these heightened
concerns were based on fresh evidence provided by the U.S. that Pakistan may use the
plant for nuclear weapons.327 Thus, even though the deal was once supported, France had
320 "Framatome Can Bid," Nucleonic Week 23, no. 51-52 (23 December 1982),9.
321 "Framatome Can Bid," 9.
322 "Information Bank Abstracts," The New York Times, 17 DecemQer 1976.
323 "Information Bank Abstracts," The New York Times, 17 December 1976.
324 Associated Press, 6 January 1978, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http;llweb.1exis-nexis.com.
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now shifted to a more clear non-proliferation stance.328 Nonetheless, France likely had
already provided Pakistan with complete blueprints for the plant and French workers
were reported at the plant's construction site for some time after the cancellation.329
Ultimately, and over the course of several years, the US. finally exerted enough
pressure on France to cancel the deal. France was not willing to provide nuclear
assistance and technology at the expense of a relationship with the US. Because the US.
was interfering with Pakistan's nuclear suppliers, that is, ones that were willing to trade,
it created an incentive in Pakistan to maintain an ambiguous posture to minimize external
pressure. Pakistan had to maintain as much secrecy as possible in its efforts to acquire
nuclear technology as even previously willing suppliers were subject to change their
minds, particularly given US. efforts to encourage non-proliferation.
Further, since some ofthe willing supplier states publicly insisted that they would
follow the nuclear non-proliferation regime, it was necessary that Pakistan not jeopardize
this relationship at the expense of declaring its ambitions. As it was, America's efforts to
discourage proliferation through the tightening of export restrictions was seriously
hampering Pakistan's ability to acquire the technology and materials to develop a
weapons option. And as the regime developed, other states would start linking their aid
to Pakistan as contingent on it signing the NPT.330 Still, while the US. could claim some
success in slowing down Pakistan's ability to complete projects needed for its weapons
328 Benjamin, "Pakistan Says France Killing Controversial Nuclear Deal," Section 1, AI.
329 "Ban This Bomb-To-Be," World Politics and Current Affairs, International, Economist, 14 April 1979,
56.
330 Farhatullah Babar, "Time for a Third Nuclear Debate," in Pakistan's Atomic Bomb and the Search for
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program,331 as well as keeping the program undeclared, it did not succeed in convincing
Pakistan to abandon its nuclear ambitions.
3. Regional Non-Proliferation Proposals
Pakistan has on number of occasions proposed various regional non-proliferation
measures, including a nuclear weapons free zone in South Asia, joint declarations to
renounce the acquisition of nuclear weapons, simultaneous adherence to the NPT, and a
bilateral nuclear test ban. All of these measures were aimed at India, with Pakistani
compliance contingent on Indian acceptance. However, because India had previously
rejected any measures that did not necessarily include China, there was little chance that
it would agree to any of the Pakistani proposals. As such, most observers saw the
proposals not as genuine attempts by Islamabad to arrest nuclear proliferation in South
Asia, but rather as attempts to cast India as the antagonistic proliferators.
For example, shortly following the Indian nuclear test, Pakistan proposed a
number of regional plans for a nuclear free zone in South Asia. Islamabad introduced a
proposal in 1974 to the UN General Assembly for a South Asian Nuclear Weapons Free
Zone. As recognized by Washington, the "major purpose of the plan was to embarrass
India.,,332 Interestingly, the proposed plan also acknowledged that Pakistan had the right
to conduct peaceful nuclear explosions, which Islamabad apparently wanted to preserve
so that it could at least gain parity to India.
331 U.S. Department of State, "General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament," 311.
332 Central Intelligence Agency, "Pakistan's Nuclear Program," no. WM00212, 10.
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On another occasion, a senior Pakistani official stated that Pakistan was willing to
sign a bilateral agreement with India to renounce nuclear weapons.333 This
pronouncement was made shortly after India's accusations that Pakistan was making
progress in its nuclear weapons program, which Pakistan denied that it intended to
produce nuclear weapons. This trend continued with Pakistan's nuclear development and
its delegation reported to the United Nations that Pakistan was committed to nuclear non-
proliferation and peaceful nuclear energy.334 The same year, 1990, Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif came to power and reiterated that Pakistan did not have a nuclear bomb
and would be happy to sign the NPT if India did SO.335
A cold reading of the historical record suggests that Pakistan proposed a number
of non-proliferation measures and might have been willing to abide by the international
non-proliferation regime. While this may have been true in other circumstances, it was
cheap talk to the extent that Islamabad knew that India would not give up its nuclear
option while China was considered a nuclear power. And Pakistan certainly was in no
position to unilateral give up its nuclear option, given its military inferiority. This meant
that there was little chance of stopping proliferation in South Asia based on agreement.
The most meaningful agreement that India and Pakistan were willing to negotiate was
that neither state would attack each other's nuclear facilities.
333 James A. McGinley, U.S. Embassy India, to U.S. Information Agency, "Special Media Reaction Report
No. 45--Pakistan's Testing of Nuclear Triggers," Unclassified Cable 17173, 16 July 1985, Nuclear Non-
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459
Because India was always unlikely to respond favorably to the Pakistani plans,
they were more likely proposed by Islamabad as a way of bolstering its non-proliferation
credentials in the face of criticism over its nuclear program. As such, none of these
measures were ever given serious consideration, with the exception of establishing a
nuclear hotline and the agreement to not attack each other's nuclear facilities. And while
the two nuclear agreements were helpful in reducing tensions between the two
adversaries, they did not contain provisions that affected either state's nuclear posture.
Therefore, there was a dearth of regional non-proliferation measures to constrain
Pakistan's nuclear posture.
In sum, international and regional non-proliferation institutions and agreements
have had little effect on Pakistan's nuclear posture. The international non-proliferation
regime has mattered to the extent that some supplier states were unwilling to provide
Pakistan with nuclear material or technologies in the absence of Islamabad safeguarding
all of its facilities. The United States also put pressure on other, less willing states such
as France in order to constrain Pakistani proliferation. The effect of these efforts was to
slow down Pakistan's nuclear progress while it recalibrated its efforts towards indigenous
production and more heavy reliance on Chinese assistance. Regional measures did not
come to fruition, and thus had no effect on Pakistan's program.
While Pakistan had some incentive to keep its program secret so that it could
avoid provoking states that did not have stringent non-proliferation standards, this was a
lesser concern because it still faced the same difficulties regardless of its stance. That is,
the fact that Pakistan was proliferating was driving U.S. and other state behavior, not
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Islamabad's nuclear posture. Further, to the extent that Pakistan's concerns related to the
international non-proliferation regime, it was based on material constraints imposed by
members of the regime. There is no evidence that Pakistani leaders embraced or
internalized the norms of the regime, or sought to further it in any meaningful way.
F. Domestic Politics/Bureaucratic Interests
What role has domestic politics or bureaucratic interests played in Pakistan
maintaining a posture of ambiguity through the 1998 nuclear tests? There are two ways
that domestic politics are hypothesized to have influenced Pakistani nuclear ambiguity.
First, there has been some lack of domestic consensus among the various interests as to
when Pakistan should publicly declare its nuclear progress and intentions. Second, other
analysts point to the increase in "nuclear nationalism" in the 1990s by politicians seeking
to gain or maintain power and argue that this forced the Pakistani decision-makers to test
in 1998. While there is evidence of both of these dynamics, these domestic political
factors were not themselves sufficiently strong to alter Islamabad's stance through 1998.
These arguments are discussed below.
1. Military Preference for Ambiguity
Pakistani leadership, similar to other states, was internally divided as to the extent
it should publicize its nuclear ambitions, as well as the timing. Early on, there was little
consensus among the political leadership, military and nuclear scientists over the
appropriateness of even pursuing a weapons option. The pro-bomb advocates, such as
Bhutto, believed that Pakistani security necessitated nuclear weapons. However, others
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were concerned that Pakistan could not afford the investment and that nuclear weapons
would do little to solve Pakistan's chronic insecurity.
Once the decision was made by Bhutto to pursue a nuclear option, the question of
openness nonetheless remained unresolved. As previously discussed, Bhutto and then his
successor Zia, primarily followed a path of ambiguity. The other major actor during this
time period was the military. After losing the 1965 and 1971 wars with India, Pakistan's
military began to view nuclear weapons as essential to Pakistani security because of its
conventional inferiority. Most ofPakistan's military leaders view a small nuclear
program as important for providing Pakistan a deterrent against New Delhi in the face of
a conventional military imbalance and unreliable allies that may not come to Islamabad's
aid.336
For its part, the military has dominated nuclear policy decisions in Pakistan for
most of its history.33? There is generally "little or no input on nuclear policy making
from senior political leaders and no involvement from the wider public.,,338 Instead, the
politicians have generally deferred to military on nuclear matters, in the hope of
garnering military support as a precondition for staying in power.339 Thus, the military
was certainly influential enough in Pakistan's political structures that is could have
pushed for a more transparent Pakistani nuclear policy if there was a widespread
336 Stephen P. Cohen, U.S. State Department, "Pakistan: Security Planning and the Nuclear Option,"
Limited Official Use, Intelligence Report 83-AR, 6 March 1981, Weapons of Mass Destruction
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consensus about its utility.340 However, the Pakistani military has historically resisted the
idea of relying on a nuclear deterrent at the expense of conventional forces. This meant
that ambiguity was a necessity in order to preserve relationship with sources of external
assistance, including the U.S., even as Pakistan continued to develop its nuclear
capability.
There have also been other divisions as to the timing and extent of public
disclosure of the nuclear program. Some generals, retired generals, and religious leaders
in Pakistan had lobbied for nuclear tests as a way to cut off international pressure and
also make sure that the "no elected government is able to bend under economic pressure
and accept safeguards, thus destroying the programme.,,341 Nonetheless, these voices
were unsuccessfully in altering Pakistan's policy.
In short, the Pakistani military primarily controlled nuclear policy, and preferred a
policy of relying on conventional force planning while developing nuclear weapons.
Based on these requirements, ambiguity was the policy of choice as it allowed Pakistan to
pursue external sources of conventional weaponry while also seeking to gain a credible
deterrent in the face of Indian superiority. There was some domestic dissent with this
position, but the reality is that the decision for Pakistan to go nuclear was not made until
India forced the issue in 1998, when the military was concerned with the security
implications from New Delhi's new stance.
340 For the overt and covert involvement of the civil-military bureaucracy in Pakistani politics, see Yunas
Sarnad, "The Military and Democracy in Pakistan," Contemporary South Asia 3, no. 3 (1994).
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2. Nuclear Nationalism
Another domestic political factor that some scholars point to as causing the 1998
tests was nuclear nationalism, but there is not a clear theory for how it would have
operated prior to then. According to this perspective, Pakistani politicians began tying
the patriotism of a regime to its willingness to pursue a nuclear option. If a political
leader appeared too weak on the nuclear issue, or potentially to cave to external pressure
on the program, opponents would attack their patriotism. This pattern gained more
prominence during the 1990s, as a number of different leaders came to power and had
difficulty staying in office. However, while this certainly has been a dynamic in
Pakistan's domestic political arena, it doesn't explain why Pakistan maintained a policy
of nuclear ambiguity for most of its history.
Pakistan's general population supports a nuclear weapons capability.342 Its
leaders were also often unpopular, and for example, it would have been in President Zia's
interests to conduct tests in the early 1980s to gain domestic popularity.343 However,
with other factors militating against a test, opposition leaders started capitalize on popular
support by using the nuclear issue to criticize their political opponents.
Starting approximately in 1988, politicians seeking to gain power through
Pakistani electoral process began questioning their opponent's nuclear stance. If there
was any suggestion that the other side might compromise on the nuclear issue, they were
342 Central Intelligence Agency, "Pakistan's Nuclear Program," no. WM00212, 1.
343 U.S. Department of State, "Indian-Pakistani Views on a Nuclear Weapons Option and Potential
Repercussions," no. WM00247, 2.
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denigrated by their political opponent.344 Indeed, "the nuclear issue has been used as a
stick by both the incumbent governments and the opposition to beat each other with.
Each has sought to establish its patriotic credentials by accusing the other of trying to
damage Pakistan's security shield by seeking accommodation on the nuclear issue.,,345
For example, during the 1988 and 1990 elections, Nawaz Sharif accused the PPP
(Benzir Bhutto's party) of being soft on bomb issue.346 Moreover he vowed that he
would explode a nuclear weapon when he came to power.347 Yet, when Sharif came to
power in 1990, he indicated that Pakistan did not have a nuclear bomb and that Pakistan
would sign the NPT if India also did SO.348 Sharif later claimed that Pakistan had the
ability to assemble at least one nuclear device, although it had not done SO.349 This move
largely attributed to politics as he sought to further his patriotism at home while diverting
attention from Pakistan's mounting social and economic problems?50 At the same time,
he underscored that Pakistan's nuclear program was for peaceful purposes, and continued
Zia's policy of ambiguity in an effort to engage the U.S. and shore up Pakistan's failing
344 Chari, Indo-Pak Nuclear Standoff, 22. An opponent's anti-India stance had long been used as a
yardstick of patriotism in politics.
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economy.351 For her part, fonner Prime Minister Bhutto acknowledged in 1992 that
Pakistan had a nuclear weapons program, which resulted in the delay of Japanese aid.352
When Benazir Bhutto again returned to power and succeeded Sharif in 1993, he
stated that Pakistan possessed an atomic bomb. 353 Sharif later revealed that he made this
statement in order to prevent Bhutto from rolling back the nuclear program under U.S.
pressure. 354 Others also speculated that his motives were to embarrass the Bhutto
government and ingratiate himself with the Pakistani Anny.355 The Bhutto government
subsequently "rejected Washington's non-proliferation initiatives and agreed in
December 1993 not to roll back the nuclear programme and to continue with Pakistan's
existing nuclear policy line.,,356 She also reaffinned that "[a]s long as there is no threat to
our security, the programme will remain peaceful.,,357
Yet, once a politician was in power, they would have a more moderated position
on nuclear weapons, given the constraints imposed by the military and external factors.
Indeed, when they were in office, "both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif tended to
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subscribe to the idea of a cautious nuclear policy. Once in the opposition, they would
adopt a tougher line and argue for a more independent nuclear stand.,,358
As the foregoing suggests, during the 1990s cracks began to appear in Pakistan's
policy of ambiguity in the form of increased nuclear rhetoric and declarations from
opposition parties. Nonetheless, the official government policy was to maintain that
Pakistan's program was peaceful and there were no indications that this was about to
change until India tested. As discussed later, the Indian test brought numerous calls from
the opposition leadership for Pakistan to test in response. However, this was a permissive
condition that the Pakistani leadership factored into choosing to test, but was not the
primary consideration.
II. Explaining the 1998 Pakistani Tests
On May 28, 1998, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif stated that Pakistan had
conducted five nuclear tests, which "settled the score with India.,,359 His justification was
that "Pakistan was left with no choice but to detonate its own nuclear devices.,,36o In
response to the tests, Pakistanis cheered in the streets while "India's parliament erupted
into shouting as opposition leaders blamed the government for starting a nuclear arms
race.,,361 On May 30th, Pakistan conducted its final test,362
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362 IDSA Database, "Chronology of Responses to Pokhran II," Strategic Digest 7 (1998), 1096.
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Pakistan's decision to test was based on India publicly "going nuclear" earlier in
May by testing. As previously discussed, Pakistan's nuclear policy is largely India
reactive, and its response in this case was also based on New Delhi's decision to conduct
test and declare itself a nuclear weapons state. Nonetheless, a set of complicated strategic
calculations faced the Pakistani leadership as it sought to grapple with countervailing
security considerations. In particular, Prime Minister Sharif understood that testing
would lead to further international sanctions against an already economically weak
Pakistan. At the same time, India's posture was seen as very provocative and led to
security concerns within the military as to whether India had fundamentally shifted its
approach to Kashmir. As it became clear to Pakistani leaders that the international
community's response to the India test was rather muted, combined with the lack of a
significant breakthrough in the relationship with the Americans, the costs did not appear
to outweigh the security benefits.
In the background, there was also an increasing chorus of political opposition
voices called for the government to respond with its own tests. This latter factor further
supported the government's decision to test, but was not itself determinative of the
decision. These dynamics are discussed below.
A. Regional Security Environment
Security was one of the primary issues facing Pakistani decision makers. Given
the historical conflict with India, the nuclear tests were perceived as a significant threat to
Pakistani security. Still, the best way to ensure security was not clear. The Indian tests
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forced the Pakistani leadership to evaluate whether responding in kind would bolster
Pakistani security.
Prior to the Indian tests, Pakistan preferred to maintain a policy of ambiguity in
South Asia. The leadership felt that they had successfully establish nuclear deterrence
with India, and that this compensated for Pakistani conventional weakness and enabled it
neutralize any attempted Indian nuclear blackmail. 363 Consistent with this stance, during
the mid-1990s when public reports surfaced that India was considering testing, Pakistani
leadership acknowledged their nuclear capability, while also seeking to maintain the
status quo in South Asia.
For example, Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto warned India that ifit
tested nuclear weapons, Pakistan would be forced to "follow suit.,,364 Bhutto further
hoped that "the day will never arise when we have to use our knowledge to make and
detonate a device and export our technology.,,365 She further warned that Indian testing
would trigger a South Asian "proliferation race.,,366 Former Pakistani Army Chief Beg
also urged restraint, saying that while Pakistan should continue to develop nuclear
weapons, it "should not become a party to such madness.,,367
363 Rizvi, India, Pakistan and the United States, 99.
364 "Bhutto Warns India Against Testing Nuclear Device" Daily Telegraph (London), 6 January 1996, in
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The next year, then Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif also acknowledged
Pakistan's nuclear capability, stating "the issue of nuclear capability is an established
fact. Hence the debate on this issue should come to an end.,,368 Western diplomats, for
their part, sought to maintain ambiguity in South Asia, arguing that nuclear testing would
ruin "the delicate ambiguity that each country maintains about its nuclear programme.,,369
And while Pakistan did not necessarily want testing, or at least to not initiate it,
Islamabad took precautions to prepare for testing in the event India did so. For example,
in February 1996 reports surfaced that Pakistan was preparing a test site in the Chagai
Hills and was considering a nuclear test in response to a planned test by India.37o
Pakistan denied these allegations.37 !
The importance of these preparations is that they signaled that Pakistan had linked
its nuclear posture to India's stance, and was technologically prepared to respond.372
Because Pakistan's posture was dependent on India's, and it had already indicated that it
would also publicly go nuclear when India did, the tests in 1998 essentially followed
Islamabad's predetermined routine. Nonetheless, Pakistani leadership and Prime
368 Shahid Ahmed Khan, "Sharif Acknowledges Pakistan's Nuclear Capability," The Times ofIndia, 8
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369 "Bhutto Warns India Against Testing Nuclear Device."
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Minister Sharifhad a number of countervailing pressures to accommodate, including
whether the tests would contribute to Pakistani security.
After the Indian tests in 1998, some of the leadership was initially divided
between those who wanted to gamer economic and military benefits from restraint, and
. others supported an immediate test to show that Pakistan had a nuclear capability.
Opponents of testing feared that Pakistan would be left more insecure in the future by
testing because economic sanctions were sure to follow and would further exacerbate
Pakistan's existing economic weakness in comparison to India. Proponents of testing
focused on bolstering Pakistan's nuclear credibility and deterrence in the face of India's
now open nuclear weapons posture. The Indian tests thus led to a "tussle between
supporters of overt weaponization and proponents of the official policy of nuclear
ambiguity.,,373 Still, it is important to note that this debate occurred while the test
preparations were already underway.374 This meant that to stop the tests, there would
have had to been a significant change to warrant Pakistan not following through on its
default reaction to India testing.
1. Economic Arguments in Opposition to Testing
For policymakers opposed to testing in response to India, which notably included
Prime Minister Sharif and Finance Minister Sartaj Aziz, they were generally concerned
about the economic impact on Pakistan. If Pakistan tested, it was economically
373 Ahmed, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program," 194.
374 Pakistani test preparations appeared to have been underway prior to May 16th. Generally, reports to the
U.S. lagged by about two days; this would put the beginning of test preparations around May 14th • U.S.
Department of State, "Secretary's Morning Summary for 5/16/98," Top Secret Cable 000354, 16 May 1998,
Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive, 1992), no. WM00500, 2.
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vulnerable from an overt arms race with India and renewed sanctions from other states.
Moreover, for opponents ofa test, a nuclear test would do little to add deterrent
credibility.375 Rather, the concern was that testing would make Pakistan more insecure
by threatening its economic viability.
Pakistan was extraordinarily weak at the time of Indian test. In some ways,
Indian testing could not have come at a much worse time for Pakistan. India had recently
benefited from economic growth and better relations with the U.S. and China. In
contrast, Pakistan was vulnerable since the draw down of the Cold War, having lost
American military and economic support from sanctions, which in tum further
exacerbated its already weak economy. In 1996 Pakistan was regarded as one of the most
corrupt countries in the world and was near economic collapse.376
Thus, Pakistan was in a precarious financial state when India tested in 1998. In
near bankruptcy, the government could ill-afford to engage in an arms race with the much
stronger India. For example, India's 1996 GDP was estimated at $371 billion, in
comparison to Pakistan's $64 billion. 377 As some Pakistani analysts understood prior to
1998, India was in a position to accelerate the arms race that could "pauperise Pakistan,
and thus achieve its presumed goal of disintegrating Pakistan without firing a shot, as the
US did with the USSR.,,378 They also recognized that provocative statements by Indian
375 Yasmeen, "Pakistan's Nuclear Tests," 50.
376 Tahir-Kheli, India, Pakistan and the United States, 26.
377 T.V. Paul, "India, the International System, and Nuclear Weapons," in Nuclear India in the Twenty-first
Century, D.R. SarDesai and Raju G.C. Thomas, eds. (New York: Palgrave, 2002).
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hawks were possibly an attempt to "lure" Pakistan into testing and the likely ensuing
arms race.
379
Additionally, Pakistan was in a poor economic position to endure the sanctions
that were sure to follow testing. Sanctions would stop foreign aid, deter investors, and
propel the economy towards collapse with $32 billion dollars in foreign debt.380
Moreover, opponents argued, that this would limit the amount of money for defense and
would further weaken Pakistan's capabilities in the face of the Indian threat.381 For his
part, Prime Minister Sharifwas "aware ofPakistan's vulnerability to economic
sanctions" and for this reason, did not want to undertake a retaliatory test. 382 There was
also some support within the Pakistani media for the position that Pakistan was much
more vulnerable to sanctions than India. It was counseled that the government should at
least assess the global measures against India, lest a premature Pakistani test would lead
to sanctions against Islamabad and shift the international focus from India.383
Further, if Pakistan refrained from testing, it would be in a better position benefit
from the proffered economic and military assistance from states hoping to dissuade it.384
379 Inayatullah, The Nuclear Arms Race, 94.
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383 U.s. Department of State, "Secretary's Morning Summary for 5/15/98," Top Secret Cable, 15 May 1998,
Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive, 1992), no. WM00499, 3-
4.
384 Rizvi, India, Pakistan and the United States, 105.
473
In particular, Pakistan would be in a better position to leverage external economic and
military aid from its once close ally, the United States. By currying U.S. non-
proliferation favor, Pakistan might have been able to gain more security over the long run
through not testing,385 especially if significant conventional assistance was forthcoming.
In short, some Pakistani leaders did not see responding to the Indian with one of
their own as enhancing Pakistan's security. Rather, since Pakistan had already
established a nuclear deterrent, they preferred to avoid economic insecurity by drawing
sanctions from testing. Additionally, they hoped that their restraint would be rewarded
by the international community with increased economic and military assistance.
However, when significant assistance was not forthcoming, this position steadily eroded
in favor of other security arguments that emphasized the importance of Pakistan
demonstrating that it had a credible deterrent. Instead, as tensions increased over
Kashmir following the Indian tests, the security environment became even more
precarious. And because the military was essentially in control of Pakistan's nuclear
weapons program, their preferences tilted the scale even more towards testing.
2. Conventional Disparity and India's Posture Support Arguments
Favoring Testing
Proponents of Pakistani testing, notably the Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Navy
and Air Force, were mainly concerned that Pakistan's security necessarily relied on a
demonstration that it possessed a credible nuclear deterrent vis-a-vis India. The military
385 Yasmeen, "Pakistan's Nuclear Tests," 51.
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security arguments focused on Pakistan's conventional inferiority and in the days
following the Indian test, India's hawkish rhetoric on Kashmir.
Pakistan was heavily dependent on a nuclear deterrent given its relative weakness
compared to India. As a much weaker state, Pakistan became increasingly reliant on its
nuclear capability to equalize India's relatively substantial economic and military power.
Further exacerbating Pakistan's security was a "growing disparity between Indian and
Pakistani conventional military capabilities" leading up to the tests.386
Moreover, in the wake of the Indian test, Pakistani leaders viewed the actions of
the Indian nationalist BJP party with increasing apprehension. Not only did the BJP
choose to publicly declare India a nuclear weapons state, but some Pakistanis believed
that that India would use its nuclear status to pressure Pakistan to accept India's
perspectives on regional issues and especially on India-Pakistan disputes [Kashmir]."387
India did little to dispel these fears; on the contrary, India's BJP party issued a number of
nationalist statements directed at Pakistan, which further heightened the security
concerns.388
On May 18th, India's Home Minister, L.K. Advani added to Pakistan's concerns
related to Kashmir. Advani issued "new warnings on Kashmir," indicating that India's
new status as a nuclear weapons state had produced a "qualitative" change between India
and Pakistan, and that a new task force on Kashmir was being established to deal more
386 Cheema, "Pakistan's Nuclear Use Doctrine," 169.
387 Rizvi, India, Pakistan and the United States, 101.
388 Rizvi, India, Pakistan and the United States, 101.
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effectively with Pakistan's "proxy war.,,389 Prime Minister Sharif responded that
Advani 's statement was "[a] naked assertion of hostile Indian intentions toward
Pakistan.,,39o
These statements were followed by reports of "unusually heavy shelling" along
the LOC in Kashmir.391 Sharif, of course, was kept briefed about the troops and positions
along the line ofcontrol in Kashmir. 392 In response to the situation, Pakistani Army
Chief Karamat told senior officials that the apparent change in Indian tactics could have
"serious implications" and might require that Pakistan "change its stance.,,393
Adding to this tension were intelligence reports of two unidentified F-16 aircraft
flying on the edge of Pakistan's airspace and fueled fears that Pakistan's nuclear facilities
would be subject to attack,394 A further report suggested that Israeli aircraft had landed
on Indian airfields and also heightened fear of a strike.395 These reports allegedly
389 U.S. Department of State, "India, New Warnings on Kashmir; India, Scant Effect of U.S. Sanctions,"
Top Secret Cable 000389, 20 May 1998, Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington D.C.: The National
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"caused much panic among Pakistan's policymakers" and on May 27th, the Ghauri
missiles were deployed.396 The cumulative effect of these developments, "created a
strong impression in Pakistan that having declared itself a nuclear power, India now
intended to adopt a more forceful approach toward Kashmir, and might even be tempted
to take military action across the LOC.,,397
For some Pakistani policymakers, nuclear weapons were the only way counter
stronger Indian conventional forces and preserve some balance where Pakistan would not
be subject to nuclear threats or blackmai1.398 They argued that the credibility of
Pakistan's nuclear deterrence required testing, rather than just the knowledge that
Pakistan could carry out tests.399 Otherwise, Islamabad feared that failing to test in the
face of ''New Delhi's provocation will undermine the credibility of Pakistan's claim to a
nuclear weapons capability.,,40o Retaining nuclear parity in this context was paramount
for proponents advocating that Pakistan test its own nuclear devices, even though the
West promised aid and threatened sanctions.401
396 Rizvi, India. Pakistan and the United States, 108. There were doubts of the credibility ofthe
government reports as potentially creating another justification for Pakistan to test. Ibid.
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The position that Pakistan needed to establish that it actually had a nuclear
capability was not without support. Historically, Pakistan had predicated its nuclear
response on India, as well as sending the mixed message that it was not pursuing nuclear
weapons. If Pakistan did not respond in kind to the new nuclear reality in South Asia,
there would questions as to whether Islamabad had been bluffing all along about the
extent to which it had acquired a nuclear weapons capability. The lack of response would
further feed Indian skeptics who claimed that Pakistan did not have a workable nuclear
capability. In this context, the Pakistani test was to make sure that it was clear to India
that it had a workable nuclear weapons capability. In short, immediate, regional security
concerns forced Islamabad to respond to the tests in kind, even though there were
questions of how well Pakistan would weather the increased regional tensions and long-
term economic effects from its decision.402
B. Patron State Pressures - The United States and China
The United States sought to persuade Pakistan to refrain from testing in response
to India. However, because Washington had previously imposed economic and military
sanctions and the Clinton administration offered minimal incentives beyond the promise
to seek removal of the sanctions, U.S. no-proliferation pressures were ineffective.
China's reaction, as a long-time patron ofPakistan, was also important to
Pakistani decision-making. While there is little direct evidence of China's position,
Beijing probably did not favor the tests but was also unwilling to exert significant
402 Reportedly, some leadership failed to make a "dispassionate" assessment of the economic sanctions and
their likely result, instead choosing to believe that they would have little impact. Rizvi, India, Pakistan and
the United States, 108.
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pressure on Pakistan to refrain from testing. Thus, patron state pressures were relatively
ineffective or unapplied, and were not sufficient to prevent the Pakistani nuclear tests in a
regional security environment that had drastically change from India's earlier tests.
1. U.S. Efforts to Dissuade Testing
In the wake of the Indian tests, the United States under President Clinton sought
to dissuade Pakistan from testing in response. Through diplomacy, the U.S. combined
carrots and sticks in an effort to shift the Pakistani calculation towards exercising
restraint. Clearly these efforts ultimately failed.
On May 11 th, the United States requested that Pakistan refrain from responding to
India with a nuclear test of its own.403 President Clinton himself called Sharif four times
between May 12th and the 27th, urging Pakistani restraint in response to the Indian
tests.404 Clinton also sent several high-ranked administration officials to Pakistan, with
offers of U.S. economic and military assistance ifPakistan would forgo testing.405
Through diplomacy, the U.S. encouraged Pakistan to "occupy the moral high ground" by
not testing.406 U.S. officials underscored that Pakistan would exacerbate the current
situation in South Asia by testing and encourage a competitive arms race that it could not
afford.407
403 IDSA Database, "Chronology of Responses to Pokhran II," 1091.
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In terms of economic and military assistance, the Clinton Administration was
willing to seek repeal to the Pressler Amendment, under which Pakistan was already
subject to imposed sanctions. This would open the door to releasing the 28 F-16 aircraft
that Pakistan had previously paid for but the U.S. had not delivered.408 The U.S. also
offered $5 billion in development funds through the World Bank and IMF over the next
five years.409
However, the U.S. offer fell far short of Pakistan's expectations. The Pakistani
leadership hoped for "at least 200 updated F-16 aircraft, advanced radar, high-altitude
anti-aircraft missiles, anti-ship missiles, air-to-air refueling tankers, tanks, ships and
submarines.,,410 In terms of economic assistance, they hoped for $15 billion for the
public sector and for Pakistan's foreign debt to be forgiven. 411 Moreover, Clinton was
clear that the U.S. would not extend security commitments in the event of an Indian
attack.
In terms of sticks, the U.S. was required under domestic law to impose additional
sanctions if Pakistan conducted a nuclear test. The U.S. had already imposed sanctions
under the Pressler Amendment, which reduced the level of economic and military
assistance the U.S. could give Pakistan. These sanctions were modified in 1995 under
the Brown Amendment, which provided for a one-time modification of the Pressler
408 Yameen, "Pakistan's Nuclear Tests," 53.
409 Yasmeen, "Pakistan's Nuclear Tests," 53.
410 Yasmeen, "Pakistan's Nuclear Tests," 51.
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Amendment to release $370 million dollars worth of embargoed military equipment and
removed non-military aid from under the ambit ofPressler. The U.S. also resumed
training ofPakistani Army officers. Still, the U.S. retained the 28 F-16s Pakistan had
already paid for.
So in 1998, the primary stick available to the U.S. was the Glenn Amendment,
legislation originally designed to deter nuclear testing by non-nuclear states as defined
under the NPT.412 The Glenn Amendment called for the U.S. refrain from providing
bilateral aid and to oppose development loans from the IMF, ADB, and the World
Bank.413 At stake was approximately $100-200 million dollars of funds from the IMF
and $1-1.5 billion from other international financial institutions that Pakistan received
annually in the mid-1990s.414
In short, the Pakistanis were not impressed with the overall lack of economic and
military assistance. Rather, the U.S. offer did little to bolster Pakistan's near-term
security, which provided little leverage for opponents of testing. Sanctions were a
considered factor but in the end were not enough leverage to prevent Pakistan from
testing, particularly since Pakistan was already weathering previously imposed U.S.
sanctions for its nuclear activities.
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2. Possible Chinese Opposition to Testing
It is unclear whether China encouraged Pakistan to respond to India's test with its
own, or whether it urged Pakistani restraint. There is evidence that a Pakistani delegation
visited China after the Indian tests, but the result of this meeting is not certain. One
analyst suggests that China likely supported Pakistan conducting its own tests, based on
China's unwavering nuclear support ofPakistan.415 China also had interests in curbing
the growth ofIndian power and influence in South Asia.416
Still, there is other evidence that China preferred Pakistani restraint to the extent
that China's own proliferation supply record would come under scrutiny as a result of the
tests. Some U.S. analysis suggests that China was preoccupied with domestic reform and
"seeking to project a responsible image in the run-up to President Clinton's visit.,,417 In
accordance with these interests, "China had adjusted its strong pro-Pakistani tilt of the
1960s-1980s with the intention of sustaining a more even-handed posture on the
subcontinent, despite recent Indian provocations.,,418 Notwithstanding China's attempts
at polishing its image, its policies would likely be under international scrutiny from
Pakistani test, as China had supported Islamabad's nuclear and missile programs.419
Consistent with the interest in distancing itself, on June 3rd after both India and Pakistan
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had tested, Chinese President Jiang Zemin felt compelled to deny that China had helped
Pakistan make the bomb.420 China also prefened the avoidance of substantial escalation
of tensions in South Asia, and "Beijing has no desire to be drawn deeper into the
subcontinent flare-up. ,,421
While China had interests in curbing New Delhi's position in South Asia, as well
as avoiding the spotlight for assisting Pakistani proliferation, it is unlikely that Beijing
took a strong stance with Pakistan either for or against testing. As reported within the
U.S. government at the time, China "neither forcefully imposed its will on Pakistan to
defer testing in response nor gave its old friend an unambiguous green light to proceed.
Beijing instead maintained slim hopes that adverse global reaction fanned by China
[towards] India's test would somehow purchase a Western security guarantee for
Islamabad and compel New Delhi to tone down its aggressive stance.,,422 In other words,
China as a patron state to Pakistan was not a significant factor in either stopping or
encouraging a Pakistani response to India's tests.
China initially voiced relatively muted criticism of India testing in public,
although it sought to identify India as the regional antagonist. However, when India
suggested that China was a primary security threat leading to the tests, China responded
that India's tests constituted an "outrageous contempt of the common will of the
420 IDSA Database, "Chronology of Responses to Pokhran II," 1097.
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422 Strobe Talbott, U.S. Department of State, "INR Assessment: China/South Asia, Gearing up for Geneva,"
Confidential Cable, 099524, 3 June 1998, Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington D.C.: The National
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international community.,,423 The Chinese government further contended India's actions
"not only threatened China, but other neighbours as well,"424 a probable reference to
Pakistan.
After Pakistan responded with its own tests, China expressed disappointment and
regret over the tests but blamed India as the instigator of the nuclear crisis in South
Asia.425 Beijing further requested that both nations practice restraint to keep the situation
from further deteriorating.426 And despite the traditionally close relationship between the
states, some commentary also suggested that China was not particularly helpful to
Pakistan in helping the latter from its diplomatic isolation.427
In short, there is little evidence to suggest whether China privately encouraged or
discouraged Pakistan to test in response to India. Publicly, China has predictably drawn
attention to India instigating the testing, but also has not strongly supported the Pakistani
position. Given Chinese interest in portraying itself as a responsible great power, it likely
did not welcome the tests. However, it was probably unwilling to damage its relationship
with Pakistan over the issue, given its historic relationship and the fact that China wishes
to minimize Indian power in South Asia.
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c. International Non-Proliferation Regime
Pakistan carefully watched the international response to the Indian tests. It hoped
for a harsh response to pressure the Indian government towards non-proliferation.
Additionally, the response towards India served to suggest the extent to which Pakistan
would be punished for following up with a test of its own. Indeed, Pakistani Prime
Minister Sharif, for his part, "from the start, linked the Pakistani government's response
to the international community's response to the Indian nuclear test.,,428
However, a strong international response to the Indian test was not forthcoming,
which further shifted the Pakistani calculation towards testing. After India tested, the
international community was divided in how to best respond to the tests, which
diminished the overall disapprobation. The G-8, for example, failed to condemn the
tests.429 Russia, for its part, condemned the tests, as it would do so with Pakistan, but was
opposed to sanctions for both countries.430
As Washington predicted, the "muted reactions from France, Russia, and other
states to India's actions ... further deepen[ed] Pakistani skepticism at the willingness of
the world community to punish New Delhi and to take a stand against a new threat
against Pakistan.,,43! The result was that Pakistani leadership was believed that the
international response to its tests would be similar - "symbolic at best and short-lived at
428 Yasmeen, "Pakistan's Nuclear Tests," 52.
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worst.,,432 This gave the Pakistani pro-test supporters additional leverage over those
calling for restraint.433
D. Domestic Politics and Bureaucratic Interests
In addition to security calculations, there were strong domestic voices calling for
Islamabad to immediately respond to India's tests. Given the fact that Pakistan's
politicians had linked support of the nuclear program as an index ofpatriotism, it was
difficult to publicly deny these calls. However, the opinions for testing were not
unanimous, and some Pakistani had concerns about the impact of economic sanctions.
Additionally, the military's stance on Pakistan's current leader has historically been much
more important for retaining power than the preference of the general population. As
such, domestic pressures certainly existed to respond, but likely would not have prevailed
in circumstances where the security calculations came out with a different outcome than
testing.
There were a number of groups that called for Pakistan to immediately test in
response to India. Several political parties, including Benazir Bhutto's opposition
Pakistan's People's Party and the Muslim League, argued that security requirements
dictated that Pakistan must respond, or otherwise there would be doubts about Pakistan's
ability to explode nuclear devices.434 Similarly, retired military and government officials,
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religious leaders and members of the press publicly and vocally pushed for Pakistani
tests.
General Pakistani public opinion also supported testing. For example, a poll
conducted on May 25th found that 64% of the urban Pakistani population favored a
response to the Indian tests, compared to 30% favoring restraint and 6% opposed to any
testing.435 In short, a cross-section of Pakistan supported a response to India. As time
went on without a response, the right wing parties began to threaten to bring down the
Sharif government if he did not "listen to the voice of the people." 436 Further, by
appealing to the masses that were previously "educated in the value of a nuclear
capability, these groups threatened to rise against the government if it failed to perform
its duty.,,437
In some sense, these calls for Pakistan to conduct nuclear tests was no different
that in the late 1980s and early 1990s, where mainly opposition parties argued that the
current government was not adequately responding to India. Indeed, in 1987 and 1990
Pakistan was on the verge of a full conflict with India-Islamabad could have easily
responded to domestic criticisms and inducted it nuclear weapons program then if
domestic politics was the primary factor.
Similarly, public support has historically been very high for Pakistan's nuclear
weapons program. This means that public opinion did not change over night, but that the
Indian tests brought renewed calls for the government to change its position. This is not
435 Matinuddin, The Nuclearization of South Asia, 134.
436 Matinuddin, The Nuclearization of South Asia, 134.
437 Yasmeen, "Pakistan's Nuclear Tests," 54.
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to say that the Sharif government would not have faced a difficult road in the face of
public opinion had he chosen to defer Pakistani testing. However, what was more
significant for Sharifs calculation was the stance of the military.
Much of the "nuclear nationalism" earlier in the decade was attributed to
opposition leaders currying favor with a military that was fearful that the civilians would
give up the nuclear option in the face of American pressure. That is, the primary
audience was not the general population (which was nonetheless exposed to the
discussion) but a particular power faction within Pakistani leadership. What changed
with the 1998 tests was that the military now favored testing. This meant that Sharifs
calculations had to accommodate these interests, and in doing so he also responded to
opposition party calls.
But if the military had preferred to retain an ambiguous stance, combined with
Sharifs own preferences to avoid further economic problems, the opposition party calls
likely could have been fended off. This would have been supported by those with
business interests in Pakistan and were reluctant to test because they feared the
repercussions of a state on verge of bankruptcy.
E. The Decision to Test As Tensions Over Kashmir Escalate
While Pakistani leadership began preparing the tests sites immediately after India
explosions, the decision was initially withheld while Pakistan's options were evaluated.
Or at least Prime Minister Sharif continued to suggest to the United States that Pakistan
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had not yet made a decision to test.438 For example, on May 19th, Sharif indicated that
factors influencing decision-making included domestic public opinion, the advice of the
program scientists, international reaction towards India, and the scope ofnew U.S.
military and economic aid to Pakistan.439 Additionally, "Pakistani deliberations have
been complicated further by concern over India's intentions in Kashmir.,,44o Based on
these cited factors, Washington accurately predicted that Pakistan would test.
It was increased tensions with India finally tipped the balance in favor of testing,
if the decision was not already previous set in stone. By May 18th, Indian and Pakistani
leaders had begun exchanging threats over Kashmir. Indian saber rattling over the
Kashmir issue was extremely provocative to Pakistani decision makers. A further
problem for Pakistani leaders is that it was difficult to tell whether India's provocative
statements were an attempt to goad Pakistan into testing, or whether the comments
genuinely portended an Indian assault on Pakistani Kashmir.441
On May 28th, Pakistan conducted the first tests, followed by another one on May
30th, and publicly declared itself a nuclear power. The official reasons for the test were
several: the threat from India, the weak response by the international community to
438 Test preparations were already underway and reportedly it would take ten days for Pakistan to be ready
to test. Sharif may have just been hopeful that something would change in the meantime to counsel against
testing and signaled that he had not yet decided. U.S. Department of State, "Secretary's Morning Summary
for 5/18/98," Top Secret Cable, 18 May 1998, Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington D.C.: The
National Security Archive, 1992), no. WM00502, 2.
439 U.S. Department of State, "Secretary's Morning Summary for 5119/98," Top Secret Cable 000375,19
May 1998, Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive, 1992), no.
WM00503,2.
440 U.S. Department of State, "Secretary's Morning Summary for 5119/98," no. WM00503, 2.
441 U.S. Department of State, "Secretary's Morning Summary for 5/21/98," no. WM00505, 2.
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India's tests, the lack of security assistance from major powers, and the need to
underscore Pakistani nuclear credibility to deter and respond to India.442 The shorthand
explanation, however, is that Pakistani nuclear policy has always been India reactive and,
in the absence of significant incentives otherwise, a decision to test by Islamabad was a
foregone conclusion when India tested earlier in May.
IV. Conclusion
In the end, Pakistan finally tested its nuclear capability in response to India, after
almost twenty-five years of developing a weapons option. Pakistan's decision to finally
shed its posture ofnuclear ambiguity was in direct response to its historic adversary first
conducting nuclear tests. Even though some Pakistani leaders rightfully feared the
economic costs associated with the tests from international sanctions, the Indian nuclear
tests signified a fundamental shift in South Asian security calculations and planning.
Added to the immediate security side of the equation was a perceived insufficient
American response, relatively muted international reaction to India's tests, and general
public support for testing with domestic political opposition calls for a response.
Yet, as the circumstances surrounding the decision to finally declare itself a
nuclear power demonstrates, Pakistan was clearly not in a race with India to be the first
state to go nuclear. Rather, the dynamics between the two states is more accurately
characterized as the "race to go second." For Pakistan's part, it had a number of
significant incentives to retain its nuclear ambiguity throughout most of its history.
442 Matinuddin, The Nuclearization of South Asia, 138.
490
Mainly, Pakistan's regional security environment provided it with as much of an
incentive to retain an ambiguous posture as it did encouraging it to acquire a nuclear
weapons capability. Pakistan has always been a much weaker state than India and it
could ill-afford to stoke any direct military competition. Rather, its security was better
served, at least until the Indian tests, by deterrence through ambiguity. In this way,
Pakistan could gamer the benefits of nuclear deterrence without encouraging India to
destroy its capability, or completely outstrip it in technology or delivery mechanisms.
At the same time, an ambiguous posture afforded the program some level of
protection early on from external pressures. The United States, serving as a patron state
to Pakistan, sought to dissuade nuclear proliferation, and failing that to keep the Pakistani
program below public purview. Thus, while the incentives and sanctions were not
enough to kill the program, U.S. efforts did lead to Pakistani denials that it was seeking a
weapons capability in an effort to gamer favor with its longtime ally. Yet, these non-
proliferation pressures were not enough to prevent Pakistan from testing in 1998. This
suggests that while U.S. pressures were a significant factor in Pakistan's overall strategic
calculations, the regional rivalry with India was the trump card that ultimately determined
Pakistan's nuclear posture.
As to the international non-proliferation regime, Pakistan studiously avoided
undertaking any significant obligations that would have limited its nuclear weapons
capability. Member states, to varying degrees, imposed some costs on Pakistan by
denying nuclear technology and materials, which slowed the program to some extent, and
an open posture, which would have increased the number of state unwilling to cooperate.
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But as Pakistan gained self-sufficiency and found other avenues of reliable nuclear
cooperation, these options further lessened supplier state concerns. Additionally, there is
little evidence that Pakistan adopted or internalized the norms of the regime itself and that
it was self-regulating its behavior in accordance with international standards of conduct.
Finally, Pakistan's domestic political atmosphere was conducive to testing, but
was not likely a determinative factor. Opposition leaders had regularly used the
government's commitment to the nuclear weapons program as a yardstick of patriotism.
Additionally, the general Pakistani population had long supported Pakistan acquiring an
independent nuclear force. That is, these factors substantially existed prior to India
testing in 1998, but had not resulted in a change in Pakistan's nuclear posture. While the
Indian test brought these renewed calls that Pakistani leaders assumed would come, the
more significant factor appeared to be security calculations and the military's perspective
on how to best respond to the shift in New Delhi's posture.
In short, and as seen in Figure 6, the Indian nuclear weapons program is both the
source of the Pakistani nuclear program and a primary contributor to Islamabad's
ambiguous posture for most of its history. Other variables further entrenched and
deepened Pakistan's posture of ambiguity, in particular when Islamabad was the recipient
of U.S. conventional weapons and financial assistance. But in the end, Pakistan's nuclear
program was created to respond to threats from its more powerful neighbor, and it was
used to this end in 1998.
Figure 6 - Summary of the Presence of Explanatory Factors in the Pakistan Case.
I Hypothesis Predictions 1971-1998 1998 Test
Reg. Sec. Env. Deterrence High Very High
Signals
Conservative Medium Medium
Nuclear Strategy
Limited Medium Low-Medium
Cooperation
Patron State Issue Linkages High High
Conforming High Low-Medium
Dependent States
Nuclear Priority High High
for Patron
Int'l Non-Prolif. Material Costs Medium (high Medium (high
Regime vulnerability) vulnerability)
Norm Low Low
Recognition
Internalized Low-non- Low-non-
Norms existent existent
Domestic Bargaining and Low-non- Low-non-
Politics Compromise existent existent
Posture is in Low Low
interest of
I
centralized
decision-maker
Moral/Cultural Expressions of Non-existent Non-Existent
Constraints Nuclear Doubt
Nuclear Non-existent Non-existent
Weapons Not an
Option
Lack of Non-existent Non-existent
questioning
existing policy
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CHAPTER VI
COMPARISON BETWEEN CASES AND FACTORS
In Chapter Two, I reviewed the existing literature on deterrence and nuclear
ambiguity, framed hypotheses, and outlined process tracing and the congruence
procedure. In Chapters Three through Five, I outlined the empirical evidence related to
each hypothesis in each case. This chapter examines the five hypotheses across the three
cases of Israel, India, and Pakistan.
There are several conclusions reached from this analysis. First, regional security
environments were an important factor informing India and Pakistan's nuclear postures.
The security competition between the two states operated as both an incentive for
deterrence, as well as a muted competition, especially as India sought to balance the
security demands from both China and Pakistan. Israel too reflected the importance of its
regional environment, although in a different fashion. Initially Israel was primarily
concerned with deterring its neighbors; over time as Israel retained its nuclear monopoly,
ambiguity was further entrenched as one way to minimize incentives for other states in
the Middle East to gain a nuclear capability.
The importance of patron state incentives, particularly based on U.S. non-
proliferation pressures was a more important consideration to Israeli leaders initially. At
the same time, the U.S. had subjected Pakistan to non-proliferation pressures for decades,
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and the Pakistanis with their relative weakness vis-a.-vis India, have been particularly
vulnerable to this pressure. U.S. patron state pressures were also an important factor in
the Indian case, but it varied over time and was primarily related to economic and
technical cooperation, and lacked the conventional weapons assistance that the U.S.
provided Israel and Pakistan.
In short, both regional security environments and patron state incentives matter
significantly across all three cases, but to varying degrees of intensity at different time
periods. There is some evidence that the international non-proliferation regime mattered
to a lesser extent, and mainly by creating material costs. There is also some evidence
suggesting that domestic politics favored the Indian tests to a limited extent in 1974, and
the rise of the BJP in 1998 helps explain the timing of that test. However, when the
domestic political explanations, including the moral restraint hypothesis, are examined
throughout the history of the three cases, domestic compulsions explain less than external
security factors. The following outlines the basis for each of these conclusions.
I. Regional Security Environment
What do the cases tell us about the regional security environment and the impact
on each state's nuclear posture? The historical record suggests that threatening regional
security environments are an important determinant for the nuclear posture of second-
generation nuclear states. As is commonly accepted wisdom, second generation nuclear
states are motivated by the threats from neighboring states to acquire a nuclear capability.
A less commonly understood effect of the regional security environment is that it also
functions as a constraint on nuclear postures under some conditions. In particular, the
495
following discusses the ways in which the regional security environments have affected
second-generation nuclear states' postures where there is a disparity among adversaries in
terms of nuclear development.
A. Deterrence Signaling: Emphasis on Capability
If the hypothesis that regional security environments influence second-generation
nuclear states' postures is correct, then there is the expectation that regional adversaries
will seek to gain some benefits of deterrence by signaling that they can respond to
nuclear threats. There is substantial evidence in the historical record of the cases studied
here to support this proposition. In particular, regional states generally emphasized that
they had capability, as compared to intent, to produce nuclear weapons. By having the
ability to produce weapons, this meant that policy changes could be rather quickly
effectuated to change from a restrained posture if the circumstances warranted it.
In the Israeli case, signaling was accomplished initially by the refusal of Israel's
leaders to disavow a nuclear weapons capability. In particular, Israeli leaders were
reluctant to accede to U.S. preferences to explicitly reassure Egypt's Nasser that Israel
was not producing nuclear weapons. As Shimon Peres argued, it was in "Israel's highest
interest to leave Nasser in a state of uncertainty regarding the level of development and
objectives of the Dimona Project."l
By not providing public reassurances of the peaceful nature of the Israeli nuclear
program, this effectively signaled that Israel was considering a nuclear option. Further,
I Zaki Shalom, Israel's Nuclear Option: Behind the Scenes Diplomacy Between Dimona and Washington
(Portland: Sussex Academic Press and Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 2005), 24.
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the lack of transparency about the program created uncertainty as to the status ofIsraeli
nuclear development. This meant that there was the risk of grave miscalculation on
behalf of a challenger. Even as Israeli leaders settled on the formula that Israel would not
be the first state to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East, this statement left open
the possibility of having created a nuclear capability. And later statements that "nor
would Israel be second" further bolstered the idea that Israel had the capability to produce
nuclear weapons, just that it doesn't intent to introduce them absent some uncertain
circumstances.
Indian and Pakistani signals of having acquired a nuclear weapons capability have
been even more direct. Starting with Nehru, Indian Prime Ministers have suggested that
India has the capability to make nuclear bombs, while simultaneously discounting that
they would choose to do so. Prior to the first Chinese nuclear test, Nehru stated that
"[w]e have the technical know-how for manufacturing the atom bomb. We can do it in
three or four years if we divert sufficient resources in that direction. But, we have given
the world an assurance that we shall never do so. We shall never use our knowledge of
nuclear science for purposes ofwar.,,2 In this instance, Nehru was actually exaggerating
Indian nuclear technology as being more advanced than it actually was. In another
example, in the mid-1980s Rajiv Gandhi indicated that if India decided to become a
nuclear weapons state, "it would take a few weeks or a few months.,,3 At the same time,
2 Cited in G.G. Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma (New Delhi: Popular Book Services, 1968), 231.
3 Warren H. Donnelly, "India and Nuclear Weapons," Unclassified Report, 10 July 1987, Nuclear Non-
Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no.
NP02483,4.
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he also indicated that while India had the ability to make nuclear weapons "for almost
eleven years now, and we have not transformed that capability into weapons.,,4
Similarly, Pakistani leaders have suggested that Pakistan had the technical ability
to produce nuclear explosions or bombs, but did not intend to do so. For example, Zia
stated simultaneously that Pakistan was not making a bomb, but was indeed enriching
uranium in what was a "humble, modest experiment."s Further, when Zia would reassure
the U.S. that Pakistan did not intend to develop nuclear weapons, he would carefully craft
his statements and would not include assurances that Islamabad would stop seeking the
ability to make weapons or conduct a "peaceful nuclear explosion.,,6
Based on these illustrative examples, second-generation nuclear states preserved
the idea that they had the technical ability to produce nuclear weapons. By suggesting
that a state has a nuclear weapons capability, this provided some measure of a deterrence
posture, at least through uncertainty. Additionally, if a state has a nuclear weapons
capability, and intentions can change quickly, this suggests that it is ready to respond
quickly to changing security circumstances. In this way, regional states seek to bolster
deterrence by having a weapons capability, and restraint is based on intentions rather than
the inability to respond.
4 Donnelly, "India and Nuclear Weapons," no. NP02483, 4.
5 Barrington King to U.S. Department of State, "Zia's Remarks to U.S. Newsmen on U.S. Air Offer,
Bilateral Agreement, Nuclear Issue," Confidential Cable 00449, 18 January 1980, Nuclear Non-
Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no.
NPOl720,2.
6 Judith Miller, "US Cites Pakistani Pledge Not to Make Atom Arms," Foreign Desk, The New York
Times, 25 June 1981, A6.
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B. Conservative Nuclear Strategies & Paced Development
If ambiguous nuclear postures are the result of regional states seeking to both
deter and reassure their adversaries, then there should also be observable evidence of
states adopting conservative strategies designed to reduce the risk of competitive nuclear
policies. The research in this study strongly supports the proposition that regional
security environments also operate as a constraint on second-generation nuclear states'
postures. Across all three cases there is evidence of paced nuclear development based on
nuclear development disparities among adversaries, as well as a primacy of conventional
military capabilities and associated resource allocation concerns.
1. Disparity in Nuclear Development
The regional balance of nuclear power has affected second-generation nuclear
states' choices. There are two main lessons derived from this analysis. First, Israel-as a
much more advanced nuclear state with a monopoly strategy-was motivated to not
provoke other states to obtain an equivalent capability. On the other end of the spectrum,
power imbalances motivated relatively weaker states to retain ambiguity in order to avoid
provoking a competitive response from its stronger nuclear adversary. In Asia, India
lagged behind Chinese nuclear development, while Pakistan was less developed than
India. Second, in addition to the balance of relative nuclear power, the threat of
intervention from stronger, external states operated as a threat to change a favorable
balance of power. As a result, both Israel and India vis-a.-vis Pakistan had additional
incentives to refrain from a public nuclear posture, lest they provoked external assistance
to their adversaries.
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Israel's nuclear monopoly in the Middle East has set its regional security.
environment apart from that of India and Pakistan. However, when Israel first began
work on its nuclear program at Dimona, it was not apparent that this would be the
outcome. At the time, it appeared that other states within the Middle East were interested
in nuclear programs and Israeli leaders seemed to believe that it was inevitable that other
states would acquire nuclear weapons.7 This belief appeared to have informed Israeli
reluctance at providing other states with reassurances that Israel was not producing
nuclear weapons. However, after adopting the posture that Israel would not be the first to
introduce nuclear weapons-at American insistence-over time it became apparent that
Israel would be able to retain its nuclear monopoly with a combination of nuclear
ambiguity and force.
With nuclear ambiguity, Israel was able to not provoke Egypt in particular into
starting its own program, which lagged substantially behind Israel's capability. As
important, Israel provided a reduced incentive for Soviet involvement in bolstering
Egypt's nuclear capability to respond. By not issuing public nuclear threats, Israel thus
was able to encourage states already predisposed to forego a nuclear weapons program to
stay that way, while also minimizing external interference. In other cases such as with
Iraq, force was used against the Osiraq reactor to retain the Israeli nuclear monopoly.
In contrast, India and Pakistan operated in a regional security environment that
was characterized by relative differences in nuclear power between actors. India's
nuclear weapons and delivery mechanism program lagged significantly behind China's
7 Shalom, Israel's Nuclear Option, 24.
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much more advanced capability. As such, India sought for most of its nuclear history to
refrain from directly identifying China as the target of India nuclear development,
notwithstanding the fact that most states recognized this reality. Both prior and after the
1974 nuclear test, India proclaimed that its nuclear program was for peaceful purposes
only. It was only in 1998, after India was close to having long-range missiles and planes
to deliver nuclear warheads to most of China, that India justified its test on the threat
from China, in part. 8
On the other hand, if India had just had Pakistan to contend with and the absence
of other external factors, New Delhi could have considered a more robust nuclear policy
early on as most of Pakistan was within deliverable range. However, the reality in South
Asia was that while Pakistan lagged behind India's nuclear development, Islamabad had
a nuclear and conventional benefactor in China. By the late 1970s there were rumors of
Chinese assistance at Pakistan's nuclear facilities, and by the early 1980s there were
further reports of China testing a nuclear device for Pakistan and that Beijing had
provided the blueprints for a nuclear bomb. 9 The reports of collusion, combined with
previous Indian concerns of Chinese assistance to Pakistan during the 1965 and 1971
wars, were threatening to India. If India had adopted a more open nuclear stance and
quickened the development of its nuclear capability, it risked prompting China to
8 China was directly named in a letter to the U.S. government. Public pronouncements were more
circumscribed, noting that India was in a nuclear neighborhood.
9 See, e.g., U.S. Department of State, "The Pakistani Nuclear Program," Secret Briefing Paper, 23 June
1983, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey,
1992), no. NP02057, 6.; U.S. Embassy Pakistan, "Pakistan's Nuclear Program: Press Reports of Chinese
Involvement," Confidential Cable 06864, 6 August 1984, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.:
The National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. NP02144, 1.
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increase its support ofPakistan as a way to balance Indian strength in South Asia. Thus,
as in the Israeli case, the conduct of external states influenced the regional balance of
power calculations in South Asia as well.
As for Pakistan, the technical hurdles it had to overcome to build a credible
nuclear arsenal were substantial and it had little incentive to provoke India into either
seeking to destroy its nuclear facilities or outstrip its nascent nuclear program. In
particular, from 1981-1984 there were recurring reports that India was considering
striking Pakistan's Kahuta facility. 10 While India chose not to exercise this option, the
evidence suggests that Pakistan sought to reassure New Delhi of its peaceful intentions
and that its program was not a threat. Pakistan also had further reasons to not test, as it
had a small stockpile of fissionable material and could conduct limited explosions and
build weapons. Additionally, ifPakistan tested it would then give India the public
justification to continue testing and weaponize its capabilities-which India claimed it
was not doing through the 1998 nuclear tests. These realities meant that Pakistani
regional incentives were to not provoke India so that Islamabad's nuclear program could
be kept within range of India's capability.
As the above cases illustrate, the level of nuclear development within the region
can affect incentives for retaining an ambiguous nuclear posture. This is both the result
of nuclear development disparities between states, and the susceptibility of stronger
powers to insert themselves into the region to promote their own interests. Thus, for
10 John J. Louis, Jr. to U.S. Department of State, "Observer Article on Indo-Pak Nuclear Issue," Limited
Official Use, Cable 00067,4 January 1983, Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National
Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. NP02005.
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second-generation nuclear states, leaders have to calculate whether an overt nuclear
posture will promote security vis-a.-vis other regional powers as well as whether external
involvement will affect a favorable balance of power.
2. Primacy of Conventional Military Capabilities & Cost Concerns
In addition to regional disparities in nuclear development, second-generation
nuclear states have placed a primacy on the conventional military balance in the region.
The priority of devoting sufficient resources for conventional capabilities has further
served to reduce incentives to adopt an open nuclear posture. This dynamic has operated
in different ways. The first way is related to leaders seeking to fund a nuclear program
without diverting resources for conventional weapons or domestic economic programs.
This meant that having paced nuclear development, rather than crash programs, more
readily facilitated balancing both priorities over a longer term. Related, U.S. patron state
incentives, as discussed below, explicitly linked the provision of conventional arms on
continued nuclear restraint. As such, Israel and Pakistan in particular were vulnerable to
U.S. pressures to retain an ambiguous stance.
All of the states in this study placed a primacy on being able to respond
conventionally to threats within their security environment. However, the source of this
constraint has differed among the states. In particular, Israel initially obtained the bulk of
its sophisticated conventional weapons from other states. The main concern this created
for Israeli leaders was to make sure the economy could handle both its conventional
purchases and nuclear development program, while also not running afoul of the U.S.
non-proliferation stance. Additionally, while there was not another state in Middle East
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during the early 1960s that could directly challenge Israel's nuclear development, the
state faced a hostile environment and was motivated to construct its deterrent force. To
this end, Israel worked out cooperative arrangements, primarily with France, to acquire
the technology and materials it would need for its nuclear weapons capability. This
enabled Israel to create a nuclear option relatively quickly.
Pakistan was similarly motivated as Israel to construct a nuclear force as quickly
as possible, although Islamabad's concern was its conventional weakness with India. To
this end, Pakistan also sought external assistance to speed up its program. At the same
time however, the Pakistani military clearly had a preference for maintaining sufficient
forces to deal with the conventional threat from India. This was because Pakistan could
not give up its conventional force in lieu of a nuclear capability; otherwise it would not
have the flexibility to respond to an incursion without massive retaliation, or alternately,
do nothing at all. II Further, if Pakistan just relied on a nuclear capability, India would
quickly have a secure second-strike capability. This meant that Pakistan's nuclear
capability would quickly be countered. And with the U.S. as a significant supplier of
conventional forces, particularly during the 1980s, this also meant that Pakistan was not
ready to rely on nuclear deterrence to solve its security problems.
India was the most reluctant to overly spend on a nuclear capability. India has
preferred not to enter into a costly arms race, or to invest large sums of money in defense
expenditures when, as a developing state, it had pressing domestic priorities. India could
11 U.S. Department of State, "India-Pakistan: Pressures for Nuclear Proliferation," Limited Official Use,
Report 778-AR, 10 February 1984, Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington D.C.: The National
Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992), no. WM00283, 5.
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deal with the short-term Pakistani threat-the longer-term problem was China, as India
was weaker than its northern neighbor. Indian development, both economic and nuclear,
has lagged far behind Chinese capabilities and, in an overt arms race, India would
struggle, at best, to keep up with Chinese developments. Additionally, it would be
decades before New Delhi was within range of having a credible deterrent with China,
and at the same time, India could manage its problems with Pakistan with conventional
forces.
Indian leaders translated these security requirements into a long-term
development plan. India marched forward with its nuclear program and delivery system
development, but at a pace relative to Pakistan, rather than seeking to outstrip Islamabad.
Because India had other priorities, such as economic development, it mainly sought to
rely on its conventional forces while continuing to manage its nuclear program.
Further, given these strategic realities, India has sought to minimize the
propensity for costly and dangerous regional arms race with Pakistan and China that
could prove counterproductive.12 For example, these regional dynamics were on Indira
Gandhi's mind, in particular given the fragility of the Indian economy during her tenure
in office, and the potential to diminish Indian security further. 13 Similarly, Rajiv Gandhi
was concerned about minimizing regional tensions, although ultimately they were
significantly exacerbated by the unfortunate Brasstacks crisis. In the wake of this low
12 Joeck, Neil, "Maintaining Nuclear Stability in South Asia," Adelphi Paper 312 (New York: Oxford
University Press for IISS, 1997).
13 Raj Chengappa, Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story ofIndia's Ouest to Be a Nuclear Power (New
Delhi: Harper Collins Publishers India, 2000), 114.
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point in relations with Pakistan, in November 1989 when VP Singh came to power as
Prime Minister of India, he decided against a nuclear test not only because ofIndia's
economic woes but also because of deteriorating relations with India's neighbors. 14
Based on this analysis, the main similarity across all three cases is that the
second-generation nuclear state placed a priority on being able to respond to threats with
conventional forces. In the cases ofIsrae1 and Pakistan, this necessarily included
cooperating with U.S. non-proliferation preferences to some extent. However, given the
relatively severe security environment both states found themselves in, they were more
motivated than India to develop a nuclear weapons capability sooner than later, as long as
doing so did not diminish the conventional forces. India, however, was not as concerned
about its conventional capability-the Soviet Union was willing to provide New Delhi
with weapons and it retained an advantage over Pakistan. India was more concerned
about the necessary costs that would be required to develop an advanced and
sophisticated system capable of deterring China-this was expensive. As such, India
sought to keep a paced development that consisted ofkeeping up with Pakistan from the
late 1970s, but not seeking to compete with China until the late 1990s. This policy also
enabled India to more closely engage the U.S. on economic and technical terms, as
discussed in more detail below.
C. Tacit and Formal Measures to Reduce Transition Risks
Another way to reduce the risk of conflict and costs stemming from the
development of nuclear weapons is to introduce tacit and formal measures to reduce
14 Chengappa, Weapons of Peace, 354.
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transition risks. The historical evidence shows that there was some minimal, tacit
cooperation between Israel and some Arab states. The Indian and Pakistani cases
exhibited more instances of tacit and formal attempts to normalize their competitive
security environment, although these could not be characterized as extensive by any
measure.
The primary tacit agreement that Israel and Egypt, in particular, came to was that
Israel would not issue nuclear threats in exchange for non-proliferation. As demonstrated
recently, the idea that Israel should retain its opaque posture has some currency within a
number of states in the Middle East. For example, the Arab league has recently stated
that its member states will withdraw from the NPT if Israel admits that is has a nuclear
weapons capability. IS
In some ways, this suggests that the Arab states are seeking to neutralize the
Israeli nuclear capability by restricting the ability for Tel Aviv to issue nuclear threats; if
this breaks down, then the threat is that other states will proliferate within the Middle
East. At the same time, there are clearly no agreements for Israel to refrain from
attacking other nuclear installations, as demonstrated by Osiraq, and more recently the
attack on the Syrian reactor in 2007. Israel has also rejected Arab calls for a nuclear
weapons free zone in the Middle East, or other measures that would restrict the Israeli
nuclear force. As Israel is currently the only state in the Middle East with a nuclear
capability, it is seeking to retain its monopoly, not facilitate a peaceful transition to
nuclear deterrence. As such, there are few measures designed to reduce the risk of
[5 Associated Press, "Arab League will call for leaving nuclear treaty ifIsrae1 admits to atomic weapons,"
International Herald Tribune, 5 March 2008.
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nuclear programs. However, one should not overlook the general consensus in the
Middle East to keep the Israeli nuclear program a "non-issue" by all relevant parties in
dealing with other more pressing, regional security problems.
India and Pakistan have had more success with some small tacit and formal
confidence building measures to reduce the risk of both states transitioning to nuclear
weapons status. For example, during the early1980s, India first refrained from attacking
Pakistan's nuclear weapons facilities. This led to discussions between Prime Minister
Rajiv Gandhi and President Zia to first agree to not attack each other's facilities, followed
by a formalized agreement, and an eventual exchange of lists of facilities. After the 1987
Brasstacks Crisis, a hotline was established, as well as measures for troop movement
notifications. While the latter two provisions did not related directly to each other's
nuclear capabilities, these measures were part of a broader effort to normalize relations,
although the overall relationship continued to break down at various intervals.
In short, there is some evidence that is consistent with this prediction. The key is
that the expectation was that any cooperation would be limited, considering the existing
security dynamics that are characterized by hostility and distrust. To this extent, the fact
that India and Pakistan were able to agree to any minimal measures supports the
proposition that the regional security environment can create incentives for restraint. In
the case ofIsrae1, which has a nuclear monopoly, this means Tel Aviv had little incentive
to agree, tacitly or otherwise, to restrict its capability or facilitate other states' peaceful
transition. What this does mean, however, is that by refraining from directly issuing
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nuclear threats, other regional states have tacitly agreed to some extent to live with an
Israeli nuclear capability.
Figure 7 - Summary of Evidentiary Support for Regional Security Environment
Hypothesis and Predictions.
India Pakistan Israel
1974 Test 1974-1998 1998 Test 1971-1998 1998 Test 1957-1975
Deterrence Strong Strong Strongest Strong Strongest Strong
Signals Support Support Support Support Support Support
Conservative Moderate Strong Limited Moderate Limited to Moderate
Nuclear Support Support Support Support Moderate Support
Strategy Support
Limited Limited Moderate Limited Moderate Limited Limited
Cooperation Support Support Support Support Support Support
II. Patron State Incentives
As outlined in Chapter Two, if patron state threats and inducements are
responsible for second-generation nuclear states' postures, several types of state conduct
that should be readily observable. First, the patron state must in some form link the
issues of economic and conventional military assistance with the ambiguous posture of
their client state. Moreover, highly dependent client states should exhibit more
conforming behavior than more independent states. Non-proliferation pressures from the
patron state should also be more effective when it is a high priority for the patron state
and proliferation is a lower priority for the client state.
Here, there is substantial evidence linking patron state pressures to the studied
cases of ambiguity. However, this statement requires an important qualifier. This
conclusion is primarily limited to the United States, although it also extends somewhat to
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Western nuclear suppliers after the 1974 Indian nuclear test. This is mainly because
other patron states-especially France, China, and the Soviet Union-rarely explicitly
linked assistance to their client states based on non-proliferation interests. To the
contrary, France and China readily assisted a number of states with both nuclear and
conventional military programs. As such, "patron state pressures" effectively means
"U.S. non-proliferation pressures."
There are two additional caveats. First, while the U.S. successfully influenced the
nuclear stance of the second-generation nuclear states researched here, Washington was
overall unsuccessful in convincing any of them to forego a nuclear option. Regional
security requirements clearly trumped U.S. efforts. Second, while the U.S. was able to
influence Indian nuclear policy, particularly the time period between the 1974 and 1998,
Washington generally had less leverage on New Delhi, relative to Islamabad or Tel Aviv.
This is mainly because the Soviet Union was the primary supplier of conventional
assistance to India, while the U.S. had economic and trade channels as avenues of
influence.
A. Issue Linkages, Client State Dependency, and Nuclear Priorities
The United States clearly linked its economic, technical, nuclear, and
conventional military assistance to its preference for non-proliferation. As mentioned
above, client state dependency varied, with Israel and Pakistan having much more
reliance on U.S. aid than India. Additionally, there is some evidence that waning U.S.
non-proliferation pressures on India in the late 1990s had an effect on India's
calculations.
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Israel was first subject to these pressures in the early 1960s, as the U.S. sought
inspection rights to the Dimona nuclear reactor. 16 Israeli leaders were subject to a great
deal ofpressure over the issue as Israel was heavily dependent on U.S. aid, which would
continue to grow during the 1970s. Yet, at the same time, Washington was unwilling to
fully breach its relationship with Israel over the nuclear non-proliferation issue. That is,
while is preferred a non-nuclear Israel, it could live with opacity ifthis was the best the
u.s. could get. Israel was simply too important of a state in the Middle East for the U.S.
to cutoff assistance.
For its part, Israel could live with opacity as long as it did not give up its nuclear
weapons option. Opacity itself was actually a compromise for Tel Aviv, resulting from
ongoing U.S. diplomatic pressure for Israel to declare its nuclear intentions. IfIsrael had
been left to its own devices, its leaders likely would have continued to simply claim that
their nuclear program was for peaceful purposes only. As it were, both sides could live
with this formulation and the U.S. would continue to repeat the Israeli statement of its
nuclear weapons program.
Pakistan was similarly dependent on U.S. largesse. At the same time, the
relationship between Islamabad and the U.S. was subject to extreme fluctuations, from
aid to sanctions. This variability in U.S. policy towards Pakistan was based on mainly on
whether U.S. interests in South Asia were engaged. For example, in the late 1970s, the
Carter administration imposed sanctions on Pakistan for its nuclear activities. However,
the Reagan administration reversed this policy with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
16 See, e.g., Dean Rusk to U.S. Embassies, "Israel's Dimona Reactor," 31 October 1962, Nuclear Non-
Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Proquest, 2008), no. NP00922.
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The Reagan administration justified this volte face in policy, arguing that if Pakistan had
enough conventional weapons to be secure, it would be less likely to acquire nuclear
weapons. 17 At the same time, U.S. government officials took great pains to remind the
Pakistanis that U.S. domestic laws required mandatory sanctions if Pakistan tested a
nuclear weapons device. These efforts resulted in President Zia providing reassurances
that Pakistan did not have a nuclear explosive device. 18
However, after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the drawdown of the
Cold War, the U.S. was no longer willing to look the other way on Pakistan's continued
nuclear progress. In 1990, the U.S. imposed sanctions again, with a one-time waiver
several years later. The result is that Pakistan was already subject to U.S. punitive
measures in 1998, with little promise of an extensive aid package if Islamabad refrained
from testing. Further, the evidence suggests that while Sharif personally wanted to
forego testing in order to resume receiving aid from the U.S., security concerns related to
India's previous tests a few weeks prior took precedence.
Taken together, this evidence demonstrates that the U.S. consistently sought to
link aid and sanctions to Pakistan's nuclear ambitions. Pakistan, for its part, was highly
dependent on U.S. assistance and largely publicly conformed to these requirements when
receiving aid. When Pakistan was under sanctions, its leaders would seek ways to renew
U.S. assistance. However, in the face of a direct Indian challenge with tests in 1998,
17 U.S. Department of State, "Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 735 of the International Security and
Development Cooperation Act of 1981: Pakistan's Nuclear Program," Secret Report, 14 March 1983,
Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Washington D.C.: The National Security Archive and Chadwick-Healey, 1992),
no. NP02022, 6.
18 U.S. Department of State, "Report to Congress: Pakistan's Nuclear Program," no. NP02022, 6.
512
Pakistan was required to respond with its own tests, lest it lose credibility that it had this
capability. Thus, regional pressures in the end mattered more than dependency on its
patron state.
U.S. patron state pressures were more complicated as related to India and varied
over time. Prior to the 1974 test, Indo-US. relations were at a low point. The US. had
some influence, to the extent that it provided fuel and spare parts for India's Tarapur
nuclear reactor. To this end, the US. sought to pressure India into refraining from testing
by indicating that from Washington's perspective, there was no difference between
peaceful nuclear explosions and testing for military purposes. India rejected this
interpretation from both the US. and Canada, who also sought to counsel the Indians
against testing. The evidence suggests however, that Indian leaders did not expect the
US. and Canada to cutoff nuclear assistance if it framed its test as a peaceful nuclear
explosion. The result is that India's civil and military nuclear power development
suffered in the aftermath of the test.
During the 1980s, the Indo-US. relationship was back on track as India sought
access to advanced US. technology and markets. This relationship continued to grow in
the 1990s and had two important implications for India's 1998 nuclear test. First, India's
economic growth enabled it to both withstand US. sanctions that would inevitably
follow, as well as ensured that the punitive measures would be relatively short-lived as
the U.S. had an interest in resuming trade. Second, the U.S. appeared increasingly
willing to live with a nuclear India under the Clinton administration. This meant that the
tests would also not have a long-lasting impact on India's relationship with the U.S.
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Finally, it is important to note that the client states also had some forms of reverse
leverage on the U.S. In particular for Israel and Pakistan, conventional weapons
assistance was seen as an important way to prevent both states from feeling the security
need to obtain nuclear weapons. This meant that leaders from both states sought to
encourage the U.S. to keep a steady supply of assistance as a way to reduce the need for
nuclear weapons. Of course, since India did not received conventional weapons from the
U.S., this form of leverage was absent from the relationship. What India did seek to do,
as did Pakistan, was to draw U.S. attention to the proliferation efforts of each other, while
both sides sought to simultaneously highlight their nuclear restraint. Interestingly, some
Arab states have employed the same tactic; they highlighted their nuclear restraint and
suggested that the U.S. should do more to restrain its ally, Israel. Figure 8 summarizes
the effects ofpatron state pressure.
Figure 8 - Summary of Evidentiary Support for Patron State Hypothesis and Predictions.
India Pakistan Israel
1974 Test 1974-1998 1998 Test 1971-1998 1998 Test 1957-1975
I Issue Moderate I Strong Moderate Strong Limited Strong
Linkages Support Support Support Support Support Support
Conforming Moderate Strong Limited- Strong Limited to Strong
Dependent I Support Support Moderate Support Moderate Support
States Support Support
Nuclear Limited Strong Moderate Strong Limited Strong
Priority for Support Support Support Support Support Support
Patron
------------
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III. International Non-Proliferation Regime
If the non-proliferation regime were a significant factor in the nuclear stance of
second-generation states, then at a minimum there should be evidence that the
proliferating states were sensitive to costs that would be imposed by the regime. In
addition to these material concerns, there would is an expectation that the proliferating
states recognized that there was a norm against testing and openly acknowledging the
development of nuclear weapons. Additionally, the strongest support for this hypothesis
would be ifthere was evidence that second-generation nuclear states had internalized the
validity of the international non-proliferation regime and the dangers ofproliferation.
There is limited evidence that the non-proliferation regime affected the nuclear
postures of the states studied here. To the extent that the non-proliferation regime
mattered, it did so by enforcing agreements among nuclear supplier states to refrain from
assisting non-nuclear states. This in tum limited some availability of access to nuclear
technology and materials, which slowed down the Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs.
In short, there were some material costs associated with members of the regime.
However, there is little evidence that any of the three states expected significant costs
from the regime at large, or that they internalized the non-proliferation norms to any
extent.
All three states have largely avoided the international commitments ofthe
international non-proliferation framework. Israel, India, and Pakistan are all members of
the Partial Test Ban Treaty, but refuse to sign the NPT or Comprehensive Test Ban
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Treaty. As such, they are not constrained by the tenns of the agreements that most
effectively restrain nuclear proliferation.
As for Israel, it had developed its nuclear capability just as the NPT was coming
into existence in 1968. Prior to this, Israel and France cooperated on a number ofnuclear
fronts that enabled both states to more quickly accomplish their nuclear goals. And while
France remained willing to assist other states with their nuclear programs and stayed
outside the NPT framework, Paris began insisting on safeguards as a way to appease the
Americans. However, Israel escaped these pressures as French non-proliferation
cooperation was a later development. Additionally, because Israel had a relatively small
nuclear program and retained an ambiguous nuclear posture, it was not subject to
sanctions or a reduction in assistance later with its program. As such, Israel emerged
relatively unscathed in material tenns with its program.
Additionally, there is scant evidence that Israel recognizes or had internalized
nonns against non-proliferation. Certainly, Israeli leaders likely accurately calculate that
ifIsrae1 declared itself a nuclear weapons state, this would have material ramifications.
But there is little to suggest that it agrees with these values or that it would hesitate to
change its stance if security requirements dictated otherwise. At the same time however,
Israel has not sought to undennine the regime in any significant way-rather, Tel Aviv
just avoids its obligations.
India and Pakistan have suffered more in material tenns than Israel from the non-
proliferation regime. Indeed, it was the 1974 Indian nuclear test that prompted U.S.
po1icymakers to adopt a more rigorous non-proliferation stance, including passing laws
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specifically targeting states that conduct nuclear tests. Yet, as previously discussed,
much of the non-proliferation regime at the time was driven the U.S. as the primary
enforcer, with some Western nuclear supplier state cooperation. The Soviet Union shared
an interest in non-proliferation but was unwilling to exert any pressure on India that
would rupture the relationship. France continued to cooperate on nuclear terms, requiring
only that French assistance would be subject to safeguards, but did not require that of
indigenous facilities or others that did not include this original obligation.
India's stance towards the non-proliferation regime was also somewhat
bifurcated. On the one hand, Indian leaders promoted disarmament norms, and early on
were on the forefront of seeking to pass agreements that would limit the spread ofnuclear
weapons. However, India was not satisfied with the nature of the agreements that were
passed as they entrenched existing nuclear powers and did not effectively constrain
growing Chinese nuclear development. As such, India excoriated existing agreements as
discriminatory.
Nonetheless, India did not directly challenge the non-proliferation regime. For
example, it did not test in 1995 with the permanent extension of the NPT or in 1996 when
the CTBT treaty was signed. At the same time however, it sought to signal that it
remained outside of this framework, and the tests in 1998 reminded the world that India
was not bound to follow the dictates of the agreements. New Delhi did lose one of its
traditional justifications in 1992 though when France and China signed the NPT. With
these traditional holdouts signing the treaty, India no longer had this reason to refrain
from signing; nonetheless, Indian leaders repeated the refrain that the treaty was
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discriminatory. India has also studiously avoided all regional proposals by Pakistan that
would limit the Indian nuclear program but not include China.
In short, there is some evidence that India was limited in material terms by
cooperating nuclear suppliers after the 1974 nuclear test. However, beyond that and U.S.
measures, there was generally an anemic response by the international community at
large. As such, as India correctly calculated, it had few concerns with long lasting effects
from testing in 1998. Moreover, India has challenged a normative framework that is
based on discriminating between "have" nuclear states and "have not" nuclear states.
This suggests that it has internalized few of international non-proliferation norms.
Pakistan's nuclear program similarly suffered material constraints from India's
1974 nuclear test, notwithstanding the fact that Islamabad had not tested. But its early
declarations that it would pursue nuclear weapons if India did so, combined with
relatively frequent reports of surreptitious nuclear activities served to capture U.S.
attention, and Washington's efforts to convince other states to not cooperate with
Pakistan. And, as with India, Pakistan knew that there would be sanctions from the 1998
nuclear tests. However, in its weakened economic state, Pakistan was in a less viable
position to ride them out; still, few states were interested in a bankrupt Pakistan and it
was able to service its foreign debt to avoid this outcome.
There is no evidence that Pakistan has internalized any non-proliferation norms.
Islamabad's security concerns trump all other considerations. As to the regional non-
proliferation proposals that it would trot out on occasion, there is little to suggest that
Pakistan's leaders considered these options as viable. Rather, the measures appeared to
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be a way of highlighting Pakistan's restrained nuclear posture, while pointing to Indian
unwillingness to sign agreements that would limit New Delhi's options. In short, the
non-proliferation regime, as mainly enforced by the U.S., was a framework to largely
avoid. Some of the regime members were willing to live up to the spirit of the
agreement, which did impose some material constraints on later proliferators, but
generally did little beyond slow down the programs. Figure 9 summarizes the evidentiary
support for the international non-proliferation regime hypothesis.
Figure 9 - Summary of Evidentiary Support for International Non-Proliferation Regime
Hypothesis and Predictions.
India Pakistan Israel
1974 Test 1974-1998 1998 Test 1971-1998 1998 Test 1957-1975
Material Limited - Moderate Limited - Moderate Limited - Limited
Costs Moderate Support Moderate Support Moderate Support
Support Support Support
Nonn Limited Limited Limited- Limited Limited Limited I
Recognition Support Support Moderate Support Support Support
Support
Internalized Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited
INonns Support Support Support Support Support Support
IV. Domestic Political Interests: Party/Interest Group Politics
The primary domestic politics explanation contends that nuclear opacity is a
compromise solution between contending economic interests groups. According to this
perspective, the cases should demonstrate evidence of the bargaining process based on
particular interests and the compromise solution of opacity.
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However, evidence across the three cases does not correlate with this model, or
even the more generalized proposition that ambiguity is a function of compromised
interests. Certainly there have been divergent interests as to whether a state should
acquire nuclear weapons, and if this choice is made, when the best time is to publicly
acknowledge this capability. Yet, the dividing lines in these debates are mainly drawn
around the best way to provide for state security. In particular, the discussion has largely
centered on the affordability of a nuclear weapons program, what type of systems are
required for security, and most importantly, the effect that acquiring a nuclear option will
have one external aid.
Further, once the decision is made to pursue a nuclear option, the debate centers
around all ofthe factors discussed in this project and the effect on state security by
publicly advertising state intentions. This suggests that parochial interests, wherever they
may lie, were of a lesser issue than leaders coming to different conclusions based on
differences in opinion on the best way to provide for state security.
By way of illustration, Solingen argues that Israeli chose ambiguity as a
compromise solution between those that wanted a more open economic system-which
thus required bending to U.S. wishes-and those that preferred a more closed model. 19
While it is true that different leaders held varied perspectives on the economic model,
u.s. nuclear policy preferences were paramount based on the economic and conventional
military assistance Washington provided. This means that it didn't matter what type of
economic model the U.S. adopted, what mattered was cooperation. Additionally, having
19 Etel Soligen, "The Domestic Sources of Regional Regimes: The Evolution ofNuclear Ambiguity in the
Middle East," International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 2 (June 1994), 318.
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a mixed economic system, as described by Solingen, fails to address the primacy of
conventional weapons assistance. And, as Solingen herself acknowledges, leadership
preferences for a particular economic model are but one factor in the overall calculus-
one that this research finds tertiary to explaining Israel's nuclear stance.
Another variant on this perspective suggests that a state's nuclear posture is
largely the outcome of the leader in power. Ambiguity is thus explained as the leader in
charge as having full control of the nuclear decision-making, with identifiable
preferences for a restrained nuclear posture. To explain the 1974 Indian test and the
Indo-Pakistani nuclear tests in 1998 then, the focus is on leaders who preferred an open
stance and also sought to capitalize on broad domestic support for nuclear weapons.
As to the 1974 Indian test, some commentators have speculated that Indira
Gandhi chose to test at the time in order to support her flagging domestic support.
However, the evidence suggests that she was motivated to respond to Chinese
advancements as well as cross-party calls for the same. As to timing, she tested as soon
as Indian scientists developed the capability. Moreover, given the general popularity of
the nuclear program with the public, there should have been additional testing by her and
other leaders whenever a weak government was in power. This did not happen.
As to the 1998 tests, Prime Minister Vajpayee was head of the nationalist BJP
party, which had included the induction of nuclear weapons in its party platform.
However, Indian history suggests that this was neither a necessary nor sufficient
condition for testing, although it does explain the timing of the tests. Vajpayee chose not
to test during his short tenure in office in 1996-by definition his government was very
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weak, but reports suggest he feared that a weak government would not be able to handle
the international fallout. Similarly, Vajpayee had himself counseled against testing in
1977 as India sought to repair relations with the West and Pakistan in the wake of the
1974 test. In short, conditions had to be conducive for Vajpayee to test.
As to Pakistan, the military has primarily controlled nuclear policy since 1977.
This has practically translated into a system of centralized decision-making. During the
early 1990s there was increased rhetoric from Pakistani leaders, mainly in opposition to
the government, that would make increasingly open statements about Pakistan's nuclear
capabilities. However, this was never official policy and was likely a way to curry favor
with the military, which had expressed some concern that the politicians would trade
away the program under U.S. sanctions. In 1998, Prime Minister Sharif appeared to have
wanted to forego testing in response to India, as he feared the economic repercussions;
the Pakistani military trumped him as tensions with India continued to rise. In short,
there is little indication that domestic politics mattered very much during Pakistan's
history, particularly in comparison to the military's control over nuclear policy.
Taken together, there is some limited evidence in the Israeli and Indian cases that
there were differences in opinion leading to compromise in the former, and interests in
capturing public support in the latter. Neither explanation transcends the particular case
very well. More importantly, there is the presence of other determinants in both instances
that can explain a broader range of state behavior throughout history. As such, while
there is some evidentiary support for these positions, they are less compelling, as shown
in Figure 10.
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Figure 10 - Summary of Evidentiary Support for Domestic Politics Hypothesis and
Predictions.
India Pakistan Israel
1974 Test 1974-1998 1998 Test 1971-1998 1998 Test 1957-1975
Bargaining Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited Limited-
and Support Support Support Support Support Moderate
Compromise Support
Posture is in Moderate Limited Moderate Limited - Limited - Limited
interest of Support Support Support Moderate Moderate Support
centralized jSupport I Support
decision-
maker J
V. Moral or Strategic Culture Explanations
A second domestic politics explanation focuses on the effect of moral or strategic
culture constraints on state leaders as a way of explaining ambiguity. One variant of this
explanation was proposed by scholars studying India, and was based on observations of
Indian leaders who have often publicly referred to the doctrine of ahisma, or non-violence
to living things. As applied to nuclear weapons, this proposition suggests that Indian
leaders held deep reservations about immorality of relying on weapons ofmass
destruction for security purposes. Another variant focuses on strategic culture to explain
ambiguity. As applied to Israel, some scholars have suggested that Israeli leaders did not
reconcile themselves with the destruction nature ofnuclear weapons, which over time
ossified into a policy of nuclear opacity.
If either of these variants on leadership reservations is correct, then we should be
able to observe expressions of doubt or lack of reliance by leaders on nuclear weapons
523
for security. Additionally, leaders should refrain from considering using nuclear
weapons when they are a militarily useful option, and there should be little questioning or
evaluation of existing policy.
This study finds that while there is evidence supporting the idea that many Indian
and Israeli leaders held personal reservations about the role of nuclear weapons in
providing for state security, there is little evidence that this affected their nuclear choices
generally. That is, there is evidence supporting the first prediction, that there are
expressions of doubt about relying on nuclear weapons for security. However, these
doubts seemed to rarely affect nuclear policy in general. Rather, even leaders that
opposed nuclear weapons took steps to further both the development of weapons and
delivery mechanisms.
Starting with Prime Minister Nehru, there are numerous post-independence public
comments by Indian leaders as to the immoral and unethical nature ofnuclear weapons.
Indian leaders have used this theme to underscore India's self-avowed disinterest in
developing nuclear weapons even though it had the demonstrated capability to do so.
However, even with these public pronouncements, even India's most morally opposed
ieaders have taken steps to further the program. For example, Prime Minister Shastri
authorized the explosives program that would lead to the 1974 nuclear test. Even during
the mid-1990s, both Prime Ministers Gowda and Gujral appeared to have opposed
nuclear weapons on moral grounds, but both authorized additional testing shafts to be
constructed. These examples demonstrate that even though Indian leaders may have
publicly articulated a personal aversion to nuclear weapons, when charged with duties of
----------------- --_.__.- ..._---
524
state security, they set aside these preferences. This suggests that they would do the same
with India's nuclear posture if the circumstances warranted it.
Similarly, there is evidence that some Israeli leaders were concerned about the
"very apocalyptic nature ofplanning the unthinkab1e."zo However, there is little to
suggest that these reservations have substantially informed Israel's nuclear postures. As
even advocates of the strategic culture arguments accept, there were other determinants
that created the policy during the late 1950s and early 1960s.21
Further, the evidence suggests that Israeli leaders have thought dynamically about
Israel's nuclear posture. Both Prime Minister Eshko1 and Meir considered using nuclear
bombs during the 1967 and 1973 wars. After the 1973, further evidence suggests that
Israel has significantly advanced its capability, which includes tactical nuclear weapons.
While never confirmed, there is also suspicion that Israel conducted a joint nuclear test
with South Africa in the Vela incident in 1979. Additionally, Israel maintains its existing
nuclear monopoly and still issues opaque threats about its nuclear capability, such as
during the first Gulf War. In short, Israel's nuclear capability appears readily accessible
to its leaders, even ifit is not an option for the country's day-to-day security problems.
Finally, this study did not find any instances ofPakistani leaders expressing any
moral concerns related to nuclear weapons. Consistent with this finding, other scholars
have not proposed this as an explanation for Pakistan's nuclear posture.
20 Avner Cohen, "Nuclear Arms in Crisis Under Secrecy: Israel and the Lessons of the 1967 and 1973
Wars," Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons,
Peter R Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz, eds. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 105.
21 Cohen, "Nuclear Arms in Crisis Under Secrecy," 343.
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In short, contributions to developing a nuclear weapons program by leaders who
seem to publicly entertain doubts inferentially suggests that such beliefs are not the
primary factor motivating their decisions. Moreover, there is little evidence that either
India or Israel's leaders did not consider their nuclear options during times ofwar and
crisis. Further, continued review by both governments also suggests that the policies are
not culturally entrenched to the extent that they are not subject reevaluation. Thus, while
there is evidence ofmoral doubts regarding nuclear weapons, there is missing evidence
linking those concerns to each state's nuclear posture. As such there is little support for
this proposition, particularly across all three cases, as seen in Figure 11.
Figure 11 - Summary of Evidentiary Support for Moral and Strategic Culture Hypothesis
and Predictions.
India Pakistan Israel
1974 Test 1974-1998 1998 Test 1971-1998 1998 Test 1957-1975
Expressions Limited - Moderate Limited No Support No Support Limited
of Nuclear Moderate Support Support Support
Doubt Support
Nuclear Limited Limited Limited No Support No Support Limited
Weapons Support Support Support Support
Not an
Option
Lack of Limited Limited Limited No Support No Support Limited
questioning Support Support Support Support
existing
policy
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VI. Conclusions
The three cases studied here reveal several important lessons about the constraints
facing second-generation nuclear states. First, the regional security environments create
countervailing pressures. On the one hand, severe security environments encourage
nuclear proliferation. Insecure states seek nuclear weapons as a way to offset existing
conventional deficiencies, or as insurance in the event the conventional balance shifts. At
the same time, disparities in nuclear development, as well as the need to retain sufficient
conventional forces, counsel in favor of a conservative development strategy.
In the case of Israel, this realization came later, after the compromise with the
U.S. that Israel would not be the first state to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle
East. As Israeli leaders realized that some states, in particular Egypt, were not
particularly motivated to compete in nuclear terms, and with the combined threat of
Soviet intervention, ambiguity gave Israel a tool to retain its nuclear monopoly. The
regional dynamic was, however. present in the Indian and Pakistani cases from the
beginning, and gave both sides some incentives for a least nascent forms of cooperation
to reduce the risks of both states transition to nuclear weapons status. For India, there
was the added concern of Chinese nuclear and military assistance to Pakistan.
A second important factor influencing the nuclear posture of second-generation
nuclear states arises from patron state pressures. Given strong interests in nuclear non-
proliferation, combined with the power to actually effectuate this policy, the United
States operated as the primary source of this pressure on all three states. This pressure
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was particularly effective as to Israel and Pakistan, given the number of avenues of
influence the U.S. had from economic and conventional assistance.
U.S. patron state pressure on India was more complicated. Prior to the 1974 test,
the U.S. rejected Indian efforts to justify conducting peaceful nuclear explosions, but was
not successful in dissuading them from going forward. This is mainly because a general
lack ofother areas of cooperation, given the low point in relations between the two states.
After the 1974 test, India sought to reengage with the United States in order to gamer
economic and technological benefits, as well as encourage the U.S. to pressure Pakistan
to slow down its program. By the mid-1990s, India was economically growing compared
to Pakistan and had relatively stable relations with the U.S. These factors, combined with
arguably some Clinton administration signals that it was softening its non-proliferation
stance vis-a.-vis India, made it possible for India to both test and then repair relations with
its now longer-term partner.
Third, the non-proliferation regime was effective to the extent that India and
Pakistan calculated the material costs of testing. However, since Israel did not seriously
consider public testing and had previously obtained nuclear assistance prior to most non-
proliferation measures, this factor was missing from the Israeli calculations. Moreover,
there is little evidence across all three cases that any ofthe state seriously recognized or
internalized non-proliferation norms, having not joined the agreements or made other
efforts to support the framework. There is the most evidence in the Indian case, to the
extent that its leaders early on supported non-proliferation and disarmament measures,
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but at the same time, Indian leaders have been among the most vocal critics of the
existing regime.
Fourth, there were few evidentiary similarities among the cases related to
domestic politics factors. That is, there is really no generalizable statement to make
about all three cases, other than domestic politics mattered to a limited extent. The
primary hypothesis for Israel is that its nuclear posture was a result of compromise
among its leaders who feared the economic repercussions of testing. This explanation
fails to fully capture the regional constraints, as well as the full panoply of U.S. non-
proliferation pressures, which certainly included an economic component, but also
conventional military assistance and diplomatic bargaining in the Middle East.
As to Indian and Pakistan, their decision-making models are centralized. In the
Pakistani case, its leaders mainly tracked the preferences of the military, the governing
body for the nuclear weapons program. The Indian case has the most evidentiary support
for some domestic political factors, as for example, the cross-party calls for a more robust
Indian nuclear policy before the 1974 test, or the BJP's promise to induct nuclear
weapons on coming to power in 1998. Still, when these specific instances are analyzed
carefully, while they were contributing factors, they were neither necessary nor sufficient
for explaining Indian nuclear policy.
Fifth, notwithstanding state leaders' individual moral reservations about nuclear
weapons in the cases ofIsrael and India, there is little evidence that this generally
affected nuclear policy. In the case ofIsrael, there is little evidence that moral
reservations ossified the program into one of ambiguity, where there are numerous
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instances of the program dynamically moving forward and being subject to review. In
moral terms, India's leaders were often publicly vocal in their opposition to nuclear
weapons, but simultaneous authorized measures that continued to move both the weapons
and delivery components forward. Additionally, there was no evidence that Pakistani
leaders suffered any doubts about moving forward with a nuclear weapons program. In
short, this particular explanation is neither especially compelling in individual cases, nor
readily generalizable across the three cases.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
Second-generation nuclear states-such as Israel, India, and Pakistan-have
followed a different proliferation pattern than the previous five nuclear states. Instead of
choosing to openly acknowledge and publicly demonstrate their nuclear weapons
capabilities, they have instead adopted ambiguous nuclear postures. In the case of Israel,
this was a carefully worded statement that it would not be the first state to introduce
nuclear weapons into the Middle East. Similarly, for decades after its self-labeled
"peaceful nuclear explosion" in 1974, India maintained that its program was for entirely
peaceful purposes and that it was not developing nuclear weapons. Pakistan also denied
that it was acquiring nuclear weapons, despite mounting evidence to the contrary. India,
followed within a few weeks by Pakistan, shrugged off this pretense in 1998 by both
conducting a series of nuclear tests and simultaneously declaring itself a nuclear weapons
state. These tests came after a period of twenty-four years during which New Delhi
explicitly foreswore nuclear weapons.
This restrained behavior against adopting an overt nuclear posture is particularly
puzzling given the regional security environments in which these states have existed
since their independence. Israel has fought in five wars with its hostile Middle Eastern
neighbors, which fought primarily in coalitions, from its independence through the 1973
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Yom Kippur war. India and Pakistan have engaged in three wars since their
independence, and have had multiple shooting skirmishes and crises over the Kashmir
region. India and China have also engaged in armed conflict over their contested
territorial claims in the Himalayas. In short, these states have existed in severe security
environments.
Based on these realities, the predicates of rational deterrence theory suggest that
second-generation nuclear states should have sought to bolster their deterrence posture by
credibly communicating to their adversaries their nuclear weapons capabilities and
intentions. Yet, they did not do so. As this study has found, this is because second-
generation nuclear states have a host of countervailing factors that they must necessarily
balance in order to best preserve their security options. Nuclear ambiguity has facilitated
balancing these often contradictory demands.
In the main, these previously described security environments have created strong
imperatives for each state to acquire a nuclear capability, notwithstanding the significant
costs and technology barriers for developing states. And the ambiguous nuclear postures
allowed for some deterrence through uncertainty. In particular, once a weapons
capability was achieved, meaning mainly that enemy attacks on their nuclear facilities
were unlikely given the radiation risks, each state's posture left some uncertainty as to
whether it actually possessed nuclear weapons. And, indeed, the ambiguous nuclear
postures went even further by signaling that there was the capability to develop nuclear
weapons, but the intention was lacking. This meant that nuclear postures could quickly
change if needed.
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For example, Israel would never deny that it had a nuclear weapons capability; its
leaders just stated that they would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons. India
signaled that it could develop a bomb capability by testing in 1974, even though it denied
that it intended to. Similarly, in response to continued Pakistani nuclear development
during the 1980s and 1990s, Indian leaders would signal that they had the capability to
construct nuclear weapons, but they were choosing not to. And Pakistan would deny that
it was developing nuclear weapons, but under conditions of extreme threat, such as
during the 1987 Brasstacks Crisis, Islamabad would signal in private undertones to India
and intervening states such as the U.S. that its stance could change. In short, by
emphasizing capabilities over intentions, an ambiguous nuclear posture has a deterrent
component embedded in the stance.
Yet, at the same time, the regional security environment also created incentives
for second-generation nuclear states to maintain an ambiguous posture because of the
differential rates of nuclear development in each region. This dynamic was present early
on in the cases of India and Pakistan. China developed and exploded its first nuclear
device in 1964, which it shortly followed up with a reportedly thermonuclear test a few
years later and relatively advanced delivery systems that could soon reach India. It
would be another ten years from this initial explosion before India could respond with a
test of its own, and many decades before it developed sophisticated enough delivery
platforms to ensure an advanced strike capability.
As a result, Indian incentives were to downplay an interest in nuclear weapons to
avoid competitive policies with its northern neighbor, against whom New Delhi could not
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compete. On the other hand, India was far stronger than Pakistan, in both conventional
and nuclear terms and could have outstripped it. Still, the shadow of China affected this
incentive as well, given Chinese predilections for supplying Islamabad with conventional
and nuclear support. Additionally, New Delhi had economic growth priorities and
wanted to avoid the potential for an- expensive arms race. As such, India sought to keep
the nuclear competition between its much stronger and weaker adversaries balanced.
Pakistani regional calculations were much simpler-avoid provoking India so that
New Delhi would be less inclined to outstrip its much weaker conventional and nuclear
capabilities. It was also this vulnerability that would make Pakistan much more
amenable to U.S. non-proliferation pressures in exchange for conventional weapons
support and economic assistance.
Israel was also affected by the imbalance of nuclear power in the Middle East,
although in a different way as it achieved a nuclear monopoly early on. Eventually the
Israelis began to recognized that they might be able to maintain the monopoly through a
combination of refraining from issuing nuclear threats towards states such as Egypt that
were not seriously pursuing nuclear weapons, as well as the use of force towards
determined proliferators such as Iraq. At the same time, a restrained nuclear posture
reduced incentives for outside intervention, in both conventional and nuclear terms, by
the Soviet Union on behalf of its Arab allies. In short, restraint was a practical response
for maintaining paced development and minimizing reasons for stronger states to
intervene regionally and upset the balance ofpower. This was also important for each
534
state given the priority for maintaining adequate conventional forces vis-a.-vis their
adversaries.
At the same time, patron state pressures, mainly from the United States, played an
important role in instituting and maintaining ambiguous postures. This dynamic mattered
the most initially in the Israeli case. Existing evidence suggests that the U.S. used
economic and conventional military incentives, as well as diplomatic pressure, to
convince the Israelis to adopt a restrained nuclear posture. This exchange was palatable
to Israel's leaders at it guaranteed that Israel would be able to retain a conventional
superiority without having to give up its nuclear arsenal, in the event it was ever needed
in emergency circumstances.
Similarly, U.S. non-proliferation pressures also operated to keep the Pakistani
nuclear capability hidden; otherwise U.S. domestic laws would have mandated sanctions
and a cut off in assistance. The Indians were not immune to U.S. non-proliferation
interests, although they did not have as many ties since they acquired most oftheir
conventional assistance from the Soviets. However, the lure of increased access to trade
and advanced technology during the 1980s and 1990s operated as an incentive to keep the
Indian nuclear program hidden. At the same time, the Indians calculated that they had
established strong enough ties and an economic base to weather the certain sanctions
after the 1998 nuclear tests. And of course, Pakistani security motivations were so strong
to respond to the Indian test that the relatively moderate American offers of renewing
cooperation with Islamabad were ineffective in convincing Pakistan to not test at this
time.
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There were few other states with the same interest in preventing nuclear
proliferation as well as the clout to enforce these interests as the U.S. Not only did this
minimize the importance of other patron states, but it also had implications for the
efficacy of the non-proliferation regime. In particular, all three of these states avoided
treaty commitments that would limit their ability to acquire nuclear weapons. Israel also
escaped most of the material restrictions of the regime because its nuclear program was at
the forefront of these measures. India and Pakistan were impacted more, although this
was limited to slowing down their programs. And the case studies revealed that there
was little evidence supporting the proposition that any of these states internalized or
genuinely supported the non-proliferation regime or norms espoused in the same. Rather,
to the extent that these states proposed non-proliferation measures, they were always
empty proposals, likely knowing that their adversaries would refuse to adopt the stringent
conditions provided for in the propositions.
Given these powerful external incentives, it is not surprising that leaders of
second-generation nuclear states face almost the exact same set of conflicting factors as
their predecessors. The result is remarkably consistent decisions across different
generations of leaders, political parties, and interest groups. As suggested in the
preceding pages, security calculations dominate the domestic political discussion, to the
extent that there is one. Even in the case ofIndia, where the BJP decided to test in 1998,
this was not a foregone conclusion. Rather, it was the result of years of economic and
technological preparations, based on the policies of previous Indian leaders, down to the
testing shafts dug in the couple years preceding the tests. And following the tests, Prime
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Minister Vajpayee set about repairing the rift with Western states so that Indian could
have its nuclear weapons and eat its economic cake too. In short, all leaders of the
second-generation nuclear states faced the same constraints, which narrowed the range of
options available to them in making nuclear decisions. Ambiguity provided a way of
balancing the most security interests, given these constraints.
Similarly, even though some leaders of second-generation nuclear states have
exhibited moral reservations about relying on nuclear weapons for state security, these
have been largely cast aside as each state has marched steadfastly forward to acquiring
advanced nuclear capabilities. That is, there is little evidence that these personal moral
reservations have significantly affected state policy in any meaningful way.
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